People v. Irvin CA5

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Filed 3/5/25 P. v. Irvin CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F086946
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. LF012027A)
v.

LARRY WILLIAM IRVIN, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Judith K.
Dulcich, Judge.
Jan B. Norman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and Galen N. Farris,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Smith, Acting P. J., Snauffer, J. and DeSantos, J.
Defendant and appellant Larry William Irvin (defendant) was convicted by a jury
of corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition, assault by means likely to cause
great bodily injury (GBI), violation of a restraining order, and assault with a deadly
weapon. The jury also found true enhancements for GBI. By virtue of two prior appeals,
defendant has been sentenced on these offenses three times. In his most recent sentence,
defendant was sentenced to a total term of 10 years imprisonment. On appeal, defendant
argues that the trial court’s consideration of an aggravating factor that he did not admit
and that was not found true by a jury resulted in constitutional error that necessitates a
reversal of the sentence. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On July 15, 2018, defendant argued with his ex-girlfriend, R.B. The argument
escalated, and defendant threatened to kill R.B. Defendant then hit, choked, stomped,
and kicked R.B. M.N., a third party, arrived and hit defendant in the face. Defendant
grabbed a sword and chased M.N. The police arrived and defendant fled, but the police
were able to effectuate defendant’s arrest. (People v. Irvin (May 4, 2022, F078625, as
modified May 6, 2022) [nonpub. opn.] (Irvin I).)
On July 31, 2018, the Kern County District Attorney filed an information that
charged defendant with: attempted murder of R.B. (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, subd. (a), 664;
count 1); corporal injury of R.B. resulting in a traumatic condition (§ 273.5, subd. (a);
count 2); assault on R.B. by means likely to produce GBI (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 3);
violation of a restraining order involving R.B. (§ 273.6, subd. (d); count 4); and assault
against M.N. with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 5). In relevant part, the
information also alleged as enhancements to counts 1 through 4 that defendant inflicted
GBI on R.B. (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)).

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

2.
On October 31, 2018, a jury found defendant guilty on counts 2 through 5 and
found true the GBI enhancements. The jury hung on count 1, and the count was
subsequently dismissed on motion by the People. The trial court sentenced defendant to
a total of 11 years as follows: the upper term of five years on count 2, plus the upper
term of five years on the GBI enhancement, and one year (one-third the midterm) on
count 5, to be served consecutively to count 2. The court sentenced defendant to
nine years on count 3 (the upper term of four years, plus the upper term of five years on
the GBI enhancement) and eight years on count 4 (the upper term of three years, plus the
upper term of five years on the GBI enhancement) but stayed the sentences pursuant to
section 654.
In the first appeal, we affirmed defendant’s conviction but reversed his sentence
and remanded for full resentencing. We reversed the sentence so that the trial court could
exercise its discretion in light of Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), which
amended section 654, and Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), which amended
section 1170. (Irvin I, supra, F078625.)
On August 16, 2022, the trial court resentenced defendant to the same sentence
that it had imposed the first time. The court stayed the sentences on counts 3 and 4 under
section 654 and imposed a total term of 11 years on counts 2 and 5 and the GBI
enhancement.
In the second appeal, we again reversed defendant’s sentence. (People v. Irvin
(2023) (July 5, 2023, F084806) [nonpub. opn.] (Irvin II).) Defendant argued that the trial
court erred by imposing the upper term sentences on count 2 and the associated GBI
enhancement because the sentences were not supported by stipulated facts or jury
findings. The court had identified four factors in aggravation to impose the upper term
sentences: (1) numerous past convictions; (2) six prior prison terms; (3) misdemeanor
probation status at the time of the current offenses; and (4) poor prior performance while
on probation. We concluded that because none of these factors were admitted by

3.
defendant or found true by a jury, the court’s reliance on these factors violated amended
section 1170. (Irvin II, supra, F084806.) In determining that reversal and a resentencing
were necessary, we explained in part:

“[T]he trial court did not specify which aggravating circumstances it
was relying on in imposing the upper term for the great bodily injury
enhancement. The People concede that the court improperly relied on
two aggravating circumstances without a required finding or stipulation
when it imposed the upper term on count 2. However, they argue that we
should presume the court was aware of and followed the applicable law
with respect to the great bodily injury enhancement. We decline to make
such a presumption given that the trial court did not make the requisite
findings beyond a reasonable doubt for the appropriate aggravating
circumstances on count 2.

“While exercising its discretion in imposing the upper term on the
enhancement, it is not clear whether the trial court relied solely on the
two circumstances regarding … defendant’s probation status and
performance and/or the two circumstances involving defendant’s prior
convictions. ‘It would be entirely speculative for us to presume, based on a
record that does not directly address the aggravating factors, what a jury
would have found true in connection with these factors.’ [Citation omitted.]
Thus, we are unable to determine whether a jury would have found the
aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court true beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (Irvin II, supra, F084806.)
On September 28, 2023, the trial court held a resentencing hearing. The court
agreed with the People that because defendant’s RAP sheet and 969b packet were
admitted into evidence during trial as People’s exhibits 13 and 14, respectively, it could
consider those documents. The court then identified the three aggravating factors it
would consider in imposing a sentence (numerous prior convictions, prior prison term,
and the status of being on probation at the time of the current convictions) and discussed
its sentencing rationale. Specifically, the court explained:

“And then I think with respect to the factors that the Court can
consider without a jury trial, without an admission, would involve

4.
[California Rules of Court, rule] 4.421(b)(2),[2] [d]efendant’s prior
convictions as an adult … are numerous or of increasing seriousness;
[rule 4.421] (b)(3), … defendant has served a prior term in prison or county
jail under [section] 1170[, subdivision] (h); [rule 4.421] (b)(4), whether he
was on probation, mandatory supervision, post release, or parole .…

“So I do have before me People’s [exhibits] 13 and 14, which does
also support what is in the original probation officer’s report for criminal
history found in pages 3 through 6.

“So with respect to whether his convictions were numerous or of
increasing seriousness, based on People’s [exhibit] 14, that does appear to
be the case, and I will find that is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. [¶]
… [¶]

“So I do think that [rule] 4.421(b)(2) is true beyond a reasonable
doubt. [Rule] 4.421(b)(3) is whether he served a prior prison term, and that
is clear from this RAP sheet as well, and [rule] 4.421(b)(4), he was on
several—he was on several misdemeanor probations at the time of the
current offense. I was just checking the dates on that. So I do find that
one true beyond a reasonable doubt as well. [¶] … [¶]

“But based on those factors alone that I did find true beyond a
reasonable doubt, I do believe the upper term on the [c]ounts 2, 3, 4, and 5
[is] appropriate.

“With respect to the enhancement, on the enhancement, I’m just
going to impose the midterm, and I’m not going to go out on a limb and try
and interpret the law. I think the upper term is sufficient with the respect to
the main charge.”
The trial court then imposed a total term of imprisonment of 10 years as follows:
on count 2, the court sentenced defendant to the upper term of five years, plus the
midterm of four years on the GBI enhancement; and on count 5, one year (one-third the
midterm) to be served consecutively to count 2. The court also sentenced defendant to
eight years on count 3 (the upper term of four years, plus the midterm of four years on the
GBI enhancement) and seven years on count 4 (the upper term of three years, plus the
midterm of four years on the GBI enhancement) but stayed the sentences pursuant to

2 Further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.

5.
section 654. Defendant filed his notice of appeal after the conclusion of the sentencing
hearing.
DISCUSSION
A. Parties’ Arguments
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously relied on the aggravated factor
that the current crimes were committed while he was on probation because he did not
admit this fact and a jury did not find this fact to be true. Defendant argues that in
Irvin II, our court held that reliance on this factor was erroneous and that the error was
not harmless. Defendant argues that since the trial court made the same error, we should
follow the reasoning of Irvin II and remand the case for resentencing.
The People in part concede that the trial court erred by relying on the fact that
defendant was on probation at the time he committed the current offenses. However, the
People argue that, pursuant to People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730 (Lynch), the error
was harmless. The People argue that exhibit 14 shows that defendant was placed on
probation on July 10, 2018, and then committed the current offenses on July 15, 2018.
Through exhibit 14, the People argue that a jury would have found beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant was on probation when he committed the current crimes.
We agree with the People.
B. Legal Standard
Effective January 1, 2022, and pursuant to section 1170, “when a sentencing court
chooses a term from a statutory triad, the chosen term shall not exceed the middle term,
unless the facts supporting the aggravating circumstances are (1) established by the
defendant’s stipulation to them, (2) proven to a jury (or to a court, if jury is waived)
beyond a reasonable doubt, or (3) based on prior convictions evidenced by a certified
record of conviction.” (People v. Jones (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 37, 44; see § 1170,
subd. (b).)

6.
“[U]nder the Sixth Amendment, any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater
potential sentence must be found by a jury, not a judge, and established beyond a
reasonable doubt, not merely by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Cunningham v.
California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 281; Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 742.) The United
States Supreme Court has emphasized that, with the limited exception of the fact of a
prior conviction (and the legal elements to sustain that conviction), “[v]irtually ‘any fact’
that ‘increase[s] the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is
exposed’ must be resolved by a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt (or freely
admitted in a guilty plea).” (Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 834, 839.)
Thus, under the current version of section 1170, “a Sixth Amendment violation occurs
when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term
sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.”
(Lynch, at p. 768; People v. Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312, 332.) The
Sixth Amendment violation is considered prejudicial, and a remand for resentencing will
be required, “unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a
jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to
justify an upper term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in
compliance with current statutory requirements.” (Lynch, at p. 768; Gonzalez, at p. 332.).
In other words, harm is assessed under the Chapman3 standard. (Lynch, at pp. 756, 768;
Gonzalez, at p. 332.)
C. Analysis
The parties agree that the trial court erred by considering defendant’s probation
status as an aggravated factor in determining the sentence. We agree with the parties that
the court erred. The jury was not asked to make any determinations regarding
defendant’s probation status, and defendant did not admit that he was on probation.

3 Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.

7.
Further, section 1170, subdivision (b)(3) permits a court to make determinations from
certified records of conviction about a defendant’s prior convictions, not a defendant’s
probation status. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3); People v. Dunn (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 394, 404–
405, overruled on other grounds by Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 768–769.) Erlinger
also indicates that probation status may not be determined by a court from certified
criminal records. (Erlinger v. United States, supra, 602 U.S. at pp. 834, 839.) Therefore,
the court erred by considering defendant’s probation status in imposing upper term
sentences on counts 2 through 4.
Defendant argues that we should follow Irvin II, supra, F084806 to find the error
harmful. However, we cannot follow Irvin II. First, Irvin II reversed the full sentence
based on harm involving the GBI enhancements. In this appeal, the challenge is to the
sentences on counts 2 through 4, not on the associated GBI enhancements. Second, we
explained in Irvin II that the trial court did not make findings beyond a reasonable doubt
and that we were unable to determine which factors the trial court had considered when it
decided to impose the upper term on the GBI enhancements. Thus, we were unable to
properly assess harm. In contrast, the record in this appeal shows that the court both
expressly identified three aggravating factors to set the upper term sentences on counts 2
through 4 and expressly found that each aggravating factor was applicable beyond a
reasonable doubt. Third, Irvin II relied heavily on Dunn. Lynch rejected Dunn’s
multipart harm analysis and instead adopted the Chapman standard for assessing harm.
(Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 768–769.) We cannot follow this aspect of Dunn any
longer. For these reasons, we will not simply adopt our prior analyses and conclusions
from Irvin II. Instead, we resolve this appeal through application of Lynch.
Reversal of defendant’s sentence is required unless we can determine beyond a
reasonable doubt that a reasonable jury would have found true that defendant was on
probation at the time he committed the current offenses. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 768.) At the urging of the People, the trial court relied on defendant’s certified RAP

8.
sheet to conclude that he was on probation when he attacked R.B. and M.N. As noted
above, the certified RAP sheet was admitted during defendant’s trial as People’s
exhibit 14. The People correctly point out that exhibit 14 shows defendant was convicted
on July 10, 2018, of a misdemeanor violation of Health & Safety Code section 11364
(possession of drug paraphernalia) and sentenced in part to three years of probation.
Exhibit 14 also shows that on June 12, 2017, defendant was sentenced in part to
three years of probation for violation of section 273.6, subdivision (a) (violation of a
protective order). Defendant does not address exhibit 14, or the probationary terms
reflected therein. In the absence of argument from defendant, and on the strength of
exhibit 14, we concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found that
defendant did commit the current offenses while he was on probation.4 (Lynch, at p. 768;
see also rule 4.421(b)(4).) Therefore, the court’s consideration of defendant’s probation
status was harmless. (Lynch, at pp. 768–769.)

4 The People contend that none of the three aggravating factors identified by the
trial court comply with section 1170 and the Sixth Amendment, but that consideration of
the three factors was harmless. We agree that defendant’s certified 969b packet and
certified RAP sheet (exhibits 13 and 14) reflect terms of imprisonment and a significant
number of convictions, and thus, weigh in favor of finding any errors to be harmless.
However, defendant’s opening brief challenged only the trial court’s consideration of
defendant’s probation status, and defendant did not file a reply brief. Therefore, there is
no indication that defendant either agrees with or wishes to pursue the People’s
concession. We are not bound by the People’s concession. (People v. Vivar (2021) 11
Cal.5th 510, 524; Desny v. Wilder (1956) 46 Cal.2d 715, 729; People v. Kimble (2024) 99
Cal.App.5th 746, 749.) In the absence of an actual argument by defendant that adopts the
People’s position, we will confine our analysis to the sole issue actually raised by the
defendant in his appeal: the court’s consideration of defendant’s probation status. We
express no opinion regarding the propriety or harmlessness of the court’s consideration of
any other aggravating factor.

9.
CONCLUSION
This judgment is affirmed.

10.

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