Drost v. Sheridan CA4/1

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Filed 2/28/25 Drost v. Sheridan CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

ISA DROST et al., D084816

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v. (Super. Ct. No. RIC2001107)

SHAMUS SHERIDAN et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEALS from a judgment and postjudgment order of the Superior
Court of Riverside County, Irma Poole Asberry, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Steven B. Stevens and Steven B. Stevens for Plaintiffs
and Appellants; Jeffrey S. Raynes for Plaintiff and Appellant Isa Drost; Law
Offices of Patricia A. Law and Patricia Anne Law for Plaintiff and Appellant
Jeffrey Drost.
Horvitz & Levy, H. Thomas Watson and Eric S. Boorstein; La Follette
Johnson Dehaas Fesler and Ames, Barry A. Vogel and Kristine A. Balogh for
Defendants and Respondents.
In 2018, then 14-year-old Jake Drost—who had a pre-existing heart
condition—died from cardiac arrest after participating in a 100-yard dash for
his school’s Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps program (at times,
JROTC or the program). Before Jake began participating, defendant and
respondent Shamus Sheridan, a licensed chiropractor, screened and cleared
him for the program and its strenuous physical activities. Plaintiffs Isa Drost

and Jeffrey Drost, Jake’s parents,1 sued Sheridan and his medical
corporation, Sheridan Chiropractic, Inc., for negligence and obtained a jury
verdict awarding plaintiffs $7 million in past noneconomic damages and
$22.5 million in future noneconomic damages. On defendants’ post-verdict
request, the trial court reduced the noneconomic damages award to the then

statutory $250,000 cap under Civil Code section 3333.2,2 the Medical Injury
Compensation Reform Act (MICRA), finding Sheridan’s negligent physical
examination of Jake “within the scope of his chiropractic license.” It later
taxed plaintiffs’ expert fees and accrued prejudgment interest sought under
Code of Civil Procedure section 998 and Civil Code section 3291, reasoning
that with the reduced verdict, plaintiffs did not show they obtained a more
favorable result than their $249,999 settlement offers.
Plaintiffs appeal from the trial court’s judgment, contending that as a
matter of statutory interpretation MICRA does not apply because Sheridan
failed to establish he acted within the scope of his chiropractic license when
he evaluated Jake and recommended him for strenuous physical activity.
They ask that if we reverse the judgment, we also reverse the court’s
postjudgment order taxing costs. We affirm the judgment and postjudgment
order.

1 Plaintiffs had divorced and Jeffrey Drost had remarried years before
Jake’s death.

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Jake’s Death and Medical History
In October 2018, Jake suffered cardiac arrest and died after
participating in a 100-yard dash for his high school JROTC. He was 14 years
old. Jake was born with a defective right ventricle in his heart, and had
undergone two prior open heart surgeries: one to replace the defective valve
during the first few months of his life, and another when he was 10 years old
to replace the valve and place a defibrillator to prevent abnormal heart
rhythms. In early 2018, the defibrillator had become detached and stopped
working.
Jake had long been under regular care with a cardiologist but was
otherwise able to engage in normal play and physical activities with the
exception of sports such as football or hockey that might result in a direct hit
to his chest. Jake also took metoprolol, a medication to prevent heart
arrythmia or heart failure.
Jake’s Physical Exam with Sheridan for JROTC
Months earlier in August 2018, Sheridan saw Jake for a screening and
physical examination as part of the process to join the program. Sheridan
conducted Jake’s screening without the presence of Jake’s father, who had

brought him to Sheridan’s office.3 Jake had with him a questionnaire about
medical conditions that he had filled out, which both he and his father had
signed. Thus, when Sheridan conducted his exam, he knew he was screening
Jake for JROTC, that the program involved strenuous activity, that Jake had
some form of congenital heart defect with multiple heart surgeries, that Jake
was taking metoprolol for high blood pressure, that Jake was treating with a

3 Sheridan admitted that his examination of Jake without his parent was
in and of itself below the standard of care for a chiropractor.
3
doctor for his right ventricle, that Jake had an internal defibrillator, and that

the defibrillator was detached.4
Though Sheridan had no training in the heart, after learning these
circumstances, he still believed he had the training to evaluate Jake.
Sheridan listened to Jake’s heart with a stethoscope and checked boxes on
the screening form, but did not make notes about Jake’s condition. Following
the screening, Sheridan was comfortable clearing Jake, approving him as
capable of strenuous activity for participation in JROTC.
Plaintiffs’ Lawsuit and Jury’s Special Verdict
Plaintiffs sued Sheridan, Sheridan Chiropractic, Inc. and others for
wrongful death, alleging Sheridan negligently cleared Jake for participation
in the program, causing Jake’s death from fatal cardiac arrythmia.
Defendants answered the complaint, in part alleging as an affirmative
defense that if found negligent, the damages for noneconomic losses should
not exceed the amount specified in MICRA.
In May 2021, plaintiffs separately served Sheridan with Code of Civil
Procedure section 998 offers to compromise for $249,999.
The matter proceeded to a jury trial, during which the parties
presented expert chiropractors who testified about the scope of chiropractic
care and a chiropractor’s standard of care. All of the experts agreed that the
scope of practice permitted chiropractors to screen children to determine
whether they could participate in athletics, but that in a case of a child with
underlying cardiac conditions like Jake, the standard of care would not
permit the chiropractor from continuing the evaluation or clearing that child

4 At trial, Sheridan testified he did not recall seeing Jake but had
reviewed Jake’s screening form, which was the only medical information he
had about Jake at the time of his evaluation.
4
for strenuous activity. Plaintiffs’ experts testified that in evaluating Jake to
determine whether he could participate in JROTC, Sheridan made a medical
decision or was practicing outside the scope of chiropractic that was also
below the standard of care. In cross-examination, however, one of plaintiffs’
experts agreed that Sheridan did not either treat or diagnose Jake’s cardiac
condition.
Sheridan’s expert testified that Sheridan examined Jake for a
musculoskeletal assessment as to whether he could be cleared to do sports.
He agreed that chiropractors were limited by regulation to treatment and
evaluation of patients within the musculoskeletal system, and were not
authorized to treat or evaluate heart pathology or disease. He agreed that if
a chiropractor found a heart abnormality during a child’s sports physical,
“the further care, treatment or plan on the basis of the heart would have to
be referred out to someone, a medical doctor, such as a cardiologist or even a
family doctor,” but testified that Sheridan, who understood Jake was already
under cardiology care, found no abnormality warranting referral to a
cardiologist. Though Sheridan’s expert agreed a chiropractor was not trained
to assess the effect on the heart of strenuous activity of a minor in Jake’s
circumstances and that to do so would be the practice of medicine, the expert
nevertheless testified that Sheridan was within the chiropractic standard of
care in approving Jake and was not practicing medicine that day.
The jury found by special verdict that Sheridan was negligent in his
evaluation and clearance of Jake for strenuous physical activity, and that the
negligence caused plaintiffs $7 million in past noneconomic damages and
$22.5 million in future noneconomic damages.
Post-trial Briefing

5
After trial, Sheridan filed a brief asking the court to apply MICRA’s cap
on noneconomic damages. In part, he asserted that California’s Board of
Chiropractic Examiners and all of the witnesses in the matter had agreed
that licensed chiropractors are permitted to conduct preparticipation physical
examinations to clear student-athletes for strenuous activities. He argued
that because plaintiffs’ action was based on his athletic clearance decision,
MICRA applied even if his decision was wrong or violated professional
standards; that the “action arose out of the ‘general range of activities’
encompassed by his license” under Lopez v. Ledesma (2022) 12 Cal.5th 848,
857 (Lopez). Sheridan asked the court to take judicial notice of federal
Department of Transportation forms—a medical examination form and a
medical examiner’s certificate for commercial driver medical certifications—
as well as a November 2014 letter from the Board of Chiropractic Examiners

and an accompanying preparticipation physical evaluation form.5
Plaintiffs separately opposed the request. Isa Drost argued Sheridan’s
act of evaluating and recommending Jake for strenuous JROTC—knowing
Jake’s cardiac history—constituted the illegal practice of medicine,
specifically pediatric cardiology. She maintained the expert testimony
uniformly established that Sheridan made a medical decision beyond the
scope of his chiropractic license when he evaluated Jake based on the
information about his cardiac condition provided in the screening
questionnaire. Jeffrey Drost argued Sheridan Chiropractic, Inc. had not met
its burden of proving MICRA applied because it had admitted in discovery
that it was not licensed. He also argued the trial evidence showed Sheridan’s

5 In its ruling, the trial court did not reference defendants’ request for
judicial notice. Defendants renew the request in this court, which we address
below.
6
negligent actions were outside the scope of Sheridan’s license: “Diagnosing a
heart condition and opining on whether that heart condition makes it
unreasonably risky for a person to participate in strenuous activities is far
outside the scope of a chiropractor’s license.” Jeffrey Drost characterized
Sheridan’s action as “accepting the assignment to evaluate a heart patient
and providing a medical diagnosis that Jake’s heart condition and high blood
pressure did not preclude participation in the strenuous activities of the
[JROTC] program.” Jeffrey Drost distinguished Lopez, supra, 12 Cal.5th 848
but argued it supported plaintiffs’ position, as Sheridan’s license precluded
him from practicing medicine.
Observing MICRA applied to chiropractors and also to any employing
entity held vicariously liable for the professional negligence of its agents, the
trial court granted the motion. It ruled Sheridan’s “performance of the
preparticipation physical exam on Jake Drost was within the scope of his
chiropractic license.” Citing Lopez’s statement that the “ ‘scope of services for
which the provider is licensed’ ” is “naturally understood as the general range
of activities encompassed by the provider’s license” (Lopez, supra, 12 Cal.5th
at p. 857), the court found Sheridan performed a physical but did not provide
Jake with any treatment, perform surgery, administer medications, or
prescribe any treatment of any ailment or condition. It stated: “Every expert
witness at trial agreed that chiropractors can conduct preparticipation
physical examinations to clear or reject student athletes for strenuous
physical activity. . . . There is no dispute this is the kind of exam Dr.
Sheridan conducted with Jake. [¶] Plaintiffs argue, though, that Dr.
Sheridan exceeded the scope of his license as a chiropractor when he cleared
Jake to participate in [JROTC]. [One of plaintiffs’ experts] testified that Dr.
Sheridan had ‘two options.’ The first was to ‘fail’ Jake and the second was to

7
refer Jake because Sheridan could not clear Jake given his heart issue. . . .
However, there was a third option and this is the option Dr. Sheridan took,
he cleared Jake to participate in [JROTC]. Dr. Sheridan committed
professional negligence in clearing Jake. Chiropractors are permitted by
their license to perform physical exams. Dr. Sheridan’s negligence occurred
within the scope of his chiropractic license, thus MICRA applies.”
Plaintiffs filed a joint notice of appeal from the judgment. Thereafter,
on Sheridan’s motion, the court taxed certain of plaintiffs’ costs ($18,695.45
in deposition costs, $45,877.94 in witness fees, and $4,378 in court reporter
fees) as well as $46,984.14 in prejudgment interest, on the grounds plaintiffs
had not shown they obtained a more favorable judgment than their Code of
Civil Procedure section 998 offers. Plaintiffs separately appealed from that
postjudgment order.
DISCUSSION
I. Application of MICRA
A. The MICRA Law
“The Legislature enacted MICRA in 1975 . . . to address a statewide
‘crisis regarding the availability of medical malpractice insurance.’ ” (Lopez,
supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 855; see also id. at p. 859.) The statute “ ‘includes a
variety of provisions all of which are calculated to reduce the cost of insurance
by limiting the amount and timing of recovery in cases of professional
negligence.’ ” (Id. at p. 856, quoting Western Steamship Lines, Inc. v. San
Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1994) 8 Cal.4th 100, 111.) “MICRA provisions
should be construed liberally in order to promote the legislative interest . . .
to reduce [malpractice insurance] premiums.’ ” (Lopez, at p. 859.)
The MICRA provision relevant at the time of the court’s order imposed
a $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages “[i]n any action for injury against a

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health care provider based on professional negligence[.]” (Former § 3333.2,

subds. (a), (b).)6 This “ ‘key component’ ” (Lopez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 859)
of MICRA “was designed ‘to control and reduce medical malpractice
insurance costs by placing a predictable, uniform limit on the defendant’s
liability for noneconomic damages.’ ” (Ibid.)
MICRA defines professional negligence as “a negligent act or omission
to act by a health care provider in the rendering of professional services,
which act or omission is the proximate cause of a personal injury or wrongful
death, provided that such services are within the scope of services for which
the provider is licensed and which are not within any restriction imposed by
the licensing agency or licensed hospital.” (Former § 3333.2, subd. (c)(2),
italics added; see Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 320.)
In Lopez, the court explained that “[t]he language ‘scope of services for which
the provider is licensed’ ” within the meaning of section 3333.2, subdivision
(c)(2) “is naturally understood as the general range of activities encompassed
by the provider’s license. A psychiatrist, for instance, is licensed to provide
psychiatric treatment. Thus, a psychiatrist’s conduct arising out of the
course of psychiatric treatment falls within the scope of services for which the
psychiatrist is licensed. [Citation.] By contrast, a ‘psychologist perform[ing]
heart surgery’ does not provide services within the scope of his or her

6 The Legislature effective January 1, 2023, amended the provision by
Assembly Bill No. 35 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.). Section 3333.2 presently states
that civil liability for noneconomic damages against health care providers in
professional negligence actions filed on or after January 1, 2023, and not
involving wrongful death, shall not exceed $350,000. (§ 3333.2, subd. (b).) In
actions involving wrongful death, noneconomic damages shall not exceed
$500,000. (§ 3333.2, subd. (c).) In addition, the respective dollar amounts are
to increase by set amounts through January 1, 2033, and thereafter shall be
adjusted for inflation each year, by 2 percent. (§ 3333.2, subds. (g) & (h).)
9
license.” (Lopez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 857-858, citing Waters v. Bourhis
(1985) 40 Cal.3d 424, 436.)
Lopez involved physician assistants, whose governing statute, the
Physician Assistant Practice Act, “only authorized [them] to perform services
‘when the services are rendered under the supervision of a licensed physician
and surgeon . . . .’ ” (Lopez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 858.) The question before
the California Supreme Court was whether section 3333.2’s cap applied to
actions against physician assistants where a licensed physician has legal
responsibility for supervising them but provides minimal or no actual
supervision. (Lopez, at p. 857.) The physician assistants there had
misdiagnosed a lesion without the supervision of the doctor who owned the
dermatology clinic. (Id. at pp. 854-855.) As a matter of statutory
interpretation of both MICRA and the Physician Assistant Practice Act as
well as regulations promulgated by the Physician Assistant Board (id. at pp.
857-858), the court held “a physician assistant practices within the scope of
his or her license for purposes of MICRA’s cap on noneconomic damages when
the physician assistant acts as the agent of a licensed physician, performs the
type of services authorized by that agency relationship, and does not engage
in an area of practice prohibited by the [Physician Assistant Practice Act].”

(Id. at pp. 861-862.)7 The court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that the

7 The governing statute in Lopez authorized a physician assistant “to
perform services ‘when the services are rendered under the supervision of a
licensed physician and surgeon,’ ” and thus the question boiled down to “what
it means for a physician assistant to be ‘under the supervision’ of a licensed
physician.” (Lopez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 858.) The governing statute also
specified particular areas of practice, such as dentistry, that physician
assistants were not permitted to perform even under supervision. (Ibid.) But
the facts in Lopez did not raise questions about such prohibited areas of
practice, as they do here with respect to the practice of medicine.
10
physician’s supervision had to be adequate, and absent that, the physician
assistants acted outside the scope of their license. (Id. at pp. 858-860.)
The Lopez court also turned to the question of whether the
circumstances fell within an exemption for services “within any restriction
imposed by the licensing agency or licensed hospital.” (Lopez, supra, 12
Cal.5th at p. 862.) In doing so, the court emphasized it had previously held
that proviso was not intended to exclude an action from MICRA because a
health care provider acted contrary to professional standards or engaged in
unprofessional conduct; “ ‘[i]nstead, it was simply intended to render MICRA
inapplicable when a provider operates in a capacity for which he is not
licensed—for example, when a psychologist performs heart surgery.’ ” (Ibid.,
quoting Waters v. Bourhis, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 436.) According to Lopez,
“ ‘the “restriction” mentioned in this clause must be a limitation on the scope
of a provider’s practice beyond simply the obligation to adhere to standards of
professional conduct.’ ” (Id. at p. 863.) Thus, a physician assistant would not
render services “ ‘within [a] restriction imposed by the licensing agency’ ”
under section 3333.2, subdivision (c)(2) by failing to comply with supervisory
regulations such as requiring a physician to be available in person or by
electronic communication at all times when the physician assistant is caring
for patients. (Id. at pp. 862-863, citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 16, § 1399.545,
subd. (a).) Those kinds of supervisory regulations “are not restrictions
imposed by a physician assistant’s licensing agency.” (Id. at p. 863.)
Under Lopez, whether MICRA’s cap on noneconomic damages applies
to an action raising questions about the “scope of services for which the
provider is licensed” or within a licensing agency restriction (§ 3333.2, subd.
(c)(2)) is a matter of statutory interpretation we assess de novo. (Lopez,
supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 857.) “[O]ur role is confined to interpreting the

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[governing] statute[s] in the manner that comports most closely with the
Legislature’s purpose in enacting MICRA” (id. at p. 861) which is in part to
“ ‘ensure[ ] predictability in damage awards.’ ” (Ibid.)
B. Scope of Chiropractic Licenses and the Practice of Medicine
Based on the above summarized principles, our inquiry for purposes of
applying MICRA is whether plaintiffs’ action was based on Sheridan’s
“professional negligence,” that is, whether Sheridan acted “within the scope
of services for which [he] is licensed and . . . not within any restriction
imposed by the licensing agency . . . .” (§ 3333.2, subd. (c)(2); Lopez, supra, 12
Cal.5th at p. 856.) To decide this question of law (id. at p. 857), we examine
the statutes and regulations governing the question, including the
Chiropractic Initiative Act of 1922 (the Chiropractic Act or the Act),
published for reference at sections 1000-1 to 1000-20 of the Business and
Professions Code.
1. Chiropractic Act and Regulations
Section 7 of the Chiropractic Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 1000-7) is the
only provision that defines chiropractic or declares what is authorized by a
license issued under the Act. (Tain v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners
(2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 609, 618, 624 (Tain); Ammon v. Superior Court (1988)
205 Cal.App.3d 783, 792-793; Crees v. California State Bd. of Medical
Examiners (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 195, 204 (Crees); People v. Fowler (1938) 32
Cal.App.2d Supp. 737, 745 (Fowler); 59 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 420, 423 (1976)
[section 7 is the “only section of the [Chiropractic Act] which defines the
practice of chiropractic”].) “Section 7 [of the Chiropractic Act] provides that a
chiropractic license ‘shall authorize the holder thereof to practice chiropractic
in the State of California as taught in chiropractic schools or colleges; and,
also, to use all necessary mechanical, and hygienic and sanitary measures

12
incident to the care of the body, but shall not authorize the practice of
medicine, surgery, osteopathy, dentistry or optometry, nor the use of any
drug or medicine now or hereafter included in materia medica.’ ” (Tain, at p.
618.) The authorization to practice chiropractic “as taught in chiropractic
schools or colleges,” however, “cannot be enlarged by any changes of the
curricula of those schools. Consequently, chiropractors are confined to the
established measures of adjusting the joints by hand, and to incidental
mechanical and hygienic measures that do not invade the field of medicine
and surgery.” (Id. at pp. 624-625; see Crees, supra, 213 Cal.App.2d at p. 204
[“ ‘[t]he effect of the words “as taught in chiropractic schools or colleges” is not
to set at large the signification of “chiropractic,” leaving the schools and
colleges to fix upon it any meaning they choose’ ”], quoting Fowler at p. 745;
see also People v. Mangiagli (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d Supp. 935, 939
(Mangiagli); In re Hartman (1935) 10 Cal.App.2d 213, 217.)
The Board of Chiropractic Examiners (the Board), created by the Act, is
authorized to adopt implementing regulations. (Tain, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th
at p. 618; Oranen v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners (1999) 77
Cal.App.4th 258, 371; People v. Schuster (1932) 122 Cal.App.Supp. 790, 792.)
In 1954, it promulgated title 16, section 302 of the California Code of
Regulations (at times, regulation 302). (Crees, supra, 213 Cal.App.2d at p.
209.) Regulation 302 “allows ‘duly licensed chiropractor[s]’ to ‘manipulate
and adjust the spinal column and other joints of the human body and in the
process thereof . . . may manipulate the muscle and connective tissue related
thereto.’ ” (Tain, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 618, quoting Cal. Code Regs.,
tit. 16, § 302, subd. (a)(1).) The regulation further provides that “a duly
licensed chiropractor may treat any condition, disease, or injury in any
patient . . . and may diagnose, so long as such treatment or diagnosis is done

13
in a manner consistent with chiropractic methods and techniques and so long
as such methods and treatment do not constitute the practice of medicine by
exceeding the legal scope of chiropractic practice as set forth in this section.”

(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 16, § 302, subd. (a)(3), italics added.)8
Regulations additionally list a range of unprofessional conduct for
licensed chiropractors. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 16, § 317.) Relevant here, unless
a patient states he or she is already under the care of an appropriate
physician, a licensed chiropractor engages in unprofessional conduct by
failing to refer a patient to such a physician when the licensed chiropractor
“detects an abnormality that indicates that the patient has a physical . . .
condition [or] disease . . . that is not subject to appropriate management by

8 Regulation 302 was most recently upheld in Tain, supra, 130
Cal.App.4th 609 against a challenge that it impermissibly narrowed the
Chiropractic Act. (Id. at p. 614.) In resolving the question, the Court of
Appeal undertook to consider the Chiropractic Act and its scope, finding the
permissible limits of chiropractic practice were described in Fowler, supra, 32
Cal.App.2d Supp. 737 and Crees, supra, 213 Cal.App.2d 195. (Tain, at pp.
619-620.) “The holding of both [Fowler and Crees] is that section 7 of the
Chiropractic Act limited authorized chiropractic healing practices to those
taught in chiropractic schools at the time of the enactment of the initiative
measure (1922), and that authorization cannot be enlarged by any changes of
the curricula of those schools. Consequently chiropractors are confined to the
established measures of adjusting the joints by hand, and to the incidental
mechanical and hygienic measures that do not invade the field of medicine
and surgery.” (Tain, at pp. 624-625.) The appellate court found nothing in
the record indicating the scope of regulation 302 did not reflect the mandate
of section 7 of the Chiropractic Act. (Id. at p. 625.) Tain further rejected an
argument that 1978 amendments to the Chiropractic Act mandating elective
courses expanded the scope of practice, explaining that those amendments
pertained to a different section and did not change the wording of section 7,
the sole provision in the Act dealing with the scope of practice. (Id. at pp.
627-628.)
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chiropractic methods and techniques.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 16, § 317, subd.
(w).)
These regulations may not alter or enlarge the terms of the enabling
statute. (See In re Gadlin (2020) 10 Cal.5th 915, 926 [“ ‘ “Administrative
regulations that alter or amend the statute or enlarge or impair its scope are
void and courts not only may, but it is their obligation to strike down such
regulations” ’ ”]; Tain, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 618 [“To be valid, an
administrative regulation must be consistent with the legislation it is
designed to implement”]; Crees, supra, 213 Cal.App.2d at p. 210; Mangiagli,
supra, 97 Cal.App.2d Supp. at p. 943.) Given this principle, “ ‘questions of
the extent and scope of chiropractic’ ” need not be referred to the Board of
Chiropractic Examiners before a court decides such a question. (Crees, at p.
210 [rejecting amicus curie argument that such questions about the scope of
chiropractic practice “should have been referred to the Chiropractic Board for
its consideration and recommendation to the court before it took final
action”].)
While a chiropractic license does not authorize the practice of medicine
or the use of any drug or medicine, “the practice of chiropractic includes
diagnosis . . . if for no other reason but that in many instances it is necessary
for a chiropractor to determine that a patient’s . . . ailment is outside the
permissible scope of his own practice.” (59 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. at p. 423,
supra; see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 16, § 302, subd. (a)(3); Ammon v. Superior
Court, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at pp. 792-793.) This conclusion arises from a
1976 opinion of the Attorney General as to what “arts” a chiropractor may
practice under his or her license. (59 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. at p. 420, supra.)
The Attorney General stated that with regard to the “specialized fields” of
“diagnosis” and other areas such as anatomy, physiology and chemistry, a

15
chiropractor may use “concepts contained in these ‘arts’ . . . in a limited and
circumscribed manner so long as said use does not exceed the limits of the
practice of chiropractic.” (Id. at p. 423.) The Attorney General found it
“clear,” however, that “the ‘art’ and practice necessarily involved” in some
“specialized medical fields” including “cardiology [and] pediatrics . . . are
outside the scope of the practice of chiropractic, and may not be practiced.”
. . . [T]hese terms are so identified with medical specialties of physicians
and surgeons, that a court would take judicial notice of such a fact . . . [as] . . .
‘not reasonably subject to dispute and . . . capable of immediate and accurate
determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.’ ” (Id.
at p. 422.) Attorney General opinions are entitled to “ ‘considerable weight.’ ”
(Ruelas v. County of Alameda (2024) 15 Cal.5th 968, 974; People ex rel.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Discovery Radiology Physicians, P.C. (2023) 94
Cal.App.5th 521, 538, fn. 7.)
2. The Practice of Medicine and Relation to the Chiropractic Act
“The Medical Practice Act . . . and related provisions regulate the
practice of medicine in California. Among other things, the Medical Practice
Act prohibits unlicensed persons from practicing, advertising, or holding
themselves out as practicing ‘any system or mode of treating the sick or
afflicted’ or ‘diagnos[ing], treat[ing], operat[ing] for, or prescrib[ing] for any
ailment, blemish, deformity, disease, disfigurement, disorder, injury, or other
physical or mental condition of any person.’ ” (People ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Discovery Radiology Physicians, P.C., supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 533,

quoting Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2052, subd. (a).)9

9 Business and Professions Code section 2141 makes it a misdemeanor
for an unlicensed person to engage in such practices. (See People v. Augusto
(1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 253, 256; People v. Machado (1929) 99 Cal.App. 702,
706.)
16
The Medical Practice Act specifically defines what it means to diagnose:
“Whenever the words ‘diagnose’ or ‘diagnosis’ are used in this chapter, they
include any undertaking by any method, device, or procedure whatsoever,
and whether gratuitous or not, to ascertain or establish whether a person is
suffering from any physical or mental disorder.” (Bus. & Prof. Code § 2038,
italics added.) “When a statute provides a specific definition of a term, the
term ‘must be understood as it is defined, not in its colloquial sense.’ ” (Little
v. Commission on Teacher Credentialing (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 322, 336,
quoting People v. Gonzales (2017) 2 Cal.5th 858, 871, fn. 12 [explaining that
such definitions create “ ‘terms of art’ ” or “ ‘words having specific, precise
meaning in a given specialty’ ”].)
“[T]he passage of the Chiropractic Act did not effect a repeal or
amendment of any portion of the 1913 Medical Practices Act” but “provided a
complete defense to an action brought for violating [that act], to the extent
one was practicing chiropractic as authorized by the Chiropractic Act.” (Tain,
supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 617.) The “only effect of the enactment of the
Chiropractic Act on the Medical Practice Act was to create a limited exception
to the prohibition against practicing a healing art without a license from the
Board of Medical Examiners; that a holder of a license to practice chiropractic
may practice chiropractic (not medicine or surgery); and that is the limit of
the exception.” (Crees, supra, 213 Cal.App.2d at p. 209.)
C. Contentions
Asserting that the application of MICRA is an affirmative defense that
was Sheridan’s burden to prove, plaintiffs contend Sheridan did not meet
that burden. Importantly, they do not dispute that a chiropractor’s license
authorizes preparticipation physical examinations or screenings for school
sports or federally regulated activities. Rather, plaintiffs maintain Sheridan

17
practiced medicine—specifically pediatric cardiology—when, at the moment
he learned of Jake’s multiple cardiac problems, he continued his evaluation

then cleared and recommended Jake for strenuous JROTC.10 According to
plaintiffs, Sheridan “made a medical evaluation and medical recommendation
about Jake’s cardiac condition” when he “determined that Jake’s heart was fit
for strenuous activities—despite being unprotected by a defibrillator.” They
maintain this “was not the practice of chiropractic; that was the practice of
cardiology.”
In making these arguments, plaintiffs point in part to the experts’ trial
testimony, as well as that of Sheridan’s brother/business partner, about the
practice of medicine, saying it contradicted any claim Sheridan acted within
the scope of his license. Plaintiffs discuss authorities involving chiropractors

10 In their reply brief, plaintiffs argue the jury’s negligence finding
constitutes a finding that Sheridan acted outside the scope of his license for
purposes of applying MICRA. In response, defendants move to augment the
record on appeal with the jury instructions and verdict form, which
assertedly show the jury was not instructed on how to assess whether
Sheridan acted outside the scope of his license. They argue plaintiffs
forfeited this argument by raising it too late and not presenting an adequate
record, but in the event we do not find a forfeiture, we should augment the
record as requested. We agree plaintiffs forfeited the argument by failing to
make it in their opening appellate brief. (Raceway Ford Cases (2016) 2
Cal.5th 161, 178 [reviewing courts “generally do not consider arguments
raised for the first time in a reply brief”]; Burton v. Campbell (2024) 106
Cal.App.5th 953, 970.) Accordingly, we deny defendants’ motion.
18
prosecuted under the Medical Practice Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2141)11—as
well as Fowler, supra, 32 Cal.App.2d Supp 737, Crees, supra, 213 Cal.App.2d
195 and Tain, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th 609, on the scope of chiropractic
practice. Plaintiffs argue Lopez, supra, 12 Cal.5th 848, relied upon by the
trial court, is factually inapposite. They also say Lopez actually undermines
Sheridan’s position that his examination was “within ‘the range of activities
encompassed by [Sheridan’s] license.’ ” The latter argument to us appears
circular: plaintiffs seem to take that position based on the fact Lopez
“reinforced the plain language of [s]ection 3333.2(c)(2), which renders the
limits on damages recovery (and the rest of MICRA) ‘inapplicable when a
provider operates in a capacity for which he is not licensed.’ ”
Characterizing MICRA as a “limitation of damages” rather than an
affirmative defense, defendants respond that to decide whether MICRA
applies to particular conduct, a court must “determine whether the alleged
negligence arose out of the ‘general range of activities’ . . . or ‘course of . . .
treatment’ . . . encompassed by the license, even if the law or professional
standards prohibit the particular action that resulted in liability.” According
to them, MICRA applies to this action because Sheridan’s decision to examine
and clear Jake for strenuous physical activities—even if wrong—arose out of
the “general range of activities” encompassed in preparticipation physical

11 These authorities involve chiropractors whose conduct invaded the field
of medicine under more straightforward circumstances. (People v. Machado,
supra, 99 Cal.App. at p. 704 [chiropractor diagnosed three-year-old child with
pneumonia then prescribed medicines for the condition]; In re Hartman,
supra, 10 Cal.App.2d at p. 215 [treating cancer by injecting an antitoxin],
People v. Fowler, supra, 32 Cal.App.2d Supp. 737 [removing a fetus from a
woman’s womb, according to Tain, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 620, fn. 7];
Mangiagli, supra, 97 Cal.App.2d Supp. 935, 937 [administering blood plasma
and hypodermic injection of liver extract to treat what the chiropractor
concluded was shock due to uterine hemorrhage].)
19
examinations authorized by his license. Defendants argue, citing Ammon v.
Superior Court, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d 783 and pointing to courses taught in
chiropractic schools, that while chiropractors are not licensed physicians,
“there is a partial ‘overlap between the practice authorized by a physician’s
and surgeon’s certificate and by a license to practice chiropractic,’ ” which
permits chiropractors to make general diagnostic decisions so as to refer
patients for appropriate treatment. According to defendants, given that
asserted overlap, the statutes pertaining to the scope of medical practice do
not determine whether MICRA applies since chiropractic regulations allow a
chiropractor to diagnose in a manner consistent with chiropractic methods,
which include relying on a patient’s self-reported course of treatment with
physicians when deciding whether to refer the patient to a medical doctor.
D. Analysis
We emphasize what is not before us. As indicated above, plaintiffs
concede that preparticipation screening evaluations for student athletics are
within the scope of chiropractic practice. Thus, we have no occasion to decide
that point. (Accord, In re Mohammad (2022) 12 Cal.5th 518, 542 [conc. opn.

20
of Liu, J.].)12 We assume without deciding that the examination itself was
within the scope of services for which Sheridan was licensed. (§ 3333.2, subd.
(c)(2).) Likewise, we need not decide the dispute over whether MICRA is an
affirmative defense (see Pressler v. Irvine Drugs, Inc. (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d
1244, 1248 [referring to section 3333.2 as an affirmative defense without
analysis]) or a damages limitation (Taylor v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1987) 821 F.2d
1428, 1433 [§ 3333.2 is a limitation of liability rather than an affirmative
defense]), as Sheridan pleaded it as an affirmative defense.
The issue is more narrowly whether Sheridan’s decision to clear Jake
for JROTC after having learned of his abnormal cardiac condition and
nonworking defibrillator fell “within any restriction imposed by the [Board of
Chiropractic Examiners]” (Lopez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 863) so as to exempt
him from MICRA. Contrary to defendants’ argument that the Medical

12 The concession eliminates our need to consider defendants’ arguments
that preparticipation physical examinations are within the scope of the
chiropractic license. As part of this argument, defendants renew their
request that we take judicial notice of federal Department of Transportation
forms that assertedly “illustrate the type of medical information
chiropractors are legally authorized and expected to collect and evaluate” and
“are relevant to this court’s determination regarding the scope of a
chiropractic license.” Defendants argue the Chiropractic Board’s letter and
form “show the types of physical examinations and considerations that, in the
Board’s opinion, are within the scope of chiropractic practice.” We question
the relevance of a letter opinion of the Chiropractic Board on the scope of a
chiropractor’s license, particularly when the letter in part relies upon specific
courses taught in chiropractic schools. (Tain, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp.
624-625; Crees, supra, 213 Cal.App.2d at p. 210.) There is no need to decide
the point, as we deny the request as unnecessary to resolve this appeal.
(County of San Diego v. State of California (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 580, 613,
fn. 29.)
21
Practice Act is not dispositive,13 we conclude that under the law, regulations
and authorities above, the answer in fact turns on whether that clearing
decision constitutes the practice of medicine, which both section 7 of the
Chiropractic Act and regulation 302, subdivision (a)(3), specifically restrict
from the scope of chiropractic practice. If so, plaintiffs’ action is not one for
professional negligence to which MICRA applies.
We hold Sheridan’s clearance decision was not the practice of medicine.
Given the narrow set of undisputed facts as to how Sheridan conducted his
evaluation, the legal question (Lopez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 857) is
straightforward. It is governed only by the statutes themselves and
consistent regulations, as well as the Attorney General’s interpretation, not
by the trial expert testimony on the issue of chiropractic standard of care or
the practice of medicine. We need not consider the trial court’s reasoning on
this question of law. (Willis v. City of Carlsbad (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1104,
1128.) In evaluating and clearing Jake, Sheridan did not “diagnose . . . any

13 Defendants rely on Ammon v. Superior Court, supra, 205 Cal.App.2d
783. But in Ammon, the court was deciding not MICRA issues, but whether a
provision of the Code of Civil Procedure requiring an attorney certificate of
merit in a malpractice action must reflect that counsel had consulted with a
professional licensed in the same discipline as the defendant. (Id. at pp. 786-
787.) The Court of Appeal observed that chiropractors were authorized to use
“the concepts of . . . diagnosis” and other fields in a “limited and
circumscribed manner” and from that concluded there was a “limited overlap
between the practice authorized by a physician’s and surgeon’s certificate and
by a license to practice chiropractic.” (Id. at p. 793.) Thus, the court
concluded the “holder of a physician’s and surgeon’s certificate, if possessing
the necessary expertise in the particular subject at issue, may be permitted to
testify in a case—such as the present one—involving the professional conduct
of a chiropractor.” (Ibid.) Ammon is not controlling on the MICRA issue
presented here or whether plaintiffs’ action was based on Sheridan’s practice
of medicine outside the scope of his license.
22
. . . physical . . . condition,” meaning he did not “ascertain or establish
whether [Jake was] suffering from any physical . . . disorder.” (Bus. & Prof.
Code, §§ 2038, 2052.) Rather, having received Jake’s screening
questionnaire, Sheridan conducted his evaluation already knowing of Jake’s
abnormal cardiac history. He did not medically diagnose Jake’s condition,
which was already disclosed to him. Because Sheridan’s clearance decision
did not involve a diagnosis within the meaning of the Medical Practice Act, it
was not conduct excepted from MICRA’s definition of professional negligence
as “within any restriction imposed by the licensing agency . . . .” (Former
§ 3333.2, subd. (c)(2).)
Plaintiffs’ cited authorities do not persuade us to reach a different
conclusion. They particularly rely on Mangiagli, in which the defendant,
prosecuted for violating the Medical Practice Act, claimed he had acted upon
an emergency, bringing him within an exception for “service in case of
emergency.” (Mangiagli, 97 Cal.App.2d at p. 941, citing Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 2144.) In affirming the judgment as supported by substantial evidence, the
court observed the jury had rejected that argument based on the fact the
defendant had been called the day before he visited the patient, spent time
packing gauze and waiting for blood plasma, and testified he did not call a
medical doctor not because of an emergency or lack of time, but because he
felt he was “ ‘capable enough to take care of her.’ ” (Mangiagli, 97 Cal.App.2d
at p. 942.) Plaintiffs compare these circumstances to Mangiagli, pointing to
evidence that Sheridan also knew of Jake’s abnormal health conditions after
reviewing Jake’s forms, had time to call a physician or refer Jake to his
cardiologist, and believed he was capable of evaluating Jake. The comparison
is misplaced given the disparate facts and different standard of review
applied there on the emergency exception, a different inquiry. Here, the

23
question of MICRA application is one of law on a narrow set of undisputed
facts.
It is evident that during the course of an evaluation, a chiropractor may
diagnose conditions to determine if they are outside the scope of chiropractic
practice (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 16, § 302, subd. (a)(3); 59 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. at
p. 423, supra) and not “subject to appropriate management by chiropractic
methods and techniques.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 16, § 317, subd. (w).) This
type of diagnosis—as used in the colloquial sense—“do[es] not fall exclusively
within the purview of the practice of medicine.” (59 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. at p.
423, supra.) If a chiropractic practitioner identifies such a condition, disease
or injury in a patient who has not disclosed they are already under
appropriate care, but fails to “refer the patient to a physician . . . or other
licensed heath care provider who can provide the appropriate management
. . . within his or her scope of practice” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 16, § 317, subd.
(w)), then that chiropractor has engaged in unprofessional conduct. But that
by itself does not qualify for a MICRA exception. (Lopez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at
pp. 863-864; Waters v. Bourhis, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 436 [exempting acts
from MICRA as within licensing restrictions “obviously was not intended to
exclude an action from . . . MICRA . . . simply because a health care provider
acts contrary to professional standards or engages in one of the many
specified instances of ‘unprofessional conduct’ ”].) As Lopez held, “a
‘restriction imposed by the licensing agency’ . . . ‘must be a limitation on the
scope of a provider’s practice beyond simply the obligation to adhere to
standards of professional conduct.’ ” (Lopez, at p. 863.) To the extent
plaintiffs’ action was based on Sheridan’s failure to refer Jake to his treating
cardiologist or other appropriate physician to make the clearance decision, it
does not take the action outside MICRA.

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II. Order Taxing Costs
Plaintiffs ask us to reverse the trial court’s order taxing their costs.
Their sole point is that if we reverse the court’s decision to apply MICRA,
they will have obtained a more favorable judgment with respect to their Code
of Civil Procedure section 998 offers. Because we affirm the court’s
application of MICRA, we do not disturb the order taxing costs.
DISPOSITION
The judgment and postjudgment order are affirmed. Defendants
Shamus Sheridan and Sheridan Chiropractic, Inc. shall recover costs on
appeal.

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, J.

RUBIN, J.

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