People v. Melara CA2/4

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Filed 2/26/25 P. v. Melara CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B334089

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA069237)
v.

ERICK A. MELARA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Laura R. Walton, Judge. Affirmed.
Steven A. Brody, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
In 2004, Erick Melara and a codefendant were convicted of
two counts of premeditated first degree murder and one count of
attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder. In 2022,
Melara filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section
1172.6.1 The trial court denied the petition at the prima facie
stage, finding that Melara was ineligible for relief as a matter of
law because he was not convicted on any theory of murder or
attempted murder that is no longer valid. We agree and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Conviction
In 2004, Melara was tried with codefendant Rafael
Ferguson. The following facts are taken from the nonpublished
appellate opinion affirming their convictions, People v. Melara
(Jan. 24, 2006, B175116).
“Both defendants were members of the Compton
Varrio 155 gang (CV 155). Defendants committed the
charged murder and attempted murder to avenge the
shooting of two men, including defendant Melara’s brother,
which had occurred in the CV 155’s neighborhood.
During the morning of March 21, 2003, defendant
Ferguson drove to the home of Gustavo Gonzalez, a fellow
CV 155 member. In Gonzalez’s white car, the two went to a
trailer park. There, Gonzalez retrieved an assault rifle,
which he gave to defendant Ferguson. The two men then
picked up defendant Melara and drove to defendant
Ferguson’s home. Defendant Ferguson retrieved an assault
rifle, which he gave to defendant Melara.

1 All undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.

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Gonzalez drove them to the territory of the rival
Barrio 13 gang. In front of a home, they saw three members
of the Barrio 13 gang (Juan Guzman, Aniba Garcia, and
Jesus Saldana) working on a car. Defendant Ferguson said:
‘Bust a bitch. There they are.’ Gonzalez made a U-turn with
the car and stopped his vehicle in front of the house.
Defendant Ferguson, who was seated in the front
passenger seat, rolled down the window. From inside of the
car, defendants Ferguson and Melara (who was seated in
the rear passenger seat) fired 20 to 30 rounds at the three
men. At one point, defendant Melara shouted ‘155.’ The
attack killed Guzman and Garcia. Saldana, wounded in
both legs, survived.”2
(People v. Melara, supra.)
“Within an hour, a witness identified Gonzalez’s car to the
police.” (People v. Melara, supra.) Gonzalez “gave the police
detailed information about the crimes,” then testified for the
prosecution at trial. (Ibid.) Two assault rifles were found in
Melara’s home, and “[b]allistics evidence established that the
shell casings found both at the shooting and in Gonzalez’s car
were fired from these two assault rifles.” (Ibid.)
The jury instructions included CALJIC Nos. 3.00,3 defining
principals; 3.31, requiring the jury to find specific intent; 8.10,

2 We include this summary of facts from Melara’s direct
appeal for informational purposes only; we do not rely on these
facts in resolving this appeal.
3 After Melara and Ferguson’s trial, CALJIC No. 3.00 was
changed to clarify the culpability of one accused of aiding and
abetting murder. Here, Melara was not tried as an aider or
abettor, and therefore the change is not relevant to his claims on
appeal.

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defining murder as an unlawful killing with malice aforethought;
8.11, defining malice aforethought; 8.20, defining willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder; 8.30, defining
unpremeditated murder of the second degree; 8.66, defining
attempted murder as requiring malice aforethought; 8.67,
defining willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder;
17.00, requiring separate findings for each defendant; and
various instructions regarding special circumstances and firearm
enhancements. The jury was not instructed on theories of felony
murder or natural and probable consequences.
The jury convicted both Melara and Ferguson of two counts
of first degree murder with the special circumstance of multiple
murder. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(3)). For each
defendant, the jury found that the murders were willful,
deliberate, and premeditated, and that each defendant personally
and intentionally discharged a firearm, causing death to each
victim. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).) The jury also convicted Melara
and Ferguson of one count each of attempted willful, deliberate,
and premeditated murder. (§§ 664/187, subd. (a).) On the
attempted murder counts, the jury found that each defendant
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, causing great
bodily injury. The jury further found that all crimes were
committed for the benefit of a street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).)
The court sentenced each defendant to an aggregate term of life
without possibility of parole plus 125 years to life. (People v.
Melara, supra.) This court affirmed the convictions on direct
appeal. (Ibid.)

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B. Section 1172.6 petition
On June 10, 2022, Melara filed a petition for resentencing
under former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6.4 On the form
document, he checked the box stating, “I could not presently be
convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes
made to Penal Code §§ 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.”
Counsel was appointed for Melara.
The People filed an opposition, attaching copies of the jury
instructions given at trial, the completed verdict forms, and the
opinion from Melara’s direct appeal. The People pointed out that
the verdict forms showed that on the two murder counts, the jury
found both Melara and Ferguson guilty of first degree murder,
that the offenses were willful, deliberate, and premeditated, and
that each defendant personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm, causing death. The jury also found both Melara and
Ferguson guilty of attempted murder, that the offense was
willful, deliberate, and premeditated, and that each defendant
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm in the
commission of the offense. The People argued that Melara’s jury
was not instructed on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, felony murder, or any other theory that allowed the jury
to impute malice to Melara. Rather, the only legal option for the
jury to convict Melara was as a direct perpetrator who committed
the crimes with actual malice.
Melara’s counsel filed a reply brief stating that Melara met
the prima facie burden under section 1172.6. The brief was a
form document that did not address anything specific to the case.

4 Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was
renumbered to section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 10.)

5
At the hearing on the petition, which also addressed a
petition for resentencing filed by Ferguson, the parties submitted
on the briefing. The court stated that based on the jury
instructions given at trial, Melara and Ferguson were ineligible
for resentencing because they were not convicted on any theory of
murder that is no longer valid.5 Melara timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Under section 1172.6, “A person convicted of felony murder
or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine
or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that person’s participation in a crime, attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or
manslaughter may file a petition with the court that sentenced
the petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder, attempted murder,
or manslaughter conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any
remaining counts” if “[t]he petitioner could not presently be
convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to
Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a) and (a)(3).)
To be eligible for relief under section 1172.6, a petitioner
must first make a prima facie showing that the petitioner could
not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder under
changes to these theories of murder liability. (People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708 (Strong).) “The record of conviction
will necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry under
section [1172.6], allowing the court to distinguish petitions with
potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.” (People v.

5 The trial court also stated that defendants were convicted
on an aiding and abetting theory. The parties agree that this
statement was erroneous.

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Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971.) “If the petition and record in
the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for
relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition.” (Strong, supra, 13
Cal.5th at p. 708.) We review de novo a trial court’s dismissal at
the prima facie stage. (People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th
1244, 1251.)
Melara acknowledges that the prosecution’s only theory at
trial was that Melara “acted as a direct perpetrator, not as an
aider and abettor.” He admits that the prosecutor told the jury
that Melara “pulled the trigger,” and “it was never suggested that
[Melara] was an aider or abettor rather than a direct
perpetrator.” Thus, Melara states that he “was charged and tried
as a direct perpetrator,” as one of two “triggermen,” which “was
the prosecution’s only option, given the evidence.”
In Melara and Ferguson’s trial, the jury was instructed on
murder with malice aforethought (CALJIC Nos. 8.10 and 8.11),
deliberate and premeditated murder (CALJIC No. 8.20), and
attempted murder, including the requirement of malice
aforethought (CALJIC No. 8.66). The jury was not instructed
about the natural and probable consequences doctrine or felony
murder, and the parties agree that Melara was not prosecuted
under those theories. “A petitioner is ineligible for section 1172.6
relief as a matter of law if . . . jurors were not instructed on any
theory of liability affected by Senate Bill 1437’s changes to
sections 188 and 189.” (People v. Allen (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th
389, 395.) The jury found that Melara and Ferguson both
committed first degree murder; that each murder was willful,
deliberate, and premeditated; that the attempted murder was
willful, deliberate, and premeditated; and that each defendant

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personally and intentionally discharged firearms, causing death
to two victims and great bodily injury to the third.
Thus, the verdict demonstrates that the jury necessarily
determined that Melara was the actual killer and that he
harbored malice aforethought. (See People v. Harden (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 45, 55.) For all three counts, Melara’s “intent to kill
was actually litigated and necessarily decided” by the jury.
(People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 452.) Such a finding is
“generally preclusive in section 1172.6 proceedings.” (Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 453; citing Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p.
710.).
Melara nevertheless imagines a scenario in which the jury
disregarded the instructions, found that Ferguson harbored
malice, then imputed Ferguson’s malice to Melara and convicted
Melara on that basis. He points to instruction CALJIC No. 3.00,
defining “principals,” which as given at trial stated, “Persons who
are involved in committing or attempting to commit a crime are
referred to as principals in that crime. Each principal, regardless
of the extent or manner of participation is equally guilty.
Principals include: 1. Those who directly and actively commit or
attempt to commit the act constituting the crime, or 2. Those
who aid and abet the commission or attempted commission of the
crime.”
Melara argues that “CALJIC No. 3.00 amounts to an
instruction that [Melara] could have been guilty of [murder and
attempted murder] based merely on his involvement in the
offense[s] and Ferguson’s mental state.” Melara asserts that
CALJIC No. 3.00 does not require a “principal” to have any
particular mens rea. Thus, the jury could have found that
Ferguson harbored malice, then decided that Melara was

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“equally guilty” without making any mens rea finding as to
Melara.
Notably, Melara cites no legal authority in support of his
contention. The Attorney General’s brief also fails to address
Melara’s contentions about CALJIC No. 3.00, and instead
discusses the jury’s firearm findings. We therefore sent counsel a
letter before oral argument asking the parties to be prepared to
discuss whether Melara has forfeited this argument, and to
address case law relevant to imputed malice relating to CALJIC
No. 3.00.
There is ample California case law (some of which is
discussed below) addressing whether the “equally guilty”
language in CALJIC No. 3.00 and in similar instruction
CALCRIM No. 400 allows a jury to impute one defendant’s malice
to another defendant. At oral argument, Melara’s counsel
acknowledged that he was aware of these cases before he filed the
opening brief, but he intentionally did not cite them because he
expected that the Attorney General would do so, and then he
could “shoot them down in reply.” The Deputy Attorney General
stated at oral argument that he did not address Melara’s
argument about CALJIC No. 3.00 because in his estimation the
argument was “irrelevant” and his proposed alternate basis for
affirmance was “the cleanest, easiest way to affirm.”
This approach represents poor appellate advocacy on both
sides. California Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3.3(a) states
that a lawyer shall not “make a false statement of fact or law to a
tribunal,” nor “fail to disclose to the tribunal authority in the
controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse
to the position of the client.” (See also In re Reno (2012) 55

9
Cal.4th 428, 5106 [“Attorneys are officers of the court and have an
ethical obligation to advise the court of legal authority that is
directly contrary to a claim being pressed”].) Comment 4 on Rule
of Professional Conduct 3.3 states, “The duties stated in
paragraphs (a) and (b) apply to all lawyers, including defense
counsel in criminal cases.” In addition, legal arguments in briefs
must be supported by citation to authority when possible. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rules 8.204(a)(1)(B) and 8.360(a).) Moreover, the
duty of a respondent is to respond to the opening brief. Although
a respondent asserting an alternative basis for affirmance can be
appropriate, simply disregarding the primary argument in the
opening brief never is.
Here, the parties ignored arguments and relevant legal
authorities they did not want to address, and instead focused
only on their own preferred positions. As such, neither party met
their obligations to the court. “‘Counsel should not forget that
they are officers of the court, and while it is their duty to protect
and defend the interests of their clients, the obligation is equally
imperative to aid the court in avoiding error and in determining
the cause in accordance with justice and the established rules of
practice.’” (In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 559, quoting
Furlong v. White (1921) 51 Cal.App. 265, 271.) We trust that in
the future, counsel will endeavor to better fulfill these essential
obligations.
As the appellant, Melara has forfeited his argument.
“Perhaps the most fundamental rule of appellate law is that the
judgment challenged on appeal is presumed correct, and it is the
appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate error.” (People v.

6 In re Reno was superseded by statute on other grounds as
stated in In re Friend (2021) 11 Cal.5th 720, 728.

10
Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573.) To that end, an
appellant’s brief “should contain a legal argument with citation of
authorities on the points made,” and if it does not, “the court may
treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration.” (People v.
Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1029.) Because Melara failed to
support his legal argument with relevant authority, it is waived.
Even if we were to consider the merits of Melara’s
argument, it is meritless. “CALJIC No. 3.00 ‘generally stated a
correct rule of law. All principals, including aiders and abettors,
are “equally guilty” in the sense that they are all criminally
liable.’” (People v. Daveggio and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790,
846; see also People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60
Cal.4th 335, 433.)7 The Supreme Court has rejected arguments
that the “equally guilty” language in CALJIC No. 3.00 allows a
jury to attribute one defendant’s state of mind to another—
especially in a case like this one, in which both defendants were
direct perpetrators and were charged with the same offenses. In
People v. Amezcua and Flores (2019) 6 Cal.5th 886, for example,
the court considered similar challenges to CALJIC No. 3.00. The
court stated, “Because the circumstances of this case reflected
defendants’ joint participation in the offenses at issue with the
required intent to kill, the trial court did not err in giving the
jury the unmodified CALJIC No. 3.00. Neither the evidence nor

7 Although there was concern that the instruction “‘could be
misleading if the principals in a particular case might be guilty of
different crimes and the jury interpret[ed] the instruction to
preclude such a finding’” (Daveggio and Michaud, supra, 4
Cal.5th at p. 846), that was not the case here, where Melara and
Ferguson were both charged with and convicted of two counts of
first degree murder and one count of attempted murder of the
same three victims.

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any theory of defense argued at trial or cited in the briefs
suggested that Amezcua and Flores entertained different states
of mind rendering them guilty of different crimes.” (Id. at p. 918.)
The court further noted that “CALJIC No. 17.00, also given here,
requires the jury to decide each defendant’s guilt separately.”
(Id. at p. 919.) The Supreme Court’s reasoning applies equally to
this case.
Similar challenges to CALJIC No. 3.00, as well as parallel
instruction CALCRIM No. 400, were rejected in People v.
Daveggio and Michaud, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 846 (rejecting the
defendants’ argument that CALJIC No. 3.00 “incorrectly
permitted the jury to convict them on the basis of the culpability
of the direct perpetrator of the charged crimes, without
considering whether they shared the perpetrator’s wrongful
intent”); People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 638-639
(rejecting the defendant’s argument that “equally guilty”
language in CALCRIM No. 400 “violated his state and federal
constitutional rights to due process because it allowed the jury to
convict him of first degree murder based on the mental state of
the perpetrator, without considering defendant’s own mental
state”); and People v. Berry-Vierwinden (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th
921, 935 (rejecting a challenge to CALCRIM No. 400 in the
section 1172.6 context, in part because “[a]fter the Supreme
Court’s 2001 decision in [People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111,
1118], it was unmistakable that a direct aider and abettor’s
‘mental state is her own; she is liable for her mens rea, not the
other person’s”’).
Moreover, as Melara acknowledges, there was no
suggestion at his trial that he was an aider or abettor. Thus,
under the language of CALJIC No. 3.00, Melara could only be a

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principal if he “directly and actively” committed murder or
attempted murder. The jury was further instructed with CALJIC
No. 8.10, which stated that for the two murder counts the jury
must find that “the killing was done with malice aforethought.”
In CALJIC No. 8.20, the jury was instructed that in order to find
the crimes deliberate and premeditated, each defendant “must
weigh and consider the question of killing and the reasons for
and against such a choice and, having in mind the consequences,
[he] decides to and does kill.” And in CALJIC No. 17.00, the jury
was instructed that it must “decide separately whether each of
the defendants is guilty or not guilty.”
Thus, the trial court clearly instructed the jury it would
have to find that Melara intended to kill in order to convict him
of first degree murder and willful, deliberate, and premeditated
attempted murder; the jury instructions did not allow Ferguson’s
malice to be imputed to Melara. “We consider [a] challenged
instruction in the context of the instructions and record as a
whole to determine whether it was reasonably likely the jury
misapplied the law” (People v. Vang (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 64,
84), and “presume that jurors follow the instructions provided by
the court in the absence of a showing to the contrary.” (People v.
Daveggio and Michaud, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 821.) Melara
makes no such showing here.
In addition, Melara does not attempt to connect his
argument to changes to section 188 or 189. Eligibility for relief
under section 1172.6 requires a showing that “[t]he petitioner
could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder
because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January
1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3), italics added.) The “changes”
refer to substantive amendments to section 189, involving the

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felony murder rule, and section 188, which now states that
“[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or
her participation in a crime.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 461,
quoting § 188, subd. (a)(3).) Section 188, subdivision (a)(3) states
that “in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime
shall act with malice aforethought.” Here, the jury instructions
made clear that for all three convictions, the jury was required to
find that Melara acted with malice aforethought.
Any contention that Melara’s jury was improperly
instructed at the time of trial cannot support a petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. “[A]
section 1172.6 petitioner cannot establish a prima facie case for
relief by asserting that the jury instructions permitted conviction
on a theory of imputed malice that was already prohibited even
before the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437. This amounts to ‘a
routine claim of instructional error’ that ‘could have been raised
on appeal from the judgment of conviction.’” (People v. Berry-
Vierwinden, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 936, citing People v.
Flores (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1173 [“Flores’s argument
reduces to a claim that the instructions given at his trial did not
clearly require the jury to find that he personally acted with
malice to find him guilty of provocative act murder, and instead
let the jury impute malice from Paez to him. Such a routine
claim of instructional error could have been asserted on appeal
from the judgment of conviction”], and People v. Burns (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 862, 867-868 [rejecting a similar argument based on
“equally guilty” language in instruction CALCRIM No. 400, and
stating that the petitioner’s “remedy for any alleged instructional
error that affected the verdict was his appeal from the judgment
of conviction.[ ] His failure to raise the argument on direct

14
appeal forfeited that claim [citation], and the subsequent petition
process created by the Legislature when it enacted Senate Bill
No. 1437 did nothing to change the applicable law so as to
resurrect an argument he had already abandoned.”].)
The jury instructions and verdicts therefore foreclose the
possibility that Melara was convicted under any now-invalid
theory. He was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law and
his petition was appropriately denied at the prima facie stage.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Melara’s petition for resentencing is
affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

ZUKIN, ACTING P. J.

MORI, J.

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