CourtListener 10340534•People v. Taylor CA2/4
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Filed 2/26/25 P. v. Taylor CA2/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B335425
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. LA033959)
v.
KIRELL FRANCIS TAYLOR,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Eric P. Harmon, Judge. Affirmed.
Cindy Brines, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah Hill and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Kirell Taylor appeals from the denial of his Penal Code
section 1172.61 resentencing petition after an evidentiary
hearing. He contends that substantial evidence does not support
the trial court’s findings that he was a major participant in the
underlying felonies and acted with reckless indifference to
human life. He also contends that the court erred by failing to
consider that he was 23 years old at the time of the crimes. We
reject these contentions and affirm the order.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the reporter’s and clerk’s
transcripts of Taylor’s jury trial, which the parties submitted
below and of which we have taken judicial notice.2
I. Prosecution Case
A. Events at the Rawlings Home
Around 7:20 or 7:30 p.m. on February 8, 1999, Christopher
Rawlings left his Woodland Hills home in his white Bentley to
pick up groceries and dinner. Rawlings had his wallet with him,
and generally carried large amounts of cash—$1,000 to $5,000—
in his pockets. Rawlings’s wife, Barbie Rawlings, stayed home
with the couple’s two young children. Rawlings called Barbie3
about 45 minutes after he left to tell her he was on his way to
pick up dinner and would be home soon.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2 The parties also asked the trial court to consider, and we
have taken judicial notice of, the appellate opinion resolving
Taylor’s direct appeal, (People v. Taylor (Aug. 29, 2002, No.
B153903) [nonpub. opn.] (Taylor I)).
3 We refer to Barbie by her first name to avoid confusion. No
disrespect is intended.
2
Around five or 10 minutes later, Barbie heard the garage
door open and loud music coming from Rawlings’s car. The music
stopped as Barbie walked toward the garage, intending to help
Rawlings with the groceries and takeout. Barbie heard loud
voices, which she described as “deep,” “commanding,” and
“forceful”; one of them said, “Get down.” Barbie opened the door
separating the house from the garage and saw Rawlings kneeling
on the floor, with two men standing over him, pushing or
punching him. The men were dressed in “all black,” and their
faces were obscured by black ski masks.
The men did not look at Barbie, who stood and watched in
disbelief for about 10 to 15 seconds. After she heard Rawlings
say “oh my god, this is happening” or “oh, my god, why is this
happening” in a “crying voice,” Barbie ran back into the house.
She grabbed the cordless phone from the kitchen, called 911, and
reported that “bad people” were in her house “robbing us and
they have my husband.” While she was on the phone, Barbie ran
upstairs, grabbed her children, and took them out a third-floor
window onto the roof of the house. From the roof, Barbie “heard
noises in the garage like lots of movements, things going on” and
heard Rawlings scream.
Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officer David
Abdalian testified that he and his partner, officer Rich Andert,
were driving in their patrol car around 9:00 p.m. when they were
dispatched to a burglary in progress at the Rawlings home. As
they approached the house, Abdalian saw Barbie and the
children on the roof and heard “loud voices, short sentences,
almost command-type statements” coming from the closed
garage. Andert radioed for backup.
3
Approximately one to two minutes after Andert called for
backup—about 10 to 15 minutes after Barbie fled to the roof—the
garage door opened. The Bentley backed out of the driveway,
struck the curb on the opposite side of the street, then drove
away; Barbie and Abdalian gave conflicting testimony about
whether it was moving slowly (Barbie) or quickly (Abdalian). A
police car arrived and began following the Bentley.
Abdalian and Andert entered the house through the open
garage door. They “searched for victims, suspects,” but did not
find anyone in the house. The officers helped Barbie and the
children climb back inside through the window. Barbie testified
that she was “terrified and I was crying because the guys had
taken my husband and I was just scared to be inside the house, I
didn’t know if there were still people inside.”
As Barbie and the officers walked through the house, they
saw that all the bedroom doors were open and there was jewelry
scattered on the floor of the master bedroom. Several pieces of
Rawlings’s and Barbie’s jewelry were missing, including Barbie’s
Cartier bracelet, ring, and earring set adorned with panthers.
Barbie’s purse was upended, and her wallet and credit cards were
missing. Barbie and the officers found a “relatively new” roll of
duct tape on a walkway outside the garage; it had not previously
been there or inside the garage or house.
B. Pursuit and Crash
Meanwhile, LAPD officers Kerry Suprenant and Mike
Callan joined the pursuit of the Bentley in a marked police
cruiser. Suprenant saw that a Black man was driving, but could
not tell if there were passengers in the vehicle. Suprenant
estimated the Bentley was going close to 100 miles per hour. It
crossed into oncoming traffic, then “made an erratic movement”
4
back across three lanes and struck a small blue car. The Bentley
spun and “it hit a curb, it hit a wooden power pole, from there it
continued to spin, and went into a front yard of a residence where
it also struck a tree.” The power pole “sheered [sic] off towards
the bottom and fell into the street,” along with the power lines it
carried. The power lines sparked, and there was a loud
explosion. The Bentley came to rest against the tree.
Suprenant stopped his cruiser in the middle of the street
and shined a spotlight on the Bentley, but did not see anyone exit
the car. When other officers arrived a few minutes later,
Suprenant approached the Bentley with them. He did not see
any people in the passenger compartment or open trunk of the
car. Suprenant and the other officers noticed a “debris field or
pattern” that “fanned out” from the trunk toward a nearby brick
wall. Suprenant followed the debris pattern and found an
unconscious man—Rawlings—lying face down, with serious
injuries to his head and face. Suprenant and his partner radioed
for an ambulance.
Rawlings was taken to the hospital, where he ultimately
died. The deputy medical examiner who performed an autopsy
on Rawlings testified that he suffered “injuries to the head, torso,
and extremities. Specifically there were lacerations, contusions
and abrasions of the head, skull fractures, and brain injuries”
including “contusions or bruises of the brain and secondary
changes of the brain consequent to injury.” Rawlings’s skull “was
fractured in a complex manner” around the forehead, top of the
head, and the eye socket area. The medical examiner opined that
the head injuries were fatal; the “mechanism of death was impact
injuries to the head which caused fracturing and caused brain
injury which led to brain death.” The medical examiner further
5
opined that these injuries were “consistent with someone being
thrown out of a vehicle at a high speed and hitting his head on a
cinder block wall.” None of Rawlings’s injuries “had an
unequivocal appearance of occurring before the accident.”
C. Perpetrators’ Flight
Dani Yashouafar witnessed the crash. He testified that
after the Bentley came to rest against the tree, he saw a Black
man get out of the driver’s side door and “go across the street.” A
“couple minutes later,” he saw another Black man exit the car
through the driver’s side door, “limping a little.” Yashouafar was
not sure if the men were wearing ski masks. He estimated that
both men were about 20 to 26 years old. The two men fled in
opposite directions.
David Mack was at his neighbor’s house on February 8,
1999 when he heard a loud bang and the electricity went out.
Mack went outside and saw a Black man with a “very youthful
appearance” wearing a “darker color” “sweat outfit” running
through the gated cul-de-sac. Mack asked the man, “what’s going
on?,” and the man replied, “A bunch of shit is happening over
there” as he continued running. Mack “heard a bang as the man
“hit the doorway to the backyard of another neighbor’s house.” In
late July 1999, nearly six months after the incident, police asked
Mack if anyone in a six-pack photo array resembled the man.
Mack selected a photograph based on the person’s “youthful
appearance,” but wrote that he was “not positive that he is the
person who committed the crime.” Mack identified Taylor in
court as the person whose photograph he circled.
Connie London testified that on the night of February 8,
1999, she and her husband were watching television when she
heard an explosion and the power went out. London then heard
6
“a crash on the right side of our house, sounded like something
crashed through our gate.” London’s husband opened the blinds
and “immediately said, ‘oh, my god, there’s somebody in our
backyard.’” London saw a person she identified in court as Taylor
walk past the window “very slowly, very cautiously,” as though
he was “trying to stay out of the lights of the helicopters that
were above.” The person was wearing dark pants and a navy
blue hooded sweatshirt. London selected Taylor’s photo from a
six-pack photo array police showed her in July 1999.
John Sorrentino testified that on the night of February 8,
1999, he was in his kitchen when he saw a big flash outside,
heard a big explosion, and the power went out. Sorrentino went
outside and saw a “young, . . . late twenties, early thirties” Black
man “kind of jogging, . . . moving at a fast pace” down the street.
The “very suspicious” man, who eventually “jumped over
somebody’s fence,” was wearing dark pants and a light-colored
football jersey or “something like that or had an inscription on it.”
The following day, neighborhood resident Jerry Mather found a
black sweatshirt and gloves on the ground near his van, which
was parked on Sorrentino’s street, and called the police. LAPD
detective David Szabo, who responded to Mather’s call, testified
that the sweatshirt had duct tape on the front and back. In July
1999, Sorrentino selected two photographs that resembled the
man he saw on February 8 from a six-pack photo array; one of
them was Taylor.
Amit Danon and Oren Afriat testified that on February 8,
1999, they were at a friend’s house when they heard a big
explosion, “saw a big light in the sky and all the power went out.”
Danon and Afriat got into Afriat’s car to go see what had
happened. Before Afriat started the car, a Black man who
7
“looked very tired,” scared, and sweaty ran up to the car, put his
hands on the hood, and offered Danon and Afriat “a thousand
dollars to get him out of that area.” They declined the offer and
drove away. A few days later, Danon and Afriat described the
man to a police artist. In July 1999, Danon circled two pictures
in a six-pack photo array that resembled the man; one of them
was a photo of Taylor. Afriat circled only the photo of Taylor.
Maria Vasquez testified that on the night of February 8,
1999, she was driving home from school. As she was making a
left turn, a man “jumped out in front of” her car and “pounded on
[her] vehicle.” The man opened her unlocked driver’s side door
and shouted at her. Vasquez was frightened and did not
understand what the man was saying. The man reached into the
car and shifted it into neutral. He then struck Vasquez in the
face and head, grabbed her by the hair, pulled her out of the car,
and threw her onto the street. The man got into the running car
and drove away, taking with him Vasquez’s belongings that were
in the car. Vasquez identified the man in court as Taylor. She
also selected Taylor’s photograph from a six-pack array in July
1999.
D. Investigation and Apprehension of Taylor
LAPD detective Andrew Purdy, the lead investigator on the
case, assigned LAPD detective Steven Galeria to investigate the
scene of the Bentley crash. Galeria found two ski masks: one in
the driver’s seat and one on the ground next to the Bentley. He
also found a glove and a police scanner near the car, and
handcuffs in the area where Rawlings was found. After the car
was towed to the police garage, Purdy found a loaded revolver on
the front passenger floorboard and a garage door opener in the
8
trunk. The garage door opener had blood on it that was later
determined to be Rawlings’s.
The day after the crash, Donna Collins was driving around
the area when she noticed a green Mustang with a tan roof
parked in a traffic lane. A Black man was standing on the
sidewalk near the car, searching through some bushes. Collins
thought the man’s behavior was “strange” and called the police.
Officers searched the bushes that evening and found Rawlings’s
wallet.
Several days later, Purdy asked Vasquez, Danon, and
Afriat to meet with a sketch artist to generate a composite sketch
of the suspect they had seen. The artist prepared a sketch on
February 19, 1999. When shown the sketch during cross-
examination, Taylor testified, “That looks exactly like me.”4
On May 19, 1999, Purdy received an anonymous tip on his
answering machine. Purdy testified that the tip was something to
the effect of, “You’ve got to go to this address on Vaughn Street
and check out Kirell. . . . He’s the one that killed that poor man
in the Bentley.” Purdy advised other officers about the tip, and
they “would drive by the location and they’d document license
plates or cars that were parked in and around the residence.”
One of the cars belonged to someone on parole, which prompted
officers to run the address for other parolees. They discovered
that a parolee named Kirell Taylor lived at the Vaughn Street
residence. Purdy also saw “a tan over green Mustang almost
exactly like what Donna Lou Collins had described parked in
4 Taylor further testified that the sketch was actually drawn
in July 1999 after he was arrested and taken into custody, and
was backdated as part of the LAPD’s efforts to frame him for the
crimes.
9
front of that address,” and learned it was registered to Taylor’s
“girlfriend/common law wife.”
Purdy “went to parole and got all the information on Mr.
Taylor.” After learning that Taylor was a suspect in a
Hawthorne robbery in which the perpetrators wore ski masks,
Purdy contacted Taylor’s parole agent. The parole agent
arranged a meeting with Taylor.
On July 13, 1999, Purdy, LAPD detective Terrill West, and
two detectives from the Hawthorne Police Department went to
the parole office to meet Taylor. West testified that Taylor “took
an aggressive stance,” when officers attempted to handcuff him,
and Purdy testified that Taylor said, “I’m not going to the Van
Nuys court and be falsely accused of something that I didn’t do.”
After Taylor “attempted to make a move for the window,” one of
the detectives from Hawthorne, detective Mena, told him that she
wanted to talk to him about the Hawthorne robbery. Taylor
relaxed and allowed the officers to handcuff him; he denied
involvement in the Hawthorne robbery.
Mena and her partner drove Taylor to the Van Nuys
infirmary to obtain a blood sample, which Taylor consented to
provide. The nurse who drew the blood sample testified that she
did not take a saliva sample from Taylor and did not see West
obtain one. Purdy testified repeatedly that the police did not
take a saliva sample from Taylor or ask him to spit into a vial.
After Taylor provided the blood sample, the Hawthorne police
took him into custody. DNA from Taylor’s blood sample was later
compared to DNA retrieved from around the mouth hole of one of
the ski masks found in the Bentley. The two samples matched
“to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty.”
10
Police obtained and executed a search warrant for the
Vaughn Street residence. In Taylor’s bedroom, they found
Barbie’s panther bracelet and one of the matching earrings. They
also found a business card belonging to Rodney Leonard, who co-
owned a clothing store with Rawlings. Leonard testified that he
recalled seeing Taylor in the store “maybe twice” prior to
February 1999 and giving him the card. Leonard also testified
that Rawlings visited the store almost every day wearing
expensive jewelry and parked his Bentley out front.
II. Defense Case
Taylor, who represented himself, presented an alibi defense
and argued that the police had framed him. Taylor’s sole alibi
witness, Sabrina Roots, testified that she followed Taylor home
on the evening of February 8, 1999, because her “car was acting
up,” he was riding his motorcycle, and it was raining. Roots and
Taylor left Taylor’s Hollywood recording studio around 8:00 p.m.
and arrived at Taylor’s house on Vaughn Street in Pacoima
around 8:45 p.m. Roots immediately turned around and drove
her car home.
Taylor testified that the police had framed him. He
initially stated that the police planted Leonard’s business card in
his room, but later admitted visiting the clothing store, asking
Leonard about a suit, and receiving Leonard’s card. Taylor also
testified that on the day of his arrest, detective West asked him
to spit into a tube. After his DNA expert testified that the DNA
sample from the mask was a “rare” profile that likely came from
Taylor, Taylor argued during closing that the police planted the
saliva from the tube onto the ski mask recovered from the
Bentley. Taylor denied that Barbie’s jewelry was recovered from
11
his room; he testified that he would have had his girlfriend or
grandmother remove it if it had been there.
Taylor called several witnesses who had seen the
perpetrators on the night of February 8, 1999 but were unable to
identify them. Barbie testified that she “remembered seeing
white” through the eyeholes of the ski masks and was unsure of
the perpetrators’ races. Connie London’s husband, Alan London,
testified that the man he had seen in his yard appeared to be a
light-skinned Black man or dark-skinned Hispanic man. When
he called 911, he described the man as Hispanic. Arloa Pierce
and John Long both testified that the person they saw was
wearing a light-colored shirt. Pierce could not determine the
man’s race, and Long thought he was Hispanic.
III. Charges and Conviction
A nine-count amended information filed March 1, 2000
charged Taylor with (1) the murder of Rawlings (§ 187, subd. (a));
(2) kidnapping Rawlings to commit robbery (§ 209, subd. (b)); (3)
kidnapping Rawlings during the commission of a carjacking (§
209.5, subd. (a)); (4) first degree residential robbery of Rawlings
(§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (a)); (5) first degree residential burglary of
Rawlings (§ 459); (6) carjacking Rawlings (§ 215, subd. (a)); (7)
evading an officer causing the death of Rawlings (Veh. Code,
§ 2800.3); (8) carjacking Vasquez (§ 215, subd. (a)); and (9) second
degree robbery of Vasquez (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)). The
information further alleged—in separate allegations—that the
murder was committed while Taylor was engaged in the
commission of burglary, robbery, carjacking, and kidnapping
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), and that Taylor personally inflicted great
bodily injury on Rawlings during the commission of the burglary,
robbery, carjacking, and kidnapping (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).
12
Additionally, the information alleged that Taylor previously
suffered a conviction for a serious or violent felony (§§ 667, subd.
(b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and did not remain free of custody
for five years (former § 667.5, subd. (b)).
Taylor proceeded to a jury trial, at which he represented
himself. The jury rejected Taylor’s alibi defense and claims he
had been framed and found him guilty on all counts. It also
found true all the special circumstance and enhancement
allegations.5 The trial court sentenced Taylor to life without the
possibility of parole, plus 24 years and four months. On direct
appeal, a different panel of this court modified Taylor’s sentence
by staying under section 654 the term of one year, four months
that had been imposed for evading an officer. It otherwise
affirmed the judgment. (See Taylor I, supra.)
IV. Section 1172.6 Proceedings
A. Summary Denial and Remand
Taylor filed a verified petition for resentencing under
former section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6)6 in January 2020.
After appointing counsel and receiving briefing, the trial court
5 The jury was not provided with verdict forms regarding the
prior conviction allegations. Prior to sentencing, Taylor brought
the error to the trial court’s attention and moved for new trial.
The court denied the motion and found the allegations true. On
direct appeal, a different panel of this court concluded that the
trial court erred by making findings regarding the prior
convictions, but concluded the error was harmless because “the
record leaves no question that appellant was convicted in 1993 of
second degree robbery with personal use of a gun.” (People v.
Taylor (Aug. 29, 2002, No. B153903) [nonpub. opn.] (Taylor I).)
6 Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered
section 1170.95 to section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
There were no substantive changes to the statute.
13
denied the petition at the prima facie stage, holding that the
jury’s special circumstances findings rendered Taylor ineligible
for relief as a matter of law. A different panel of this court
reversed the ruling in 2022 and remanded with directions for the
trial court to issue an order to show cause and hold an
evidentiary hearing. (People v. Taylor (Apr. 21, 2022, No.
B312057) [nonpub. opn.] (Taylor II).)
B. Additional Briefing
On December 27, 2022, the trial court issued an order to
show cause pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (c). Taylor,
representing himself, filed a brief arguing that the prosecution
could not prove that he kidnapped or intended to kill Rawlings.
He also contended that prosecution could not prove he was the
actual killer because it was unclear if he was driving the car, and
could not prove he was a direct aider and abettor because
Rawlings could have gotten in the trunk of his own volition.
Taylor additionally argued that there was insufficient evidence
he was a major participant in the crimes or acted with reckless
indifference to human life as those requirements are defined by
People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v.
Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark). To this end, Taylor asserted
that he “was not involved in any planning of the carjacking,
kidnapping, or murder” of Rawlings; there was no evidence he
“had a prior criminal relationship with” or even “knew the driver
of the Rawlings vehicle”; he had no knowledge of any weapons
used or Rawlings’s presence in the trunk; and as the (alleged)
passenger he could not stop the car or otherwise prevent the
kidnapping or crash. He made no mention of his age at the time
of the incident.
14
The prosecution filed an opposition brief arguing that
evidence adduced at Taylor’s trial “shows that his conviction for
murder continues to be valid because he was a major participant
and acted with reckless indifference to human life.” The
prosecution requested that the trial court take judicial notice of
the 12-volume reporter’s transcript and three-volume clerk’s
transcript from Taylor’s trial, as well as Taylor I, supra. Citing
evidence from the reporter’s transcript, the prosecution argued
that Taylor was a major participant under Banks and acted with
reckless indifference to human life under Clark.
C. Evidentiary Hearing
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on July 24,
2023. At the hearing, the prosecution provided the court with
electronic copies of the materials of which it had requested
judicial notice. Both sides agreed to submit on those materials;
neither side introduced new or additional evidence. The court
stated it would review the materials and invited the parties to
argue.
After reading a portion of his brief into the record, Taylor
told the court that he “desires to re-litigate and reexamine the
kidnapping to commit robbery at count 2, and the kidnapping to
commit carjacking at count 3, because count 2 and count 3
directly relate to whether the defendant was not a major
participant and/or did not act with reckless disregard to human
life pursuant to Banks and Clark.” Taylor maintained his alibi
defense, but asserted that “hypothetically, if the defendant were
present at that crime, he definitely would have prevented a
kidnapping, because you don’t go to a robbery to commit a
kidnapping, you don’t go to a kidnapping and go commit a
murder. That’s what stupid criminals do. . . . [T]he prosecution
15
has never, to this point, proven beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant had a specific intent to commit kidnapping, carjack
and commit kidnap for robbery.”
Taylor further asserted that the prosecution’s opposition to
his petition was “speculative” to the extent it asserted that he
knew of Rawlings’s presence in the trunk or played any role in
putting Rawlings there. Taylor hypothesized a scenario in which
the driver of the car “placed the victim in the trunk unbeknownst
to the passenger, as he was inside of the house rummaging
through the victim’s property; and in that scenario, came outside
into the garage and got into an argument with his confederate
and jumped in the passenger seat as his confederate was backing
out of the garage. . . . [T]o state that petitioner was physically
present and actively involved in the kidnapping, that’s just not
true, and they have no evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that
that is true.” Taylor argued that under this scenario, in which he
was the passenger, there was no evidence that he was or assisted
the actual killer. Taylor also argued that the LAPD manipulated
evidence and framed him.
The prosecution responded that “this hearing is not an
opportunity for [Taylor] to plead his innocence.” The prosecution
pointed to Barbie’s testimony that she heard Rawlings scream
from her perch on the roof before the garage door opened, and
asserted that the scream “would have been heard by both
defendants” such that “there is no way for either of them to argue
. . . that they were not aware that Mr. Rawlings was in the
trunk.” The prosecution also argued that even if Taylor were the
passenger during the police pursuit, he aided and abetted the
driver because “his presence in the garage prevents Mr. Rawlings
from fighting back; it helps them getting him into the trunk,
16
assists with overpowering him. The idea that he crawled in the
trunk is silly. . . . Fleeing in the car, that’s something that both
of these guys are participating in. Mr. Taylor is there giving
support, he’s there giving assistance to the driver. He is
absolutely aiding and abetting the kidnapping, just the way that
the jury found. And in so doing, he’s acting in a way that carries
a high probability of death.”
In reply, Taylor reiterated his contention that “you can’t
assume where the passenger was at any particular point” during
the 10 to 15 minutes the perpetrators were in the Rawlings home
and garage. He further asserted that the passenger in the car
“had no opportunity to stop the driver,” slow down the car, or
otherwise prevent the crash. Neither Taylor nor the prosecution
mentioned Taylor’s age at any point.
D. Ruling
On October 13, 2023, the trial court issued a written order
denying the petition. The court stated that it “reviewed the
entire record of conviction in the matter, including the entire
twelve-volume set of trial transcripts, and the trial exhibits,” in
addition to the parties’ written and oral arguments. It further
stated that it was “relying on facts taken from the evidence before
it and not from prior appellate opinions.”
The court made the following factual findings. Taylor and
an accomplice pursued Rawlings into his garage, detained him,
and forced him to the ground. Barbie called 911 and ran to the
roof after seeing the two men and hearing their commands.
Police arrived “[a]s Taylor and the accomplice ransacked the
residence for valuable items.” “Alerted to the police presence by
way of a scanner they had brought along, Taylor and his
accomplice forced Rawlings into the trunk of his Bentley sedan,
17
and fled the scene.” After a high-speed pursuit that came to “a
horrific conclusion,” Rawlings “was ejected from the trunk.” The
perpetrators “abandoned the vehicle, leaving Rawlings
unconscious at the accident scene.” Rawlings later died from his
injuries. The court rejected Taylor’s alibi as “belied by the DNA
evidence linking him to the crimes and the stolen property
recovered from his room.”
The court considered the Banks factors and concluded there
was “proof beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner was a major
participant in the underlying crimes leading to the death of the
victim.” The court first found that Taylor was part of a
“sophisticated and well-thought-out plan” and “engaged in
significant planning of the criminal enterprise” that ended in
Rawlings’s death. The court cited evidence showing Taylor
visited Rawlings’s clothing store multiple times and had its
business card in his room; a loaded revolver, a police scanner,
handcuffs, a ski mask with Taylor’s DNA on it, and a garage door
opener with Rawlings’s blood on it were found at the crash scene;
and duct tape was found near the Rawlings home. In considering
Taylor’s awareness of the particular dangers of the crime, the
court pointed to much of the same evidence to find that Taylor
and his co-perpetrator “had a plan that a gun would be used, at
the very minimum, to force the victim (or victims) to submit to
being handcuffed or duct taped.”
The court next considered Taylor’s presence at the scene of
the killing, ability to facilitate or prevent Rawlings’s death, and
the contributions his actions or inaction made. Here, the court
found that both perpetrators stood over and pushed Rawlings
while he was in the garage, Barbie heard noises and movement
and her husband’s scream, “Taylor and the other perpetrator
18
forced the victim into the trunk” after becoming aware of police
presence via the police scanner, and two men left the car and fled
the scene after the chase and crash. The court concluded “Taylor
was present at stages [sic] of the criminal enterprises, including
at the scene of the killing,” and “did nothing to interrupt the
chain of events” or “abandon his criminal enterprise.” Finally,
the court considered Taylor’s actions after the lethal force was
used. It found that instead of rendering aid to the unconscious
and injured Rawlings, Taylor “instead fled and carjacked another
victim.” Viewing these findings together, the court concluded
Taylor was “a major participant in the criminal enterprise that
resulted in Rawlings’s death.”
The court then considered the Clark factors, which it noted
have significant overlap with the Banks factors, and found,
“beyond a reasonable doubt, that petitioner acted with reckless
indifference in the underlying criminal enterprise.” The court
reiterated its previous findings with respect to Taylor’s presence
during the crimes and failure to withdraw from or stop them.
The court further found that the crimes lasted at least 10 to 15
minutes in addition to the perpetrators’ flight, and “Taylor did
nothing to minimize the risk of violence, and instead escalated
the risk of violence by putting Rawlings in the trunk.” With
respect to the number and use of weapons, and Taylor’s
knowledge thereof, it found that the loaded revolver recovered
from the car showed that “at least one of the perpetrators was
armed with a firearm,” and “without the use of a gun, the
perpetrators would have almost no chance of ensuring that the
victim would comply to the degree he did.” The court found that
it was “not clear what Taylor’s knowledge” of his confederate’s
likelihood of killing was, but it was clear that he “escalated the
19
risk of violence” and there was “no evidence” that he attempted to
minimize the risk of violence.
The court observed that “Taylor could have done any
number of things to help the victim” when the police arrived at
the Rawlings home, including “demand that they leave without
him, distract the other person, or attempt to dissuade him, to
name a few. But instead, petitioner chose to continue to force the
victim to comply with their demands and, along with the other
perpetrator, forced him into the trunk. He had an opportunity to
let Rawlings stay behind at his home instead of forcing him into
the trunk.” The court continued, “A law-abiding person in
Taylor’s position would have perceived that placing the victim in
the trunk of a car that was about to flee the police posed a grave
danger to his life, and Taylor knowingly and actively participated
in the kidnapping in disregard of that risk. Furthermore, as
evidenced by their use of a police scanner, Taylor was focused on
avoiding apprehension, which is why he decided to take Rawlings
with them. At no time prior to the fatal crash did Taylor try to
deescalate the situation, and after the crash he demonstrated his
ongoing indifference to human life by carjacking another victim.”
In light of these findings, the court denied the petition.
Taylor timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Section 1172.6
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature “‘amend[ed] the
felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is
not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act
with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
20
life.’” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448 (Curiel),
quoting Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(f).) As amended, section 188,
subdivision (a)(3) now provides that “in order to be convicted of
murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought.
Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) Section 189 now
provides that a participant in qualifying felonies during which a
death occurs generally will not be liable for murder unless (1) he
or she was “the actual killer,” (2) he or she, “with the intent to
kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited,
requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of
murder in the first degree,” or (3) he or she “was a major
participant in the underlying felony [who] acted with reckless
indifference to human life.” (§ 189, subds. (e)(1)-(3); accord, People
v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 868-869.)
A person convicted of murder or attempted murder under a
now-invalid theory may petition the trial court under section
1172.6 to vacate the conviction and be resentenced on any
remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) If the trial court
determines the petitioner has made a prima facie showing of
eligibility for relief, the court must issue an order to show cause
and hold an evidentiary hearing at which the prosecution bears
the burden “to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder” under
current law. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(3)). At the evidentiary
hearing, the trial court “act[s] as an independent fact[ ]finder”
and may consider evidence admitted at any prior hearing or trial
that is admissible under current law, or any new or additional
evidence submitted by the parties. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The
trial court “must review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and
21
resolve contradictions, and make determinations as to credibility,
all under the reasonable doubt standard. . . .” (People v. Clements
(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298 (Clements).) “‘If the prosecution
fails to sustain its burden of proof, the prior conviction, and any
allegations and enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be
vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining
charges.’” (People v. Wilson, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 869, quoting
§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
II. Standard of Review
We review the trial court’s findings after a section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3), evidentiary hearing for substantial evidence.
(Clements, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 298; accord, People v.
Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 591 (Mitchell).) Under this
standard, we “‘“examine the entire record in the light most
favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains
substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value that would support a rational trier of
fact in finding [the defendant guilty] beyond a reasonable
doubt.”’” (Clements, at p. 298.) Substantial evidence includes
both circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57), and we
presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact
that can be reasonably deduced from the evidence. (People v.
Owens (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1022.) We do not resolve
credibility issues or evidentiary conflicts, and we reverse only if
there is “no hypothesis whatever” under which the findings are
unsupported by substantial evidence. (People v. Zamudio (2008)
43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)
22
III. Major Participant
Taylor contends the evidence was insufficient to prove he
was a major participant in the underlying felonies. He primarily
focuses on the kidnapping, “which was what made the robbery
and carjacking ‘more’ than the danger present in every robbery
and carjacking.” The cornerstone of his argument is that the trial
court’s finding he was involved in getting Rawlings into the trunk
of the Bentley “rests on speculation.” In Taylor’s view, “it is not
reasonable to infer appellant was present when Rawlings was
placed in the trunk.” Instead, “the only reasonable inference was
that one perpetrator was most likely in the garage restraining
Rawlings while the other perpetrator was burglarizing the
home.” Taylor acknowledges that “the evidence does not indicate
which role each perpetrator took,” but asserts it is “just as
reasonable to conclude appellant was the one to ransack the
house as his accomplice.” Taylor further asserts there was no
evidence that the kidnapping was part of the perpetrators’
original plan, and no indication of when Rawlings was placed in
the trunk.
We reject these arguments to the extent they challenge the
validity of Taylor’s underlying kidnapping convictions and the
jury’s findings related to those convictions. Despite Taylor’s
express desire to “re-litigate and reexamine” the kidnapping
convictions, a section 1172.6 petition “does not afford the
petitioner a new opportunity to raise claims of trial error or
attack the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s
findings.” (People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947.) The
purpose of section 1172.6 “‘is to give defendants the benefit of
amended sections 188 and 189 with respect to issues not
previously determined, not to provide a do-over on factual
23
disputes that have already been resolved.’” (Ibid.; see also Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 460 [“issue preclusion will ‘ordinarily’
apply in such proceedings”].) By finding Taylor guilty of
kidnapping Rawlings to commit robbery and kidnapping
Rawlings during the commission of a carjacking, and finding that
he committed the murder during the course of the kidnapping,
the jury necessarily found that Taylor was aware of and involved
in the kidnapping offenses. We do not revisit those findings now.
Next, while acknowledging that he “was a participant” in “a
robbery, burglary, carjacking and kidnapping that did not involve
a plan to kill,” Taylor contends that “the evidence showed he was
not a major participant” in the crimes within the meaning of
Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788. We disagree.
In Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 794, the California
Supreme Court set forth several factors relevant to determining
“under what circumstances an accomplice who lacks the intent to
kill may qualify as a major participant” in a felony resulting in
death. Those factors are: “What role did the defendant have in
planning the criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths?
What role did the defendant have in supplying or using lethal
weapons? What awareness did the defendant have of particular
dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past
experience or conduct of the other participants? Was the
defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a position to
facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or her own
actions or inaction play a particular role in the death? What did
the defendant do after lethal force was used?” (Id. at p. 803, fn.
omitted.) “No one of these considerations is necessary, nor is any
one of them necessarily sufficient. All may be weighed in
determining the ultimate question, whether the defendant’s
24
participation ‘in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of
death’ [citation] was sufficiently significant to be considered
‘major.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
As to the first factor, his role in planning the criminal
enterprise, Taylor acknowledges “there was evidence that
appellant had a role in planning the robbery and the burglary.”
He contends “there was no evidence that he had a role in
planning the kidnapping,” which “was an essential part of the
sequence of criminal activity that culminated in Rawlings [sic]
death.” Even if we were to accept Taylor’s claim of ignorance as
to the kidnapping, which we do not, the robbery and burglary
were also essential components of the fatal sequence of events.
Those offenses remained ongoing at the time of the crash because
the perpetrators had not reached a place of safety. (See People v.
Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23, 28 [“robbery is a continuing
offense that begins from the time of the original taking until the
robber reaches a place of relative safety”]; People v. Bodely (1995)
32 Cal.App.4th 311, 314 [“felony-murder liability continues
during the escape of a burglar from the scene of the burglary
until the burglar reaches a place of temporary safety”].) And as
Taylor recognizes, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
finding that he was involved in planning these crimes. Taylor
visited the clothing store Rawlings co-owned at least twice and
kept its business card in his room. Taylor’s DNA was found on
one of the ski masks recovered from the Bentley, which the
perpetrators wore to conceal their identities during the crimes. A
sweatshirt that a factfinder reasonably could infer Taylor shed
during the course of his flight from the crash scene had duct tape
on it similar to that found outside the Rawlings home. The
perpetrators also came prepared with a police scanner, handcuffs,
25
and a revolver. As the trial court found, the attack on Rawlings
was “well-thought-out.”
As to the second factor, his role in supplying or using lethal
weapons, Taylor asserts there was no evidence that he had
knowledge of or used the gun recovered from the Bentley, which
he speculates could have belonged to Rawlings. However, an
appellant cannot show the “evidence is insufficient by citing only
his own evidence, or by arguing about what evidence is not in the
record, or by portraying the evidence that is in the record in the
light most favorable to himself.” (People v. Sanghera (2006) 139
Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573.) Assuming, as Taylor does, that he was
the passenger in Bentley, it is reasonable to infer that he was
aware of or used the gun found in that area of the car. Moreover,
although neither the trial court nor the parties appear to have
considered the point, “[s]everal cases have recognized a vehicle as
a deadly weapon based on the manner it was used.” (People v.
Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1055, 1065.) Whether passenger or driver,
Taylor unquestionably had a role in obtaining the Bentley—the
jury found him guilty of carjacking Rawlings—and using it to
complete the offenses of robbery, burglary, and kidnapping.
Taylor contends the third Banks factor, the defendant’s
awareness of the particular dangers posed by the nature of the
crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other
participant, cuts in his favor because there was no evidence of a
plan to kidnap or kill Rawlings or previous violent behavior by
his co-perpetrator. Whatever Taylor may or may not have
believed about the plan for the robbery and burglary at the
outset, or knew about his co-perpetrator, he was was clearly
aware of the risk of death once Rawlings was placed in the trunk
of the Bentley. (See In re Harper (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 450, 461
26
(Harper).) Further, as the trial court found, the various means of
restraint present posed an increased danger to Rawlings, and it
was reasonable to infer that at least one of the perpetrators had a
gun.
As to the fourth factor, the defendant’s presence at the
scene of the killing and ability to facilitate or prevent the victim’s
death, Taylor reiterates his claim that there was no evidence he
knew Rawlings was in the trunk. Therefore, he argues, “the
evidence does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant
had an opportunity to stop it and failed to do so.” As noted above,
Taylor may not relitigate his involvement in the kidnapping. The
trial court found, and substantial evidence supports, that Taylor
“engaged in significant execution of the underlying criminal
enterprise while being present at all stages,” and “did nothing to
interrupt the chain of events” or “minimize the risk of violence.”
Taylor targeted Rawlings, pushed or punched him into
submission alongside the co-perpetrator, and placed Rawlings in
the trunk rather than, say, allowing him to ride in the passenger
compartment or simply leaving him in the garage. This factor
accordingly favors a finding that Taylor was a major participant.
The final Banks factor is what the defendant did after
lethal force was used. Here, substantial evidence supports the
trial court’s findings that Taylor fled the crash scene with items
looted from the home without even a cursory attempt to check on
Rawlings and proceeded to violently carjack another victim. This
conduct does not reflect disapproval or disavowal of the killer’s
actions. Instead, as the trial court found, it “demonstrates an
ongoing lack of concern for the welfare of others.” Taylor’s
counterfactual claim that he “had no reason to look around the
27
site for Rawlings” because he did not know Rawlings had been in
the trunk does not convince us otherwise.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings
regarding the Banks factors, both individually and collectively.
We find no error in the court’s conclusion that Taylor was a major
participant in the series of crimes that culminated in Rawlings’s
death.
IV. Reckless Indifference to Human Life
Taylor contends the evidence was also insufficient to prove
that he acted with reckless indifference to human life. We
disagree.
At its core, “[r]eckless indifference to human life is ‘implicit
in knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a
grave risk of death.’” (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 676
(Scoggins), quoting Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 157
(Tison). It “encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist another
in killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the [appellant] does
not specifically desire that death as the outcome of his actions.”
(Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 617.) For instance, a person “who
tortures another not caring whether the victim lives or dies, or
the robber who shoots someone in the course of the robbery,
utterly indifferent to the fact that the desire to rob may have the
unintended consequence of killing the victim” acts with reckless
indifference to human life. (Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 157.)
“Reckless indifference to human life has a subjective and
an objective element. [Citation.] As to the subjective element,
‘[t]he defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the
violent manner in which the particular offense is committed,’ and
he or she must consciously disregard ‘the significant risk of death
his or her actions create.’ [Citations.] As to the objective
28
element, ‘“[t]he risk [of death] must be of such a nature and
degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s
conduct and the circumstances known to him [or her], its
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.”’
[Citation.] ‘Awareness of no more than the foreseeable risk of
death inherent in any [violent felony] is insufficient’ to establish
reckless indifference to human life; ‘only knowingly creating a
“grave risk of death”’ satisfies the statutory requirement.
[Citation.] Notably, ‘the fact a participant [or planner of] an
armed robbery could anticipate lethal force might be used’ is not
sufficient to establish reckless indifference to human life.”
(Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.)
The California Supreme Court articulated several factors
relevant to determining whether a defendant acted with reckless
indifference to human life in Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618-
623. Those factors include: “Did the defendant use or know that
a gun would be used during the felony? How many weapons were
ultimately used? Was the defendant physically present at the
crime? Did he or she have the opportunity to restrain the crime
or aid the victim? What was the duration of the interaction
between the perpetrators of the felony and the victims? What
was the defendant’s knowledge of his or her confederate’s
propensity for violence or likelihood of using lethal force? What
efforts did the defendant make to minimize the risks of violence
during the felony?” (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677, citing
Clark, supra, at pp. 618–623.)
The major participant and reckless indifference factors
“significantly overlap” in that “‘the greater the defendant’s
participation in the felony murder, the more likely that he acted
29
with reckless indifference to human life.’” (Clark, supra, 63
Cal.4th at pp. 614-615, quoting Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 153.)
Consequently, the trial court’s factual finding that Taylor was a
major participant in the robbery, burglary, kidnapping, and
carjacking leading to Rawlings’s death is supportive of the court’s
additional factual finding that Taylor acted with reckless
indifference to human life. (People v. Cody (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th
87, 113; see also Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 158, fn. 12 [a
defendant’s status as a major participant in the underlying felony
will “often provide significant support for [ ] a [reckless
indifference] finding”].)
Taylor argues that the “notion that appellant’s specific
conduct during the underlying felonies in this case was anywhere
close to ‘the person who tortures another not caring whether the
victim lives or dies, or the robber who shoots someone in the
course of the robbery’ is irrational.” The question is not one of
rationality, however, but of substantial evidence. And here,
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings.
The first Clark factors concern the defendant’s use or
knowledge of weapons. Taylor correctly points out that “[t]he
mere fact of a defendant’s awareness that a gun will be used in
the felony is not sufficient to establish reckless indifference to
human life.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 618.) Thus, the trial
court’s reliance on Taylor’s knowledge of the gun in support of
this factor was misplaced. However, as discussed above in
connection with the similar Banks factor, vehicles may be deadly
weapons, and Taylor knowingly carjacked Rawlings, put him in
the trunk of the Bentley, and used the Bentley to flee the
Rawlings home.
30
The next Clark factors concern the defendant’s presence at
the killing and opportunity to restrain the crime or aid the
victim. “Proximity to the murder and the events leading up to it
may be particularly significant where . . . the murder is a
culmination or a foreseeable result of several intermediate
steps. . . .” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619.) That is the case
here, where Rawlings’s death was the result of a tragic sequence
of several criminal acts. As discussed above in connection with
the overlapping Banks factor, substantial evidence supports the
trial court’s findings that Taylor was present and involved
throughout the entire sequence of events, from the planning
stages through the fatal crash. We again reject Taylor’s claim
that he was not present during the kidnapping and reiterate that
an appellant cannot relitigate facts necessarily found by the jury
or show the evidence is insufficient by “portraying the evidence
that is in the record in the light most favorable to himself.”
(People v. Sanghera, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1573.)
The next Clark factor concerns the duration of the crime.
“Where a victim is held at gunpoint, kidnapped, or otherwise
restrained in the presence of perpetrators for prolonged periods,
‘there is a greater window of opportunity for violence’ [citation],
possibly culminating in murder.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p.
620.) Here, the perpetrators subdued Rawlings and ransacked
the Rawlings home for 10 to 15 minutes, during which time they
also restrained Rawlings in the trunk of the Bentley. Substantial
evidence supports the trial court’s finding that “Taylor did
nothing during [sic] to minimize the risk of violence, and instead
escalated the risk of violence by putting Rawlings in the trunk.”
We decline Taylor’s invitation to draw the competing inference
that he had no opportunity to minimize the risk to Rawlings
31
because he was occupied with burglarizing the home. We agree
with him and the trial court, however, that there was no evidence
as to the next Clark factor, whether Taylor knew his co-
perpetrator had a propensity for violence or was likely to use
lethal force.
Finally, we consider whether Taylor undertook any efforts
to minimize the risk of violence during the felony. The trial court
found that he did not, and substantial evidence amply supports
this finding. Taylor and his co-perpetrator, armed with duct
tape, handcuffs, and a gun, initiated the offenses by ambushing
Rawlings as he arrived home from the store. Rather than simply
leaving Rawlings at the house as they fled, or placing him in the
passenger compartment of the car, Taylor and his co-perpetrator
forced him into the trunk. They then led the police on a high-
speed chase, knowing full well that Rawlings was rolling around
in the trunk as they did so. After crashing the car, both
perpetrators fled the scene without checking on or rendering aid
to Rawlings, and Taylor proceeded to violently carjack another
victim to facilitate his escape. As the trial court astutely noted,
“[a] law-abiding person in Taylor’s position would have perceived
that placing the victim in the trunk of a car that was about to flee
the police posed a grave danger to his life, and Taylor knowingly
and actively participated in the kidnapping in disregard of that
risk.” Even though Taylor is correct that there was no evidence
Rawlings would have survived had he rendered aid (see In re
Taylor (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 543, 559), his actions throughout
the course of the entire incident tip this factor against him.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings
regarding the Clark factors, both individually and collectively.
We accordingly affirm its finding that Taylor acted with reckless
32
indifference to human life during the events that led to
Rawlings’s death.
V. Youth
Taylor, who was 23 years old at the time of Rawlings’s
death, contends that the order denying his petition must be
vacated and the matter remanded for the trial court to consider
the impact of his youth on his conduct and mental state. He
asserts that his “youth likely impacted his ability to appreciate
the risks,” and thus was a relevant factor that the trial court
should have considered. Taylor concedes that he failed to raise
the issue in his briefing or at the hearing, but argues this
omission “should be excused because of the recency” of People v.
Jones (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1088, fn. 7 (Jones), which
stated that “a defendant’s youthful age must be considered.”
A review of Jones shows why remand is not warranted in
this case. There, defense counsel argued the defendant “‘was
barely 20 years old at the time of [the] crime,’” “‘immature’” and
“‘still developing.’” (Jones, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1091.)
The trial court issued a detailed explanation of its denial of the
resentencing motion, but “did not mention [the defendant’s] age
or maturity level.” (Ibid.) On appeal, the court observed that
“[i]n the usual case, the fact that a court did not specifically
mention certain evidence does not mean that the court ‘ignored’
that evidence.” (Id. at p. 1092.) Rather, the court will “presume
the trial court followed the law in exercising its duties and duly
considered the evidence presented to it.” (Ibid.) The court
determined, however, the “unusual circumstances” of the case
before it required remand “for the court’s consideration of all
relevant factors consistent with prevailing law.” (Id. at pp. 1079,
1093.)
33
The Jones court pointed out that In re Moore (2021) 68
Cal.App.5th 434, which “squarely” held a defendant’s youth is a
relevant factor in the Banks and Clark analyses, was not issued
until months after the trial court’s decision denying Jones’
resentencing motion. (Jones, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1092.)
To the extent another case, People v. Harris (2021) 60
Cal.App.5th 939 (Harris) previously indicated youth was a
relevant factor, that opinion was issued “just a few weeks” before
the trial court’s denial of Jones’ resentencing petition and
without any “remonstrance by defense counsel.” (Jones, supra, at
pp. 1091-1092.) Accordingly, and “in the interest of justice,” the
court remanded the matter for “the trial court to have a
meaningful opportunity to consider [Jones’] youth . . . consistent
with prevailing law.” (Id. at p. 1093.)
Here, the “unusual circumstances” identified in Jones are
not present. Taylor’s evidentiary hearing was held on July 24,
2023, more than six months after Jones, 23 months after Moore,
and 29 months after Harris. Taylor’s hearing also significantly
post-dated other relevant case law cited in Jones. (See Jones,
supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1091-1092; citing People v. Ramirez
(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 990-991 [no substantial evidence
defendant acted with reckless indifference in light of his youth]
and Harper, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at pp. 467-472 [habeas corpus
petition denied where defendant’s youth, even if a factor, did not
change his culpability].)
Although neither Taylor nor the prosecution expressly
addressed his youth as a relevant factor, “we presume the trial
court followed the law in exercising its duties and duly considered
the evidence presented to it.” (Jones, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p.
1092.) This presumption derives from the “fundamental principle
34
of appellate procedure,” that “a trial court judgment is ordinarily
presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to
demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate
court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies
reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th
594, 608-609.) “In the usual case, the fact that a court did not
specifically mention certain evidence does not mean that the
court ‘ignored’ that evidence.” (Jones, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p.
1092.)
Here, information regarding Taylor’s age was included in
the underlying criminal record admitted at the evidentiary
hearing. His birthdate was included on the charging documents,
and several witnesses at the trial commented on Taylor’s
“youthful appearance” and estimated that both perpetrators were
“young.” The trial court expressly stated that it reviewed the
entire record of conviction, including the lengthy trial transcript
and exhibits. Although the court did not expressly discuss
Taylor’s age in issuing its final ruling on the petition, it was not
required to do so, and there is no affirmative indication it refused
to consider the point. We thus presume the court properly
considered Taylor’s youth as part of its analysis. Taylor’s
speculation to the contrary does not defeat that presumption.
In any event, youth alone is not dispositive (Harper, supra,
76 Cal.App.5th at p. 470), and “[t]he fact of youth cannot
overwhelm all other factors.” (People v. Mitchell (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 575, 595.) Here, the trial court performed a
thorough inquiry, and its findings were well supported by
substantial evidence. Taylor has not demonstrated which factors
or findings, if any, were affected by the key traits of youth,
impulsivity and vulnerability to peer pressure, which
35
“presumably . . . weaken[ ] as a defendant approaches 26.”
(People v. Oliver (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 466, 489.) As respondent
points out, the evidence showed that the crimes were planned
and Taylor was prepared with a disguise, restraints, and a police
scanner. Nothing in the record suggested that Taylor acted in
response to peer pressure from the co-perpetrator or anyone else.
For all these reasons, we find that remand for the consideration
of Taylor’s youth is not warranted.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Taylor’s petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6 is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COLLINS, J.
We concur:
CURREY, P. J.
ZUKIN, J.
36
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