S.F. v. Hunter CA2/5

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Filed 2/25/25 S.F. v. Hunter CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

S.F., B324129

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 22SMRO00115)

JAMES WEBB HUNTER,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, David W. Swift, Judge. Affirmed.
Lewin Law Group and Chad M. Lewin for Defendant and
Appellant.
Law Office of A. George Glasco and A. George Glasco for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Plaintiff and respondent S.F. (plaintiff) applied for a
Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) restraining order
against defendant and appellant James Hunter (defendant). The
two were formerly in a sexual relationship, which defendant at
one point described as a “sugar baby” relationship (we’ll explain).
At the restraining order hearing, plaintiff testified, defendant
exercised his right against self-incrimination when notified of
plaintiff’s intent to call him as a witness, and the trial court ruled
a five-year restraining order should issue on two alternative
bases: under the DVPA as requested and, sua sponte without
objection, as a civil harassment restraining order under Code of
Civil Procedure section 527.6 (Section 527.6). We are asked to
decide whether the court erred in advising defendant he would
not be permitted to invoke his right against self-incrimination on
a question by question basis, whether the substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s finding the parties were previously in a
“dating relationship” as defined by the DVPA,1 and whether the
trial court’s alternative Section 527.6 basis for issuing the order
violated defendant’s due process rights. For reasons we shall
explain, answering only two of these questions is necessary.

I. BACKGROUND
On April 15, 2022, plaintiff, then 22 years old, called the
police to report defendant as a stalker. Plaintiff explained to
responding officers that she and defendant, who was then 44

1
“‘Dating relationship’ means frequent, intimate
associations primarily characterized by the expectation of
affection or sexual involvement independent of financial
considerations.” (Fam. Code, § 6210.)

2
years old, had been in a sexual relationship that lasted
approximately one year. She ended the relationship in 2019, and
defendant reportedly refused to accept that and had been a
“problem” for her ever since.
Plaintiff explained that, on multiple occasions since the
termination of their relationship, defendant threatened to share
sexually explicit images of her on social media if she contacted
the police. According to plaintiff, defendant had appeared at her
residence uninvited on multiple occasions and, on another
occasion, he secretly followed her to dinner and sent her text
messages describing what she ate and drank. Plaintiff explained
her call to the police that day was triggered when she received
multiple phone calls and text messages from defendant asking for
“alone time” with her and plaintiff’s mother subsequently
realized defendant was parked in the alley behind their home.
While she was being questioned by the officers, defendant
called and sent text messages to plaintiff warning her about
contacting the police; the messages suggested defendant knew
police officers were at her residence. The police advised plaintiff
to obtain a restraining order.

A. Plaintiff Obtains a Temporary Restraining Order
On April 21, 2022, plaintiff submitted a form application
for a domestic violence restraining order to protect herself and
her mother, father, and younger brother from defendant. On her
application, plaintiff checked a box stating she and defendant
“are dating or used to date.” She explained that in addition to
“[c]ontinued and persistent stalking, including constant
harassment through text messages, calls and social media
outreach,” defendant “threatened to publish explicit photos of

3
[her] on the internet unless [she] agreed to meet him in private.”
She attested further that defendant made “multiple unwelcome
attempts in person to come near [her] home, has been seen
in . . . close vicinity of [her] home and neighborhood, has
threatened to . . . get [her] expelled from school and to ruin [her]
personal reputation through slander . . . .” Attached to her
application were 10 pages of supporting documents, including a
copy of the police report, copies of text messages, and letters from
her and her parents to the court.
In one of the attached text message exchanges, plaintiff
received the following message: “Let’s make peace please [¶] I
won[’]t harass you[,] [I] swear [¶] I won[’]t be jealous [¶] I won[’]t
interfere with who you are seeing.” Plaintiff responded: “Do not
contact me or this number, be advised I have contacted the
police.” The response was as follows: “Lmao [¶] Be advised that I
don[’]t give a fuck.” In another text message attaching a sexually
explicit video of plaintiff, defendant said, “You mention the police
to me again and it goes on Pornhub[.]” There were also other text
messages threatening dissemination of sexually explicit images of
plaintiff and making lewd comments.
In the letter to the court plaintiff submitted with her
restraining order application, she explained she began her
relationship with defendant in 2019 and admitted it “was not a
healthy relationship.” After she broke it off and took steps to
block any further communications from defendant, he “eventually
tracked [her] down” and “threatened to send explicit pictures to
the dean of my school and put sexual photos and videos of me on
the internet. [¶] He also threatened me with putting videos of me
on porn sites if I went to the police.” After plaintiff told her
parents about defendant, “he started harassing them as well. He

4
contacted my ex-boyfriend as well as threatening to send pictures
to any future boy I dated.”
The letter from plaintiff’s father stated he was “personally
present” when defendant approached the family home and
demanded to see plaintiff in private. He also said he had been
“on or near the phone when [defendant] has called or messaged
with threatening and unrelenting acts of attempted blackmail
and coercion, desperation, obsession, and utter vulgarity.” The
letter from plaintiff’s mother related defendant impersonated her
husband “in an effort to get information from others” about
plaintiff and had vandalized the family home. She added that
she cannot forget defendant’s “hate[-]filled words” when she
personally spoke with him on the telephone and she advised she
is afraid to leave plaintiff alone in the house. She reported that
as a result of defendant’s harassment, plaintiff had “lost her
appetite, hardly sleeps, and exhibits severe social anxiety.”
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order
forbidding defendant from contacting or approaching plaintiff
and her family at home, work, or school. The court also noticed
an evidentiary hearing to consider issuing a more permanent
restraining order.

B. The Restraining Order Hearing
The trial court held the restraining order hearing in August
2022, and both plaintiff and defendant were represented by
counsel at the hearing.2 The court admitted plaintiff’s
application and supporting exhibits in evidence and she testified.

2
The hearing was originally calendared for May of that year
but had been continued multiple times at defendant’s request

5
On direct examination, plaintiff testified her relationship
with defendant began while she was in her last year in high
school and the “amicabl[e]” phase of that relationship lasted
between one and a half to two years. After she ended the
relationship in August 2019 (about the time she started college),
however, defendant began calling her in the middle of the night
and pleading with her to continue the relationship. When she
refused, he threatened to share sexually intimate videos of her—
which were recorded without her consent—with family, the dean
of her college, and others.
Plaintiff acknowledged defendant did not directly threaten
to harm her physically, but she explained he made her fearful
and he threatened to harm himself (“he said if I ever blocked him
or stopped him, that he would . . . kill himself . . . in front of my
house”). Defendant also got other people to call plaintiff,
including “multiple random women,” who would deliver “really
cryptic messages,” such as “[Defendant] is looking for you. Be
careful where you go. Be careful who you meet. He’s angry. It’s
not over.” Defendant also sent “really scary” messages to
plaintiff on social media. In response, plaintiff changed her
phone number, purchased and downloaded to her cellular phone
an application that blocked telephone calls from numbers with no
identifying information, and told “everyone [she] knew” not to
give defendant her new phone number.
Discussing the specific events that triggered her call to the
police and request for a restraining order, plaintiff testified she

based on his belief that criminal charges might be filed against
him. At the time of the hearing, no criminal charges had been
filed.

6
felt “harassed” and “intimidated” when she received the text
messages she submitted in support of her application and
“terrified” when she saw defendant standing outside her home.
She agreed to leave the house to speak with him because he
promised over the phone to end his harassment if she told him
face-to-face to leave her alone. Once she was outside, defendant
apologized and told her he had left her a “birthday present” in the
alley behind her home; plaintiff discovered her new social media
name and the words “I see you” had been spray-painted on a
mural on the back wall of her family’s property. Defendant then
ran towards her, causing her to back up in fear: “I can’t really
describe that fear. It’s painful in your stomach. It’s physical.”
On cross-examination, defendant’s attorney asked about
the origins of plaintiff’s relationship with defendant. She
testified defendant contacted her on social media asking if she
was interested in a “sugar baby” relationship.3 That contact then
led to exchanges between them on Instagram and Snapchat, and
ultimately, plaintiff had sex with defendant a “handful” of times

3
“[S]ugar dating is typically understood to mean an
arrangement between a ‘sugar daddy’ or ‘sugar momma,’ namely
an older, wealthier individual, and a ‘sugar baby,’ who is a
younger, financially motivated person.” (Reflex Media, Inc. v.
Successfulmatch.com (N.D.Cal. December 6, 2022, Case No. 20-
cv-06393-JD) 2022 WL 17477109 at *1.) In exchange for money
or valuable gifts, the sugar baby provides companionship and/or
sexual favors to the older person. (Reflex Media, Inc. v. Luxy Ltd.
(C.D.Cal. October 3, 2021, Case No. 2:20-cv-00423-RGK-KS),
2021 WL 5936974 at *1; Infostream, Inc. v. PayPal, Inc. (N.D.
Cal. August 28, 2012, Case No. C 12–748 SI) 2012 WL 3731517 at
*1 & fn. 1.)

7
and each time for money, with the amount increasing from $300
the first time to $4,000 the final time. Plaintiff acknowledged she
also “willingly” sent intimate still photos of herself to defendant
in exchange for money. Plaintiff broke things off with defendant
in 2019 because “she was feeling disgusted by the relationship”
and “couldn’t handle it anymore.”
Between August 2019 and April 2022, plaintiff saw
defendant in person only one other time before she saw him
outside her house and called the police: while out walking with
her boyfriend, she spotted defendant walking down the street
toward her home. Between 2019 and early 2021, however,
defendant and plaintiff spoke by phone “all the time. There were
discussions, conversations about the same thing over and over
again. You know, threats, [defendant] calling saying ‘I love you.
I just want you back.’ Multiple conversations.” After she
changed her phone number in 2021 and moved away from the
family home, plaintiff did not receive any phone calls or text
messages from defendant until shortly before she called the police
in April 2022 because he “couldn’t find [her].”
Defendant’s attorney also questioned plaintiff about a
movie defendant was supposedly producing (entitled “Vagabond
Lover 1999”).4 She recalled doing some voiceovers for the movie,
but she denied receiving money to act in the film or signing a

4
Plaintiff testified she believed the film was about “an older
man having a relationship with a younger girl.” The cross-
examination of plaintiff indicates defendant filed a contract-
based civil suit against plaintiff in connection with the movie
project and served her with the complaint and summons the day
before the restraining order hearing.

8
contract to appear in it. When asked whether she and defendant
discussed this movie during the less amicable “I want you back”
phase of their relationship, plaintiff testified “it was never the
focus of any conversation we had . . . . [¶] What he wanted from
me was to see me again, to have me back in his life, and for me to
never block him or to leave him. That was the main point of any
conversation we had.”
When plaintiff’s counsel advised that his next witness
would be defendant, the trial court asked defense counsel
whether his client would testify or exercise his right against self-
incrimination. Without objection, the trial court briefly explained
that right as follows: “Just so there’s no confusion, sir. We don’t
allow people to selectively exercise [Fifth] Amendment rights.
You have [Fifth] Amendment rights, so you do not have to testify.
I’m not going to get you on the stand and have you answer every
question with ‘I assert my [Fifth] Amendment rights.’
[¶] . . . [I]t’s perfectly fine, and I won’t hold it against you. You
are allowed to do that. [¶] What’s not okay is for you to pick and
choose what questions you want to answer and what questions
you are going to decline to answer. That’s not how it works. So,
you either decline to answer questions, which is your right, or you
answer all of the questions.”
After a pause in the proceedings to confer with counsel,
defendant personally stated he “would very much like to testify,”
but he would follow his attorney’s recommendation and decline to
do so. Defense counsel also confirmed for the court that he
advised his client to invoke his right against self-incrimination
and refuse to testify.
After the presentation of evidence, the court heard brief
argument from counsel. Defendant’s attorney made what he

9
characterized as a “motion to dismiss” because there was no
evidence of a dating relationship under the DVPA. Defendant’s
attorney emphasized plaintiff’s testimony that the only meetings
between defendant and plaintiff were for sex in exchange for
money. Defense counsel also argued there was no basis to issue a
restraining order even putting aside the dating relationship issue
because there was too big a gap between when the parties’
communication tapered off in 2019 and plaintiff’s call to the
police in 2022.
The trial court remarked that defense counsel gave it “more
to think about than [it] expected with the [dating relationship]
argument.” The court, however, found there was sufficient
evidence the parties were in such a relationship. The trial court
also found in the alternative—and without objection from the
defense—that it had “the authority to convert a [DVPA]
application into a civil harassment restraining order application”
and that the facts supported issuance of a restraining order
under that statute too.5 Specifically, the court found by clear and
convincing evidence that defendant engaged in unlawful
harassment, threats, and a “knowing and willful course of
conduct that would reasonably place a person in fear for herself
and her immediate family.”

5
After the court stated it would make an alternative Section
527.6 finding, defense counsel asked to make a record and argued
he believed the evidence would not permit an order to issue under
that statute because there was insufficient evidence of “a series of
acts and a series of incidents that happen in order for a court to
grant that.” Defense counsel did not contest the court’s authority
to conform the evidence to proof and alternatively grant the
restraining order under Section 527.6, however.

10
The five-year restraining order the court issued prohibited
defendant from contacting, harassing, or otherwise disturbing the
protected parties’ peace; in addition, the court ordered defendant
not to distribute post, share, or send any sexually explicit images
of plaintiff via any medium.

II. DISCUSSION
Novel questions abound concerning the definition of “dating
relationship” in Family Code section 6210: whether the
“independent of financial considerations” proviso modifies the
“expectation of affection” element or just the “sexual
involvement” element, what precisely “financial considerations”
means, and just how independent must sexual involvement (or
expectation of affection) be from such considerations. But these
are questions for another day; we need not answer them to
resolve this appeal.
We hold defendant’s challenge to the court’s self-
incrimination advisement fails because a civil litigant like
defendant can be advised selective invocation of the right is not
permitted and because defendant in any event makes no showing
of prejudice from the court’s advisement. We further hold the
trial court did not violate defendant’s due process rights by
alternatively conforming plaintiff’s request for a restraining order
to proof and justifying the order under Section 527.6; the due
process argument defendant makes now is forfeited because there
was no objection below and, regardless, conforming to proof was
permitted when the elements of the two statutory predicates
(DVPA and Section 527.6) were related and did not adversely
impact the presentation of evidence. Because there is no other

11
challenge to the Section 527.6 basis for the trial court’s order, we
shall affirm it.

A. Reversal Is Not Warranted for an Asserted
Misstatement of Self-Incrimination Principles
“It is well settled that the privilege against self-
incrimination may be invoked not only by a criminal defendant,
but also by parties or witnesses in a civil action. [Citation.]
However, while the privilege of a criminal defendant is absolute,
in a civil case a witness or party may be required either to waive
the privilege or accept the civil consequences of silence if he or
she does exercise it. [Citations.]” (Alvarez v. Sanchez (1984) 158
Cal.App.3d 709, 712; accord, Oiye v. Fox (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th
1036, 1054.) “‘[I]t is not unconstitutional to force a litigant to
choose between invoking the Fifth Amendment in a civil case,
thus risking a loss there, or answering the questions in the civil
context, thus risking subsequent criminal prosecution.
[Citations.]’” (Avant! Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 79
Cal.App.4th 876, 886; accord, In re Marriage of Sachs (2002) 95
Cal.App.4th 1144, 1155 [“‘[A] civil defendant does not have the
absolute right to invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination. . . . A party or witness in a civil proceeding “may
be required either to waive the privilege or accept the civil
consequences of silence if he or she does exercise it”’”].)
As the United States Supreme Court has explained, “a
witness has the choice, after weighing the advantage of the
privilege against self-incrimination against the advantage of
putting forward his version of the facts and his reliability as a
witness, not to testify at all. He cannot reasonably claim that the
Fifth Amendment gives him not only this choice but, if he elects

12
to testify, an immunity from cross-examination on the matters he
has himself put in dispute. It would make of the Fifth
Amendment not only a humane safeguard against judicially
coerced self-disclosure but a positive invitation to mutilate the
truth a party offers to tell. . . . The interests of the other party
and regard for the function of courts of justice to ascertain the
truth become relevant, and prevail in the balance of
considerations determining the scope and limits of the privilege
against self-incrimination.” (Brown v. United States (1958) 356
U.S. 148, 155-56.)
In advising defendant that he could either testify and
answer all questions put to him or invoke his right to remain
silent, the trial court did not err. The court’s position was
consistent with the high court’s view of the matter in Brown. The
cases defendant cites as ostensible support for his contention that
the court should have instead allowed him to assert his right
against self-incrimination on a question-by-question basis all
involve factual scenarios that are distinguished from the posture
of this case. (A & M Records, Inc. v. Heilman (1977) 75
Cal.App.3d 554, 564-565, 566 [affirming order precluding
defendant from testifying at trial on matters he refused to testify
about at his deposition based on his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination]; Warford v. Medeiros (1984) 160 Cal.
App.3d 1035, 1038-1039, 1045-46 [trial court erred by not
conducting a particularized inquiry into nonparty deponents’
refusal to answer questions at their deposition based on their
Fifth Amendment rights]; Fuller v. Superior Court (2001) 87
Cal.App.4th 299, 308 [any discovery order with respect to
security guards’ privilege against self-incrimination would be
premature until depositions commenced and the guards invoked

13
that privilege with respect to specific questions]; Blackburn v.
Superior Court (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 414, 420 [addressing
various issues arising out of accused child molester’s refusal to
answer most questions at his deposition based on his Fifth
Amendment rights]; People ex rel. City of Dana Point v. Holistic
Health (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1016, 1031 [trial court abused its
discretion by excluding evidence on summary judgment due to a
marijuana dispensary operator’s invocation of the Fifth
Amendment privilege during a deposition].)
Moreover, even if it was error to advise defendant he could
not selectively invoke his right against self-incrimination, and
even if defendant’s decision not to testify can be attributed to the
court’s advisement rather than his attorney’s independent advice,
defendant did not make the required showing below that would
permit us to conclude the court’s advisement was prejudicial. If
defendant believed there was some testimony he could have given
that would have been favorable to him in this matter while not
implicating his right to refrain from making statements that
could be used against him in criminal proceedings, he had an
obligation to make an offer of proof to describe what that
testimony would have been—which would allow this court to
determine whether the effective exclusion of that testimony
resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art VI, section
13; see also Evid. Code, § 354.) No such offer of proof was made
in the trial court, nor has defendant even now explained what
that purported testimony could have been. Reversal on this
ground is therefore unavailable.

14
B. Defendant’s Due Process Argument is Forfeited and
Meritless
In this court, defendant does not reprise the Section 527.6
argument he made in the trial court, namely, that the evidence
was insufficient to meet the elements that must be proven to
issue a Section 527.6 restraining order. (See generally Code Civ.
Proc., § 527.6, subd. (b)(3) [“harassment” justifying issuance of a
restraining order includes “unlawful violence, a credible threat of
violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a
specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the
person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of
conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable person to
suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause
substantial emotional distress”]; Schild v. Rubin (1991) 232
Cal.App.3d 755, 762.) Instead, he makes a solitary, new
argument: that his due process rights were assertedly infringed
“because [plaintiff] never requested and the [c]ourt similarly did
not indicate before taking evidence that it would contemplate
issuing an order restraining different conduct and based upon
different concerns from the [DVPA].” That argument, however,
was waived when counsel failed to object below or ask to reopen
the presentation of evidence (instead opting to contest the court’s
alternative ruling only based on the sufficiency of the evidence
presented).6 (See, e.g., D.Z. v. L.B. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 625,

6
In the case on which defendant chiefly relies to argue his
due process rights were violated, North Coast Village
Condominium Assn. v. Phillips (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 866, the
aggrieved party did object to the court’s announced course of
action. (Id. at 878.)

15
632 [“California courts recognize that claims alleging violations of
due process rights can be forfeited by failing to raise them in the
trial court”]; Hepner v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th
1475, 1486 [“In civil cases, constitutional questions not raised in
the trial court are considered waived”].) The trial court’s
restraining order therefore stands because there is no properly
preserved challenge to the Section 527.6 justification for it.
Even putting aside the forfeiture for the sake of argument,
defendant’s due process argument still fails. Established
authority permits a trial court to amend a pleading to conform to
proof “at any time before or after commencement of trial, in the
furtherance of justice” (Code Civ. Proc., § 576), and decisions to
permit such amendments are reviewed for abuse of discretion
(Trafton v. Youngblood (1968) 69 Cal.2d 17, 31). “‘[N]o abuse of
discretion is shown unless by permitting the amendment new and
substantially different issues are introduced in the case or the
rights of the adverse party prejudiced.’” (Ibid.)
There is no such showing on this record. The trial court’s
reliance on Section 527.6 did not introduce new and substantially
different issues; the necessary factual predicates for issuing a
restraining order under Section 527.6 and under the DVPA are
quite similar. At most, the trial court’s decision to conform the
restraining order application to Section 527.6 proof removed an
issue from the case (whether the parties were in a dating
relationship) rather than injected a new issue that the parties
could not have anticipated a need to address through the
presentation of evidence. In addition, defendant’s rights were not
otherwise prejudiced by the court’s decision to make an
alternative Section 527.6 finding. Generally speaking, Section
527.6 in many respects is the more defendant-favorable statute:

16
it imposes a higher burden of proof (clear and convincing
evidence) and requires a factual predicate that is just as
stringent as the DVPA, if not more so. To be sure, Section 527.6
does not require the existence of a dating relationship, and the
absence of that element did close off one avenue of the defense
strategy for prevailing in this case. But the prejudice to which
Trafton refers is not merely a lower chance of prevailing; that
would necessarily exist any time there is an amendment to
conform to proof. Rather, the prejudice must be some other
hindrance in the presentation of evidence. (See, e.g., McMillin v.
Eare (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 893, 913 [“‘“Due process requires that
all parties be notified of the facts and issues in dispute, that each
party be afforded a fair opportunity to present evidence in open
court, and that judgment be rendered based on an evaluation of
the evidence on each side, findings of fact and conclusions of
law”’”]; Mac v. Minassian (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 510, 519
[“California courts have denied leave to amend where the
proposed amendment to the complaint is during or after trial,
and the amendment would require the defendant to have
litigated or acted differently to assert his rights before and at
trial”].) There was no such hindrance here.

17
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed. Plaintiff is awarded
costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, J.
We concur:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

MOOR, J.

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