Manos v. J Paul Getty Trust CA2/5

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Filed 2/21/25 Manos v. J Paul Getty Trust CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

GEORGE MANOS, B322283

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 21STCV07276)

J PAUL GETTY TRUST,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, William F. Fahey, Judge. Affirmed.
Abrolat Law and Nancy L. Abrolat; Benedon & Serlin,
Judith E. Posner, and Kian Tamaddoni for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, Johnnie A.
James, and Kathleen J. Choi for Defendant and Respondent.
Defendant and respondent the J Paul Getty Trust (the
Getty) discharged plaintiff and appellant George Manos (Manos)
after granting repeated extensions of a leave of absence due to a
workplace injury. Manos then sued the Getty alleging his former
employer failed to provide a reasonable accommodation, failed to
engage in the interactive process to determine a reasonable
disability accommodation, and retaliated against him for
engaging in protected activity. The trial court granted summary
judgment for the Getty. We consider whether there is a dispute
of material fact requiring trial on any of the aforementioned
causes of action, as well as on Manos’s derivative cause of action
for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.

I. BACKGROUND
In February 2011, the Getty hired Manos as a heating,
ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) technician at its Los
Angeles campus. The position’s physical requirements entailed,
among other things, standing, walking, squatting, bending,
kneeling, twisting, climbing, driving, pushing/pulling, lifting 30-
40 pounds, and carrying 20-30 pounds. The “physical work
environment” included duties inside, outside, in confined
quarters and high places, along with exposure to fumes, odors,
gases, dust and dirt. Manos was interviewed for the position by
John Donohoe, the Facilities Manager, Michael Galindo
(Galindo), the Facility Engineer Supervisor, and Robert
Margherita (Margherita), the HVAC Lead Technician. The Getty
hired Manos as a “HVAC Technician II,” which meant he was
responsible for, among other things, maintaining ice machines.

2
A. Manos Complains About His Co-Workers’ Conduct
On June 19, 2018, Manos complained to Veronica Leute
(Leute), a Human Resources Coordinator, about his treatment at
the hands of Galindo, Margherita, and a third employee. Among
other things, Manos described feeling “threaten[ed],” “harassed,”
and “belittled”; he related that two days earlier, he felt “so
stressed out” after a conversation with Galindo that he “began to
have chest pains” and went to the hospital.
The following day, Leute alerted Michael Ruhr (Ruhr), a
Senior Human Resources Specialist, to Manos’s complaints by
emailing him notes of her conversation with Manos. A day after
that, Ruhr invited Manos to meet with him to discuss his
concerns.
During the meeting, Manos described a number of
incidents involving both Galindo and Margherita, some of which
occurred several years earlier and one of which, according to
Manos, caused him to seek treatment at a hospital (after
performing a work assignment that aggravated a medical
condition). Ruhr’s notes of the meeting recorded Manos as
stating he “does not feel harassed. He is not looking for any
further action, he just wants to come to work and feel like he’s
not an ‘irritant’ to [Galindo] and [Margherita]. He would like to
see more civility in the shop.” Later that same day, Manos
emailed Ruhr, thanking him for the meeting and advising he had
a “productive” conversation with Galindo that helped “clear the
air over [his] concerns.”
Two days later, on June 28, 2018, Manos again met with
Ruhr. Manos described a conversation he overheard the day
before between Margherita and another employee about “what
they would do if anyone ever retaliated against them”; during the

3
conversation, Manos heard Margherita say “he would make sure
that he knew where the person lived.” Manos advised Ruhr that
although he did not know what Margherita meant by his
comment, it nonetheless upset him. Manos also advised he was
too upset to continue discussing the matter with Ruhr, who
recommended he “take a sick day and go home” and that they
would continue their discussion when he was “back at work and
feeling better.”
On July 3, and again on July 10, 2018, Ruhr emailed
Manos asking to meet again to continue their discussion about
Margherita’s comments. Ruhr never received a response.

B. Manos Goes on a Medical Leave of Absence Due to a
Work Injury
Roughly a year later, on June 4, 2019, Manos fell off a
ladder while performing preventive maintenance on an ice
machine and fractured his left leg. Four days later, Manos
submitted his first request for medical leave, in which he asked
for an “indefinite” leave of absence. A doctor certified Manos was
not “able to perform work of any kind” and estimated he might be
able to return to work that November.
In a letter dated August 22, 2019, Ruhr explained to Manos
that his 12 weeks of protected leave would soon expire and
advised that the Getty, as an accommodation, would place him on
a supplemental leave of absence with an expected return to work
on December 3, 2019. Ruhr advised further that “the Getty
cannot guarantee reinstatement during or after a supplemental
leave and, depending on the nature of [his] job, [his] department
may need to fill the position [he] held prior to [his] leave.”

4
In November 2019, Manos, submitted a second medical
leave request in which he indicated a continuing need for an
“indefinite” leave. Manos’s physician, Dr. Clinton Soppe, opined
Manos was still unable to perform work of “any kind,” but he
estimated Manos would be able to return to work by the end of
January 2020. The Getty advised Manos it was placing him on
“inactive” status (without pay) and explained that “[if] an
employee who has been placed on inactive status does not return
to work at the Getty, within 90 days of being placed on inactive
status, he or she will be separated from employment . . . .”
In January 2020, Manos submitted a third request for
medical leave in which he requested an extension of his leave to
April 30, 2020. Dr. Soppe again opined Manos was unable to
perform any work and estimated Manos would be able to return
to work at the Getty by the end of April.
Manos continued on inactive status, and Ruhr wrote to him
in advance of the anticipated April return to work to advise the
Getty “provides reasonable accommodations to employees with
disabilities to permit them to perform the essential
responsibilities of their jobs.” Ruhr’s letter asked Manos to detail
any accommodations that he believed would allow him to carry
out his job duties. Manos never responded to the request to
identify accommodations.
In early April 2020, Manos submitted a fourth request for
medical leave. In contrast to his third request, which asked for
leave to a date certain in April, Manos’s fourth request returned
to requesting “indefinite” leave. Dr. Soppe again opined Manos
was unable to work and estimated he would be able to return to
work at the end of July.

5
Ruhr later wrote to Manos and requested he and his
physician complete an “Interactive Process Questionnaire.” Ruhr
also asked Manos to see if his physician could “offer suggestions,
if any, for the type of accommodation(s) that would allow you to
perform the essential functions of your position and return to
work.” Attached to Ruhr’s letter was the interactive process
questionnaire and a copy of Manos’s job description.
Less than two weeks later, in May 2020, Manos returned a
signed copy of the job description and the completed
questionnaire. In his portion of the questionnaire, Manos
affirmed he had difficulty performing his job duties and stated: “I
still can’t stand upright, walk without a walker or cane, squat,
kneel, bend, operate foot controls, climb, push, pull, lift or carry
items 20 pounds or move distances.” Manos advised that he was
not requesting any accommodations “at this time,” checked a box
requesting “continuous leave,” and advised the “end date” for his
leave was “unknown.”
In Dr. Soppe’s portion of the questionnaire, he affirmed
Manos had a physical impairment (a tibial plateau fracture in the
left leg) that limited a major life activity. Dr. Soppe checked a
box characterizing Manos’s impairment as “temporary” and
stated the expected duration of the impairment was “12-18
months.” Based on the attached description of Manos’s job
duties, Dr. Soppe affirmed Manos could not perform the following
functions: “climbing, squatting, bending/walking for extended
time periods.” Although he opined Manos could not perform his
job with accommodations, Dr. Soppe at the same time
recommended accommodations in the form of “[n]o climbing at
this point or excessive bending/squatting.”

6
C. The Getty Terminates Manos’s Employment
Ruhr interpreted the completed interactive process
questionnaire as a request for an indefinite leave because
defendant’s physician did not know for certain when or if Manos
would be able to return to work—and it was expected to be 12 to
18 months before he might return. Because he considered a
request for unlimited leave to be an unreasonable
accommodation, Ruhr recommended to his manager that Mano’s
employment be terminated. His manager agreed with the
recommendation, and Ruhr sent a letter, dated June 22, 2020, to
Manos terminating his employment with the Getty. The letter
explained the termination decision was ultimately based on the
results of the interactive process questionnaire, which indicated
Manos would not be able to return to work in the “foreseeable
future.”
In February 2021, eight months after his termination,
Manos sued the Getty for violation of the Fair Employment and
Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.1) and other
alleged wrongs.2 Manos’s FEHA causes of action averred the
Getty retaliated against him for engaging in protected conduct
(e.g., raising complaints about misconduct in the workplace by
Galindo and Margherita) (§ 12940, subd. (h)), failed to
accommodate his disability (§ 12940, subd. (m)), and failed to
engage in the interactive process (§ 12940, subd. (n)). Based in

1
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Government Code.
2
Manos also sued Galindo and Margherita. In October 2021,
Manos accepted those defendants’ statutory offers of compromise.

7
part on these alleged FEHA violations, Manos also averred the
Getty wrongfully terminated him in violation of public policy.3

D. The Getty’s Motion for Summary Judgment
The Getty moved for summary judgment, arguing Manos’s
FEHA causes of action for failure to accommodate and failure to
engage in the interactive process failed as a matter of law for two
reasons.
First, in the period after he was terminated, Manos
repeatedly and consistently admitted he remained unable to work
with or without an accommodation. In September 2020, for
instance, Manos signed and certified as true and complete an
“Activities and Capabilities Questionnaire” for the Standard
Insurance Company in which he stated, “I am still not fully
recovered from the work injury and cannot stand upright, walk
long distances without a walker/cane, squat, kneel, bend, climb,
push, pull, lift or carry items over 20 pounds without assistance
or losing my balance.” Manos also stated on the questionnaire
that he did not believe he would be able to return to his
occupation as a HVAC technician—or return to work in any
occupation—and stated, “I can no longer work as a HVAC
technician because of my physical disability. I was an HVAC
technician for over 35 years and can no longer do this job because
of the physical requirements.” At his deposition in July 2021,
Manos testified his physical health had not improved to the point
where he could resume work as a HVAC technician and that his

3
Manos’s other causes of action are not at issue in this
appeal.

8
physician was “not sure” when he could return to work because
“[h]e’s never seen damage to a leg like this before.”
Second, the Getty argued there were no job openings
between May and October 2020 for which Manos was qualified
that did not require, at a minimum, bending and the ability to
walk extended distances. During that period there were only
seven positions that did not require bending and extended
walking, but each of those positions required professional
qualifications, skills, or work experience Manos did not possess.
As for Manos’s FEHA retaliation claim, the Getty
contended it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because
there was no evidence establishing a causal link between the
concerns Manos raised in June 2018 and his termination two
years later. The Getty also argued it had a legitimate reason for
terminating Manos’s employment: his inability to return to work
as a HVAC technician or to qualify for an open position.4
The Getty supported its motion with declarations from
Ruhr, Ruhr’s manager, Galindo, and Margherita, excerpts from
transcripts of the depositions of Manos and the aforementioned
declarants, Manos’s responses to written discovery requests, and
an August 2020 qualified medical evaluation of Manos—which
concluded he was “unable to return to his usual and customary
occupation as an HVAC Technician due to the physical demands
of his job including weight bearing, squatting, kneeling and
climbing ladders . . . .” The medical evaluation concluded Manos
was “most amenable to a sedentary job” and recommended “no

4
Because the predicate claims were infirm, the Getty argued
Manos’s cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of
public policy should be dismissed.

9
lifting more than 10 pounds to the waist and no more than 5
pounds overhead.”
Manos’s opposition to the Getty’s motion for summary
judgment conceded as undisputed he made multiple requests for
“indefinite” medical leave prior to his termination, his failure to
respond to Ruhr’s inquiry about accommodations shortly before
his termination, and his post-termination testimony that he
remained unable to perform his duties as a HVAC technician.
But he maintained there were still several disputed issues of fact
precluding entry of summary judgment in the Getty’s favor.
First, Manos argued Dr. Soppe’s statements on the
interactive process questionnaire released him to return to work
in May 2020 with certain “temporary” restrictions that would be
“lifted in 12 to 18 months”; in Manos’s view, this was a request
for an accommodation just one month before the Getty
terminated him.
Second, Manos argued the Getty improperly terminated
him instead of offering him a vacant Security Officer position,
which he could perform with the limitations identified by his
physician. In support of his position, Manos argued Sergio
Grijalva (Grijalva) was hired by the Getty as a security officer
without any prior security experience, was trained by the Getty,
and could perform his job from a wheelchair.
Finally, as to his retaliation claim, Manos changed his
theory of liability. His opposition argued the Getty retaliated
against him, not because of his reports of misconduct by Galindo
and Margherita, but because of his purported request for a
disability accommodation in the interactive process questionnaire
he and Dr. Soppe completed.

10
In reply, the Getty argued the only accommodation
requested by Manos was additional leave because, immediately
following his injury and for years afterwards, he was unable to
perform his duties as an HVAC technician. The Getty disputed
Manos’s contention that his physician declared him ready to
return to work in May 2020, observing Dr. Soppe had
unambiguously declared Manos unable to work from June 4,
2019, (the date of the accident) through July 31, 2020. In
addition, the Getty disputed Manos’s characterization of
Grijalva’s deposition testimony about the physical requirements
for a Getty security officer.5 That position required, among other
things, standing, walking, squatting, bending (neck and waist),
twisting (neck and waist), climbing, pushing/pulling, lifting 50
pounds and carrying 25 pounds. Concurrent with its reply, the
Getty filed written evidentiary objections to Manos’s declaration
and to the declaration from his attorney, along with several of the
exhibits attached thereto.
The day before the summary judgment hearing, one of
Manos’s lawyers filed a supplemental declaration in support of
his opposition to the summary judgment motion. Attached to the
declaration was an excerpt from the “rough draft” of an
uncertified transcript of Dr. Soppe’s deposition, which was taken
two days earlier. At his deposition, Dr. Soppe testified that when

5
In support, the Getty submitted excerpts from Grijalva’s
deposition, a clarifying declaration by Grijalva, and a declaration
by John Gale, a 22-year veteran of the Getty Security
Department. In addition, the Getty submitted the job
qualifications for the security officer position, which was open
during a portion of Manos’s medical leave of absence.

11
he estimated in the interactive process questionnaire that Manos
would return to work in 12 to 18 months, the start date for that
estimate was from when Manos suffered his leg injury in June
2019; in other words, when Dr. Soppe wrote in May 2020 that he
estimated Manos’s impairment would last 12 to 18 months, he
expected Manos to return to work “[in] the next one to six
months” or between June and November 2020.6

E. The Trial Court Grants Summary Judgment for the
Getty
The trial court held the summary judgment hearing on
April 8, 2022. During the hearing, the court pressed Manos’s
counsel to address the May 2020 interactive process
questionnaire, a document the court considered to be “very
significant.” The court queried: “[W]hy does that [document] not
foreclose your client’s claim of a failure to accommodate when he
specifically says . . . he is not requesting any accommodations
whatsoever, and then later on in that same document, the doctor
says that he’s not aware of any accommodations that could be
provided to the plaintiff, and it’s go[ing] to be another up to 18
months before it’s possible that your client goes back to work[?]”
When Manos’s counsel responded by raising its submission—just
the day before—of excerpts from the uncertified transcript of Dr.
Soppe’s deposition, the court stated it had not seen the document
and observed, “I don’t know where under [Code of Civil Procedure
section] 437c you get to do that.” The court additionally
remarked that the date on which Dr. Soppe estimated Manos

6
The Getty did not file a written objection to Manos’s
submission of Dr. Soppe’s deposition testimony.

12
could return to work was “quite indefinite” without “considering
this late-filed stuff” that the court said it was “discounting.”7
Counsel for the Getty argued that even if the doctor’s testimony
about the May 2020 questionnaire was considered and credited, it
was still negated by Manos’s subsequent admission at his July
2021 deposition that he was then still unable to return to work as
an HVAC technician.
After taking the matter under submission, the trial court
issued a ruling granting summary judgment to the Getty.8
The court found the Getty was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on the failure to accommodate and failure to

7
At the hearing, Manos’s counsel observed it had sought
unsuccessfully to continue the trial and summary judgment
motion deadlines so that certain discovery could be completed.
The appellate record indicates Manos’s ex parte requests to
continue the deadlines were made shortly before his opposition to
the Getty’s motion for summary judgment was due. The record,
however, does not include the requests themselves or the trial
court’s ruling on those requests, and Manos does not contend the
trial court erred in denying those requests.
8
The trial court sustained “many” of the Getty’s objections to
Manos’s declaration. Among other things, the court sustained
objections to Manos’s assertion he was at all times qualified and
able to work as a security officer and that in May 2020 Dr. Soppe
released him to return to work with certain restrictions. The
court also sustained an objection to the submission by Manos’s
counsel of a Getty document showing a vacant security officer
position during Manos’s medical leave of absence and the
attorney’s accompanying assertion Manos was qualified for the
position. Manos does not challenge any of the trial court’s
evidentiary rulings, express or implicit, in this appeal.

13
engage in the interactive process causes of action because the
undisputed facts showed Manos was not able to perform the
essential functions of his job, was not requesting any
accommodation other than continued leave, and his return date
was unknown. The trial court did not credit or discuss the
excerpts from the uncertified transcript of Dr. Soppe’s deposition
submitted on the eve of the hearing. Instead, it viewed the
interactive questionnaire from May 2020 as indicating Manos
would not be able to return to work until “November 2021, more
than two and a half years after his accident.” The court
additionally observed Manos’s claim that he should have been
offered a position as a security officer was not made in the
complaint and offered for the first time in his opposition to the
Getty’s motion.
The court ruled in the Getty’s favor on Manos’s retaliation
cause of action because there was “no evidence” of a causal
connection between his complaints of workplace harassment in
June 2018 (the protected activity alleged in the complaint) and
his termination two years later. Finally, because Manos failed to
raise a triable issue of material fact with regard to his other
causes of action, the trial court found the Getty was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on Manos’s derivative cause of action
for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.9

9
The trial court also found that “myriad procedural defects”
in Manos’s opposition provided “a sufficient basis by themselves
to grant the MSJ.” Among other things, Manos’s response to the
Getty’s statement of undisputed facts was “replete with
objections and argument and purports to both dispute and not
dispute facts. It frequently cites to Manos’[s] declaration without

14
II. DISCUSSION
The trial court correctly concluded the Getty was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. No trial was required on the failure
to accommodate and failure to engage in the interactive process
causes of action because the undisputed evidence showed the
Getty reasonably accommodated Manos’s request for medical
leave for more than a year following his injury and reasonably
terminated his employment based on evidence he would not be
able to return to work in the foreseeable future as an HVAC
technician and was not qualified for any other positions available
at the time. No trial was required on Manos’s retaliation cause of
action because there was no evidence from which retaliatory
intent could be inferred; instead of a relatively short period
separating the protected conduct and the adverse employment
action, two years had elapsed between Manos’s complaints about
Galindo and Margherita and the Getty’s decision to terminate his
employment. Finally, no trial was required on the cause of action

providing a page, paragraph or line citation. Other facts are
purportedly disputed, but with no citation to any admissible
evidence. [Manos’s response] also improperly states ‘Manos does
not oppose,’ whatever that means. [¶] In any event, [Manos]
essentially concedes his [response] is irrelevant. [Manos]’s
Opposition Brief completely fails to reference his [response]. One
wonders why [Manos] even bothered to provide the [response].”
(Footnotes omitted.) As we discuss post, our resolution of this
appeal makes it unnecessary to address Manos’s argument that
his opposition was not so deficient as to warrant entry of
summary judgment in favor of the Getty.

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for wrongful termination in violation of public policy because the
predicate contentions for such a claim were not viable.

A. Summary Judgment and the Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate only “if all the papers
submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A triable
issue of material fact exists if the evidence and inferences
therefrom would allow a reasonable juror to find the underlying
fact in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. (Aguilar v
Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)
“On appeal after a motion for summary judgment has been
granted, we review the record de novo, considering all the
evidence set forth in the moving and opposition papers except
that to which objections have been made and sustained.
[Citation.] Under California’s traditional rules, we determine
with respect to each cause of action whether the defendant
seeking summary judgment has conclusively negated a necessary
element of the plaintiff’s case, or has demonstrated that under no
hypothesis is there a material issue of fact that requires the
process of trial, such that the defendant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24
Cal.4th 317, 334.) We “liberally construe the evidence in support
of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts
concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Yanowitz v.
L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037; see also Arnold v.
Dignity Health (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 412, 423 [we review the
ruling of the trial court, not its rationale].)

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B. The Getty Was Entitled to Judgment as a Matter of
Law on the Failure to Accommodate and Engage in
the Interactive Process Causes of Action Because
Manos’s Request for Indefinite Leave Beyond a Year
Was Not a Reasonable Accommodation
FEHA requires employers “to make reasonable
accommodation for the known physical or mental disability of
an . . . employee.” (§ 12940, subd. (m)(1).) “The elements of a
reasonable accommodation cause of action are (1) the employee
suffered a disability, (2) the employee could perform the essential
functions of the job with reasonable accommodation, and (3) the
employer failed to reasonably accommodate the employee’s
disability.” (Nealy v. City of Santa Monica (2015) 234
Cal.App.4th 359, 373.)
FEHA also requires employers “to engage in a timely, good
faith, interactive process with the employee . . . to determine
effective reasonable accommodations, if any, in response to a
request for reasonable accommodation by an employee . . . with a
known physical or mental disability or known medical condition.”
(§ 12940, subd. (n).) “To prevail on a claim for failure to engage
in the interactive process, the employee must identify a
reasonable accommodation that would have been available at the
time the interactive process occurred.” (Nealy, supra, 234
Cal.App.4th at 379.)
Under California law, authorizing medical leave can be a
reasonable accommodation. “When the employee cannot
presently perform the essential functions of the job, or otherwise
needs time away from the job for treatment and recovery, holding
a job open for an employee on a leave of absence or extending a
leave . . . may be a reasonable accommodation provided that the

17
leave is likely to be effective in allowing the employee to return to
work at the end of the leave, with or without further reasonable
accommodation, and does not create an undue hardship for the
employer. . . .” (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 11068, subd. (c); see also
Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 215, 226;
Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 245, 263.) An
employer is not obligated, however, to hold open a position
indefinitely for an employee on medical leave, to reassign the
employee, or to create a new position for him or her. (Cal. Code
Regs. tit. 2, § 11068, subd. (c); Nealy, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at
377-378 [“A finite leave of absence may be a reasonable
accommodation to allow an employee time to recover, but FEHA
does not require the employer to provide an indefinite leave of
absence to await possible future vacancies”]; Hanson, supra, 74
Cal.App.4th at 226-227 [“Reasonable accommodation does not
require the employer to wait indefinitely for an employee’s
medical condition to be corrected”]; see also Dark v. Curry County
(9th Cir. 2006) 451 F.3d 1078, 1090 [recovery time of unspecified
duration may not be a reasonable accommodation when the
employee will not be able to return to his former position and
cannot state when and under what conditions he could return to
work].)
Here, it was undisputed that the only accommodation
Manos requested following his workplace accident in June 2019
was medical leave, which the Getty repeatedly granted—
ultimately for about a year. During the period between his injury
in June 2019 and his discharge in June 2020, Manos submitted
four requests for leave, three of which requested “indefinite”
leave—including his fourth and final request. During this same
period, Manos’s physician repeatedly certified Manos was unable

18
to perform any work and the evidence showed there were no
positions available at the Getty for which Manos was qualified
other than as a HVAC technician. It was also undisputed that
when Ruhr asked Manos in the spring of 2020 to identify
accommodations that would allow him to return to work, Manos
never responded. In addition, when Manos completed his portion
of the interactive questionnaire, he advised he was not requesting
any accommodations “at this time” and was requesting only
“continuous leave.” Furthermore, it was undisputed that
following the termination of his employment with the Getty,
Manos affirmed more than once (in the September 2020
insurance company questionnaire and again in July 2021
deposition testimony) that he remained unable to work. Under
such circumstances, a reasonable juror could not find that the
Getty failed to accommodate Manos or failed to engage in the
interactive process.
Based on the uncertified deposition testimony of Dr. Soppe,
however, Manos argues the Getty failed to engage in the
interactive process in good faith by failing to contact Dr. Soppe
and inquire about his seemingly contradictory or ambiguous
statements in the portion of the interactive process questionnaire
he completed. The argument fails because the deposition
testimony was never properly before the trial court: it was not
argued in Manos’s opposition brief or presented in his response to
the Getty’s statement of undisputed facts. (Olson v. La Jolla
Neurological Assocs. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 723, 739 [affirming
summary judgment for defendant because plaintiff’s theories of
“apparent authority and ratification depend on controverted facts
not put in issue below”]; DiCola v. White Brothers Performance
Products, Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 666, 676 [“‘possible theories

19
that were not fully developed or factually presented to the trial
court cannot create a “triable issue” on appeal’”] City of San Diego
v. Rider (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1473, 1493 [holding a party waives
a theory on appeal “when he fails to include the underlying facts
in his separate statement of facts in opposing summary
judgment”]; see generally United Community Church v. Garcin
(1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 327, 337.) To be sure, the trial court had
discretion to consider the untimely submitted deposition excerpts
(upon a showing of good cause for the delay (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (b)(2); Bozzi v. Nordstrom, Inc. (2010) 186
Cal.App.4th 755, 765)), but the trial court declined to exercise
that discretion as demonstrated by its comments on the record at
the summary judgment hearing and the absence of any
discussion of the untimely submitted deposition testimony in the
court’s later ruling.10

10
Manos does not challenge the propriety of any of the court’s
evidentiary decisions, including its refusal (whether express or
implied) to consider the excerpts from the uncertified transcript
of Dr. Soppe’s deposition submitted the day before the summary
judgment hearing. Even if he had challenged the refusal to
consider the deposition excerpts, the challenge would fail. (See,
e.g., Bozzi, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at 765-766 [trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it refused to consider a “surrebuttal”
brief and a supplemental expert declaration filed on the day of
the summary judgment hearing]; Choi v. Sagemark Consulting
(2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 308, 320-321.)

20
C. The Getty Was Entitled to Judgment as a Matter of
Law on the Retaliation Cause of Action Because
There Was No Substantial Evidence of a Causal Link
“[I]n order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation
under the FEHA, a plaintiff must show (1) he or she engaged in a
‘protected activity,’ (2) the employer subjected the employee to an
adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between
the protected activity and the employer’s action.” (Yanowitz,
supra, 36 Cal.4th at 1042.) “In the summary judgment context,
‘“the employer, as the moving party, has the initial burden to
present admissible evidence showing either that one or more
elements of plaintiff’s prima facie case is lacking or that the
adverse employment action was based upon legitimate,
nondiscriminatory [or retaliatory] factors.”’ [Citation.] If the
employer meets this initial burden, the plaintiff must
‘“demonstrate a triable issue by producing substantial evidence
that the employer’s stated reasons were untrue or pretextual, or
that the employer acted with discriminatory [or retaliatory]
animus, such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that
the employer engaged in intentional discrimination [or
retaliation] or other unlawful action.”’ [Citation.]” (Choochagi v.
Barracuda Networks, Inc. (2020) 60 Cal.App.5th 444, 457; see
also Sangster v. Paetkau, 68 Cal. App. 4th 151, 162-163
[“where . . . the defendant has made a sufficient showing to
establish a prima facie case in his or her favor, in order to avert
summary judgment the plaintiff must produce substantial
responsive evidence sufficient to establish a triable issue of
material fact on the merits of the defendant’s showing”].)
Courts have observed that proof of retaliation often
depends on circumstantial evidence because retaliation consists

21
of “subjective matters only the employer can directly know, i.e.,
his attitude toward the plaintiff and his reasons for taking a
particular adverse action.” (Mamou v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc.
(2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 686, 713.) As a result, “‘[t]he causal link
may be established by an inference derived from circumstantial
evidence, “such as the employer’s knowledge that the [employee]
engaged in protected activities and the proximity in time between
the protected action and allegedly retaliatory employment
decision.’’’” (Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214
Cal.App.3d 590, 615.) The adverse employment action should
ordinarily follow “within a relatively short time” after the
employee’s protected activity. (Morgan v. Regents of University of
California (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 69; see also Clark County
School District v. Breeden (2001) 532 U.S. 268, 273 [causation
will be inferred from timing alone only if the proximity is “‘very
close’” and adverse action taken 20 months later by itself
suggests no causality at all].)
After Manos raised his complaints against Galindo and
Margherita with Leute in June 2018, Ruhr met with Manos twice
and, following their second meeting, invited Manos via email to
continue their discussion about his complaints. Nothing in the
record indicates Manos accepted Ruhr’s invitation, otherwise
pursued his original complaints against Galindo and Margherita,
or raised any additional complaints against his two coworkers (or
anyone else) at the Getty during the 11 months between his
second meeting with Ruhr and his workplace injury. While on
medical leave for the following year, there were also no additional
complaints by Manos against his coworkers or his employer. In
view of the two years that elapsed between his complaint to the
Getty’s Human Resources Department and his termination,

22
during which time he declined to pursue his initial complaint any
further (despite being invited to do so) and made no additional
complaints, there is no substantial evidence that would permit a
juror to find a causal link between any protected conduct by
Manos and his subsequent termination.

D. Manos’s Derivative Cause of Action for Wrongful
Termination
Because we conclude Manos failed to establish any genuine
issues of material fact that could reasonably support a decision in
his favor on his FEHA failure to accommodate, failure to interact,
and retaliation causes of action, his cause of action for wrongful
termination in violation of public policy necessarily fails.
(Arteaga v. Brinks, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 327, 355 [“The
wrongful termination claim is . . . based on the FEHA’s
prohibition of physical disability discrimination. As a result, the
wrongful termination claim fails for the same reasons as the
FEHA claim”].)

23
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The Getty is awarded costs on
appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, J.
We concur:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

MOOR, J.

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