CourtListener 10336563•People v. Younger CA1/4
Full text
Filed 2/20/25 P. v. Younger CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A167530
v.
PRECIOUS YOUNGER, (Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. 1963321)
Defendant and Appellant.
Precious Younger1 appeals from the trial court’s restitution order
making her jointly and severally liable for $18,467.63 in medical expenses
incurred by the victim of an assault by Younger and her codefendant Exzaver
Allen Hughes. Younger contends that the trial court unlawfully found her
liable for restitution pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.4 because the
victim’s injuries could not be attributed to conduct with which she was
charged or convicted; Hughes, only, was responsible for stabbing the victim,
and the stab wound was the sole cause of the medical expenses for which the
Victim Compensation Board (VCB) reimbursed the victim, Evan Doubrava.2
1 Younger’s counsel reported to the trial court that Younger does not
use gender titles, but Younger later corrected the court, approving the court’s
use of the female pronoun “she.” We use “she/her” pronouns to refer to
Younger.
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
The Attorney General argues that Younger waived her right to appeal
the restitution issue and relatedly was required to, but did not, obtain a
certificate of probable cause. Even if Younger’s claim is cognizable on appeal,
the Attorney General adds, the trial court had broad discretion to impose
restitution as a condition of probation pursuant to section 1203.1, including
as to offenses or conduct for which Younger was not charged or convicted, and
in this case the restitution amount is reasonably related to Younger’s
criminal conduct, consistent with the factors set forth in People v. Lent (1975)
15 Cal.3d 481, 486 (Lent). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On the evening of June 18, 2021, Concord police officer Wayne Leonard
responded to a call of a fight at a gas station convenience store. Doubrava
was lying down, bleeding from a two-inch gash in his lower abdomen.
Doubrava told Leonard that he was going to the convenience store when
Younger and Hughes asked him for money. Doubrava pointed to Younger’s
shoes and questioned why the two were asking for change, implying that they
did not look like they needed money. Hughes asked Doubrava, “Do you have
a fucking problem?”
As described by Leonard, the surveillance footage showed that
Doubrava was “the first to square up.” He was walking toward the storefront
when he stopped, turned, and approached Hughes and Younger while making
fists. He then “rush[ed] past” them and went around the corner of the store.
Hughes believed Doubrava was trying to lure him and Younger out of sight of
the security camera to fight them. Doubrava was also threatening and
verbally challenging Hughes and Younger to fight. At some point, Hughes
swung a traffic cone at Doubrava; the first physical contact shown on the
footage occurred when Hughes punched Doubrava.
2
After the three returned to the front of the store, they exchanged
punches. During the altercation, Younger got in between Hughes and
Doubrava several times. The third time, Doubrava punched Younger in the
face causing her to lose balance. The footage did not show Younger having
thrown any punches to that point. Doubrava eventually stumbled to the
ground. Younger grabbed his hair and, with Hughes, continued the assault.
Hughes told Leonard that the knife was his and that he had opened the
knife and was holding it as he punched Doubrava, so he must have stabbed
him, although he did not remember doing so. No evidence indicated that
Younger stabbed Doubrava. Hughes said he was defending himself and
Younger from Doubrava.
Doubrava spent four days in the hospital and had to take between two
and one-half and three months off work to recover from the stab wound.
Younger and Hughes were charged by felony complaint, with count 1
alleging assault with a deadly weapon (the knife), with a serious bodily injury
enhancement, and count 2 alleging assault by means likely to produce great
bodily injury, also with a great bodily injury enhancement. Hughes was
charged in both counts 1 and 2, while Younger was charged only in count 2.
At the preliminary hearing, the prosecution relied on a “group assault” theory
as to the count 2 enhancement, noting both defendants attacked Doubrava
when he was on the ground. Hughes pointed out the absence of evidence of
injury other than from the stab wound. Younger emphasized that no
evidence indicated that she inflicted the stab wound. Ultimately, while
Hughes was held to account for counts 1 and 2, the court found insufficient
evidence that Younger inflicted great bodily injury to support the count 2
enhancement.
3
In April 2022, Younger pled no contest to one count of simple battery,
with a sentence of one year of court probation. The court described the
probation conditions and Younger completed an advisement of rights form,
which the court reviewed with her. After prompting by the prosecutor, the
court explained that if any victim on any count, even dismissed ones, had
incurred a loss, Younger would “be on the hook for it.” The court noted its
“authority to order [Younger] to pay that restitution if the Court determines
it’s a legitimate claim,” and asked Younger if she understood and agreed.
Younger answered “Yes.” The court stated that the VCB claim of $18,467.63
would apply to both defendants “because it’s the same deal.”
The court continued: “Let me lay this out. The law sets up this system
for the [VCB] to pay out claims for restitution or to compensate victims of
crime for losses. There’s a process that the victims have to go through to
submit that claim to the [VCB] and the [VCB] considers everything
submitted in support of it. And if it determines that it’s a legitimate claim
that should be paid, they pay it out to the victim. [¶] How does that affect
you? Well, if I’m going to reserve restitution and you’re on the hook for any
restitution as a result of your case, if the [VCB] has undergone the statutory
process, then I’m going to treat that as a presumptive restitution amount,
and I’m going to make it a condition of probation. But it’s going to be subject
to your right to have a hearing to dispute it. . . . If it’s just the claim and the
VCB hasn’t paid the money, the statutory process has not gone through, then
I say pay restitution as determined by the Court, so the burden shifts back to
the People.”
The court asked the parties to respond, and Younger’s substitute
counsel pointed out that the issue had not been raised with her assigned
counsel. Counsel asked the court to “reserve restitution today and put the
4
matter on for . . . the future for [assigned counsel] to be heard as to the proper
procedure by which restitution would be set.” Hughes’s counsel agreed,
commenting that “the issue of causation and restitution is going to be
something that likely, given the VCB payout, would be litigated at a
restitution hearing.” The court explained its understanding that some form
of restitution was part of the plea deal, the only question being “what is and
isn’t the appropriate” amount. The prosecutor agreed as to the presumption
of restitution, because the plea offer required restitution, with the court
reserving the amount for a later hearing.
The court reaffirmed that the starting presumption was that Hughes
and Younger owed restitution and the only question—for later resolution—
was in what amount. The court explained that the defendants would enter
their pleas knowing the amount of restitution would be resolved this way.
After discussion, counsel agreed they would proceed accordingly, with a
Harvey3 waiver. Younger confirmed that she had understood the discussion
and it accurately summarized the plea agreement. The court then addressed
both defendants: “I’m going to order you both as conditions of probation to
pay restitution on all counts here, not just the ones you’re pleading to, but I’m
not going to specify the amount. I’m going to set it for a court date for you to
have a hearing . . . to determine what if any amount you got to pay. But it
will definitely—if it’s determined by the Court that there’s restitution to be
paid to the [VCB] . . ., you’re on the hook for that, whatever the Court
decides.” Younger and her counsel agreed.
3 “In People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754, 758–759 [citation], our
Supreme Court held that facts underlying charges dismissed as part of a
negotiated plea may not, absent contrary agreement by the defendant (now
called a Harvey waiver), be used to impose adverse sentencing consequences.”
(People v. Weatherton (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 676, 678 (Weatherton).)
5
After confirming that Younger was freely agreeing to the plea, the court
accepted her plea. The court reiterated the applicable probation conditions,
including: “Actual restitution—you’re to pay restitution, and this applies to
all counts since there’s a Harvey waiver, as determined and directed by the
Court including to the [VCB] if it’s compensated any victim in this case.” The
court set a restitution hearing date.
At the restitution hearing held on January 20, 2023, Younger argued
that she should not be jointly liable with Hughes for the stabbing injury. The
court took the matter under submission. The hearing resumed on March 24,
with the court citing section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(4)(a), as establishing the
presumption that Hughes and Younger had to rebut to avoid paying
restitution. Younger asked the court to consider her individually,
emphasizing that Doubrava’s medical bills arose only from the stab wound
inflicted by Hughes. Hughes’s counsel argued that Hughes should not have
to pay for defending himself against a larger, aggressive assailant who
decided to pick a fight with him. The prosecution responded that these
disputes were better addressed at trial; through their pleas, defendants had
accepted financial responsibility for Doubrava’s injury.
The court described the surveillance footage, noting that Hughes and
Younger were more aggressive than they had acknowledged, and found that
neither defendant had rebutted the presumption that Doubrava’s injuries
were directly caused by their joint criminal conduct. It ordered Younger to be
jointly and severally responsible for the $18,467.63 in restitution to the VCB.
6
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
We review a grant of restitution under either section 1202.4 or
section 1203.1 for abuse of discretion. (People v. Nichols (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th
330, 341; People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 663 & fn. 7.)
II. Appellate Waiver and Certificate of Probable Cause
The Attorney General argues that we may not consider Younger’s
challenge to the court’s restitution order because she waived her right to
appeal and should have obtained a certificate of probable cause. (§ 1237.5;
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b); see People v. Becerra (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th
178, 185 (Becerra); People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 86.) The
Attorney General contends that Younger is challenging the trial court’s
authority to order restitution at all, not just the amount. Younger responds
that, when the court stated that it was reserving restitution, it explained that
it would “determine what if any amount you got to pay” and that Younger
was on the hook “if it’s determined by the Court that there’s restitution to be
paid to the [VCB].” (Italics added.)
We agree that the court’s remarks left open the possibility that it could
find the amount Younger owed was zero, and therefore that she was not
required to obtain a certificate of probable cause to contest the award in any
amount. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(2)(B) [no certificate of probable
cause required for “matters occurring after the plea . . . that do not affect the
validity of the plea”]; see Weatherton, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at pp. 680, fn. 5
& 686 [no certificate of probable cause required for appeal from post-
judgment restitution order because appeal did not implicate validity of plea].)
We also find that Younger’s general waiver of her appeal rights does not
preclude her challenge here, which relates to a claimed error that arose only
7
after she entered her plea and which the court and parties agreed would be
reserved for future proceedings independent of her plea. (See Becerra, supra,
32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 186–187.)
III. Restitution
Contending that the trial court awarded restitution pursuant to
section 1202.4, Younger argues that the award was unauthorized because
section 1202.4 permits restitution only for injuries caused by her criminal
conduct, and Doubrava’s injury was caused solely by Hughes’s act of stabbing
him. The Attorney General disputes Younger’s premise, arguing that the
trial court ordered her to pay restitution as a condition of probation pursuant
to section 1203.1, which does not require the same causal nexus between the
victim’s injury and the defendant’s conduct, but only, as here, some
reasonable relationship between the two. (See, e.g., People v. Woods (2008)
161 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1050–1052 [explaining that affirming restitution
award in section 1203.1 case was not inconsistent with finding similar
restitution award invalid in section 1202.4 case, even though in both cases
the defendant did not participate in the charged murder but was merely an
accessory after the fact].)
Younger’s opening brief merely assumed, without argument, that the
court’s restitution award was made pursuant to section 1202.4 rather than
section 1203.1. In response to the Attorney General, Younger argues in her
reply brief that the award must have been based on section 1202.4 because
(1) the trial court did not “grant probation within the meaning of the Penal
Code” (as required for an award under section 1203.1) because Younger was
sentenced to, and served, 14 days in jail; (2) “there is nothing in the record to
indicate the trial court ordered restitution pursuant to its discretion under
section 1203.1”; (3) the court held a separate restitution hearing that would
8
not have been required under section 1203.1; (4) at the hearing, the court
expressly found that Younger failed to rebut the presumption under
section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(4)(A), that any amount paid by the VCB was
directly caused by her criminal conduct; and (5) the written order was made
on Judicial Council Form CR-110, which states that it is to be used for orders
under section 1202.4, subdivision (f). Assuming these arguments were not
forfeited by the failure to make them in the opening brief, we find them
unpersuasive.
First, section 1203.1, subdivision (a) expressly allows a court to
“imprison the defendant in the county jail” as a condition of probation. That
is what happened here: “As conditions of probation you will be required to
serve jail time that’s going to be time served, no further jail time.” The cases
interpreting section 1202.4 make clear that a nonprobationary restitution
order applies only to those defendants who are sentenced to a state prison
term, not a county jail term. (People v. Selivanov (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 726,
786; People v. Lai (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1227, 1234, 1246.)
Second, it is not true that there is nothing in the record to indicate that
the trial court was relying on its authority under section 1203.1. As noted
above, the court stated at the plea hearing: “I’m going to treat [the VCB
payment] as a presumptive restitution amount and I’m going to make it a
condition of probation.” And again: “I’m going to order you both as
conditions of probation to pay restitution on all counts here . . . .” While the
court did not refer expressly to the statute, these statements show that it
intended to impose restitution as a condition of probation. (§ 1203.1,
subds. (a)(4), (b).)
Third, Younger cites no authority to show that it is irregular or
improper for a trial court to give the parties an opportunity to be heard on
9
any restitution award made pursuant to section 1203.1. She does note that
“[t]here is no requirement the restitution order be limited to the exact
amount of the loss in which the defendant is actually found culpable.”
(People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1121.) That observation,
however, does not warrant a conclusion that the trial court’s decision to hold
a hearing at which the parties were permitted to address the appropriate
amount means that it was not relying on its authority under section 1203.1.
Moreover, the court may have decided that a separate hearing was
appropriate in light of its decision, discussed next, to rely on the presumption
under section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(4)(A).
Fourth, the trial court’s statement that it would treat the VCB
payment “as a presumptive restitution amount” that would be made “a
condition of probation” suggests that it was borrowing the presumption under
section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(4)(A) to determine the appropriate award
under section 1203.1. We will assume, as Younger argues (and as the
Attorney General implicitly concedes by ignoring it), that the trial court erred
insofar as it found she did not rebut the presumption by showing that
Doubrava’s injury was “directly caused” by Hughes. But adhering to her
position that the trial court imposed restitution pursuant to its authority
under section 1202.4, Younger expressly declines in her reply brief to respond
to the Attorney General’s argument that the award was an appropriate
exercise of discretion under section 1203.1 as measured by the three Lent
factors. The upshot of that argument is that any error the trial court made in
applying section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(4)(A) was harmless. (See, e.g., People
v. Brewer (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1311–1312 [section 1203.1 probation
condition erroneously ordered in reliance on one statute was not prejudicial
where it was reasonable under Lent and authorized by alternative statute];
10
People v. Tuggles (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 339, 387 [“When a trial court
misunderstands the scope of its discretion, we must assess whether the error
resulted in prejudice to the appellant”].) By declining to address the Attorney
General’s argument, Younger has forfeited any contention that she was
prejudiced by the claimed error in the court’s application of section 1202.4,
subdivision (f)(4)(A) when ordering restitution under section 1203.1. (See
People v. Vance (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 706, 717.)4
Fifth and finally, we disagree that the trial court’s use of Judicial
Council Form CR-110, entitled “Order for Victim Restitution,” indicates that
it intended to order restitution pursuant to section 1202.4 and not
section 1203.1. Younger overlooks that section 1203.1, subdivision (a)(3)
provides that “[t]he restitution order shall be fully enforceable as a civil
judgment forthwith and in accordance with Section 1202.4 of the Penal
Code.” By using Form CR-110, the trial court, “in accordance with
Section 1202.4,” made its restitution order into an enforceable civil judgment.
(See, e.g., Nationwide Ins. Co. of America v. Tipton (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th
4 In any event, we have no trouble concluding that the trial court would
have made the same award if it had addressed the Lent factors, and would
not have abused its discretion by doing so. (See Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at
p. 486.) First, the injury was reasonably related to the assault for which
Younger was convicted. The stabbing apparently occurred while Hughes,
with Younger, was punching Doubrava. And at the change of plea hearing,
Younger agreed to a Harvey waiver, which the trial court noted allowed it to
look to all charged conduct in determining the amount of restitution. Second,
the award related to conduct that was criminal: Although Hughes asserted
that he stabbed Doubrava in defense of himself and Younger, he accepted
criminal responsibility for the assault by his plea, as did Younger by hers.
Third, a restitution order that attempts to make a victim whole is generally
deemed a deterrent to future criminality. (People v. Carbajal, supra,
10 Cal.4th 1114, 1123.) Here, the $18,467.63 sum is large enough to be an
effective deterrent and therefore is reasonably related to future criminal
conduct.
11
1355, 1361; In re Keith C. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 151, 154–156.) Its use of
the form is entirely consistent with the entry of a restitution order under
section 1203.1.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court made its restitution award
pursuant to section 1203.1, and that any error in its reliance on the
presumption under section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(4)(A) in doing so was
harmless.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
GOLDMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
BROWN, P. J.
STREETER, J.
12
Wondering how this text applies to your situation?
Free consultation, no commitment
Describe your situation. Our team will contact you by email about your consultation.
Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.