Ramsden v. Ramsden CA4/1

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Filed 2/20/25 Ramsden v. Ramsden CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SOILA RAMSDEN, Individually and as D083916
Trustee, etc.,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 37-2019-00036989-
v. CU-OR-CTL)

CHARLES GALLAGHER RAMSDEN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Richard S. Whitney, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
The Stone Law Group and Kenneth H. Stone for Defendant and
Appellant.
Law Offices of Beatrice L. Snider and John L. Romaker for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
Charles Bennett Ramsden (Charles B.) died in 2017. The parties in
this case are his widow, Soila Ramsden, and his son, Charles Gallagher
Ramsden (Charles G.). They dispute who is entitled to the family home.
After his father’s death and purportedly acting as trustee of a family
trust, Charles G. transferred the property to himself, which prompted Soila
to file a lawsuit against him. Soila asserted causes of action to quiet title, to
cancel the instruments Charles G. recorded against the property, and for
damages on multiple theories. When Charles G. did not respond to the
complaint, the court entered a default judgment. Soon thereafter, he moved
to set aside the judgment, which was granted “in part.” He then filed a
renewed motion to set aside the judgment, which was denied.
Charles G. seeks to appeal the latter denial. For reasons we explain,
we conclude that he is attempting to appeal from a nonappealable
interlocutory order. We do not have jurisdiction to entertain such appeals,
and therefore we must dismiss this appeal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Charles B. and Rose Ramsden—his first wife and Charles G.’s
mother—created the “Ramsden Family Trust dated August 12, 1994” (the
1994 trust) and deeded their family home to the trust. Rose died in 1998,
and Charles B. married Soila in 2001. Charles B. and Soila subsequently
transferred the home to themselves in their individual capacities, then to
another trust, and ultimately to the “Ramsden Family Trust dated July 22,
2013” (the 2013 trust). Charles B. died a few years later, in October 2017.
Charles G. believes he inherited the family home pursuant to the 1994
trust. One month after Charles B.’s death, in November 2017, Charles G.
recorded two instruments against the property: (1) an affidavit of death,

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wherein he averred that he was the successor trustee of the 1994 trust; and
(2) a grant deed transferring the home to himself in his individual capacity.
Soila maintains that she is the rightful owner of the house according to
the 2013 trust. In July 2019, she filed a complaint against Charles G.
asserting six causes of action: (1) quiet title; (2) cancellation of instruments;
(3) slander of title; (4) civil theft; (5) financial elder abuse; and (6) double
damages (Prob. Code, § 859). In the latter four claims, Soila alleged that she
was entitled to compensatory, punitive, and double damages, as well as
attorney’s fees and costs, in amounts to be proven.
Charles G. did not respond to the complaint. The trial court entered
default in September 2020. A combined default prove-up hearing (see Code.

Civ. Proc.,1 § 585) and quiet title evidentiary hearing (see § 764.010)2 was
held in October 2022. Charles G. did not make a formal appearance, but a
law clerk from the firm representing him attended the hearing.
Following the combined hearing, the trial court entered judgment on
October 13, 2022. It declared that Charles G. had no interest in the family

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2 “Because of the unique nature of a quiet title action—seeking to declare
rights ‘against all the world’—the normal procedural rules for a default
judgment set forth in section 580 do not apply. (Paterra v. Hansen (2021) 64
Cal.App.5th 507, 532.) “Under section 580, in a non-quiet-title action . . . ,
after an entry of default and before a default judgment, the plaintiff must
present evidence at a hearing (with witnesses or by documents) to prove up
the claimed damages or other relief requested, and the defendant cannot
participate in this hearing.” (Paterra, at p. 532.) In contrast, under section
764.010, after a defendant defaults in a quiet title action, “the plaintiff must
prove the merits of its claim and the grounds for the relief sought with
admissible evidence at a live hearing in open court and the defendant has a
right to participate at this hearing.” (Paterra, at p. 532.)
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home and that both instruments he recorded were void or voidable. The
court also awarded Soila $238,200 in punitive damages, $1,828,400 in double
doubles, and $17,867.50 in attorney’s fees and costs.
A few weeks later, in November 2022, Charles G. filed a motion to set

aside the default judgment (§ 473, subd. (d)).3 He argued the judgment was
void on two grounds. First, under section 580, subdivision (a), the court could
not award Soila more damages than what she had demanded in her
complaint or described in a statement of damages, and here she failed to
specify damages in her complaint and did not serve any statement of
damages. Second, he contended the court did not hold a proper quiet title
evidentiary hearing because it only considered Soila’s documentary evidence
and argument from her counsel.
On February 3, 2023, the court granted the motion “in part.” It agreed
with Charles G.’s first argument, so it deemed its judgment void as to the
damages, attorney’s fees, and costs. The court rejected his second argument,
however, explaining that it rendered judgment based on the evidence that
was presented. It gave him an opportunity to present his own evidence and
argument at the hearing; it could not control whether he took advantage of
that opportunity. The court therefore saw “no reason to find the judgment as
to quiet title is void” and declared the rest of its judgment—i.e., quieting title
and voiding the instruments—“valid and enforceable.”

3 Section 473, subdivision (d) grants the court authority to “set aside any
void judgment or order.”
4
At this point, presumably to address the damages issue, Soila sought

leave of court to file her First Amended Complaint (FAC).4 The court
granted the request and deemed the FAC filed and served in April 2023.
The FAC realleges all the same causes of action as the original complaint,
except it omits the civil fraud claim. It specifies the amount of damages,
attorney’s fees, and costs sought for the slander of title, financial elder abuse,
and double damages claims.
Charles G. then filed a “motion to set aside entry of default judgment
against [him] based on new facts” under sections 473, subdivision (d) and

1008, subdivision (b).5 He specifically asked the trial court to set aside its
October 13, 2022 default judgment and its February 3, 2023 order granting
“in part” his initial motion to set aside the judgment (which he calls the
“amended” default judgment). He asserted that the filing of the FAC
constituted “new and different facts and circumstances” justifying the relief
sought.
As he reasoned, the FAC superseded the original complaint, thereby
voiding the default judgment and the so-called “amended” default judgment,

4 When a judgment is void because it awards more damages than what
was demanded in the complaint or in a statement of damages, the plaintiff
may proceed with a new default prove-up hearing, subject to a limitation on
damages equal to the amount of damages actually demanded, or to the
amount-in-controversy jurisdictional minimum. (Airs Aromatics, LLC v. CBL
Data Recovery Technologies, Inc. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1013, 1018–1019,
1025.) Alternatively, the plaintiff can amend their complaint to specify the
full amount of damages sought, which vacates the default and gives the
defendant a chance to respond to the amended complaint. (Id. at p. 1025.)
5 Section 1008, subdivision (b) allows “[a] party who originally made an
application for an order which was refused in whole or part, or granted
conditionally or on terms, [to] make a subsequent application for the same
order upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law . . . .”
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which were based on the original complaint. Moreover, the FAC included
substantive amendments—insofar as it added damages—which “opened” the
entry of default. Referencing Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094,
Charles G. also pointed out that the court had inherent power to reconsider
its previous orders on its own motion, and on that basis invited the court to
reconsider whether it conducted a proper quiet title evidentiary hearing.
The motion was denied on December 15, 2023. The court reiterated
that it already set aside “the portion of the judgment that was void” based on
the failure to specify damages. It was not convinced that the filing of the
FAC voided the rest of its judgment because the authorities Charles G. cited
in his moving papers were factually distinguishable. The court seemed to
accept the premise that adding damages to the FAC constituted a substantive
amendment. But in the court’s view, that simply meant Soila needed to serve
Charles G. with the FAC, which she did.
Charles G. noticed an appeal from the court’s December 15, 2023 order.
Before briefing began, we asked the parties to submit letter briefs addressing
the appealability of this order. Both parties filed responses, which we
indicated would be considered with the appeal itself.

DISCUSSION

Charles G. purports to appeal from the December 15, 2023 order
denying his “motion to set aside entry of default judgment . . . based on
new facts” under sections 473, subdivision (d) and 1008, subdivision (b).
(Capitalization omitted.) He characterizes this as an appealable order
after judgment within the meaning of section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2).
We disagree.
“The right to appeal in California is ‘entirely statutory and subject
to complete legislative control.’ ” (Meinhardt v. City of Sunnyvale (2024)

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16 Cal.5th 643, 651 (Meinhardt).) Thus, “an appellate court generally lacks
jurisdiction to decide an appeal from an order unless the order is one that is
expressly made appealable by statute.” (Id. at p. 652.) Section 904.1 sets
forth a list of appealable judgments and orders in unlimited civil cases.
Primarily, section 904.1, subdivision (a)(1) authorizes an appeal “[f]rom
a judgment, except an interlocutory judgment” (with further exceptions not
relevant here). This means that, generally, “an appeal must be taken ‘from a
judgment that is not intermediate or nonfinal but is the one final judgment.”
(Meinhardt, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 652.) “Judgments that leave nothing to
be decided between one or more parties and their adversaries, or that can be
amended to encompass all controverted issues, have the finality required by
section 904.1, subdivision (a). A judgment that disposes of fewer than all of
the causes of action framed by the pleadings, however, is necessarily
‘interlocutory’ [(ibid.)], and not yet final, as to any parties between whom
another cause of action remains pending.” (Morehart v. County of Santa
Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 741 (Morehart).) “This one final judgment rule
is a fundamental principle of appellate practice, the purpose of which is to
prevent piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals that tend to be oppressive
and costly.” (Meinhardt, at p. 652, citations & quotation marks omitted.)
Many interlocutory orders are not statutorily appealable, though
section 904.1 lists a handful of exceptions. (See Meinhardt, supra, 16 Cal.5th
at pp. 652–653.) The statute also expressly permits an appeal “[f]rom an
order made after a judgment made appealable by paragraph (1).” (§ 904.1,
subd. (a)(2), italics added.) “An order granting or denying a statutory motion
to vacate or set aside a default and default judgment is appealable under
section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2) as an order made after final judgment.”
(Shapell Socal Rental Properties, LLC v. Chico’s FAS, Inc. (2022) 85

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Cal.App.5th 198, 207, fn. 2.) But again, to invoke this theory, the underlying
judgment must be final. (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(2); see also Eisenberg et al., Cal.
Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2024) ¶ 2:172.)
Here, the December 15, 2023 order cannot be an appealable order after
judgment, because there is no final judgment in this case yet. When the trial
court granted Charles G.’s motion to set aside the judgment “in part” on
February 3, 2023, it revived the litigation, at least as to the slander of title,
financial elder abuse, and double damages claims. Indeed, the register of
actions shows that, after the December 15 order, Charles G. filed a demurrer
and a motion to strike, which were apparently denied, and then an answer to

the FAC. There is a status conference scheduled for April 2025.6 Regardless
of the court’s rulings on the quiet title and cancellation of instruments claims,
the fact that there are still issues to be litigated and decided means there is
no final judgment in the case. (See Morehart, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 743 [“an
appeal cannot be taken from a judgment that fails to complete the disposition
of all the causes of action between the parties even if the causes of action
disposed of by the judgment have been ordered to be tried separately, or may
be characterized as ‘separate and independent’ from those remaining”].)

6 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the register of actions as
of January 8, 2025. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).)
8
We also see no basis to construe the December 15, 2023 order as an
appealable interlocutory order. The law is clear that an order denying a
renewed motion under section 1008, subdivision (b) is not appealable.
As this court explained in Tate v. Wilburn (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 150,
allowing a party to appeal the denial of a renewed motion would create the
possibilities that “(1) a nonappealable order or judgment would be made
appealable, (2) a party would have two appeals from the same decision, and
(3) a party would obtain an unwarranted extension of time to appeal . . . .”
(Id. at pp. 158–159.)
Finally, we decline Charles G.’s invitation to treat his appeal as a
petition for writ of mandate. He ultimately seeks to argue that the trial court
erred in adjudicating the quiet title and cancellation of instruments claims
because it did not consider defense evidence at the hearing, and that it erred
in attempting to validate a partial judgment on those claims despite granting
the motion to vacate the judgment and despite the filing of the FAC. But
Charles G. fails to meaningfully explain why we must address these issues

now, as opposed to on appeal from the final judgment.7 Although we “have
power to treat [a] purported appeal as a petition for writ of mandate, we
should not exercise that power except under unusual circumstances.” (Olson
v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 401.) We perceive no such circumstances here.

7 We express no opinion on the merits of these arguments.
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DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed. Respondent is entitled to costs on appeal.

DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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