CourtListener 10335664•In re Eric S. CA1/1
Full text
Filed 2/19/25 In re Eric S. CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re ERIC S., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. A170932, A171747
ERIC S.,
(Solano County
Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. No. J44994)
In February 2022, after Eric S. admitted to one count of murder
committed when he was 17 years old, the Tulare County juvenile court placed
him in a secure youth treatment facility (SYTF). The following year, the case
was transferred to Solano County. Eric now appeals from a July 2024 order
denying his request to reduce his baseline term of confinement and a
September 2024 order transferring him to a less restrictive placement,
raising several claims involving the court’s dispositional rulings.
We agree with Eric that the juvenile court failed to adhere to the
requirements of Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 875 by not awarding
precommitment credits, by mistakenly setting a maximum term of
confinement (maximum term) that extends beyond his 25th birthday, and by
failing to set a valid baseline term of confinement (baseline term). We
therefore reverse the current maximum and baseline terms and remand for
the court to reset those terms and calculate precommitment credits. We also
modify a probation condition as the parties agree is appropriate. Otherwise,
we affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
The resolution of this appeal does not require a detailed description of
the underlying facts. Briefly, Eric has admitted crimes involving firearms on
two occasions. The first time arose out of an incident on June 14, 2020, when
Eric was 16 years old, and he was found in possession of a loaded gun while
at a Visalia mall. He also claimed to own a second loaded gun found in the
possession of another minor who was present. Two days later, the Tulare
County District Attorney filed a wardship petition alleging that the juvenile
court had jurisdiction over Eric under section 602, subdivision (a). The
petition contained two felony counts, carrying a concealed firearm on the
person and carrying a stolen, loaded firearm in public.2
On June 22, 2020, Eric admitted both counts in exchange for deferred
entry of judgment. The minute order noted that his maximum term of
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code unless otherwise noted.
2 The allegations were made under Penal Code sections 25400,
subdivisions (a)(2) and (c)(4), and 25850, subdivisions (a) and (c)(2).
2
confinement was three years and eight months. The same day, the case was
transferred to Solano County, where Eric was already in foster care. The
probation department’s motion for transfer stated that Eric had two days of
custody credits, apparently based on his time in custody before he was
released to his foster parent. Eric left his placement shortly after returning
to Solano County, and a bench warrant was issued for him in July 2020.
The second incident occurred on January 19, 2021, when Eric killed
Travis Chaney in Ivanhoe (Tulare County). That night, Eric, who had just
turned 17 years old, was at the home of H.F., his new girlfriend. Chaney,
who was married but had an on-and-off relationship with H.F.’s mother,
arrived and began arguing with and threatening the mother. Chaney also
argued with Eric and threatened to beat him up. During the commotion, Eric
used a rifle he commonly carried to shoot Chaney, who was unarmed. Eric
and H.F. ran away from the house together, and Eric was apprehended the
following day.
On January 22, 2021, the Tulare County District Attorney filed another
wardship petition under section 602, subdivision (a), alleging that Eric
committed one count of murder. The petition also alleged that Eric
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death, personally
and intentionally discharged a firearm, and personally used a firearm.3 The
petition sought a hearing on whether to transfer Eric to criminal court.
In July 2021, after a multiday hearing, the juvenile court denied the
prosecution’s motion to transfer Eric to criminal court. Before doing so, the
court indicated that “[t]he only way” it could deny the motion was “if we don’t
3 The murder count was brought under Penal Code section 187,
subdivision (a), and the firearm allegations were made under Penal Code
section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) through (d).
3
have to wait for the jurisdiction hearing,” since Eric “need[ed] every day that
he can possibly get in the [Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ)] program.”
Over the prosecution’s objection to “an improper extraction of a plea,” Eric
then admitted the murder and firearm allegations.
That October, after the prosecution successfully sought writ relief in
the Fifth District Court of Appeal, the juvenile court “withdr[ew Eric’s] pleas”
and reopened the transfer hearing for Eric to present evidence on the new
SYTF that was replacing DJJ in Tulare County. Three months later, the
court again denied the prosecution’s transfer motion. Eric then admitted the
murder and firearm allegations.
At a dispositional hearing on February 25, 2022, the juvenile court
declared Eric a ward of the court and committed him to Tulare County’s
SYTF. The court also declared that Eric’s maximum term was 50 years to life
plus eight months, based on both the murder and the 2020 firearm-
possession offenses.4 The court did not orally set a baseline term, though it
observed that it was “going to take [Eric] every bit of the seven years that
[the court had] for this program to hopefully get him to the point where he
would be strong enough to lead a productive life.” The court’s written order
stated that Eric was committed to the SYTF “until the requirements of the
program have been satisfactorily completed.” Finally, the court did not
4 As we discuss below, the juvenile court later reset this term on the
basis that it violated the age limit on a ward’s confinement under section 875,
subdivision (c). In any case, this term was incorrect if it was meant to reflect
the term an adult would receive. A sentence of 50 years to life reflects a
conviction of first degree murder with an accompanying enhancement for
personally and intentionally discharging a firearm causing death. (See Pen.
Code, §§ 190, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (d).) Yet Eric admitted only a generic
charge of murder under Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a), and the
juvenile court never specified a degree of murder, meaning the offense is
second degree murder.
4
address custody credits, although the probation report indicated that Eric
had 404 days of credits, 2 days for time in custody after the 2020 offenses and
402 days for time in custody after the murder.
Throughout the next year of review hearings, the probation
department’s reports consistently stated that Eric’s maximum term and
baseline term were both seven years. At an August 2022 review hearing,
Eric’s counsel “clarif[ied] for the record” that Eric’s maximum term was “six
years, 318 days,” the time between his commitment to the SYTF on
February 25, 2022, and his 25th birthday, January 9, 2029. The juvenile
court did not respond to this comment.
In July 2023, the juvenile court granted Eric’s request to transfer the
matter to Solano County and ordered Eric to receive “a case plan equivalent
to the [SYTF] Program.” The court also adopted the probation department’s
recommendation that the baseline term be reduced by six months, but the
court did not state what the new baseline term was. The written transfer
order stated that Eric’s maximum term was 50 years to life plus eight months
and that he had 906 total days of custody credits, but it likewise did not
specify a baseline term.
The Solano County juvenile court accepted the transfer, and Eric was
placed in that county’s SYTF, RISE. At a September 2023 review hearing,
Eric requested another reduction in the baseline term, which the court
denied. At the next hearing that December, however, the court granted Eric’s
request for a six-month reduction. Eric also suggested the court should
revisit the baseline term generally, given recent changes in the law.
In April 2024, Eric filed a motion to reduce the baseline term, which he
stated was seven years, to four years. He argued that although the juvenile
court was originally required to set the baseline term at seven years, under
5
newly adopted California Rules of Court, rule 5.806, it now had discretion to
set the term between four and seven years.5 He then filed a separate petition
under section 778 that likewise sought to reduce the baseline term to four
years based on changed circumstances, consisting not only of changes to the
law but also his significant progress in RISE.
At a June 2024 review hearing, before hearing Eric’s motion and
petition to reduce the baseline term, the juvenile court adopted the probation
department’s recommendation to reduce that term by another six months.
Eric was also being considered for a less restrictive placement at Pine Grove
Youth Conservation Camp (Pine Grove), a fire camp.
The juvenile court denied Eric’s request to reduce the baseline term on
July 8, 2024, stating that the term “remain[ed] at the seven years at this
time.” The court characterized the request as an attempt to get “two bites of
the apple,” since Eric had already gotten three six-month reductions based on
good behavior. The court did not view the changed law as retroactive under
In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada), meaning it could not alter what
it assumed was the original seven-year baseline term by applying rule 5.806.
The court also declined to reduce the term under section 778, disagreeing
that Eric’s rehabilitative needs had changed significantly after his transfer to
RISE. Eric appealed from this order (July 8 order), initiating no. A170932.
On August 21, 2024, the juvenile court held a hearing on the status of
Eric’s placement at Pine Grove. During the hearing, the court stated that it
“had to do some recalculation on the maximum term of confinement, because
we had it at 50 to life, which is not the correct way to review that.” The court
then stated the maximum term was six years and 11 months “from the date
of when SYTF was entered on [February 25, 2022].”
5 All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
6
At the next hearing, on September 11, 2024, the juvenile court
committed Eric to Pine Grove “for the remainder of the baseline term,” which
the court stated was “15 months as of this date.” The court also reiterated
that the maximum term was six years and 11 months, and it stated that
Eric’s “total credits for the period of wardship” were 1,331 days. Finally, the
court imposed several probation conditions, including an order that Eric not
“have contact with the victim’s widow, [N.S.]. And he’s to stay away from the
victim’s residence or place of business.” Eric also appealed from this order
(September 11 order), initiating no. A171747. We consolidated the two
appeals.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Remand Is Required for the Juvenile Court to Award
Precommitment Custody Credits and to Correct the Maximum
Term of Confinement.
Eric claims the juvenile court erred by failing to award precommitment
custody credits and improperly determined his maximum term. We conclude
the matter must be remanded for the court to calculate precommitment
credits. On remand, the court must also correct the maximum term to end by
the time Eric turns 25 years old, at which point it may also exercise its
discretion under the current version of section 875, subdivision (c)(1), to set
an even lower maximum term.
Before the 2020 passage of juvenile justice realignment, DJJ “was ‘the
state’s most restrictive placement for its most severe juvenile offenders.’ ” (In
re M.B. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 435, 448 (M.B.).) The realignment program
“included the transfer of DJJ’s responsibilities to California’s counties
beginning on July 1, 2021 (§ 736.5, subd. (a)), and the closure of DJJ on
June 30, 2023 (id., subd. (e)).” (Ibid.) As one aspect of this transfer,
7
“section 875 took effect on May 14, 2021, with the enactment of Senate Bill
No. 92 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 18, § 12).” (Ibid.) Under
section 875, beginning July 1, 2021, juvenile courts may commit wards
meeting certain criteria to an SYTF. (§ 875, subd. (a).)
When placing a ward in an SYTF, the juvenile court must set “a
maximum term of confinement.” (§ 875, subd. (c)(1).) The maximum term
cannot “exceed the middle term of imprisonment that can be imposed upon
an adult convicted of the same offense or offenses.” (§ 875, subd. (c)(1)(B).) In
addition, where, as here, the ward “would face an aggregate sentence of seven
or more years” if convicted for the offenses in criminal court, “the ward shall
not be held in secure confinement beyond 25 years of age, or two years from
the date of commitment, whichever occurs later.” (§ 875, subd. (c)(1)(A).)
Finally, a ward’s “[p]recommitment credits for time served must be applied
against the maximum term of confinement.” (§ 875, subd. (c)(1)(C).) We
review de novo whether the court complied with these statutory
requirements. (See, e.g., In re M.W. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1, 4; People v.
Culp (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1278, 1282.)
We begin with the custody credits issue. The Attorney General does
not dispute that the juvenile court had a duty to calculate precommitment
credits, which could not be delegated to the probation department. (See In re
Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 533–536; In re Edward B. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th
1228, 1238.) Yet the court never calculated the credits that Eric accrued
before he was committed to an SYTF in February 2022. At the September 11,
2024 hearing, the court stated that Eric had 1,331 days of total credits but
did not specify how many of those days were accrued before his SYTF
commitment.
8
Eric claims it is clear from the record that he is entitled to 407 days of
precommitment credits, composed of 5 days for time spent in custody for the
firearm-possession offenses and 402 days for time spent in custody for the
murder before the February 2022 dispositional hearing. The June 2020
motion to transfer the case to Solano County, however, indicates that Eric
accrued only two days of credits for his confinement for the firearm-
possession offenses. Because the record lacks clarity and the Attorney
General fails to address the issue, we conclude it is appropriate to remand for
the juvenile court to calculate precommitment credits in the first instance.
Depending on that calculation, Eric’s total number of credits may also need to
be modified.
We now turn to issues involving the maximum term. The juvenile
court determined that the initially imposed term of 50 years to life plus eight
months was wrong under section 875, subdivision (c), because it extended
beyond Eric’s 25th birthday.6 On appeal, the Attorney General does not
contest that Eric’s maximum term of confinement cannot extend beyond his
25th birthday. We therefore agree with Eric that the current maximum term
of six years and 11 months is still incorrect because it only approximates the
time between the original dispositional order and his 25th birthday. (But see
M.B., supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 460–461 & fn. 21 [holding that juvenile’s
maximum term could be 22 years and characterizing 25th-birthday limit as
6 We disagree with the Attorney General that the juvenile court
effectively set a maximum term of seven years in February 2022, based on its
statement that Eric would need “every bit of the seven years” he could get in
an SYTF. At the same hearing, the court unambiguously stated that the
maximum term was 50 years to life plus eight months, and it is more
reasonable to conclude the court was referring to a seven-year baseline term.
In any event, the only maximum term we are reviewing is the one set in
2024.
9
“separate cap” on confinement].) The original dispositional order was entered
on February 25, 2022, and Eric turns 25 years old on January 9, 2029, which
is six years, 10 months, and 15 days later.
Eric also claims that even apart from the approximation problem, the
juvenile court erred in resetting the maximum term because it failed to
exercise its discretion to set an even lower term. When Eric was committed
to an SYTF in February 2022, section 875, subdivision (c), limited the
maximum term based only on a ward’s age and the sentence an adult would
receive for the same offenses. (Former § 875, subd. (c)(1)–(2).) Effective
June 30, 2022, section 875 was amended to provide that the maximum term
must be “based upon the facts and circumstances of the matter or matters
that brought or continued the ward under the jurisdiction of the court and as
deemed appropriate to achieve rehabilitation.” (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 41;
§ 875, subd. (c)(1).) As the parties agree, this amendment gave courts the
discretion to set a maximum term lower than that otherwise limited by age
and adult sentencing. (M.B., supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 460–461.)
When the juvenile court reset the maximum term at six years and
11 months, this statutory amendment had been in effect for over two years.
Although the court did not explicitly state it was exercising its discretion to
consider a downward departure, we disagree with Eric that “the record shows
that the court believed its task was merely making arithmetical calculations
rather than assessing [his] rehabilitative needs.” On a silent record, we
generally presume the lower court understood and followed the applicable
law. (Ruelas v. Superior Court (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 374, 383.)
Nonetheless, remand is independently required for the court to award
precommitment credits, and the maximum term must be corrected anyway to
reflect the court’s intent that it not extend beyond Eric’s 25th birthday.
10
Thus, on remand Eric may seek a further reduction in the maximum term
based on “the facts and circumstances” of his offenses and his rehabilitative
needs. (§ 875, subd. (c)(1).)
B. The Baseline Term Must Be Reset on Remand.
Next, Eric claims the juvenile court failed to set a baseline term as
required. He also claims the court abused its discretion by denying his
request to reduce the term to four years. We conclude that in denying Eric’s
request for a reduction, the court failed to recognize that the February 2022
dispositional order did not actually set a baseline term. We also conclude
that a term of seven years is incorrect. Therefore, on remand the court must
reset the term under current law.
1. General legal standards
When committing a ward to an SYTF, the juvenile court is required to
set “a baseline term of confinement” (§ 875, subd. (b)(1)), which is roughly
analogous to what used to be known as a parole consideration date. (See
M.B., supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 468–469.) The baseline term “is based on
the most serious recent offense for which the ward has been adjudicated” and
“represent[s] the time in custody necessary to meet the developmental and
treatment needs of the ward and to prepare the ward for discharge to a
period of probation supervision in the community.” (§ 875, subd. (b)(1).) The
baseline term must “be determined according to offense-based classifications
that are approved by the Judicial Council,” which was directed to “develop
and adopt a matrix” of such classifications by July 1, 2023. (§ 875,
subds. (b)(1), (h).)
Pending the Judicial Council’s adoption of this matrix, courts were
required to “set a baseline term . . . utilizing the discharge consideration date
guidelines applied by the [DJJ] prior to its closure” under California Code of
11
Regulations, title 9, sections 30807 to 30813. (§ 875, subd. (b)(1).)
Section 875 also provided that courts could, “pending the adoption of Judicial
Council guidelines, modify the initial baseline term with a deviation of plus
or minus six months.” (§ 875, subd. (b)(1).) Under the DJJ regulations, the
offense of murder required “[a] parole consideration date interval of seven
years” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, § 30807, subd. (a)), meaning that when Eric
was initially committed to an SYTF in February 2022, his presumptive
baseline term was seven years.
The Judicial Council adopted baseline-term guidelines effective July 1,
2023. (Rule 5.806.) Under the guidelines, murder is a category A offense for
which the baseline term must be between four and seven years.
(Rule 5.806(d).) Rule 5.806 lists four general criteria that juvenile courts
must consider in selecting a baseline term “based on the individual facts and
circumstances of the case . . . that is no longer than necessary to meet the
developmental needs of the youth and to prepare the youth for discharge to a
period of probation supervision in the community.” (Rule 5.806(b).) These
criteria are: “(1) [t]he circumstances and gravity of the commitment offense”;
“(2) [t]he youth’s prior history in the juvenile justice system”; “(3) [t]he
confinement time considered reasonable and necessary to achieve the
rehabilitation of the youth”; and “(4) [t]he youth’s developmental history.”
(Ibid.) Rule 5.806 also contains a nonexclusive list of relevant factors to be
weighed when evaluating each criterion. (Ibid.) Under the rule, a court must
“state on the record its reasons for selecting a particular term, referencing
each of the criteria and any factors the court deemed relevant.” (Ibid.)
Again, we review de novo whether the juvenile court complied with
statutory and other legal requirements. When making a discretionary
12
decision, a court abuses its discretion if it applies the incorrect legal
standards. (In re Shannon M. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 282, 289–289.)
2. Analysis
We begin by agreeing with Eric that the Tulare County juvenile court
failed to set a baseline term in the February 2022 dispositional order. The
court did not orally pronounce a baseline term, and the written order stated
only that Eric was committed to an SYTF until he completed the program’s
requirements.
The Attorney General argues that there was an “implied setting of the
baseline at seven years.” We are not persuaded. Although the juvenile
court’s comment at the February 2022 hearing about needing “every bit of the
seven years” to rehabilitate Eric could be construed to refer to the baseline
term, it is too ambiguous to constitute a setting of that term. Moreover, at
the time of this hearing the juvenile court had discretion to depart from the
seven-year baseline term for murder by up to six months. (§ 875, subd. (b)(1);
see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, § 30807, subd. (a).) Thus, there was no single
mandated term we can presume the court intended to impose. Clearly, the
parties and the court assumed the original baseline term was seven years,
but the Attorney General does not provide any authority to suggest that this
assumption was binding. In short, we conclude the court did not validly set a
baseline term in the original dispositional order.
This omission is significant, because it undermines an essential basis
for the July 8 order denying Eric’s request to decrease the baseline term.
Citing Estrada, the juvenile court appeared to conclude that it lacked
authority to modify the baseline term by applying the Judicial Council
guidelines in rule 5.806 implemented after the original dispositional hearing.
Had the Tulare County juvenile court actually set a baseline term in
13
February 2022, we might agree that Eric was not entitled to the ameliorative
benefits of rule 5.806 because the original dispositional order was final. (See
In re Hunter W. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 358, 366–369 [ward not entitled to
ameliorative benefit of new law enacted after the order committing him to
DJJ became final].) But the court did not announce on the record what the
baseline term was until over two years later, when it said the term remained
at seven years, at which point rule 5.806 was already in effect. Thus, the
February 2022 order did not constrain the court from setting a term under
the current legal standards.
Moreover, as the Attorney General recognizes, even if the juvenile court
had otherwise validly set a seven-year baseline term in February 2022 or
July 2024, that term would still be incorrect because it extends beyond Eric’s
25th birthday. In addition, the court never stated what Eric’s modified
baseline term was in light of the three six-month reductions already granted.
On September 11, 2024, the court said that 15 months of the baseline term
remained, but we are unable to discern the basis for that calculation. If the
baseline term had originally been seven years and was reduced by 18 months,
then the modified term would be five years and six months. Five years and
six months from February 25, 2022, is August 25, 2027, but 15 months from
September 11, 2024, is December 11, 2025. And this additional reduction
cannot be attributed to precommitment custody credits, which must be
applied against the maximum term, not the baseline term. (§ 875,
subd. (c)(1)(C); M.B., supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 464.)
In short, the juvenile court did not set the baseline term until it ruled
on July 8, 2024, that the term remained at seven years, and that term is
incorrect. The court also confused matters by stating in the September 11
order that 15 months of the baseline term remained. Therefore, we reverse
14
the seven-year term, and we direct the court on remand to reset the term
under current law. In calculating how long a baseline term remains, the
court must give Eric the benefit of the 18-month reduction already granted.
C. We Modify the Probation Condition Prohibiting Contact with the
Victim’s Widow.
Finally, Eric claims that a probation condition prohibiting contact with
Chaney’s widow and directing him “to stay away from the victim’s residence
or place of business” is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We modify
the condition in the manner the parties agree is appropriate.
When committing Eric to Pine Grove on September 11, 2024, the
juvenile court orally imposed various probation conditions, including that he
not “have contact with the victim’s widow, [N.S.]. And he’s to stay away from
the victim’s residence or place of business.” The court also signed a written
order, prepared by the probation department, that prohibited Eric from
having contact with “Victim’s widow [N.S.]” and directed him to “Stay Away
from: Victim N.S. residence or place of business.”7 Eric did not object to this
condition.
“ ‘A probation condition “must be sufficiently precise for the [ward] to
know what is required . . . , and for the court to determine whether the
condition has been violated,” if it is to withstand a challenge on the ground of
vagueness. [Citation.] A probation condition that imposes limitations on a
person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the
purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally
overbroad.’ ” (In re L.J. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 37, 53, quoting In re Sheena K.
7 Eric states in his briefing that the September 11 minute order does
not reflect this probation condition. In fact, the minute order incorporates
the “terms and conditions of wardship,” which are reflected in the written
order referred to above.
15
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890.) Where, as here, an appellant raises a claim of
vagueness or overbreadth for the first time on appeal, it is not forfeited if the
error “is capable of correction without reference to the particular sentencing
record developed in the [lower] court.” (Sheena K., at p. 887.) We review
such claims de novo. (L.J., at p. 53.)
Eric claims the probation condition at issue is vague for various
reasons, including because (1) the oral condition refers to both “the victim’s
widow” and “the victim” and (2) a person’s “residence” and “place of business”
are not “specific identifiable place[s].” Eric also claims the condition is
overbroad because it requires him to “stay away from unidentified locations”
without any “geographic limitations.” The Attorney General responds that
the condition can be modified to address these concerns by specifying that
Eric “not . . . knowingly get within 50[]yards of [N.S.’s] home or business,”
and Eric states that “[t]his modification is acceptable to [him].” Accordingly,
we modify the condition in accordance with the parties’ agreement.
III.
DISPOSITION
The July 8, 2024 ruling that Eric’s baseline term of confinement is
seven years and the September 11, 2024 ruling that Eric’s maximum term of
confinement is six years and 11 months are reversed. The probation
condition imposed on September 11, 2024, requiring Eric to have no contact
with N.S. is modified to specify that Eric “not have contact with N.S. and not
knowingly go within 50 yards of N.S.’s home or place of business.” The
matter is remanded for the juvenile court to award Eric precommitment
credits and set a maximum term of confinement and baseline term of
confinement in accordance with this opinion. In all other respects, the July 8
and September 11 orders are affirmed.
16
_________________________
Humes, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Banke, J.
_________________________
Smiley, J.
In re Eric S. A170932, A171747
17
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