People v. Ali CA2/6

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Filed 2/19/25 P. v. Ali CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B330506
(Super. Ct. No. BA381310)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)

v.

ASHIA NAKISIA ALI et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

Codefendants Ashia Nakisia Ali and Antonio Dale Burton
appeal from the denials of their Penal Code1 section 1172.6
petitions for resentencing. Ali contends the denial of her petition
should be vacated because the trial court considered inadmissible
hearsay at the evidentiary hearing. Burton similarly contends
the court relied on inadmissible evidence when denying his
petition, without which substantial evidence does not support the
finding that he committed murder. He also contends his
admission of a section 12022.5, subdivision (a) firearm allegation

1 Unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code.
does not render him categorically ineligible for resentencing
relief. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The underlying crimes2
Jeremy Owens and Darnell Jackson were walking home
from a club one morning. Neither was a gang member, but
Jackson was wearing a red baseball cap and red shoes similar to
clothing worn by Blood gang members. An SUV drove slowly
past Owens and Jackson. One of the men inside asked the two
where they were from. Another person in the SUV then “threw
up a gang sign” before the vehicle drove away.
Three people—two males and one female—later walked
toward Owens and Jackson as they continued down the street.
The shorter male asked, “Where you all from?” Jackson replied,
“I don’t gang bang. I don’t bang.” He also displayed the tattoos
on his arms to show that they were not gang related.
The three people walked a few steps in the other direction.
The shorter man then spun around and shot Jackson in the back
of the head. He and his accomplices also shot at Owens. A bullet
struck Owens’s forehead as he ran away.
Statements made by Ali, Burton, and their accomplices that were
admitted at the preliminary hearing
Jean Palacios was a member of the same gang as Ali,
Burton, and their accomplices in the shootings of Owens and
Jackson, Charles Allen and Brandon Maxwell. Allen told
Palacios that he, Ali, Burton, and Maxwell “caught some Bloods”
and shot them. Ali said that she was “a real Blood killer.”

2 The factual summary is taken from the preliminary
hearing, which the trial court considered at the section 1172.6
evidentiary hearing.

2
Burton took Palacios to the scene of the shooting and pointed out
“where they killed the Blood.” Burton said that they had killed
one person but another got away.
Burton told Palacios that he and his accomplices walked up
to Owens and Jackson and asked them where they were from.
The two said “they didn’t bang.” Burton, Maxwell, and Ali then
acted like they were walking away. Once the two victims also
began to walk away, Burton said that he, Ali, and Maxwell “ran
up on them and shot them.” The three then ran back to the car
where Allen was waiting and drove away.
Palacios said that while in jail Allen and/or Maxwell drew a
map showing the area where Owens and Jackson were shot.
Palacios saw the map sitting between Allen and Maxwell and
overheard Allen describe “all the players that were part of the
shooting,” including Ali and Burton.
Laroneisha Age told police that Ali bragged to her about
committing a retaliatory shooting hours after Owens and Jackson
were shot. During the preliminary hearing, Age said what she
had told police was “not true.”
Travon Francis told police that Maxwell said that he shot
someone in the head. Francis also told police that Ali described
what Jackson was wearing when she, Burton, and Maxwell shot
him, and described the car Allen had driven them in. She later
showed him three firearms. During the preliminary hearing,
Francis said that he had lied to police.
After the preliminary hearing Ali pleaded no contest to
committing voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and
admitted that she was personally armed with a firearm when she
did so (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). Burton pleaded no contest to
voluntary manslaughter and admitted a personal-use firearm

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allegation (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).
Section 1172.6 proceedings
Ali and Burton filed petitions for section 1172.6
resentencing. At their combined evidentiary hearing the
prosecutor said that he would not call any witnesses but would
rely instead on the preliminary hearing transcript, a minute
order reflecting Ali’s plea, Burton’s plea transcript, and
sentencing transcripts for both codefendants. Ali said she did not
object to the court’s consideration of the preliminary hearing
transcript, but claimed “there’s double hearsay as the only
evidence against” her. Burton similarly objected on “double
hearsay” grounds but did not point to any specific testimony he
considered inadmissible. He also objected to “any other improper
evidence under [Senate Bill No.] 775.”
The trial court said that preliminary hearing testimony
admitted pursuant to section 872, subdivision (b) was
inadmissible at a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing and would
not be considered. As to the “double hearsay” objections, the
court said that the statements of Ali and Burton would be
admissible against both codefendants as statements of the
declarants themselves and statements against penal interests.
Statements of other codefendants would be admissible against
both Ali and Burton as statements against penal interests.
Neither Ali nor Burton challenged these rulings.
The prosecutor argued each codefendant acted with malice.
He claimed that there was a gang-related motive for the shooting
in that Ali and Burton were retaliating for the recent shooting of
one of their fellow gang members by “hunting” for rivals. He
argued there was evidence of three shooters, and noted that both
Ali and Burton admitted to personally using firearms, indicating

4
that they were among those who were shooting. He
acknowledged, however, that it was unclear who fired the fatal
shot. At minimum, Ali and Burton each acted with the intent to
kill by aiding and abetting a murder.
Ali countered that her plea “was not a factual plea” because
it was entered pursuant to People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595.
She thus did not “take responsibility for the firearm
enhancement.” She also claimed that her young age—16 years
old at the time of the murder—undermined any evidence that she
was bragging about her involvement.
Burton similarly argued his admission of a firearm
allegation should be given little weight since the plea was entered
pursuant to People v. West. He also urged the court to consider
his young age at the time of the crime. He said that at most the
evidence established that he was guilty of assault with a deadly
weapon.
The prosecutor noted there were at least 18 gunshots fired
at Owens and Jackson, which went beyond assault and was
evidence of intent to kill. Witnesses said that both Ali and
Burton were involved in the shooting. Burton claimed the same
thing and said that both he and Ali were among the shooters.
Ballistics corroborated those statements.
After considering the arguments and evidence presented,
the trial court denied Ali’s and Burton’s respective section 1172.6
petitions. The court noted that even though the codefendants’
pleas were entered pursuant to People v. West, it did give “some
weight” to their manslaughter convictions and admissions to
personally using firearms. The court also observed that the
preliminary transcript contained no evidence that the firearms
were displayed in a menacing manner or used in any way other

5
than to shoot at the victims.
According to Owens’s preliminary hearing testimony, he
and Jackson were walking home when an occupant of a car
driving by threw up a gang sign. Three people then approached
and asked where the two were from. Owens and Jackson said
“nowhere” and turned to walk away. At that point the three
individuals opened fire.
Ali’s and Burton’s respective statements to Palacios were
consistent with Owens’s testimony. After the incident Ali told
Palacios that she’s now a “real Blood killer.” Burton told Palacios
that he walked up to Owens and Jackson and “banged on them.”
He said that he, Ali, and Maxwell all shot at Owens and Jackson
when they turned to walk away.
The trial court concluded that the prosecutor proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that Ali and Burton committed
“malice murder.” The two and their accomplices planned the
murder to “retaliate against somebody [who] had been killed that
evening at a party. The four of them got in the car[;] they drove
into rival gang territory, with loaded firearms[;] three got out[;]
and three shot.” The court therefore denied the section 1172.6
petitions.
DISCUSSION
Legal principles
“In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) to ‘amend the felony
murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who [was] not the actual killer, did not act
with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human

6
life.’ [Citation.] To accomplish these goals, Senate Bill 1437
redefined ‘malice’ in section 188, and narrowed the classes of
persons liable for felony murder under section 189. [Citation.] It
also added what is now section 1172.6 to the Penal Code, which
permitted those convicted of felony murder or murder under a
natural and probable consequences theory to petition to have
their murder convictions vacated and to be resentenced on any
remaining counts. [Citations.] This relief was subsequently
extended to persons convicted of manslaughter and attempted
murder. [Citation.]” (People v. Allen (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 389,
394-395 (Allen).)
“A person may now petition for resentencing if: (1) the
information allowed prosecutors to ‘proceed under a theory of
felony murder, murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine[,] or [any] other theory under which malice
is imputed to a person based solely on [their] participation in a
crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine’; (2) the person was convicted of . . .
manslaughter . . . ; and (3) the person could not now be convicted
of murder . . . under the current versions of sections 188 and 189.
[Citation.] If a person files a facially valid petition, the trial court
must appoint counsel, if requested, and set the matter for a
prima facie hearing. [Citation.] At that hearing the court may
rely on the record of conviction and deny a petition if the
petitioner is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of
law.” (Allen, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 395, footnote omitted.)
If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing of eligibility
for relief, however, the trial court must issue an order to show
cause and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6,
subds. (c) & (d)(1).) During the evidentiary hearing prosecutors

7
must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a petitioner
convicted of manslaughter under prior versions of California law
could still be convicted of murder under current law. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (d)(3).) They may meet this burden by offering into
evidence matters that were previously admitted into evidence
and are admissible under current law, plus any new evidence
they choose to proffer. (Ibid.) Hearsay admitted at a preliminary
hearing pursuant to section 872, subdivision (b) may not be
considered, however. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) We review whether
prosecutors met their burden for substantial evidence. (People v.
Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298.)
Ali’s petition
Ali contends the denial of her section 1172.6 petition should
be vacated because the trial court considered inadmissible
hearsay evidence at the evidentiary hearing. She specifically
challenges the court’s consideration of: (1) preliminary hearing
testimony admitted pursuant to section 872, subdivision (b); (2)
Francis’s statements to police implicating her in the shootings;
(3) Age’s statements doing the same; (4) Palacios’s preliminary
hearing testimony that Burton took him to the scene of the
shooting and told him about it; and (5) Palacios’s testimony that
Allen told him that he, Ali, Burton, and Maxwell engaged in a
retaliatory shooting. The Attorney General counters that the
court did not consider section 872, subdivision (b) testimony, and
notes that Ali did not specifically object to Francis’s or Age’s
respective statements or to Palacios’s testimony. We agree with
the Attorney General.
Ali’s contention that the trial court considered preliminary
hearing testimony admitted pursuant to section 872, subdivision
(b) is not supported by the record. The court stated that such

8
testimony was not admissible at an 1172.6 evidentiary hearing,
and said that it did not consider it when denying her
resentencing petition. We accordingly reject Ali’s first
evidentiary challenge.
Her remaining four challenges are forfeited. “A verdict or
finding shall not be set aside . . . by reason of the erroneous
admission of evidence unless” a party timely and specifically
objects and any error “resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” (Evid.
Code, § 353.) The failure to lodge a “ ‘ “ ‘ “timely and specific
objection” on the ground asserted on appeal makes that ground
not cognizable.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1010.)
This is because “[s]uch a failure ‘deprives the trial court of the
opportunity’ to create a record and to ‘correct potential error in
the first instance.’ ” (People v. Romero and Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th
1, 24.) It is also “ ‘both unfair and inefficient to permit a claim of
error on appeal that, if timely brought to the attention of the trial
court, could have been easily corrected or avoided.’ ” (People v.
McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593.) Were the rule
otherwise, a party would “ ‘ “ ‘ “be careful to be silent as to [their]
objections until it would be too late to obviate them, and the
result would be that few judgments would stand the test of an
appeal.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1103.)
Based on these rules, we reject Ali’s challenges to Francis’s
and Age’s statements and Palacios’s testimony. (Cf. People v.
Vance (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 706, 713-714 (Vance) [forfeiture
rules apply during section 1172.6 evidentiary hearings]; People v.
Schell (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 437, 444 [same].) At the beginning
of the evidentiary hearing Ali objected that “double hearsay” in
the preliminary hearing transcript was the “only evidence”
against her. She did not direct the trial court’s attention to any

9
specific statements or testimony in the transcript, however, nor
did she challenge the court’s explanation as to why what it saw
as “double hearsay” was admissible. She also did not object when
the court detailed what evidence it considered when deciding her
section 1172.6 motion. Because Ali had ample opportunity to
correct any potential error during the proceedings below but did
not do so, her appellate challenges are forfeited.
Burton’s petition
Burton contends the trial court considered inadmissible
hearsay at the section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing, without which
there is insufficient evidence that he aided and abetted the
murder of Jackson. For the reasons set forth above, we conclude
Burton has forfeited any challenge to the court’s admission of
evidence at the evidentiary hearing. The evidence is also
sufficient to uphold the finding that Burton aided and abetted
Jackson’s murder. (Cf. Vance, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 713
[“hearsay admitted without objection is substantial evidence
sufficient to support a judgment”].)
A person is liable for aiding and abetting a murder if they
“ ‘aided or encouraged the commission of the murder with
knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and with
the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating
its commission.’ ” (In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562, 579.)
Whether the person has such liability “ ‘ordinarily is a question of
fact.’ ” (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1054 (Nguyen).)
Among the factors to consider include “ ‘presence at the scene of
the crime, companionship, and conduct before and after the
offense.’ ” (Ibid.)
Reviewing the “ ‘ “ ‘whole record in the light most favorable
to the’ ” ’ ” trial court’s denial of Burton’s resentencing petition,

10
we conclude “ ‘ “ ‘it contains substantial evidence—i.e., evidence
that is credible and of solid value—from which a rational trier of
fact could have found [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt’ ” ’ ”
of aiding and abetting Jackson’s murder. (Nguyen, supra, 61
Cal.4th at pp. 1054-1055.) The evidence considered at the
evidentiary hearing showed that Burton aided and encouraged
the commission of Jackson’s murder. Burton was present at the
scene of the murder. He was with the actual perpetrator. When
he, Ali, and Maxwell saw Jackson and Owens they approached
and asked if they were members of a rival gang. When Jackson
and Owens denied gang membership, the three feigned walking
away before spinning around and opening fire. They then ran
back to the vehicle where Allen was waiting.
The evidence also showed that Burton was aware of and
shared Maxwell’s unlawful purpose of killing Jackson. Prior to
the murder Burton went to the territory of a rival gang with
Maxwell, Allen, and Ali, intending to retaliate for the shooting of
one of their fellow gang members. They were armed, and acted
as if they were leaving before turning and opening fire. After the
shooting Burton bragged that they had killed one person, but
lamented that the other had gotten away. Considered together,
these actions support the trial court’s finding of a shared intent
to kill between Burton and the actual perpetrator. Burton was
therefore liable for aiding and abetting murder.3 Denial of his
section 1172.6 petition was proper.

3 Given our conclusion we need not resolve Burton’s
contention that his admission of a firearm enhancement does not
show that he was liable as the direct perpetrator of Jackson’s
murder.

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DISPOSITION
The April 7, 2023, orders denying Ali’s and Burton’s
respective resentencing petitions are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

YEGAN, J.

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Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Heather J. Manolakas, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Ashia Nakisia Ali.
Johanna Pirko, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Antonio Dale Burton.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Theresa A. Patterson, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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