CourtListener 10334805•People v. Robertson CA2/1
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Filed 2/18/25 P. v. Robertson CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B335636
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A616774)
v.
WAYNE JEROME ROBERTSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Laura R. Walton, Judge. Reversed.
James S. Donnelly-Saalfield, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Heidi Salerno, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
In 1980, a jury convicted Wayne Jerome Robertson of
murder and found a felony-murder special circumstance true. In
2022, Robertson petitioned for resentencing pursuant to
Penal Code1 section 1172.6, and the trial court denied the
petition at the prima facie stage. The trial court found Robertson
was the actual killer in the felony murder.
On appeal, Robertson argues that the record of conviction
does not conclusively establish all elements of a currently valid
theory of murder. We agree. Although the record supports that
the jury found Robertson participated in a robbery in which a
death occurred, the record does not conclusively establish
Robertson was the actual killer.
We reverse the trial court’s order denying Robertson’s
section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage. Because we
reverse, we do not consider Robertson’s argument that his trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.
BACKGROUND
In 1979, the People charged Robertson with the murder of
Ivory Collins, robbery, assault with intent to commit the murder
of Frank Greshom, and the violation of the dangerous weapon
control law.2 With respect to the murder, the People alleged a
felony-murder special circumstance. The People later amended
1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
2 “ ‘The general purpose of The Dangerous Weapons[ ]
Control Law (citation) is to control the threat to public safety in
the indiscriminate possession and carrying about of concealed
and loaded weapons.’ [Citation.]” (Garber v. Superior Court
(2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 724, 730.)
2
the information.3 Robertson was the only defendant charged in
the information and amended information. The jury verdict
shows the jury convicted Robertson of first degree murder and
found the felony-murder special circumstance true. The
remaining jury verdicts are not included in our record.
In 1982, this court affirmed the judgment of conviction.
(People v. Robertson (Sept. 17, 1982) 2 Crim. No. 39454 [nonpub.
opn.].) The opinion states: “On September 16, 1979, defendant,
Wayne Jerome Robertson, entered a market, robbed the
proprietor, Mr. Ivory Collins, at gunpoint, and then shot and
killed him. He also shot a customer, severely wounding him.
“Defendant was convicted by a jury of murder (Pen. Code,
§ 187), robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), assault with intent to commit
murder (former Pen. Code, § 217), and possession of a firearm by
a felon (Pen. Code, § 12021). The jury found the special
circumstance allegation of commission of murder during the
commission of a robbery to be true and fixed the penalty at life
without possibility of parole. An allegation that defendant
personally used a firearm during the commission of the murder
having been found true, the two-year enhancement prescribed by
Penal Code section 12022.5 was added to the life sentence, and
the court ordered that this sentence run consecutively to the
unstayed sentence of eight years and eight months imposed on
the other counts.” (Robertson, supra, 2 Crim. No. 39454, at p. 2.)
3 Although only part of the amended information is in our
record, the absence of a full copy does not affect resolution of this
appeal.
3
1. Robertson’s petition for resentencing
In June 2022, Robertson petitioned for resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.6. Among other things, he averred he
could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder
because of changes made to sections 188 and 189. The trial court
appointed counsel for Robertson.
2. The People’s opposition to resentencing
The People argued Robertson could not establish a prima
facie case because Robertson was “prosecuted and convicted as
the actual killer.” The People further argued as the actual killer
in a felony murder, Robertson was ineligible as a matter of law
for resentencing. The People attached the preliminary hearing
and jury instructions to their opposition. The People did not
include a transcript of the trial in the record; the record does not
reveal whether that transcript is still available.
a. Jury Instructions
As a preliminary matter, we note although the full text of
some instructions is in our record, other instructions appear in
our record only as a reference to a CALJIC instruction number
and check mark as to whether the form instruction was modified.
Where the jury instructions indicate no modification, we refer to
the 1980 form instruction. Where the instruction is included in
the record, we refer to the instruction from the record. As set
forth in our Discussion, post, where the text of a modified
instruction is not included in the record, we cannot ascertain how
the trial court instructed the jury.
The jury instructions indicate that the trial court defined
murder pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.10. That instruction provided
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murder is the “unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought.” (CALJIC No. 8.10 (1980 ed.).) The court modified
the definition of malice aforethought by instructing the jury only
on express malice and not on implied malice. The court modified
the CALJIC first degree felony-murder instruction, but its
modification is not included in our record.
The court instructed the jury on special circumstances
pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.80, which informs the jury that if it
finds defendant guilty of first degree murder, it must determine
whether a special circumstance exists. (CALJIC No. 8.80 (1980
ed.).) The court instructed the jury on special-circumstance
murder in the commission of robbery pursuant to section 8.81.17,
which for the jury to find true, required the jury to find the
murder was committed while defendant was engaged in, or was
an accomplice in the commission or attempted commission of a
robbery or during the immediate flight after the commission or
attempted commission of a robbery. (CALJIC No. 8.81.17 (1980
ed.).)
The court instructed the jury on assault with intent to
commit murder pursuant to CALJIC No. 9.01. As it existed in
1980, that instruction provided: “Every person who assaults
another with the specific intent to commit murder, is guilty of the
crime of assault to commit murder. [¶] In order to prove the
commission of the crime of assault to commit murder, each of the
following elements must be proved: [¶] 1. That a person was
assaulted, and 2. That the assault was made with the specific
intent to murder such person.” (CALJIC No. 9.01 (1980 ed.).)
The court instructed the jury on whether defendant
personally used a firearm in the commission of a felony as
follows: Using a firearm “means to display a firearm in a
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menacing manner, intentionally to fire it, or intentionally to
strike or hit a human being with it.”
b. Preliminary Hearing
As pertinent to this appeal, during the preliminary
hearing, Frank Gresham testified that on September 16, 1979, he
was visiting his friend, Ivory Collins, in Collins’s store. A “little
girl” was also in the store. Robertson “slammed the door [to the
store] and pulled” out a gun and said “Freeze.” Robertson said,
“This is a stickup. Put your hands in the air.” Gresham stood
about three feet from Robertson. He observed Robertson point
the gun at Collins.
Robertson asked Collins, “Where is your money?” and
Collins directed him to the cash register. Robertson put money in
his pocket. Gresham did not see Robertson shoot him but heard a
shot from behind and saw blood shoot out from his (Gresham’s)
head. Gresham heard three additional shots. Gersham had
bullet wounds in his head.
3. Robertson’s reply
Robertson argued he “filed a form Petition for Resentencing
and checked all the appropriate and pertinent boxes, establishing
a prima facie case for relief. If . . . this court accepts the
allegations made by Mr. Robertson as true, without improperly
engaging in fact-finding, the court must issue an order to show
cause and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing.” Counsel
did not object to consideration of the preliminary hearing
transcript.
6
4. Trial court order
After a hearing, the trial court denied Robertson’s petition
for resentencing. The trial court found Robertson ineligible for
resentencing because he was the actual shooter. Robertson
timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Briefly summarized, Robertson makes the following
arguments on appeal: (1) Nothing in the record of conviction
conclusively establishes that the jury found all elements of a
currently valid theory of murder; and (2) trial defense counsel’s
failure to object to admission of the preliminary hearing
transcript constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.
Respondent argues Robertson was ineligible for resentencing as a
matter of law and trial counsel did not render ineffective
assistance of counsel.
We first address the substantive and procedural
requirements of section 1172.6. We then explain why the record
of conviction fails to show as a matter of law that Robertson was
ineligible for resentencing. We need not address the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim because we reverse the trial court’s
order.
A. The Resentencing Statute
“Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate
Bill [No.] 1437 ‘to amend the felony murder rule and the natural
and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to
ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who
is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or
was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted
7
with reckless indifference to human life.’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959.) “Section 1172.6 offers
resentencing for petitioners who have not been determined
beyond a reasonable doubt to have the degree of culpability now
required for a murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter
conviction.” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 720.)
Section 189, as amended, provides that in cases where a death
occurs during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of
specific felonies including robbery, a person is liable for murder
only if the person was the actual killer, the person acted with
intent to kill in aiding, assisting, or soliciting the killer, or if the
person “was a major participant in the underlying felony and
acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in
subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e)(3).)
Under section 1172.6, if a petition states a prima facie case
for resentencing, the resentencing court must issue an order to
show cause, and “must hold a hearing ‘to determine whether to
vacate the murder conviction and to recall the sentence and
resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts in the same
manner as if the petitioner had not . . . previously been
sentenced, provided that the new sentence, if any, is not greater
than the initial sentence.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 960; § 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).)
In determining whether prima facie entitlement to relief
has been shown, the trial court’s inquiry will necessarily be
informed by the record of conviction, which allows the court to
distinguish “petitions with potential merit from those that are
clearly meritless.” (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)
In assessing a petition at the prima facie stage, the court may not
engage in “ ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the
8
exercise of discretion.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 972.) Rather, the
court must “ ‘ “take[ ] [the] petitioner’s factual allegations as
true” ’ ” and make a “ ‘ “preliminary assessment regarding
whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her
factual allegations were proved. . . .” ’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 971.)
A section 1172.6 petition may be denied at the prima facie
stage only where the record of conviction “ ‘establish[es]
conclusively that the [petitioner] is ineligible for relief’ ” (People
v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 460), which showing is not made
“unless the record conclusively establishes every element of the
offense” under a valid theory. (Id. at p. 463.) With respect to
felony murder, resentencing relief is unavailable if the defendant
was the actual killer. (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216,
233.)
We independently review whether a petitioner has made a
prima facie showing. (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45,
52.)
B. The Record of Conviction Does Not Show as a Matter
of Law That the Jury Convicted Robertson on All
Currently Valid Elements of Felony Murder
As a matter of law, the jury found Robertson participated
in a robbery in which a death occurred when it found true the
felony-murder special circumstance. To find the special
circumstance true, the jury had to have found the murder was
committed while defendant was engaged in, or was an accomplice
in the commission or attempted commission of a robbery or
during the immediate flight after the commission or attempted
commission of a robbery. (CALJIC No. 8.81.17 (1980 ed.).)
The principal question before us is whether the record of
conviction also demonstrates as a matter of law that Robertson
9
was the actual killer. If it does, then Robertson would be
ineligible for resentencing. (People v. Delgadillo, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 233 [actual killer and only participant in the
killing not entitled to resentencing relief under § 1172.6].)
1. Assuming arguendo that the preliminary
hearing transcript is part of the record of
conviction, it does not show as a matter of law
that Robertson was the actual killer
Assuming for purposes of this appeal that the preliminary
hearing transcript was properly part of the record of conviction,4
4 Because the trial court engaged in impermissible fact
finding even if the preliminary hearing transcript was part of the
record of conviction, we need not resolve the parties’
disagreement as to whether the trial court erred in considering
the preliminary hearing transcript at the prima facie stage.
The matter before us involves a conviction following a jury
trial and not a guilty plea. We acknowledge that on review in our
Supreme Court is whether in assessing prima facie eligibility for
sentencing relief following conviction by a guilty plea, the trial
court may consider a preliminary hearing transcript as part of
the record of conviction. (See, e.g., People v. Mares (2024)
99 Cal.App.5th 1158, 1173, review granted May 1, 2024, S284232
[court properly relied on preliminary hearing transcript when
assessing prima facie case under § 1172.6]; People v. Patton
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 649, 657, review granted June 28, 2023,
S279670 [same]; People v. Davenport (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 476,
481 [preliminary hearing transcript may be part of the record of
conviction]; People v. Nguyen (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 1154, 1166
[petitioner who pleaded guilty to second degree murder agreed
that preliminary hearing transcript may be considered at prima
facie stage of § 1172.6 evaluation]; People v. Pickett (2023)
10
the preliminary hearing transcript here does not demonstrate
that the jury necessarily found Robertson was the actual killer.
The fact Gresham testified at the preliminary hearing that
Robertson was the shooter does not show as a matter of law that
the jury necessarily made that finding. At the prima facie stage
of a section 1172.6 petition, the trial court is charged with
determining whether the “record conclusively establishes every
element of the offense. . . .” (People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 463.) To reiterate, at the prima facie stage, the trial court may
not make factual findings. (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 971.)
No party argues the preliminary hearing transcript
necessarily shows the jury found Robertson was the actual killer.
Respondent acknowledges that the preliminary hearing
transcript is not “determinative.” Instead, respondent argues the
transcript “shed[s] light on the People’s theories of guilt at trial.”5
We fail to discern how respondent’s argument sheds light on
what the jury necessarily found.
93 Cal.App.5th 982, 988, review granted Oct. 11, 2023, S281643
[preliminary hearing transcript may be considered following a
guilty plea when it “ ‘reliably reflect[s] the facts of the offense for
which the defendant was convicted’ ”]; but see People v. Williams
(2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 375, 397–403, review granted Sept. 11,
2024, S286314 [error to rely on preliminary hearing transcript at
prima facie state.)
5 Respondent further states that the Attorney General is
using the facts in the preliminary hearing transcript “only to
shed light on the prosecution’s theory of the case during the trial
and not to suggest that any factfinding or weighing of evidence
would be appropriate at the prima facie stage of section 1172.6
proceedings.”
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2. The jury instructions and verdict do not
necessarily establish all elements of felony
murder as currently defined
Respondent argues the charges, instructions, and jury
verdict demonstrate as a matter of law that Robertson is
ineligible for resentencing. As previously stated, the special
circumstance finding shows that the murder occurred during a
robbery or during the immediate flight after the robbery. The
question is whether the record of conviction also shows the
remaining element of felony murder—that Robertson was the
actual killer, acted with intent to kill, or as a major participant,
acted with reckless indifference to human life. (§ 189, subd. (e).)
Initially, a “charging decision does not establish any facts
as a matter of law.” (People v. Estrada (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th
328, 339.) Thus, respondent’s reliance on the charges to
demonstrate ineligibility as a matter of law is misplaced.
Turning to the instructions, the record does not include the
trial court’s modification to the felony-murder instruction,
making it impossible to determine what the jury found based on
that instruction.6 Because of the incomplete record, there is no
support for respondent’s assertion that the trial “court instructed
the jurors that they could only find appellant guilty of felony
murder if he perpetrated the underlying inherently dangerous
felony and in the course of committing that felony he personally
killed the victim.” Without the felony-murder instruction, this
case is not comparable to People v. Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th
6 Respondent improperly relies on the form instruction.
The record shows that the trial court modified the instruction but
does not contain that modified instruction.
12
at pp. 54–55 where the appellate court held the felony murder
and other instructions given in that case required the jury to find
the defendant was the actual killer. (Id. at p. 55.)
The felony-murder special-circumstance instruction in this
case did not require the jury to find that Robertson was the
actual killer, intended to kill, or was a major participant who
acted with reckless disregard for life. The instruction required
only that the jury find that the murder occurred during the
commission of a robbery or the flight after the robbery.
Respondent correctly contends the jury necessarily found
Robertson intended to kill Gresham when he assaulted Gresham.
Respondent argues that finding also shows Robertson intended to
kill Collins because only a “single incident” occurred. We need
not decide whether a defendant necessarily has the same intent
when a felony murder and assault to commit murder occur as
part of a “single incident” because respondent cites no record
support showing that as a matter of law, the felony murder and
the assault with intent to kill were part of a “single incident.” To
the extent respondent is relying on the appellate opinion
following Robertson’s direct appeal, that reliance is
inappropriate. (People v. Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1183
[factual summary in appellate opinion may not be used to
determine petitioner’s eligibility for § 1172.6 resentencing at
prima facie stage].) To the extent respondent is relying on the
preliminary hearing transcript, as respondent acknowledges, that
transcript only “sheds light” but is not “determinative.”
The firearm instruction given in this case also does not
show the jury necessarily found Robertson was the actual killer.
Under the given instruction, Robertson could have displayed the
firearm in a menacing manner or used it to strike a human being.
13
In contrast to People v. Beaudreaux (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1227,
1233, 1245–1246, the jury in the case before us was not
instructed that it had to find Robertson “personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm and caused great bodily injury
and death . . . .” Thus, Beaudreaux’s conclusion that a defendant
who discharged the firearm and caused great bodily injury and
death was the actual killer (ibid.) does not apply here.
Finally, Robertson argues his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel because “the preliminary hearing
transcript was not part of the record of conviction and was
inadmissible to establish the basis of the conviction.” Because we
have considered de novo Robertson’s eligibility under section
1172.6 and reverse the trial court’s order, we need not consider
his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying Wayne Jerome Robertson’s
resentencing petition at the prima facie stage is reversed. Upon
remand the trial court shall issue an order to show cause. (People
v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. WEINGART, J.
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