Young v. Jacop CA6

CourtListener 10334803CalctappFeb 18, 2025

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Filed 2/18/25 Young v. Jacop CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

TED ROGER YOUNG, H051685
(Monterey County
Petitioner and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 23PT000062)

v.

KARI LYNN JACOP,

Respondent.

Appellant Ted Roger Young contends that a domestic violence restraining order,
and specifically the order’s firearm restrictions, violate the Second Amendment. Because
the order has expired, we will dismiss the appeal as moot.
I. BACKGROUND
Respondent requested a domestic violence restraining order against appellant in
November 2022. Respondent alleged appellant verbally and emotionally abused her
“every day” and had physically abused her three times. She alleged that on the most
recent occasion, appellant threw ice water on her, called her a “bitch,” and said he
“wanted to kill” her. Later that night, when respondent refused to have sex with him,
appellant allegedly became “irate,” “blocked” respondent from “accessing” her child, and
“was physically pushing and grabbing at” her. Respondent alleged she suffered “large
bruises” on her arm as a result of the incident.1 Appellant filed a response denying the
allegations.

1
Appellant was arrested in connection with the incident, and he asks us to take
judicial notice of various documents related to the criminal proceedings. We grant the
Following a hearing, the trial court issued a domestic violence restraining order
against appellant. No court reporter was present at the hearing. According to the minute
order, evidence admitted at the hearing included photographs of respondent’s injuries.
Exhibits were returned to the parties and have not been made part of the record on appeal.
The restraining order prohibited appellant from possessing firearms and
ammunition, and required him to surrender all firearms in his possession. It expired on
October 30, 2024, while this appeal was pending.
II. DISCUSSION
Appellant seeks to challenge a “myriad of California laws mak[ing] it unlawful for
any person subject to any type of protective order issued by a California state court
(including [appellant’s] restraining order) to possess firearms or ammunition, or to sell or
provide firearms or ammunition to the restrained person,” contending those laws are
unconstitutional as applied to him. Respondent has not filed an appellate brief, and we
may therefore decide the appeal based on the record and appellant’s briefing. (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.220(a)(2).)
As of October 30, 2024, the challenged domestic violence restraining order is no
longer in effect. We invited supplemental briefing as to whether the appeal is moot and,
if so, whether any exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply. Appellant filed a
supplemental brief acknowledging that he is no longer subject to the firearm restrictions
associated with the restraining order. The appeal is therefore moot. (See City of
Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1079 [“ ‘If relief granted by the
trial court is temporal, and if the relief granted expires before an appeal can be heard,
then an appeal by the adverse party is moot’ ”].)

unopposed request. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).) The documents
indicate, among other things, that appellant was charged with possession of an assault
weapon as a felony, which was dismissed in furtherance of justice.
2
Generally, “when a case becomes moot pending an appellate decision ‘the court
will not proceed to a formal judgment, but will dismiss the appeal.’ ” (Paul v. Milk
Depots, Inc. (1964) 62 Cal.2d 129, 134.) However, appellate courts have discretion to
consider the merits of a moot appeal when the case presents an issue of broad public
interest that is likely to recur; the same controversy between the same parties is likely to
recur; or a material question remains undecided. (Harris v. Stampolis (2016)
248 Cal.App.4th 484, 495.) In his supplemental brief, appellant asks us to consider the
merits of his claim because it raises an important constitutional issue that is likely to
recur while evading appellate review. We decline to do so for the reasons we will
explain.
Were we to review appellant’s claim on the merits, our review would be hampered
by the limited nature of the record provided. “ ‘A judgment or order of the lower court is
presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on
matters as to which the record is silent.’ ” (Rossiter v. Benoit (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 706,
712.) An appellant also bears “the burden of affirmatively demonstrating error by
providing an adequate record.” (Mountain Lion Coalition v. Fish & Game Com. (1989)
214 Cal.App.3d 1043, 1051, fn. 9.) “ ‘Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue
requires that the issue be resolved against’ ” the appellant. (Jameson v. Desta (2018)
5 Cal.5th 594, 609.)
Here, appellant has provided neither a reporter’s transcript nor a settled statement
describing the hearing at which he and respondent testified and after which the trial court
issued the challenged restraining order. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137(a) [a settled
statement “is a summary of the superior court proceedings approved by the superior
court” and can be used where the proceedings were not reported by a court reporter].)
The lack of a reporter’s transcript or settled statement describing the primary proceeding
at issue would on its own be sufficient justification to decline to reach the merits. (See
Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 186 [appellate
3
courts “have refused to reach the merits of an appellant’s claims because no reporter’s
transcript of a pertinent proceeding or a suitable substitute was provided”].) Meaningful
review of appellant’s claim, which depends on the specific factual circumstances litigated
in the trial court, would be difficult given the absence of an oral record and other
pertinent evidence from the hearing.
Appellant’s as-applied challenge to the firearm restrictions necessarily seeks
“ ‘relief from a specific application of a facially valid statute or ordinance to an
individual or class of individuals who are under allegedly impermissible present restraint
or disability as a result of the manner or circumstances in which the statute or ordinance
has been applied.’ ” (In re D.L. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 144, 157.) On the record before
us, it is not clear whether appellant may have forfeited his claim by failing to object in the
trial court. (People v. Patton (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 934, 946 [“An as-applied
constitutional challenge is forfeited unless previously raised”].)
Even if preserved, appellant’s position rests on “a ‘constitutional defect [that] may
be correctable only by examining factual findings in the record or remanding to the trial
court for further findings’ ” which is “not appropriately raised for the first time on
appeal.” (Zachary H. v. Teri A. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1136, 1144, citing In re Sheena K.
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887.) Specifically, appellant argues the firearm restrictions were
unconstitutional in his case because the underlying allegations “have nothing to do with
firearms”; appellant and respondent live separately; and appellant “has never previously
violated firearm laws,” unlike the defendant in United States v. Rahimi (2024)
602 U.S. 680. In Rahimi, the United States Supreme Court held that when “a restraining
order contains a finding that an individual poses a credible threat to the physical safety of
an intimate partner, that individual may—consistent with the Second Amendment—be
banned from possessing firearms while the order is in effect.” (Id. at p. 690.)
Appellant’s attempt to distinguish his case from Rahimi relies on alleged factual
differences that cannot be confirmed on this record.
4
We note that while the general issue appellant seeks to raise is an important one of
constitutional dimension, it has not evaded appellate review. Even before Rahimi was
decided, California courts had upheld Family Code section 6389 (which prohibits
individuals subject to domestic violence restraining orders from possessing firearms or
ammunition) against Second Amendment challenges. (Altafulla v. Ervin (2015)
238 Cal.App.4th 571, 581–582; Zachary H. v. Teri A., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1144–1145.) More recently, a different panel of this court upheld a gun violence
restraining order statute, “which was based on the domestic violence restraining order
statute,” and concluded that “nothing in Rahimi calls into question the lawfulness of
firearms restrictions imposed on individuals subject to restraining orders.” (Mountain
View Police Dept. v. Krepchin (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 480, 502.) Given the narrow
scope of appellant’s as-applied challenge and the numerous deficiencies in the record, we
do not believe that exercising our discretion to reach the merits of appellant’s claim
would add value to existing precedent.
Finally, appellant asserts in his supplemental brief that county sheriffs, “who
oversee the relinquishment and return of firearms, are notoriously slow and hesitant to
return firearms in general.” He asks us “to retain jurisdiction over the matter until the
firearms are returned, or for a remand to the lower court to oversee and guarantee the
prompt return of the firearms at issue, if the matter is found to be moot.” Because that
request is unrelated to any alleged error in the trial court’s issuance of a domestic
violence restraining order, it is beyond the scope of this appeal.
Given that the challenged order has expired, we can no longer grant appellant any
effective relief. Appellant has not persuaded us to review his claim under an exception to
the mootness doctrine, and we will therefore dismiss the appeal as moot.
III. DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot. Appellant shall bear all appellate costs, if any,
by operation of rule 8.278(a)(1) of the California Rules of Court.
5
____________________________________
Grover, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________
Manoukian, Acting P. J.

____________________________
Lie, J.

H051685
Young v. Jacop

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