CourtListener 10334744•People v. Lopez CA2/4
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Filed 2/18/25 P. v. Lopez CA2/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B336229
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA204075)
v.
LUIS LOPEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, H. Clay Jacke, II, Judge. Affirmed.
Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Jonathan M. Krauss and Allison H.
Chung, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Luis Lopez appeals from an order
summarily denying his petition for resentencing under Penal
Code section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6).1 The trial court found
defendant was not entitled to relief as a matter of law because
the jury was not instructed on felony murder or the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. On appeal, defendant argues
the court erred in denying his petition because the jury
instructions permitted him to be convicted of murder under an
imputed malice theory. We disagree and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Charges and Conviction2
In June 2000, Mario Garcia (Garcia) was shot and killed at
the intersection of East 49th Street and Ascot Avenue in Los
Angeles. A Los Angeles Police Department detective observed a
pool of blood on the sidewalk and found 37 spent bullet casings
from semi-automatic weapons in the surrounding area.
Lourdes M., who lived on East 49th Street, heard gunshots
and went out to her porch, where she saw someone wearing a
white tee shirt and dark pants shooting. She saw the victim
lying on the sidewalk and recognized him as Garcia, her niece’s
1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 to
section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) There were no substantive
changes to the statute. All further references to the statute will be to
the new section number.
2 Our summary of the facts is taken from the opinion of
defendant’s direct appeal following his conviction, People v. Lopez
(Sept. 19, 2005, B175516 [nonpub. opn.].) We do not rely on the facts
in resolving this appeal. The People’s request for judicial notice of the
entire appellate record of this prior appeal is denied.
2
boyfriend. The shooter walked up to the body, touched it with his
foot, and then got in a green-blue car that was parked nearby.
Lourdes saw a driver and a man in the back seat. The car
departed up Ascot Avenue towards East 48th Place.
Lourdes’s nine-year-old son, Ricardo M., and his twelve-
year-old cousin, Pedro G., were walking to a market on the corner
of East 49th Street and Ascot Avenue on the day of the shooting.
Pedro saw Garcia running into an alley followed by a red car.
Pedro heard gunshots and saw the car stop. A bald, dark-
skinned male with a white shirt and black pants got out of the
car’s passenger side and ran towards Garcia. Pedro heard more
gunshots and saw Garcia emerge from the other end of the alley
on Ascot Avenue. A blue car pulled up, and a bald, dark-skinned
man wearing a white shirt and black pants got out of the car,
shot Garcia, and then kicked him as Garcia lay on the ground.
He shot Garcia again in the back. Pedro saw defendant open the
car door for the shooter, who got in, and the car went down Ascot
Avenue.
Police went to a residence on East 48th Street shortly after
the shooting, where they found defendant and Rogelio Medrano
(Medrano) inside. After police questioned Lourdes, Pedro, and
Ricardo, they took them to the residence. Lourdes identified
Medrano as the shooter. Pedro recognized defendant as the man
sitting in the car. Later, at the police station, Pedro said he only
recognized Medrano and not defendant.
Ivonne G. and her sister Miriam, who lived on East 48th
Street between Ascot Avenue and Compton Avenue, were
awakened by gun shots. Ivonne looked out the window and saw
two to four Hispanic males, approximately 23 to 24 years old. An
aqua green car, driven by a man she knew as “George,” drove by,
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picked up the men, made a U-turn, and drove toward Ascot
Avenue. Shortly after, Ivonne heard more gunshots. Ivonne saw
the car return almost immediately. Two Hispanic males, whom
she had seen standing in the street before being picked up by the
car, got out and went into a house across the street. One of the
men was carrying a gun. One was taller and heavier than the
other. After stopping in front of the house, the man named
George drove away.
Several months later, Ivonne saw a photographic lineup
and identified defendant as the thinner man who got out of the
car and Humberto Jorge Godoy as George. She said defendant
was not the one who had the gun. At the time of the shooting,
defendant was 5 feet 7 inches tall and weighed 135 pounds.
Medrano was 5 feet 9 inches tall and weighed 220 pounds.
Defendant was placed in a six-person cell in the Los
Angeles County Jail. One of defendant’s cellmates testified at
trial that defendant told him he had been arrested in a house
after a shooting and that police had the gun. Defendant said he
was charged with murder but did not say he was the murderer.
The next day, the cellmate overheard defendant telling another
cellmate about the crime, saying the police got the gun when they
arrested defendant. The other cellmate asked about the gun and
defendant gestured with his hands that he had cleaned it.
An information filed in October 2000 charged defendant
and Medrano with one count of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)). It
further alleged that a principal personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury and death to
Garcia (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d), and (e)(1)); that Medrano
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great
bodily injury and death to Garcia (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53,
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subds. (b), (c), and (d)); and that the offense was committed for
the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal
street gang with the specific intent to promote, further, and
assist in criminal conduct by gang members (§ 186.22,
subd. (b)(1)).3
Defendant and Medrano were tried together. The jury was
instructed on murder and malice aforethought (CALJIC Nos. 8.10
and 8.11), first degree premeditated murder (CALJIC No. 8.20),
second degree murder based on express malice (CALJIC
No. 8.30), and aiding and abetting (CALJIC No. 3.01). The jury
was not instructed on the felony murder or natural and probable
consequences doctrine, or on second degree murder based on
implied malice.
The jury convicted defendant of second degree murder. In
a separate court trial, defendant admitted he had a prior serious
felony conviction. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).)
He was sentenced to a term of 30 years to life: 15 years to life for
the murder conviction, doubled to 30 years for the previous
strike. The judgment was affirmed on direct appeal.
B. Petition for Resentencing
In July 2023, defendant filed a petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6. The trial court appointed counsel for
defendant and ordered briefing. The court denied the petition,
finding the jury was not instructed on felony murder, the natural
and probable consequences doctrine, or any theory of imputed
malice. Accordingly, the court found defendant was ineligible for
resentencing as a matter of law.
3 After both sides rested at trial, the trial court granted
defendant’s motion to strike the gang allegation.
5
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.) (SB 1437) to clarify the felony-murder rule and
eliminate the natural and probable consequences doctrine “to
ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is
not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not
a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1,
subd. (f); accord, § 189, subd. (e); People v. Lewis (2021) 11
Cal.5th 952, 957, 959.) Under this framework, a “person’s
culpability for murder must be premised upon that person’s own
actions and subjective mens rea.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1,
subd. (g).) A person may still be convicted of murder as an aider
and abettor. (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 546
(Coley) [theory of direct aiding and abetting remains a valid
theory after SB 1437]; People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 990–
991 [aiding and abetting implied malice murder is a valid theory
of second degree murder liability].)
SB 1437 also added now section 1172.6, providing a
procedure for individuals convicted of murder under a now-
invalid theory to seek retroactive relief by petitioning the
sentencing court to vacate the conviction and resentence on any
remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) If a petitioner makes a
prima facie showing for relief, the trial court is required to issue
an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing. (People
v. Hurtado (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 887, 891; § 1172.6,
subds. (c), (d)(1).) However, if the petition and record in the case
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establish conclusively that the petitioner is ineligible for relief as
a matter of law, the court may deny the petition. (People v.
Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708; People v. Harden (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 45, 52 [“For example, if the record shows that the
jury was not instructed on either the natural and probable
consequences or felony-murder doctrines, then the petitioner is
ineligible for relief as a matter of law”].)
We review de novo the trial court’s denial of a section
1172.6 petition without issuing an order to show cause. (Coley,
supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 545; People v. Harrison (2021) 73
Cal.App.5th 429, 437.)
B. The Jury Instructions Did Not Allow Malice to be
Imputed to Defendant
Defendant does not dispute the jury in this case was not
instructed on felony murder or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. Rather, relying on People v. Langi (2022)
73 Cal.App.5th 972 (Langi), he argues the jury instructions did
not require finding he personally acted with malice and “instead
permitted the jury to impute malice to him based on his aiding
and abetting the perpetrator’s unlawful act.” We disagree.
In Langi, the appellant was convicted of second degree
murder, battery, and robbery in connection with the beating
death of a robbery victim. (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at
p. 975.) The victim died after someone in a group, which included
the appellant, punched him, causing him to fall and hit his head.
(Ibid.) “As the case was tried, the jury could have found [the
appellant] guilty as an aider and abettor even if it found that
someone else threw the fatal punch.” (Id. at p. 980.) The
appellant’s jury was not instructed on the natural and probable
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consequences doctrine, but he argued the instructions given were
ambiguous and allowed the jury to find him guilty on a theory
that imputed malice to him based solely on his participation in
the crime. (Ibid.)
Two jury instructions were “of central significance”:
(1) CALJIC No. 8.31 on second degree murder and (2) CALJIC
No. 3.01 on aiding and abetting. (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at
p. 981.) As given to the jury, CALJIC No. 8.31 stated that a
killing was second degree murder if: “‘1. The killing resulted from
an intentional act, [¶] 2. The natural consequences of the act are
dangerous to human life, and [¶] 3. The act was deliberately
performed with knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious
disregard for, human life. [¶] When the killing is the direct result
of such an act, it is not necessary to prove that the defendant
intended that the act would result in the death of a human
being.’” (Ibid.) CALJIC No. 3.01 stated “‘A person aids and abets
the commission . . . of a crime when he or she: [¶] (1) With
knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, and [¶]
(2) With the intent or purpose of committing or encouraging or
facilitating the commission of the crime, . . . [¶] (3) By act or
advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of
the crime.’”4 (Id. at p. 981, fn. omitted.)
Langi found that although the aiding and abetting
instruction stated that a person aids and abets a crime if he or
she acts “with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the
perpetrator, and . . . with the intent or purpose of committing or
encouraging or facilitating the commission of the crime,” “the
second-degree-murder instruction specified that the direct
4 CALJIC No. 3.01, as given in Langi, is identical in substance to
the instruction as given to the jury in this case.
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perpetrator of that crime need not act with the unlawful intent of
causing death.” (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 982, italics
omitted.) “Thus, while the perpetrator must have deliberately
performed the fatal act ‘with knowledge of the danger to, and
with conscious disregard for, human life’ (CALJIC No. 8.31), his
purpose may have been only to strike or to injure, or conceivably
only to embarrass, the victim. Since the perpetrator’s purpose
need not have been to kill the victim, the aider and abettor’s
knowledge of that purpose similarly need not have been
knowledge that the perpetrator aimed to kill. If the perpetrator
need not have had ‘murderous intent,’ certainly the aider and
abettor need not have had such an intent.” (Id. at pp. 982–983.)
The instructions permitted the jury to conclude that, to be guilty
as an aider and abettor of second degree murder, the appellant
need only have intended to encourage the perpetrator’s deliberate
act (i.e., the punch), regardless of whether or not he “intended to
aid or encourage [the] killing,” or “knew of and disregarded the
risk of such a killing.” (Id. at p. 983.)
The aiding and abetting instruction created an ambiguity
under which the jury could “find the [appellant] guilty of aiding
and abetting second degree murder without finding that he
personally acted with malice.” (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at
p. 982, fn. omitted.) Because the record of the appellant’s
conviction in Langi did not conclusively negate the possibility
that the jury found him guilty as an aider and abettor on an
imputed malice theory, an evidentiary hearing was required. (Id.
at p. 984; but see People v. Berry-Vierwinden (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 921, 936 [rejecting Langi because it failed to consider
the requirement that a section 1172.6 petitioner show that the
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petitioner “can no longer be convicted of murder ‘because of
changes’ made” to the law of murder].)
We are not persuaded the ambiguity identified in Langi is
present in this case. The only theories on which defendant’s jury
was instructed were first and second degree murder, either as a
direct perpetrator or as an aider and abettor. Moreover,
defendant’s jury was instructed on only one theory of second
degree murder: unpremeditated murder with the intent to kill
(express malice murder) using CALJIC No. 8.30.
CALJIC No. 8.30 instructed the jury: “Murder of the second
degree is . . . the unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought when the perpetrator intended unlawfully to kill a
human being but the evidence is insufficient to prove deliberation
and premeditation.” Accordingly, the sole theory of second degree
murder presented to the jury required it to find the perpetrator
intended unlawfully to kill.
Reading CALJIC No. 3.01, the aiding and abetting
instruction, together with the second degree express malice
murder instruction, the jury could have found defendant aided
and abetted second degree murder only if he acted with
“knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator”—that is,
with knowledge of the perpetrator’s unlawful intent “to kill a
human being”—and that he acted “[w]ith the intent or purpose of
committing or encouraging or facilitating the commission of the
crime.” Consequently, as instructed, the jury could not have
found defendant guilty of second degree murder without finding
he personally harbored malice. (People v. McCoy (2001) 25
Cal.4th 1111, 1123 [“Absent some circumstance negating malice,”
where the only unlawful purpose charged is an unlawful killing,
10
“one cannot knowingly and intentionally help another commit an
unlawful killing without acting with malice”].)
Defendant’s reliance on Langi is misplaced. In Langi,
CALJIC No. 8.31 specified that the perpetrator of the crime need
not act with the unlawful intent of causing death, but in this
case, CALJIC No. 8.31 was not given. (Langi, supra, 73
Cal.App.5th at p. 982.) The only theory of second degree murder
on which defendant’s jury was instructed required that the
perpetrator acted with intent to kill and that defendant, as an
aider and abettor, knew of and shared that intent. Langi is
inapplicable where the record of conviction shows that the
defendant “was convicted of second degree murder with express
rather than implied malice.” (See Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 547–548.)
Defendant argues the jury could have convicted him under
a theory of second degree implied malice murder because the trial
court gave the jury CALJIC No. 8.11, which generally defines
malice aforethought as including both express and implied
malice. However, nothing in CALJIC No. 8.11 negates the
specific instructions the jury was given, requiring it to convict
defendant of second degree murder if he knew “the perpetrator
intended unlawfully to kill a human being” and acted with the
intent to aid the perpetrator’s crime.5 (See CALJIC Nos. 3.01 and
5 People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, on which defendant
relies in arguing that CALJIC No. 8.11 could have caused the jury to
convict him of second degree implied malice murder, is distinguishable.
In Chun, the trial court did not instruct the jury on second degree
murder based on express malice (CALJIC No. 8.30). (Id. at p. 1202.)
Thus, Chun did not hold that CALJIC No. 8.11 negates the
requirement that a jury find the perpetrator intended unlawfully to
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8.30.) We presume the jury understood and followed the trial
court’s instructions. (See People v. Gonzales (2011) 51 Cal.4th
894, 940.)
Thus, to find defendant guilty of second degree murder, the
jury was required to find defendant personally harbored malice.
He is accordingly ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a
matter of law.6
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
MORI, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, Acting P. J.
COLLINS, J.
kill under CALJIC No. 8.30. Rather, Chun addressed an instructional
error concerning the second degree felony murder rule. (Id. at
pp. 1201–1203.)
6 Given our conclusion, we do not reach the parties’ remaining
contentions, including the People’s alternative argument that
defendant’s claim of instructional error should have been raised on
direct appeal rather than a section 1172.6 petition, citing People v.
Berry-Vierwinden, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th 921, People v. Burns (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 862, and People v. Flores (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1164,
1174.)
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