CourtListener 10334616•People v. Quiles CA6
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Filed 2/18/25 P. v. Quiles CA6
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H051587
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. C1501990)
v.
BRENDAN RENE QUILES,
Defendant and Appellant.
In 2017, a jury found defendant Brendan Rene Quiles guilty of first degree felony
murder of Sean Wofford (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, 189) and found true a robbery-murder
special circumstance allegation (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)). The jury, however, found not
true an allegation that Quiles personally and intentionally discharged a firearm and
caused Wofford’s death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The trial court sentenced Quiles to life
in prison without the possibility of parole.
In 2020, on direct appeal, a different panel of this court (hereafter, the Quiles
court) affirmed the judgment. (See People v. Quiles (Dec. 28, 2020, H045800) [nonpub.
opn.] (Quiles).) In rejecting a claim of instructional error as to the robbery-murder
special circumstance allegation, the Quiles court opined “the jury found beyond a
1
All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
reasonable doubt that Quiles was the actual killer who committed an act that caused
Wofford’s death.” (Id. at p. 42.)
In 2022, Quiles filed a petition in the trial court to vacate his murder conviction
and be resentenced under section 1172.6. The trial court denied Quiles’s petition at the
prima facie stage, finding that the record of conviction established he is ineligible for
relief as a matter of law because he was the actual killer.
In this appeal, Quiles contends the trial court erred because the trial record allows
the possibility that the jury convicted him of felony murder without finding that he was
the actual killer.
For the reasons explained below, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Quiles’s
petition.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Trial Proceedings
1. Charges
In September 2016, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed a first amended
information (information) charging Quiles and a codefendant, Christopher Azure, with
the murder of Wofford (§ 187; count 1 [Jan. 9, 2015]) and Quiles, alone, with resisting an
officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count 2 [Jan. 11, 2015]). Attendant to the murder count, the
information alleged that Quiles personally and intentionally discharged a firearm and
proximately caused Wofford’s death (firearm use allegation) (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)).
The information also alleged that the murder was committed while Quiles and Azure
were engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a robbery (special
circumstance allegation) (§§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17), 211, 212.5).2
2
The information included additional counts charging Azure, alone, with
voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a); count 3) plus an attached firearm allegation
(§ 12022, subd. (a)), second degree robbery (§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c); count 4), and
conspiracy to sell marijuana (§ 182, subd. (a)(1); count 5). Pursuant to a negotiated
2
2. Trial Evidence
The prosecution presented evidence to the jury in March–April 2017, including
testimony from Azure. Quiles presented one witness in his defense—an audio forensic
analyst who sought to enhance the clarity of speech in a video recording.
A description of the trial evidence appears in the Quiles opinion.3 (Quiles, supra,
H045800, at pp. 2–10.) In the present appellate briefing, both parties quote, in full, the
“Trial Evidence” section from Quiles. Under these circumstances, we incorporate the
Quiles court’s description of the trial evidence. (Ibid.)
In brief, the trial transcripts demonstrate the following: Azure testified that he and
Quiles devised a “plan” to steal a “[h]alf pound of marijuana.” Quiles said that he
“wanted to rob the person that [they] were buying the marijuana from.” Azure arranged
the drug deal and was tasked with “mak[ing] sure that the person had the marijuana.”
Wofford arrived with the marijuana and parked in a lot across the street from Azure’s
residence. As Wofford and Azure sat inside Wofford’s car with the marijuana, Quiles
opened the driver’s side door while holding a gun in the air and yelled “Give me
everything you got.” At that point, Azure “had opened the door and gotten out [of the
passenger side of Wofford’s car] and went back to [Azure’s] house.” Subsequently,
agreement, Azure pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter, robbery, and conspiracy to
sell marijuana in exchange for a sentence of 14 years in state prison.
3
The Quiles opinion is included in the instant appellate record because the district
attorney attached it as an exhibit to an opposition he filed in the trial court. The district
attorney also attached, inter alia, the reporter’s transcripts and clerk’s transcripts prepared
for Quiles’s direct appeal. In the trial court, Quiles objected to the “statement of facts” in
the district attorney’s opposition, because that statement was “based on a summary of the
Court of Appeal decision.” Notwithstanding any limitation on the use of the evidentiary
summary provided in a prior appellate opinion (see People v. Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th
1164, 1183), the record of conviction germane to this matter properly includes all the
documents attached to the district attorney’s opposition. (See People v. Beaudreaux
(2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1232 (Beaudreaux); People v. Maldonado (2023) 87
Cal.App.5th 1257, 1269; People v. Allen (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 389, 395, fn. 4.)
3
Azure sent an instant message to his girlfriend saying he had “[j]ust jacked someone.” In
addition, Quiles told Azure that he (Quiles) “had shot him” (Wofford).
Quiles’s girlfriend D.V.4 testified that when she confronted Quiles about a
newspaper article reporting a person had been shot and killed in a car, Quiles “just said
he didn’t mean to do it.”
The prosecution introduced a recorded conversation between Azure’s brother and
Quiles in which Quiles said that Azure “didn’t even do nothin.’ ”
Police found a “shell casing approximately 10 feet” away from the car in the
parking lot. According to the medical examiner, Wofford suffered “a gunshot wound of
entrance involving the upper left arm and a corresponding gunshot wound of exit on the
right chest.” The trajectory of the bullet was “left to right and downward.”
3. Instructions and Closing Arguments
The trial court instructed the jurors on the general principles of homicide as
follows: “Homicide is the killing of one human being by another. Murder is a type of
homicide. The defendant is charged with murder.” (CALCRIM No. 500.)
The trial court instructed the jurors on one theory of murder—felony murder—
with CALCRIM No. 540A: “The defendant is charged in [c]ount 1 with murder under
the theory of felony murder. [¶] To prove that the defendant is guilty of first degree
murder under this theory, the People must prove that, one, the defendant committed or
attempted to commit the crime of robbery; two, the defendant intended to commit the
crime of robbery; and three, while committing or attempting to commit the crime of
robbery, the defendant caused the death of another person. [¶] A person may be guilty
of felony murder even if the killing was unintentional, accidental, or negligent. To
decide whether the defendant committed or attempted to commit the crime of robbery,
please refer to the separate instruction I will give you on that crime. You must apply
4
To protect the witness’s privacy, we refer to her by her initials. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.90(b)(10).)
4
those instructions when you decide whether the People have proved first degree murder
under a theory of felony murder. [¶] The defendant must have intended to commit the
felony of robbery before or at the time he caused the death. The crime of robbery
continues until a defendant has reached a place of temporary safety. It is not required
that the person die immediately as long as the act causing death occurred while the
defendant was committing the felony.” (Italics added.)
The trial court instructed the jurors with CALCRIM No. 3149 on the firearm use
allegation, stating in pertinent part: “If you find the defendant guilty of the crime charged
in [c]ount 1, you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional
allegation that the defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm during that
crime causing death. [¶] To prove this allegation, the People must prove that, one, the
defendant personally discharged a firearm during the commission or attempted
commission of that crime; two, the defendant intended to discharge the firearm; and
three, the defendant’s act caused the death of a person.” (Italics added.)
The trial court instructed the jurors with CALCRIM No. 730 on the special
circumstance allegation, stating: “The defendant is charged with a special circumstance
of murder committed while engaged in the commission of a robbery in violation of Penal
Code [s]ection 190.2[, subdivision] (a)(17). To prove that this special circumstance is
true, the People must prove that, one, defendant committed or attempted to commit the
crime of robbery; two, the defendant intended to commit the crime of robbery; and three,
the defendant did an act that caused the death of another person. [¶] To decide whether
the defendant committed or attempted to commit the crime of robbery, please refer to the
separate instruction I’ve given you on that crime. You must apply those instructions
when you decide whether the People have proved this special circumstance. The
defendant must have intended to commit the crime of robbery before or at the time of the
act causing death. [¶] In addition, in order for this special circumstance to be true, the
People must prove that the defendant intended to commit the crime of robbery
5
independent of the killing. If you find that the defendant only intended to commit murder
and the commission of robbery was merely part of or incidental to the commission of that
murder, then the special circumstance has not been proved.” (Italics added.)
In closing argument, the prosecutor maintained that Quiles “shot and killed Sean
Wofford during a drug . . . rip-off.” The prosecutor argued: “So the evidence is Sean
Wofford was shot once and killed from that single shot during the commission of a
robbery. So somebody committed or attempted to commit the crime of robbery.
Somebody intended to commit the crime of robbery, and somebody caused the death of
another person. That person was Brendon Quiles.” The prosecutor added, “There’s no
evidence to put Azure as the shooter.”
Quiles’s defense counsel argued that Quiles “did not shoot Sean Wofford” and
there was no “forensic evidence that Mr. Quiles was at the scene.” Rather, Azure “set up
someone to get robbed[] and killed someone.” Counsel contended, “This is a case where
everything points to Mr. Azure being the shooter.”
4. Verdicts and Sentence
In April 2017, the jury found Quiles guilty of first degree felony murder (count 1)
and found true the attendant special circumstance allegation. The jury found not true the
firearm use allegation. The jury also found Quiles guilty of resisting an officer (count 2).
In March 2018, the trial court sentenced Quiles to life in prison without the
possibility of parole on count 1 and 30 days in county jail (deemed served) on count 2.
B. Direct Appeal
Quiles raised several claims on direct appeal, including that the jury’s not true
finding on the firearm use allegation “supports a finding that he was not the actual killer”
and, thus, “the jury’s true finding on the robbery-murder special circumstance [citation]
6
must be reversed because the jury was not instructed with CALCRIM No. 703.”5
(Quiles, supra, H045800, at p. 36.)
In December 2020, the Quiles court rejected the claim of instructional error for
two reasons. First, the court decided that Quiles invited the error, because his “counsel
expressly agreed to exclude CALCRIM No. 703 and had a clearly implied tactical
purpose.” (Quiles, supra, H045800, at p. 40.) Second, and alternatively, the court
rejected Quiles’s claim on harmless error grounds. (Id. at p. 42.)
In deciding harmlessness, the Quiles court noted that “the prosecutor in this case
did not argue that Quiles was guilty as an aider and abettor. [Citation.] The prosecutor
expressly argued that Quiles was the one who shot Wofford.” (Quiles, supra, H045800,
at p. 41.) The court further explained that “the jury instructions reflect that the jury
convicted Quiles based on the theory that he was the actual killer, not an aider and
abettor. The jury was instructed with CALCRIM Nos. 540A and 730. CALCRIM No.
540A, the instruction on felony murder where the defendant allegedly committed the fatal
act, requires the jury find that Quiles ‘caused the death of another person.’ Likewise,
CALCRIM No. 730 requires that Quiles ‘did an act that caused the death of another
person.’ In other words, when it reached its verdict, the jury found beyond a reasonable
doubt that Quiles was the actual killer who committed an act that caused Wofford’s
death.” (Id. at pp. 41–42, italics added.)
The Quiles court continued: “Accordingly, even if we assume that the trial court
erred in failing to give CALCRIM No. 703, any error was not prejudicial and was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . Any failure to instruct on the elements of being
a major participant and acting with reckless indifference was harmless because those
5
CALCRIM No. 703 sets forth the requirements for finding a felony-murder
special circumstance when the defendant “is guilty of first degree murder but was not the
actual killer.” The requirements include harboring an intent to kill or major participation
in the crime with reckless indifference to human life. (See People v. Mil (2012) 53
Cal.4th 400, 408–409; § 190.2, subds. (c), (d).)
7
elements are required only when a jury finds that a defendant was not the actual killer.”
(Quiles, supra, H045800, at p. 42.)
The Quiles court likewise rejected Quiles’s argument that “the jury necessarily
found that he was not the actual killer because it did not find the firearm enhancement
under section 12022.53, subdivision (d) to be true.” (Quiles, supra, H045800, at p. 42.)
The court explained, “There is nothing incompatible with the jury’s determination that
the People proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Quiles fired the fatal shot—and was
the actual killer—but failed to meet its burden of proof to show that Quiles intentionally
discharged the firearm as required under section 12022.53, subdivision (d).” (Id. at
pp. 42–43.)
Additionally, the Quiles court rejected Quiles’s claim challenging the
constitutionality of the felony-murder special circumstance under the Legislature’s
posttrial modifications to the felony-murder rule through Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–
2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2, 3). (Quiles, supra,
H045800, at pp. 43–46.)
C. Petition for Resentencing
In November 2022, Quiles filed an amended petition for relief under section
1172.6 (petition). Quiles asserted, inter alia, that he was “not the actual killer,” and “[t]he
jury was not instructed that [his] liability for felony murder required a finding that [he]
personally killed the victim,” only that he had “ ‘caused the death’ of another person.”
Quiles also mentioned the jury’s not-true finding on the firearm use allegation.
The district attorney opposed Quiles’s petition. The district attorney contended
that Quiles was conclusively determined to have been the actual killer of Wofford, both
by the jury and, after Senate Bill 1437 became effective, by the Quiles court and, thus,
was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. The district attorney also noted that
“[t]here was neither argument nor instruction on imputed malice, accomplice liability, or
alternative theories to find Quiles guilty of murder.” In addition, the district attorney
8
contended that collateral estoppel applies to Quiles’s current assertion that he was not the
actual killer and precludes him from relitigating that claim in the instant proceeding.
Quiles, through appointed counsel, replied to the opposition. Quiles asserted, inter
alia, that his factual allegations must be accepted as true, the jury did not make a finding
that he was the actual killer (citing People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1 (Lopez) and
People v. Vang (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 64 (Vang)), and nothing in the record rendered
him ineligible for relief as a matter of law. Quiles noted that in March 2023 (after his
trial and direct appeal), CALCRIM Nos. 540A and 730 were revised to require a finding
that the defendant “ ‘personally committed (an/ the) act[s] that directly caused the death
of another person.’ ” (Boldface omitted & italics added.)
Quiles contended that the requirements for issue preclusion were not satisfied,
because “[t]he issue raised in [the] petition is not identical to any issue decided” by the
Quiles court on direct appeal and the instant issue “was not ‘actually litigated’ in the
direct appeal.” Quiles further asserted that an exception to the issue preclusion doctrine
should apply because the law had changed to “now make clear that ‘caused the death of
another’ does not equate to ‘actual killer.’ ” (Italics omitted.)
The trial court held a hearing on Quiles’s petition. On November 9, 2023, the
court filed a written order denying the petition. The court concluded that Quiles is
ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law because the record of conviction establishes
that he was the actual killer.
In its order, the trial court noted the Quiles court’s “holding” that “ ‘the jury found
beyond a reasonable doubt that Quiles was the actual killer who committed an act that
caused Wofford’s death.’ ” Regarding Quiles’s trial, the court explained that “[t]he
undisputed evidence presented at trial was that a single gunshot wound, passing through
the heart, killed Sean Wofford. There was no dispute over causation or any alternative
theory regarding what killed Mr. Wofford.” The court stated that the trial “turned on
whether the jury believed Azure or Quiles was the shooter. The prosecution’s argument
9
was that Quiles was guilty of felony murder because he shot and killed the victim while
Azure was no longer even present. The defense argued just the opposite, that Azure was
the shooter and it was Quiles who was not present. [Citation.] There was neither
argument nor instruction on imputed malice, accomplice liability, or alternative theories
to find Quiles guilty of murder.”
The trial court noted that the prosecution had explained to the jurors in argument
that they could find Quiles guilty of felony murder “ ‘even if the killing was
unintentional, accidental, or negligent.’ ” The court found this explanation “significant
because there was evidence from which the jury could have concluded Quiles fired the
fatal shot unintentionally: when admitting the murder to D.V., Quiles told her he didn’t
mean to do it.”
The trial court decided that all the elements of issue preclusion were met,
explaining that Quiles “did raise and ‘actually litigated’ the issue of whether he was the
‘actual killer’ in his [direct] appeal.” The court rejected Quiles argument that this matter
should be excepted from the application of the preclusion doctrine, finding that “the
doctrine would serve its underlying fundamental principles of promoting efficiency while
ensuring fairness to the parties in the present action.” (Italics omitted.)
Lastly, the trial court concluded that because the record of conviction established
that Quiles was the “ ‘actual killer,’ ” “any purported error” at Quiles’s trial arising from
the use of the then-current versions of CALCRIM Nos. 540A and 730 “was harmless
under any standard. [Quiles] was convicted on a murder theory that remains valid after
Senate Bill 1437. As a matter of law, resentencing relief under section 1172.6 is not
available to an ‘actual killer.’ ”
II. DISCUSSION
Quiles contends the trial court erred by denying his petition at the prima facie case
stage because the trial record allows the possibility that the jury convicted him of felony
murder without finding he was the actual killer. Quiles argues that “some degree in
10
weighing the evidence, including evaluating Azure’s credibility” is required “to conclude
that Quiles was the actual killer.” He analogizes this matter to Lopez, a case in which the
Court of Appeal reversed a trial court’s summary denial of a section 1172.6 petition. In
addition, Quiles contends the Quiles court’s conclusion that the jury found him to be the
actual killer does not have an issue-preclusive effect on this section 1172.6 proceeding.
The Attorney General responds that because Quiles’s jury was not instructed on
proximate causation, accomplice liability, or aiding and abetting, and the prosecution and
defense both maintained there was only one perpetrator at the scene when Wofford was
shot, “the only way for the jury to find [Quiles] ‘caused the death of the victim’ was to
find that he was the actual killer.” The Attorney General further contends the Quiles
court’s conclusion that Quiles was convicted as the actual killer “precludes relitigation of
this same issue in the instant petition.”
A. Legal Principles
“Senate Bill 1437 ‘amend[ed] the felony murder rule and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was
not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to
human life.’ ” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842, superseded by statute on
another ground as stated in People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 869; see also § 188,
subd. (a)(3).)
Senate Bill 1437 added section 189, subdivision (e) (section 189(e)) to narrow the
application of the felony-murder rule. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3; see People v. Curiel
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448 (Curiel).) “[S]ection 189, as amended, now limits liability
under a felony-murder theory principally to ‘actual killer[s]’ [citation] and those who,
‘with the intent to kill,’ aid or abet ‘the actual killer in the commission of murder in the
first degree’ [citation]. Defendants who were neither actual killers nor acted with the
intent to kill can be held liable for murder only if they were ‘major participant[s] in the
11
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in
subdivision (d) of . . . [s]ection 190.2’ — that is, the statute defining the felony-murder
special circumstance.” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708 (Strong), quoting
§ 189(e).)
The Court of Appeal in Vang concluded that, for the purposes of section 189(e), an
“ ‘actual killer’ ” is “the actual perpetrator of the killing, i.e., the person (or persons) who
personally committed the homicidal act.” (Vang, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 88; see also
Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 19; People v. Garcia (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 123, 152
[under section 190.2, subdivision (b), “[t]he actual killer is the person who personally
kills the victim”].) However, Senate Bill 1437 did not alter “the longstanding rule that a
defendant is guilty of felony murder if, while intending to commit a qualifying felony, he
personally performs an act that causes death, regardless of whether the fatal act was
intentional or accidental.” (Beaudreaux, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1243–1244.)
“Senate Bill 1437 also created a special procedural mechanism for those convicted
under the former law to seek retroactive relief under the law as amended.” (Strong,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) When the trial court receives a petition under section 1172.6
requesting vacatur of a murder conviction and resentencing, and “containing the
necessary declaration and other required information, the court must evaluate the petition
‘to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.’ [Citations.]
If the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible
for relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition. [Citations.] If, instead, the defendant
has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, ‘the court shall issue an order to
show cause.’ ” (Ibid., citing People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 970–972 (Lewis),
§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
During the prima facie stage of review, the trial court “may look at the record of
conviction . . . to determine whether a petitioner has made a prima facie” showing.
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) The prima facie inquiry under section 1172.6,
12
subdivision (c) is “limited.” (Ibid.) The court “ ‘ “takes petitioner’s factual allegations as
true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be
entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘[A] court
should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility grounds without first
conducting an evidentiary hearing.’ [Citation.] ‘However, if the record, including the
court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,”
then “the court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the
petitioner.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Although the court may rely on the record of conviction in
determining whether defendant has made a prima facie showing, the court “should not
engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ”
(Id. at p. 972.) “[A] relevant jury finding is generally preclusive in section 1172.6
proceedings, i.e., it ‘ordinarily establish[es] a defendant’s ineligibility for resentencing
under Senate Bill 1437 and thus preclude[s] the defendant from making a prima facie
case for relief.’ ” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 453–454.)
“As a matter of law, resentencing relief under section 1172.6 is not available to an
‘actual killer,’ ” because an “ ‘actual killer’ ” remains liable for felony murder after
Senate Bill 1437’s amendments to section 189(e). (People v. Garcia (2022) 82
Cal.App.5th 956, 973.) An allegation that the petitioner could not currently be convicted
of a homicide offense because of changes made to homicide law by Senate Bill 1437 “is
not refuted by the record unless the record conclusively establishes every element of the
offense.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463.) “This means that if the record of
conviction in this case conclusively establishes the jury found facts sufficient to support
[petitioner]’s conviction . . . under current law, he has not made his prima facie case.”
(People v. Morales (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 1120, 1130–1131.) “A petitioner is ineligible
for resentencing as a matter of law if the record of conviction conclusively establishes,
with no factfinding, weighing of evidence, or credibility determinations, that [] the
petitioner was the actual killer.” (Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 14.)
13
“We independently review the denial of a resentencing petition at the prima facie
stage, whether the denial is based on the issue preclusion doctrine [citation], the law of
the case doctrine [citation], or, more generally, failure by the petitioner to make a prima
facie showing under section 1172.6.” (Beaudreaux, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1238–
1239; accord, People v. Bodely (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1193, 1200.) If the denial of the
resentencing petition was legally correct, we affirm that denial regardless of the trial
court’s reasoning. (People v. Camacho (2022) 14 Cal.5th 77, 123.)
B. Analysis
As an initial matter, we note that the Attorney General does not challenge the
proposition that an “ ‘actual killer’ ” (Vang, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 90) for the
purposes of section 189, subdivision (e)(1) and the felony-murder special circumstance
“means the person (or persons) who personally killed the victim.” (Id. at p. 91.) Rather,
the Attorney General argues that “[e]ven accepting” Vang’s definition of actual killer and
“that the versions of CALCRIM Nos. 540A and 730 given at [Quiles]’s trial were
deficient, it does not lead to the conclusion suggested by [Quiles] that the jury could have
found that his mere participation in the robbery somehow proximately caused the
victim’s death.” The Attorney General further contends that this matter “is
distinguishable from Lopez because [Quiles]’s jury was not instructed on proximate
causation” and “in Lopez, the jury heard evidence that there were two persons at the
scene when the victim was killed.”
We agree. The record of conviction conclusively establishes that Quiles’s jurors
found he was the person who actually shot Wofford. The jurors considered murder
liability for Quiles only under a theory of robbery- or attempted robbery-murder and did
not receive any instructions on accomplice liability. The prosecution argued solely that
Quiles personally shot Wofford after Azure had exited Wofford’s car and left the scene.
Quiles’s defense counsel argued the opposite—that there was no evidence placing Quiles
at the scene of the shooting and Azure was the person who shot Wofford. Neither party
14
contested the fact that Wofford’s death was caused by a single gunshot fired by a lone
shooter. These circumstances establish that, in reaching their verdicts on felony murder
and the special circumstance allegation, Quiles’s jurors accepted the prosecution’s theory
that Quiles, in fact, shot Wofford and rejected Quiles’s counterpoint.
Regarding causation, the trial court instructed the jurors that to find the murder
count proved and the special circumstance allegation true, the jurors had to find Quiles
“caused the death of another person.” Similarly, for the firearm use allegation, the court
instructed that the prosecution had to prove “[t]he defendant’s act caused the death of a
person.” The court did not provide the jurors any other definition of causation.
The narrow causation instructions provided to Quiles’s jurors materially
distinguish this matter from Lopez. “The defendant in Lopez was convicted of first
degree murder with a robbery felony-murder special-circumstances finding . . . .
[Citation.] The victim was found in his apartment naked and bludgeoned to death.
[Citation.] The defendant testified he had been to the victim’s apartment with his ‘friend
and drug dealer,’ who he implied was the actual killer. [Citation.] Though the defendant
admitted having been in the victim’s apartment, he denied killing him or participating in
any robbery or even entering the bedroom in which the body was later found. [Citation.]
The prosecution argued the defendant was the actual killer and committed the robbery
alone, but its case for that theory was largely circumstantial.” (Beaudreaux, supra, 100
Cal.App.5th at p. 1246 [discussing the facts and circumstances in Lopez].)
The trial court in Lopez provided instruction on causation beyond that provided in
Quiles’s case. Namely, the trial court in Lopez told the jurors: “ ‘An act causes death if
the death is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and the death would
not have happened without the act. A natural and probable consequence is one that a
reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes.’ ”
(Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 16.) Given this instruction, the Court of Appeal in
Lopez concluded “[t]he jury might have found defendant, though not the actual killer,
15
participated somehow in the home invasion robbery, and the victim’s death was the
direct, natural, and probable consequence of an act committed in the course of his
participation.” (Id. at p. 20.)
Quiles argues that the difference between the causation instructions in his case and
Lopez is immaterial because “[a] lay juror (or anyone else) is likely to understand
‘caused’ as encompassing both direct and indirect causation.” We are not persuaded.
The trial court directed Quiles’s jurors to apply “ordinary, everyday meanings” to
undefined words when deliberating the case. (CALCRIM No. 200.) The dictionary
definition of the verb “cause” is “to serve as a cause or occasion of” or “to compel by
command, authority, or force.” (Merriam-Webster Dict. Online (2025)
<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cause> [as of Feb. 14, 2025] archived at
<https://perma.cc/J48Q-8YQD>.) That definition suggests a direct causal connection
between Quiles’s act and Wofford’s death. Viewed in the context of the instant
instructions (which do not include instruction on indirect causation), the jurors would
have applied the ordinary meaning of “caused” in a commonsense fashion to conclude
Quiles personally shot Wofford.
The jury’s not true finding on the firearm use allegation does not undermine the
conclusion that the jurors found Quiles personally shot and killed Wofford. The trial
evidence included testimony by Quiles’s girlfriend D.V. about Quiles having said he
“didn’t mean to do it.” This evidence supports an inference that Quiles unintentionally
discharged the gun and explains the jury’s findings that Quiles was liable for felony
murder with a special circumstance (which did not require an intentional killing but did
require that Quiles committed an act that caused the death of Wofford) but not the
attached firearm use allegation (which required an intentional discharge of the firearm).
For these reasons we conclude the record of conviction conclusively establishes—
without resort to factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or credibility
determinations—that Quiles’s jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the
16
actual killer of Wofford. We decide Quiles remains liable of murder under current law
and is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6. The trial court did not err in denying his
petition at the prima facie stage.6
III. DISPOSITION
The trial court’s November 9, 2023 order is affirmed.
6
Having decided that the record of conviction provides an adequate and
independent basis to deny Quiles’s petition at the prima facie stage, we need not address
whether, under the doctrine of issue preclusion, the Quiles court’s conclusion that Quiles
was found to be the actual killer precludes relitigation of that issue.
17
______________________________________
Danner, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
____________________________________
Bromberg, J.
H051587
People v. Quiles
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