Optronic Technologies, Inc. v. Celestron Acquisition, LLC

CourtListener 10330387CalctappFeb 10, 2025

Full text

Filed 1/15/25; Certified for partial publication 2/10/25 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

OPTRONIC TECHNOLOGIES, B330798
INC.,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No.22STCV35723)

v.

CELESTRON ACQUISITION, LLC,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Richard L. Fruin, Jr., Judge. Reversed and
remanded with instructions.
BraunHagey & Borden, J. Noah Hagey, Matthew Borden,
and Kory DeClark for Plaintiff and Appellant.
FROST, Christopher Frost, Joshua S. Stambaugh and
Nicholas Lauber for Defendant and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
In a previous litigation, appellant Optronic Technologies,
Inc. d/b/a Orion Telescopes & Binoculars (Orion) sued Chinese
company Ningbo Sunny Electronic Co., Ltd. in federal court in an
antitrust action. The federal court entered a judgment in favor of
Orion for over $50 million.
In a separate lawsuit that is the basis for this appeal, Orion
sued Celestron Acquisition, LLC for fraudulent transfer under
the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (UVTA) (Civil Code,
§ 3439 et seq. 1), and tortious interference with prospective
economic advantage. Orion alleged that after the federal court
entered judgment against Ningbo Sunny, but before Orion was
permitted to collect on the judgment, Celestron and Ningbo
Sunny arranged to have Celestron pay an approximately $4.2
million debt to Ningbo Sunny that was not yet due. By doing so,
Celestron undermined Orion’s ability to collect on its judgment by
eliminating a significant accounts receivable asset, and by
sending the funds to China, effectively putting them out of
Orion’s reach.
Celestron demurred to Orion’s complaint, and the trial
court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. Orion
appealed. We reverse in part. Although Orion did not
demonstrate that Celestron is a debtor or a transfer beneficiary
under the UVTA, the facts alleged in Orion’s complaint were
sufficient to state a cause of action for conspiracy or aiding and
abetting a fraudulent transfer. We therefore find that the
demurrer to the fraudulent transfer cause of action should have
been overruled. We agree with Celestron and the trial court,

1 All undesignated section references are to the Civil Code.

2
however, that Orion failed to state a viable cause of action for
tortious interference with prospective economic advantage.
Orion also contends the trial court erred in failing to rule
on Celestron’s special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP
statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. 2 Orion asks us to
consider the merits of the anti-SLAPP motion in the first
instance, find the motion frivolous, and award Orion attorney
fees. However, Orion has not demonstrated that the trial court
erred in finding that the motion had been withdrawn by
stipulation of both parties. We therefore do not address the
merits of the anti-SLAPP motion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Antitrust litigation
Orion, a company based in California, states that it “sells
telescopes, binoculars, and accessories online, through a network
of dealers, and through its catalog.” Celestron is “is the largest
importer and seller of telescopes in the United States and
abroad.” Ningbo Sunny is a Chinese telescope manufacturer; its
U.S. subsidiaries are Sunny Optics, Inc. and Meade Instruments
Inc.
On November 1, 2016, Orion filed a federal antitrust action
against Ningbo Sunny, Sunny Optics, and Meade. 3 Orion alleged

2 “SLAPP” stands for “strategic lawsuits against public
participation.” (FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7
Cal.5th 133, 139.)
3 In this court, Orion filed a motion for judicial notice of the
federal antitrust complaint and three additional documents from
the federal case. We take judicial notice of the antitrust
complaint filed on November 1, 2016 (exhibit 2 to Orion’s motion),
as the trial court did. (Evid. Code, § 459, subd. (a).) It is not

3
that these defendants “colluded and conspired with third party
telescope manufacturers in China to fix prices, control and
restrict output, and divide the $200 million market for
manufacturing and distribution of recreational telescopes and
components sold in the U.S.”
In its antitrust complaint, Orion alleged there were
unnamed “settling parties” who had “participated as partners in
the conduct alleged herein but have settled and resolved Orion’s
claims and are therefore not named as parties.” According to
Orion’s opening brief in this appeal, these settling parties
included Celestron and its corporate parent, Synta.
The case against Meade and Sunny Optics was stayed due
to their bankruptcy filings. On November 26, 2019, a jury in the
antitrust action found in favor of Orion. On December 5, 2019,
the district court entered judgment “in favor of [Orion] against
[Ningbo Sunny] as to Orion’s claims for damages under Section 1
of the Sherman Act, Section 2 of the Sherman Act, Section 7 of
the Clayton Act, and the California Cartwright Act, Cal. Bus. &
Profs. Code § 16600, et seq.” The $54,000,000 judgment included
treble damages. Under federal law, Orion could not enforce the
judgment for 30 days; the stay would expire on January 5, 2020.
(Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 62(a).)
After the jury announced its verdict but before judgment
was entered, Orion moved for a restraining order barring Ningbo
Sunny from removing assets, including accounts receivable, from

clear whether the other three documents were presented to the
trial court, and they are not necessary to our determination of the
issues herein. Judicial notice is therefore denied for exhibits 1, 3,
and 4 to Orion’s motion. (See Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health
Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 482.)

4
the United States. Orion noted that Ningbo Sunny and the
majority of its assets were in China. Orion further alleged that
Ningbo Sunny had a “significant asset” in the United States in
the form of accounts receivable, but “[t]hose funds . . . are
currently in the hands of the entities that conspired with [Ningbo
Sunny] to violate antitrust laws.” The district court set a briefing
schedule, and held a hearing on December 5, 2019. At the
hearing, the district court repeatedly asked Ningbo Sunny’s
counsel whether Ningbo Sunny could provide assurance to Orion
and the court that it would not frustrate enforcement of the
judgment by transferring assets outside of the United States.
Ningbo Sunny’s counsel told the district court that he was
“unaware of [a] judgment avoidance plan,” and that Ningbo
Sunny simply sought to continue operations “in the ordinary
course of business.” The Court noted that “there’s historical
evidence of how you do business, your payments et cetera to
offsite” recipients and, “As the case goes forward, if there’s
deviation in that,” it would cause “a little concern.” The court
also said, “[T]here’s going to be great scrutiny on the books now.
[¶] If there’s deviation from the books, there’s going to be some . .
. explaining to do.” The district court took the matter under
submission.
On December 10, 2019, Ningbo Sunny filed a declaration by
its president, Wenjun “Peter” Ni, stating in part, “Ningbo will not
transfer any of its cash or other assets located in the United
States to a location outside of the United States other than in the
ordinary course of business while post-trial motions and appeals
remain pending.” The district court then denied Orion’s
application for a restraining order.

5
Meanwhile, Celestron had received inventory from Ningbo
Sunny throughout 2019, and it owed Ningbo Sunny a
“substantial” sum for that inventory. Celestron’s payment terms
with Ningbo Sunny were on a “net 100” basis, meaning that
Celestron was required to pay for any inventory within 100 days
of receiving the invoice for the inventory. On November 27, 2019,
the day after the jury’s verdict, Orion’s counsel sent a letter to
Celestron’s counsel. The letter noted that Celestron held
“significant amounts payable” to Ningbo Sunny. It stated, “In
order to ensure that Orion is able to fully satisfy its impending
judgment against [Ningbo Sunny], and to ensure that you do not
aid and abet or otherwise assist those parties from fraudulently
conveying assets outside of the United States,” Celestron should
not “not aid, assist, facilitate or otherwise cause the transfer of
assets, cash, or other consideration to [Ningbo Sunny] to be made
from the United States to outside of the United States.”
On January 2, 2020, three days before the judgment
execution stay was set to expire, Celestron paid Ningbo Sunny
$4,184,057.70 for outstanding invoices.
On January 13, 2020, Orion served Celestron with a notice
of levy under writ of execution. On January 17, 2020, the district
court issued an order assigning to Orion all of Ningbo Sunny’s
accounts receivable from Celestron.
Orion discovered that Celestron made the January 2
payment. On February 13, 2020, Orion filed a motion in the
district court seeking sanctions against Ningbo Sunny. Orion
asserted that Ningbo Sunny “falsely represent[ed] to the [district
court] under oath that [Ningbo Sunny] would not transfer any
assets outside of the U.S. except in the ordinary course of
business.” Orion produced a remittance document showing that

6
the January 2, 2020 payment from Celestron to Ningbo Sunny
included payment for invoices dated from early October to late
December 2019. Orion noted that pursuant to the parties’ net
100 payment terms, payment for invoices from October or later
was due no earlier than mid-January 2020—much later than
Celestron’s January 2 payment. Orion also presented an email
dated January 1, 2020 from Ningbo Sunny to Celestron, in which
Ningbo Sunny asked Celestron to “pay as much payment as
possible this week.” 4
The district court granted Orion’s motion for sanctions on
March 9, 2020. In a written ruling, the district court stated, “The
evidence in this case strongly suggests that the transfer . . . was
outside the ordinary course of business,” because Ningbo Sunny
requested payment from Celestron on January 1, 2020, and “most
of the money paid was not yet due; rather Ningbo Sunny
requested early payment.” The court also stated, “The evidence
indicates that the historical practice between Ningbo Sunny and
Celestron did not include requests for full, early payment of all
debts within a week of notice.” The court concluded, “The Court
finds that the totality of the circumstances and the evidence show
that Ningbo Sunny made the Ni Declaration in bad faith.” The
court enjoined Ningbo Sunny from transferring assets outside the
United States and issued an order with several requirements,
including that Ningbo Sunny “pay Orion the $4,184,057 [it]
received from Celestron.”

4 Discovery responses filed in district court on March 23,
2020 also showed that Ningbo Sunny’s counsel and Celestron’s
counsel spoke on approximately January 1, 2020 about
“Telescope supply continuity” and “judgment enforcement.”

7
B. This litigation
1. Orion’s complaint
On November 10, 2022, Orion filed a complaint against
Celestron. Orion summarized relevant portions of the antitrust
litigation, and asserted that Celestron and its counsel “were
copied on all filings in the [antitrust] litigation, and were thus
aware of Chairman Ni’s representations to the Court.” It also
alleged that on December 2, 2019—a few days before the
December 5 restraining order hearing in district court—Ni
emailed Ningbo Sunny’s counsel “trying to find a way to
circumvent the judgment. He asked: ‘is it possible that we ship to
US customers through [a] third party in the future’ to avoid
having to pay Orion.” On December 4, 2019, Ningbo Sunny’s
counsel advised Ni that “[i]n terms of the [accounts receivable] . .
. it would be in Ningbo Sunny’s interest to collect as much as
possible as soon as possible.” On December 5, 2019, at the
restraining order hearing, a different attorney for Ningbo Sunny
told the district court that “we are unaware” of any “judgment
avoidance plan.”
Orion further asserted that “[o]n New Year’s Eve,
[Celestron’s] lawyer . . . sent an unsolicited email to Ningbo
Sunny’s lawyer . . . asking to set up an ‘urgent’ call. That
conversation ensued on New Year’s Day. The day after—three
days before Orion could begin enforcing the Judgment—Celestron
wired the funds to” Ningbo Sunny.
Orion alleged that in this transfer, “Ningbo Sunny’s co-
conspirator and largest customer, Celestron, paid Ningbo Sunny
$4.2 million for invoices that were not yet due. The District Court
found that this transfer was not in the ordinary course of
business.” Orion stated that “Celestron was aware of Chairman

8
Ni’s representations to the Court and chose to help its
coconspirators with the fraud.”
Orion alleged that “[p]ursuant to its agreement with
Ningbo Sunny, Celestron made early payment of the accounts
receivable to Ningbo Sunny outside the ordinary course of
business, knowing that Ningbo Sunny had avoided an injunction
that would have prevented such a transfer by making a
fraudulent representation under oath to the District Court that it
would not make such transfers.” It stated, “Ningbo Sunny and
[Celestron] attempted to hide this plot by creating a paper trail
whereby Ningbo Sunny sent a written request for the payments
[on January 1, 2020], which Celestron then purported to honor.”
Orion stated that Ningbo Sunny’s January 1 email “was written
to provide a purportedly legitimate basis for the Fraudulent
Transfer. But as Ningbo Sunny’s earlier discussions with
[counsel] about avoiding the Judgment reveal, and as the District
Court subsequently found, the Fraudulent Transfer was not in
the ordinary course of business and was intended to frustrate
Orion’s ability to enforce the Judgment, contrary to their
representations to the District Court.” Orion alleged that
“[w]ithout the Fraudulent Transfer, Orion would have collected
the accounts receivable through post-Judgment collection
procedures.” Orion also alleged that despite the district court’s
sanction orders, neither Ningbo Sunny nor Ni had paid Orion.5
Orion asserted two causes of action: “actual fraudulent
transfer” under section 3439.04, subdivision (a), and “tortious
interference.” Orion alleged that Celestron was directly liable for

5 Orion alleged that the district court had also granted a civil
contempt sanctions motion against Ni, ordering that he pay
Celestron $4,203,200.20.

9
fraudulent transfer under the UVTA and was vicariously liable
“because [it] aided and abetted and conspired in the wrongful
conduct alleged herein.” Orion prayed for compensatory
damages, punitive damages, declaratory relief, prejudgment
interest, attorney fees, and costs.
2. Celestron’s demurrer
Celestron filed a demurrer, a motion to strike portions of
the complaint, and requested judicial notice of certain documents
from the antitrust litigation. Celestron also filed a special motion
to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-
SLAPP statute. We discuss the anti-SLAPP motion in a separate
section below, and focus here on the demurrer, which is the
primary basis for Orion’s appeal.
In Celestron’s demurrer, it asserted that the antitrust
litigation was tried against Ningbo Sunny, and “Celestron was
not a party to that lawsuit, did not participate in that lawsuit, is
not a debtor on the judgment, did not receive any transfers, and,
for obvious due process reasons, is not bound by the findings or
determinations made in that lawsuit.” Celestron argued that
Orion’s UVTA claim was “prohibited because Celestron is neither
Orion’s debtor, nor a transferee of the allegedly fraudulent
transfer,” and a UVTA claim may be asserted only against a
debtor or a transferee. It further asserted that a civil conspiracy
claim requires that the defendant owe the plaintiff a duty, and
because Celestron owed no duty to Orion, any civil conspiracy
theory also failed.
Celestron further asserted that the tortious interference
claim failed because a “judgment creditor-debtor relationship is
not a ‘business’ relationship subject to an interference claim.” In
addition, Celestron argued that Orion already sought and

10
obtained a judicial remedy regarding the transfer, because the
district court ordered Ningbo Sunny to transfer Celestron’s
payment to Orion, so Orion was seeking a double recovery.
Celestron further asserted that Orion’s claims were barred by the
two-year statute of limitations, even under the delayed discovery
doctrine, because Orion learned of the alleged transfer in
February 2020 but did not file its complaint until November
2022.
3. Orion’s opposition
In its opposition, Orion asserted that its UVTA claim
against Celestron was viable because “[t]he UVTA[ ] expressly
provides in the disjunctive that a creditor may recover judgment
from a transferee or ‘the person for whose benefit the transfer
was made.’ Civ. Code § 3439.08(b)(1)(A). The complaint alleges
that [Celestron] made the transfer to benefit itself by protecting
its relationship with Ningbo Sunny, its largest supplier, and to
intentionally injure Orion, its biggest competitor.”
Orion also argued that California law recognizes liability
for aiding and abetting a debtor’s evasion of a judgment.
Moreover, Orion asserted that Celestron could be liable under a
conspiracy theory because Celestron “‘owe[d] a duty not to
commit an intentional tort against anyone,’ including Orion. It
violated that duty by conspiring to commit a fraudulent transfer.”
Orion further asserted that there was no danger of a double
recovery because Celestron “fraudulently transferred Ningbo
Sunny’s accounts receivable to China, [so] Orion has not been
able to recover those funds to partially satisfy its judgment, as
they are beyond the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.”
Orion also asserted that its claim was timely because
although Orion knew of the transfer, it “did not know, and could

11
not have known at that time, that Defendant committed the
independently wrongful act of interference by instigating the
transfer.” It pointed to Celestron’s communications with Ningbo
Sunny on December 31, 2019 and January 1, 2020, which Orion
argued included a “offer to send the money abroad . . . in direct
violation of Mr. Ni’s sworn declaration to the court.” Orion stated
that it learned about this communication in December 2021, so
its November 2022 complaint was timely.
Orion further asserted that should the court sustain the
demurrer, Orion should be granted leave to amend the complaint.
Celestron filed a reply in support of its demurrer.
4. Court ruling
The motions were argued in a series of hearings on
February 2, February 9, and April 7, 2023. The court then issued
a written ruling sustaining Celestron’s demurrer without leave to
amend. For the UVTA claim, the court stated that the statute
“does not apply to Celestron’s payment of a business debt it owed”
to Ningbo Sunny. The court stated, “The only transfer that the
statue makes ‘voidable’ is one that a debtor owes to a ‘creditor.’
But Orion is not a creditor of Celestron; and Celestron is not [a]
debtor of Orion. Any ‘transfer’ made by Celestron to its creditor,
Ningbo, cannot be voided by non-creditor Orion under section
3438.04(a)(1).” The court also rejected Orion’s argument that
Celestron was a “person whose benefit the transfer was made”
under section 3439.08, section (b)(1)(A), because Celestron was
“permitted to act in its own interest by paying a business debt.”
The court did not discuss Orion’s conspiracy or aiding and
abetting theories. The court denied leave to amend the
fraudulent transfer cause of action because “Orion has pled all
possible facts to support its claim” under the UVTA.

12
The court also sustained the demurrer for what it called the
cause of action for “tortious interference with contract.” The
court stated that Orion’s judgment against Ningbo Sunny “gave
[Orion] no rights recognized under contract law,” and there was
no legal restriction preventing Celestron from paying Ningbo
Sunny. The court denied leave to amend because Orion “cites no
facts it could allege to support such a claim against Celestron.”
The court stated, “Counsel have stipulated that Celestron’s
motion to strike and SLAPP motion are withdrawn. The action,
therefore, is concluded in the trial court.”
Orion filed a notice of appeal on June 5, 2023. The trial
court entered a judgment of dismissal on September 6, 2023. 6 We
exercise our discretion to treat the premature notice of appeal as
a timely appeal from the judgment. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.104(d)(2); Brooks v. Mercy Hospital (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1, 4 fn.
2.)
DISCUSSION
A. Demurrer
Orion contends the trial court erred in sustaining the
demurrer without leave to amend. “‘In reviewing a judgment of
dismissal after a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend,
we assume the truth of all properly pleaded facts. We examine
the complaint’s factual allegations to determine whether they
state a cause of action on any available legal theory regardless of
the label attached to a cause of action. [Citation.] We do not
assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact

6 Neither the notice of appeal nor the court’s judgment are in
Orion’s appellant’s appendix, as required by California Rules of
Court, rules 8.122(b)(1) and 8.124(b)(1)(A). We trust that counsel
will comply with these rules in all future appeals.

13
or law, and may disregard allegations that are contrary to the
law or to a fact that may be judicially noticed.’ [Citation.] We
review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a demurrer and examine
the operative complaint to determine whether it alleges facts
sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.”
(Summerfield v. City of Inglewood (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 983,
992.)
1. Fraudulent transfer
Orion asserts that Celestron can be liable for fraudulent
transfer for two reasons. First, it asserts that that Celestron can
be directly liable under the UVTA either as a “debtor” (§ 3439.01,
subd. (b)) or as a “person for whose benefit the transfer was
made” (§ 3439.08, subd. (b)(1)(A)). Second, Orion asserts that
Celestron can be vicariously liable as a coconspirator or an aider
and abettor to Ningbo Sunny’s fraudulent transfer. We find that
the statutory definitions of debtor and transfer beneficiary under
the UVTA do not fit this situation, but that Orion pled a viable
cause of action under a conspiracy and/or aiding and abetting
theory.
Under the UVTA, a “transfer made or obligation incurred
by a debtor is voidable as to a creditor, whether the creditor’s
claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the
obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or
incurred the obligation . . . [w]ith actual intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud any creditor of the debtor.” (§ 3439.04, subd. (a)(1).)
The UVTA defines a “claim” as “a right to payment” (§ 3439.01,
subd. (b)), a “creditor” as “a person that has a claim” (id., subd.
(c)), and a “debtor” as “a person that is liable on a claim” (id.,
subd. (e)).

14
Orion argues that Celestron can be held directly liable
under the UVTA. It asserts that Celestron was a “debtor to Orion
for the purposes of the UVTA” because Orion “had a claim to the
accounts receivable Celestron was holding for Ningbo Sunny.”
Orion argues that its claim was “unmatured” and was contingent
upon the expiration of the federal judgment execution stay.
Celestron disagrees. It asserts there were two different
claims with two different debtors: first, the judgment, for which
Orion was the creditor and Ningbo Sunny was the debtor; and
second, the accounts receivable, for which Ningbo Sunny was the
creditor and Celestron was the debtor. Celestron argues that
“Orion never had a claim for which Celestron was the debtor,” so
under the UVTA Celestron cannot be liable as a debtor.
Neither party cites authority directly on point. We also
have found no authority holding that a debtor’s debtor can be
considered the creditor’s debtor for purposes of the UVTA. It is
telling that although the UVTA is the most recent in “a line of
statutes dating to the reign of Queen Elizabeth I” (Mejia v. Reed
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 657, 664), there appears to be no authority
supporting Orion’s position. We are not persuaded that
Celestron, a stranger to the judgment between Orion and Ningbo
Sunny, became Orion’s debtor because Ningbo Sunny was Orion’s
debtor. It does not make sense to interpret “a claim” in the
UVTA as a “right to payment” to someone other than the
“creditor.” Orion’s citations about the nature of contingent claims
and unmatured claims also do not render Celestron a “debtor” to
Orion under the UVTA.
Orion also argues that Celestron may be directly liable
under the UVTA because Celestron was a transfer beneficiary
under the statute. The UVTA allows a creditor to “recover

15
judgment for the value of the asset transferred,” and “[t]he
judgment may be entered against . . . [t]he first transferee of the
asset or the person for whose benefit the transfer was made.”
(§ 3439.08, subd. (b)(1)(A).) Orion argues that Celestron
benefited from the transfer, which “allowed it to continue
purchasing telescopes from Ningbo Sunny, preserving its
business.”
Again, legal authority does not support Orion’s position. As
the Court of Appeal stated in Lo v. Lee (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th
1065 (Lo), “[T]he fact that a person received any kind of ‘benefit,’
no matter how intangible or indirect, from a fraudulent
transaction does not necessarily subject that person to liability.”
(24 Cal.App.5th at p. 1073.) “‘“[T]ransfer beneficiary status
depends on three aspects of the ‘benefit’: (1) it must actually have
been received by the beneficiary; (2) it must be quantifiable; and
(3) it must be accessible to the beneficiary.”’” (Ibid.) “[I]n order
for a benefit to be ‘quantifiable,’ ‘[a] merely theoretical benefit is
not sufficient, since it would not be subject to disgorgement.’” (Id.
at p. 1074.)
Celestron argues that its transfer cannot meet the test
articulated in Lo. First, it did not “receive” the transfer;
Celestron was the transferor. Second, to the extent that Orion
asserts Celestron “received” a benefit in its business relationship
with Ningbo Sunny, any such benefit is neither quantifiable nor
subject to disgorgement. We agree with Celestron. Celestron did
not receive the transfer, and the fact that Celestron received an
amorphous “benefit” from its continued business relationship
with Ningbo Sunny does not render it a transfer beneficiary
under the UVTA.

16
The cases Orion cites do not compel a different result.
Orion relies on Qwest Communications Corp. v. Weisz (S.D. Cal.
2003) 278 F.Supp.2d 1188 and Potter v. Alliance United Ins. Co.
(2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 894, for example, but neither case holds
that a debtor’s debtor may be held directly liable to the debtor’s
creditor as a transfer beneficiary under the UVTA.
Orion argues that even if Celestron cannot be directly liable
for fraudulent transfer under the UVTA, it nevertheless can be
vicariously liable under a theory of conspiracy or aiding and
abetting. Orion argues that Ningbo Sunny committed a
fraudulent transfer under the UTVA, and Celestron either
conspired with and/or aided and abetted Ningbo Sunny to effect
the transfer. Orion argues that the trial court erred by “failing to
even consider” these alternate theories of liability, or in the
alternative, by denying leave to amend to allege additional facts
to support these theories.
We agree that the complaint adequately stated a claim for
conspiracy and/or aiding and abetting a fraudulent transfer. 7
Several California cases have held that a party may be liable for
fraudulent transfer as a coconspirator or aider and abettor. (See,
e.g., Aghaian v. Minassian (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 447, 459
[recognizing a cause of action for aiding and abetting a

7 “Despite some conceptual similarities, civil liability for
aiding and abetting the commission of a tort, which has no
overlaid requirement of an independent duty, differs
fundamentally from liability based on conspiracy to commit a
tort.” (Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Sherwood Partners, Inc.
(2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 802, 823 fn. 10.) For the most part, these
differences are irrelevant for purposes of this demurrer. We
therefore discuss the two concepts together.

17
fraudulent transfer in a UVTA case]; Berger v. Varum (2019) 35
Cal.App.5th 1013, 1025-1026 [conspiracy theory permitted on a
common law fraudulent transfer claim]; Filip v. Bucurenciu
(2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 825, 837-838 [conspiracy theory
permitted on a claim under the former UFTA].) 8
Celestron acknowledges that California law allows causes
of action for conspiracy or aiding and abetting fraudulent
transfers, but argues that Orion’s complaint did not sufficiently
allege such a claim because it was “specifically based upon the
UVTA, not the common law tort of fraudulent transfer.” Case
law does not support this argument. The claims in Aghaian v.
Minassian, supra, were alleged under the UVTA (see 59
Cal.App.5th at p. 453), and the claims in Filip v. Bucurenciu,
supra, were alleged under the UVTA’s predecessor, the former
UFTA (see 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 829). Moreover, “the remedies
specified in the UVTA are cumulative and not the exclusive
remedy for fraudulent conveyances” (Berger v. Varum, supra, 35
Cal.App.5th at p. 1019), so Orion was not barred from asserting a
common law claim. Even if Orion could have alleged only a
common law fraudulent transfer cause of action rather than a
UVTA claim, the trial court was obligated to either overrule the
demurrer or grant Orion leave to amend its claim. (See, e.g., San
v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 370 [“‘If the complaint
states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title
under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of

8 In enacting the UVTA in 2015, the Legislature amended
what had previously been known as the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act (UFTA). (See Aghaian v. Minassian, supra, 59
Cal.App.5th at p. 455 fn. 8.)

18
the complaint is good against a demurrer’”]; County of Santa
Clara v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1034, 1041 [leave to
amend must be granted where there is a reasonable possibility
that the defect can be cured by amendment].)
Here, Orion’s allegations were sufficient to allege a cause of
action for conspiracy or aiding and abetting a fraudulent transfer.
(See, e.g., Taylor v. S & M Lamp Co. (1961) 190 Cal.App.2d 700,
706 [“‘a debtor and those who conspire with him to conceal his
assets for the purpose of defrauding creditors are guilty of
committing a tort and each is liable in damages’”]; Berger v.
Varum, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p.1025 [same]; Monastra v.
Konica Business Machines, U.S.A., Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th
1628, 1644-1645 [“The elements of civil conspiracy are the
formation and operation of the conspiracy and damage resulting
to the plaintiff”].) Orion alleged that Celestron and Ningbo
Sunny arranged and completed the transfer outside the course of
ordinary business for the purpose of thwarting Orion’s efforts to
collect on its judgment against Ningbo Sunny. Orion further
alleged that Celestron was aware of Orion’s judgment and Ni’s
declaration about not transferring assets out of the country.
Orion alleged that Celestron “directly participated in a scheme to
orchestrate the Fraudulent Transfer,” and was “separately liable
because [Celestron] aided and abetted and conspired in the
wrongful conduct.” These allegations were sufficient to state a
cause of action for aiding and abetting and/or conspiring to
commit a fraudulent transfer.
Celestron asserts that these allegations are insufficient
under a conspiracy theory, because “[b]y its nature, tort liability
arising from conspiracy presupposes that the coconspirator is
legally capable of committing the tort, i.e., that he or she owes a

19
duty to plaintiff recognized by law and is potentially subject to
liability for breach of that duty.” (Applied Equipment Corp. v.
Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503, 511.) Celestron
asserts that because it did not have a duty to Orion as a debtor
under the UVTA, it did not owe Orion a duty at all. The Court of
Appeal rejected a similar argument in Filip v. Bucurenciu, supra,
129 Cal.App.4th at p. 837, stating that “a claim under the
[former] UFTA in fact involves tortious conduct. In fraudulently
transferring property, tortious conduct occurred.” Even non-
debtors have a duty not to knowingly participate in a fraudulent
transfer intended to impede collection on a judgment. Moreover,
no such duty is required under an aiding and abetting theory.
Celestron also argues that any version of Orion’s
fraudulent transfer cause of action fails because the transfer was
not fraudulent; it was a legitimate payment for inventory
Celestron received. However, Orion has alleged that Celestron
paid the invoice before it was due—and before the stay for
judgment enforcement expired—for the purpose of helping
Ningbo Sunny evade Orion’s judgment collection. “Whether a
debtor had the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a
creditor is a question of fact.” (Aghaian v. Minassian, supra, 59
Cal.App.5th at p. 456; see also Filip v. Bucurenciu, supra, 129
Cal.App.4th at p. 837 [“the timing of transfers and the
circumstances relating to those transfers” may support a finding
that the defendants conspired to defraud the plaintiff].) For
purposes of the demurrer, we presume Orion’s factual allegations
are true.
Celestron further argues that Orion has not adequately
alleged any damages, because it already has a judgment against
Ningbo Sunny and recovery of the approximately $4.2 million

20
payment from Celestron would constitute a double recovery.
However, Orion has sought various remedies, such as declaratory
relief, costs, and the attorney fees it has incurred in attempting
to recover the transferred assets. Damages claims such as costs
of suit may “fall within the scope of recoverable tort damages and
satisfy the damage element for a fraudulent transfer claim for
purposes of demurrer.” (Berger v. Varum, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1021.) Thus, Orion has stated a viable claim for damages. 9
Thus, Orion’s complaint adequately stated a cause of action
for fraudulent transfer under a conspiracy theory and/or an
aiding and abetting theory of liability. The demurrer to this
cause of action should have been overruled.
2. Tortious interference
Orion also contends the trial court erred in sustaining the
demurrer for the cause of action Orion titled “tortious
interference.” “California has traditionally recognized two
economic relations torts: interference with the performance of a
contract [citation] and interference with a prospective economic
relationship.” (Ixchel Pharma, LLC v. Biogen, Inc. (2020) 9
Cal.5th 1130, 1140-1141 (Ixchel Pharma).) Orion’s complaint

9 Celestron cites David S. Karton, a Law Corp. v. Musick,
Peeler Garrett LLP (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1044 for the
proposition that “attorney fees are not recoverable in [a] case for
fraudulent transfer.” This case considered whether attorney fees
were recoverable under “the tort of another doctrine”—not
whether fees are recoverable in fraudulent transfer cases
generally. (Id. at p. 1043.) Other case authority holds that
attorney fees “expended to enforce a judgment against third
parties who conspired with the judgment debtor to evade its
enforcement” are recoverable under certain circumstances.
(Cardinale v. Miller (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1025.)

21
listed its cause of action as simply “tortious interference” without
further elucidation. The trial court interpreted this imprecise
wording as a cause of action for intentional interference with
performance of a contract, and held that because Orion had “no
rights under contract law” as a result of its judgment against
Ningbo Sunny, Orion failed to state a valid cause of action.
On appeal, the parties discuss the cause of action as one for
tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. To
state a claim for tortious interference with prospective economic
advantage, a plaintiff must plead and prove (1) that the plaintiff
and a third party have an economic relationship that carries the
probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff, and (2) that
the defendant knowingly interfered with that relationship.
(Ixchel Pharma, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1141.)
Orion asserts that its judgment against Ningbo Sunny can
constitute an “economic relationship,” citing a single case from
the United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois,
DAN Joint Venture III, L.P. v. Touris (N.D. Ill. 2019) 598 B.R.
430, 435. In that case, a plaintiff alleged that several defendants
conspired to fraudulently transfer the assets of a debtor. The
court held that the plaintiff failed to allege facts to support a
claim for tortious interference with prospective economic
advantage, in part because the plaintiff “fail[ed] to point to any
factual allegations establishing that [one defendant] had
knowledge of any judgments or citations against [the debtor].”
(Id. at p. 448.) Even if we were to consider this case as
persuasive authority, its statement about the plaintiff’s pleading
failures does not constitute a finding that a judgment is a
prospective economic advantage for purposes of this cause of
action. “It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for

22
propositions that are not considered.” (Cal. Bldg. Industry Assn.
v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1032,
1043.)
Celestron correctly points out that cases involving tortious
interference with economic advantage typically involve
commercial transactions. For example, in Della Penna v. Toyota
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 376, 392 (Della
Penna), cited with approval in Ixchel Pharma, supra, 9 Cal.5th at
p. 1142, our Supreme Court considered tortious interference
causes of action as straddling “the analytical line between
interference with an existing business contract and interference
with commercial relations less than contractual.” The court
acknowledged that “[b]ecause ours is a culture firmly wedded to
the social rewards of commercial contests, the law usually takes
care to draw lines of legal liability in a way that maximizes areas
of competition free of legal penalties.” (Ibid.) Similarly, in
Witkin’s Summary of California Law the tort is listed in the
section addressing “Interference with Business Relations,”
explaining that the cause of action “impose[s] liability for
intentional interference with business relations or advantages
that are merely prospective and ordinarily not the subject of an
existing contract. The wrong consists of intentional and improper
methods of diverting or taking business from another that are not
within the privilege of fair competition.” (5 Witkin, Summary of
Cal. Law (2024) 11th Torts § 854.) The Restatement (Third) of
Torts states that “the tort generally involves cases in which a
defendant’s intentional wrong prevents the plaintiff from making
a contract with another party or otherwise pursuing economic
gain.” (Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Econ. Harm § 18
(2020).)

23
Orion’s judgment was neither an existing commercial
contract nor a relationship suggesting future business relations.
Rather, the judgment against Ningbo Sunny constituted an
existing legal entitlement. There is a “distinction between claims
for the tortious disruption of an existing contract and claims that
a prospective contractual or economic relationship has been
interfered with by the defendant.” (Della Penna, supra, 11
Cal.4th at p. 392.) For purposes of the tort, prospective economic
relationships “are only ‘probable’ [citation], and harms resulting
from a breach of such relationships are ‘speculative’ [citation].
Neither party to such a relationship has a legal claim to
continued relations with the other.” (Ixchel Pharma, supra, 9
Cal.5th at p. 1146.) Orion’s existing judgment against Ningbo
Sunny does not meet the definition of a prospective economic
relationship.
Moreover, Orion’s cause of action for tortious interference
with prospective economic advantage was time-barred under the
two-year statute of limitations. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 339, subd.
(1); Augusta v. United Service Automobile Assn. (1993) 13
Cal.App.4th 4, 10.) The transfer at issue was completed on
January 1, 2020, and Orion’s complaint was filed on November
10, 2022. Even including the approximately six-month tolling
period under Emergency Rule 9, 10 Orion’s complaint was filed
beyond the two-year statute of limitations.
Orion does not dispute that the claim is time-barred on its
face, but asserts that accrual of its claim was tolled by the
delayed discovery doctrine. “[A] cause of action accrues at ‘the

10 “COVID-19 Emergency Rule 9(a) . . . tolled unexpired
limitations periods from April 6, 2020 until October 1, 2020.”
(Ross v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 722, 743.)

24
time when the cause of action is complete with all of its
elements,’” but the delayed discovery doctrine “postpones accrual
of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to
discover, the cause of action.” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc.
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806-807 (Fox).) “In order to rely on the
discovery rule for delayed accrual of a cause of action, ‘[a]
plaintiff whose complaint shows on its face that his claim would
be barred without the benefit of the discovery rule must
specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of
discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery
despite reasonable diligence.’” (Id. at p. 808.)
The complaint does not include any facts about delayed
discovery, but Orion asserts that with leave to amend the
complaint, it could allege the necessary facts. It acknowledges
that it knew of the transfer in February 2020. Orion’s request for
sanctions filed in the antitrust action in February 2020 show that
Orion was aware that Celestron and Ningbo Sunny discussed
“judgment enforcement” on January 1, 2020, and that Ningbo
Sunny emailed Celestron requesting payment on January 1,
2020. Orion also had the remittance showing Celestron’s
payment, and stated in its February 2020 federal filing that
under Celestron and Ningbo Sunny’s net 100 payment
agreement, payment on the invoices was not yet due. Orion
argued to the federal court that these facts showed that Celestron
made the payment early “[t]o ensure that Orion could not collect
any of these assets.”
Orion now contends it was missing “key facts” until
December 2021, when Orion received a copy of a December 31,
2019 email from Celestron’s counsel to Ningbo Sunny’s counsel
requesting a “[r]elatively urgent” call to “discuss Celestron’s

25
plans vis a vis Ningbo Sunny.” Orion argues that its receipt of
this email in December 2021 was the first time Orion discovered
that Celestron “committed [an] independently wrongful act” of
making an “offer to send the accounts receivable funds overseas.”
We are not persuaded. “Under the discovery rule, suspicion
of one or more of the elements of a cause of action, coupled with
knowledge of any remaining elements, will generally trigger the
statute of limitations period.” (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 807.)
Orion was aware of the transfer and its allegedly fraudulent
nature in February 2020; it had ample information to either
pursue the cause of action or further investigate Celestron’s role.
It argued to the federal court in February 2020 that the transfer
was made outside the scope of normal business practices with the
intent of evading Orion’s judgment efforts. Moreover, which
party initiated the discussion is not an element of the cause of
action, so discovery of this fact does not support delayed accrual
of the claim. Under these facts, the delayed discovery doctrine
would not render Orion’s claim timely. The demurrer to this
cause of action was appropriately sustained.
B. Special motion to strike
As noted above, Celestron also filed an anti-SLAPP special
motion to strike along with its demurrer. The trial court did not
rule on the anti-SLAPP motion, stating that the motion had been
withdrawn by the parties’ stipulation. Orion argues that the trial
court erred “by failing to find Celestron’s withdrawn anti-SLAPP
motion frivolous and failing to award Orion fees.” Celestron
asserts that because the “anti-SLAPP motion was withdrawn by
stipulation,” that “should end the inquiry.” We find that Orion
has forfeited any claim to error on appeal by agreeing—or not

26
objecting—to the court’s statements that it would not rule on the
anti-SLAPP motion if it sustained the demurrer.
1. Background
Celestron filed an anti-SLAPP special motion to strike to be
heard on the same day as its demurrer and motion to strike.
Celestron requested that the court to strike 13 specific
paragraphs or portions of the complaint; it did not request that
entire causes of action be stricken. Celestron explained that the
allegations it sought to strike discussed communications
involving counsel for Celestron and/or Ningbo Sunny. For
example, Celestron sought to strike a statement in paragraph 5
of the complaint stating that Celestron’s attorney sent an email
to Ningbo Sunny’s attorney on December 31, 2019 requesting an
“urgent” call. Celestron asserted that these communications
were directly related to the antitrust lawsuit and related
judgment enforcement proceedings, and therefore were privileged
under Civil Code section 47. 11
Orion opposed the anti-SLAPP motion. It asserted that its
claims arose from the fraudulent transfer, which was not
protected activity, and counsel’s conversations were cited only as
evidence of the wrongful activity. (See, e.g., Park v. Board of
Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057,
1060 [under the anti-SLAPP statute, “a claim may be struck only
if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained
of, and not just evidence of liability or a step leading to some
different act for which liability is asserted”].) Orion also argued
that the anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous, and requested an
award of costs and attorney fees.

11 Celestron also sought to strike these statements in its
regular motion to strike.

27
At the first hearing on the demurrer, motion to strike, and
anti-SLAPP motion on February 3, 2023, the court and parties
discussed their positions on the three motions. The court stated
that that it had not yet prepared a tentative ruling on the
motions, and asked, “[I]f I rule upon the demurrer, I presume I
still have to rule upon the special motion to strike[?]” Celestron’s
counsel answered in the affirmative. After discussing some
substantive issues, the court asked which motion should be
decided first. Orion’s counsel asserted that “the anti-SLAPP
motion ought to go first” because it could be easily denied.
The court and parties then discussed some of the
substantive arguments about the anti-SLAPP motion. The court
said, “A ruling on the SLAPP motion is appealable immediately
which will stop this case for two years. Do each of you want that
to occur?” Orion’s counsel said, “We want the case to go forward.”
The court noted that Celestron wanted certain allegations about
counsel’s involvement to be stricken from the complaint, and
Celestron “doesn’t care about the SLAPP motion as long as those
allegations are removed.” The court asked, “As a matter of
strategy, do the two of you think this SLAPP motion is
unnecessary presuming I were to rule on the regular motion to
strike so you can get on with this trial rather than going up on
appeal . . . ?” Orion’s counsel answered, “[I]f the Court wants to
rule on the regular motion, that’s fine. But I don’t know how that
would work procedurally. They’ve made an anti-SLAPP motion.”
The court said, “Someone would have to withdraw it.” Orion’s
counsel responded, “I’m fine if they want to withdraw their anti-
SLAPP motion.”
Celestron’s counsel said, “If the Court sustains the
demurrer without leave to amend and/or strikes the allegations

28
against the lawyers on a regular Motion to Strike, then we would
stipulate under those circumstances that the anti-SLAPP motion
could be treated as withdrawn. . . .” The court noted, “If you
withdraw the anti-SLAPP motion, there could be no appeal
because it’s not ruled upon.” Celestron’s counsel agreed, and said,
“It has to be stipulated that it’s withdrawn and nobody gets any
fees under it.” The court and parties went on to discuss
scheduling for discovery and trial, and the court suggested
setting a further hearing on the motions, with a hearing for the
demurrer and motion to strike one day and a hearing on the anti-
SLAPP motion the following day. The parties and court
discussed some additional issues, then the court said, “I think
what we’ve done indirectly is reached a conclusion that if there is
a way which is legitimate, we don’t want a ruling on the SLAPP
motion because it’s appealable.” Orion’s counsel said, “I
understand, but it’s also – there’s no basis for striking these
allegations from a pleading . . . .” There was no further
discussion that day about the court deciding the anti-SLAPP
motion.
At the next hearing on February 9, 2023, Celestron’s
counsel stated again that if the court granted the regular motion
to strike, thus removing certain allegations from the complaint,
Celestron would withdraw the anti-SLAPP motion. Orion’s
counsel did not object or say anything about Celestron’s
suggestion, but asserted that the allegations were relevant to
show intent to defraud. The court again questioned whether it
should first decide the demurrer and motion to strike or the anti-
SLAPP motion. Celestron’s counsel suggested that if the
demurrer were sustained, “we will put in abeyance or dismiss our
anti-SLAPP motion so you don’t have to rule on it, and then we

29
can streamline it that way.” The court agreed, and asked, “Does
that make sense?” Orion’s counsel said, “I’m fine with the court
ruling on the demurrer. I think it should just be overruled.” He
added, “Whatever order the court wants to do it in is fine by us.”
Celestron’s counsel then said, “So let me be very clear. . . . [I]f
everything is sustained short of the anti-SLAPP, if it’s sustained
without leave to amend, we’ll drop the anti-SLAPP even though
we don’t have to.” The court complimented both counsel on a
“very smart” way “in which we can get a ruling without an appeal
on the anti-SLAPP,” which would “stop[ ] everything for two
years” for an appeal. Orion’s counsel did not object. The court
asked counsel to return for a final hearing, saying it would
prepare a tentative ruling.
At the continued hearing on April 7, 2023, the parties
discussed the merits of the demurrer. Near the end of the
hearing, the court said that it was inclined to stick to its tentative
ruling, but “I will change it [by] adding a new paragraph saying
‘pursuant to the argument this morning, defendant withdraws
their . . . special motion to strike.’” Celestron’s counsel said,
“Correct,” and Orion’s counsel did not say anything. The court
thanked counsel for their thoughtful arguments on a difficult
issue, both counsel thanked the court, and the hearing ended.
The court’s April 7, 2023 written ruling sustaining the
demurrer states in part, “Counsel have stipulated that
Celestron’s motion to strike and SLAPP motion are withdrawn.
The action, therefore, is concluded in the trial court.” Nothing in
the record suggests that Orion objected to this statement or
sought any further ruling on the anti-SLAPP motion. Orion filed
a notice of appeal on June 5, 2023. After being informed by this
court that a judgment of dismissal was required, Orion sought

30
and received a judgment of dismissal from the trial court.
Nothing in these additional documents suggest that Orion sought
a ruling on the anti-SLAPP motion before seeking the judgment
of dismissal.
2. Analysis
Orion now argues that after Celestron “withdrew its anti-
SLAPP motion,” the trial court “should have then held the anti-
SLAPP [motion] to be frivolous and determined the amount of
fees that should be payable to Orion as a sanction.” Orion relies
on Code of Civil Procedure, section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1),
which states in part, “If the court finds that a special motion to
strike is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary
delay, the court shall award costs and reasonable attorney’s fees
to a plaintiff prevailing on the motion.”
We agree with Celestron that Orion has failed to
demonstrate that the trial court erred. Orion appeared to agree
with the trial court and Celestron’s proposal about withdrawing
the anti-SLAPP motion. At three different hearings, the trial
court discussed Celestron’s offer to withdraw the anti-SLAPP
motion, resulting in the court not ruling on the motion and there
being no appeal from the ruling. Orion’s counsel agreed with this
plan, never objected to it, and never argued that Celestron’s
withdrawal of the motion nevertheless required the court to make
findings and award attorney fees.
Even after the trial court sustained the demurrer without
leave to amend and stated that the anti-SLAPP motion had been
withdrawn by stipulation, Orion did not seek to correct the court
about the nature (or existence) of the stipulation. Nor did Orion
move for an award of attorney fees. Rather, Orion asserts that
this court, in the first instance, should consider the merits of the

31
motion, find the motion frivolous, then “direct the trial court on
remand to determine the amount of fees Celestron should pay
Orion in sanctions.”
We decline to do so. “[T]he burden is on an appellant to
demonstrate . . . that the trial court committed an error that
justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5
Cal.5th 594, 609.) Here, Orion appeared to comply with the plan
to have the anti-SLAPP motion withdrawn without a ruling.
Orion has not shown that the trial court’s actions in not ruling on
the motion constituted reversible error.

DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded. The
trial court is directed to enter a new order overruling Celestron’s
demurrer on the cause of action for fraudulent transfer and

sustaining the demurrer on the cause of action for tortious
interference. Orion is entitled to its costs on appeal.

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

CURREY, P. J.

ZUKIN, J.

32
Filed 2/10/25

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

OPTRONIC TECHNOLOGIES, B330798
INC.,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Los Angeles County
v. Super. Ct. No.22STCV35723)

CELESTRON ACQUISITION, LLC, ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION FOR
PARTIAL PUBLICATION
Defendant and Respondent.

THE COURT:*
Good cause appearing, it is ordered that the opinion in the above
entitled matter, filed January 15, 2025, be certified for publication with the
exception of part B. of the Discussion section.

___________________________________________________________________
CURREY, P.J.* COLLINS, J. ZUKIN, J.

1

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.