People v. Hardin CA2/7

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Filed 2/10/24 P. v. Hardin CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B324483

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A893110)
v.

TONY HARDIN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Victor D. Martinez, Judge. Affirmed.
David Andreasen, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Nima Razfar, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________
Tony Hardin appeals from a postjudgment order denying
his Penal Code former section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6)1 petition
with respect to his first degree murder conviction. Hardin
contends the superior court erred in denying his petition at the
prima facie stage after deciding Hardin did “not have a right to
re-file an identical petition” and “was the actual killer.” The
People concede and we agree Hardin was not procedurally barred
from filing a second petition. However, we conclude the record of
conviction conclusively establishes Hardin was the actual killer
as a matter of law and affirm the superior court’s denial of the
petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

A. Relevant Evidence at Trial
“The victim, Norma Barber, lived alone in the Casa La Paz
apartments. [Hardin] was the nighttime security guard for the

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to
section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
2 We recite facts from the opinion on Hardin’s direct appeal
from his conviction. (People v. Hardin (July 19, 1993, B051873)
[nonpub. opn.].) We provide a summary of the relevant facts for
background purposes only. (See People v. Lee (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1183 [“By logical extension, the factual
summary also may not be used to determine a petitioner’s
eligibility at the prima facie stage” under § 1172.6]; People v.
Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 988 [“the factual summary in
an appellate opinion is not evidence that may be considered at an
evidentiary hearing to determine a petitioner’s eligibility for
resentencing” under § 1172.6].) In considering this appeal, we do

2
complex. He also lived in the apartment complex two doors down
from the victim. [Hardin] and Ms. Barber were friendly and on
occasion socialized in Ms. Barber’s apartment. [¶] The last time
Ms. Barber was heard from was Tuesday night, April 4, 1989.”
On Wednesday, April 5, 1989, Hardin “had possession of
several items of Ms. Barber’s personal property. At 8:00 a.m. he
tried to exchange one of her necklaces for rock cocaine. The drug
dealer, Richardson, who testified at trial, stated he dealt only in
cash and refused the necklace as payment. Instead he gave
[Hardin] cocaine in exchange for a ride to pick up a supply of
drugs. At the time [Hardin] was driving Ms. Barber’s car which
bore the distinctive personal license plate of ‘Mabahba.’ [¶] After
they picked up the drugs, [Hardin] drove the car to a pawn shop
in Los Angeles. At the pawn shop [Hardin] exchanged two
woman’s necklaces, two charms and one woman’s ring for $15.
He filled out the pawn slip giving his true name of Tony Hardin
as well as a thumbprint. At trial the pawn slip with his thumb
print was introduced as was the jewelry he pawned which Ms.
Barber’s son and friends identified as jewelry the victim almost
always wore and almost never took off. . . . [¶] [Hardin]
purchased more cocaine with the $15 he received from the
pawned jewelry.
“Later that evening [Hardin] convinced Richardson to
accept a VCR in exchange for cocaine. Richardson testified still
later that evening [Hardin] said there was a microwave at a
friend’s house he wanted to trade for cocaine. Richardson agreed
to the exchange and the two men went to Ms. Barber’s

not rely on any evidence from the trial or the closing arguments
because the transcript of Hardin’s trial proceedings is not part of
the appellate record.

3
apartment. [Hardin] unlocked the door to her apartment with a
key. As [Hardin] held the door open, Richardson went into the
apartment, removed various items off the top of the microwave,
and carried the microwave out of the apartment.
“In exchange for still more cocaine, [Hardin] lent
Richardson Ms. Barber’s car to pick up another supply of drugs.
Richardson testified [Hardin] had a key to the car.”
“Concerned she did not answer his telephone calls, on
Saturday night, April 8, 1989, Ms. Barber’s son came to her
apartment. He noticed her car was not parked in its usual
parking stall, her daily newspapers dating from Wednesday,
April 5, 1989, were stacked unread at her patio door and the
deadbolt on her apartment door was not locked. Inside the
apartment he discovered the VCR and microwave missing and
eventually discovered his mother’s body underneath the bed. She
had bruises on her head and chest. She had ligature marks on
her neck and on her wrists. Her legs were bound with a belt.
Her shorts and pantyhose were pulled down around her knees
and her t-shirt and robe were pulled up to her breasts. There
were small blood stains on her clothes and bed clothes and some
blood on her left hand and under her fingernail. There were
other stains on her t-shirt and shorts that appeared to be
urine.[3]”
“An assortment of debris was discovered on her body:
several head, body and pubic hairs probably originating from the
victim, plant debris, lint and fabric fibers. There were also three
pubic hairs whose donors could not be identified. Two of these

3 Tests of the blood stains proved inconclusive and tests to
detect whether a sexual assault occurred were negative.

4
hairs were found in the panty portion of the victim’s pantyhose
and one partial hair was found on the victim’s thigh. Both sides’
experts agreed the hairs were likely pubic hairs. The experts
further agreed the hairs did not originate from the victim, her
son, Richardson or [Hardin].”
“The coroner determined Ms. Barber died of manual
strangulation and the binding marks on her neck and wrists
occurred post mortem.
“After securing the apartment the police interviewed
various witnesses who had been on the scene including the son,
the apartment managers and [Hardin]. The police also
interviewed other residents of the apartment complex. The police
interviewed [Hardin] in his apartment. In his unit police saw
Budweiser beer cans and Vantage cigarette butts which, after
talking to the victim’s son, police suspected belonged to the
victim. Police also noticed a pair of handcuffs laying on a room
divider.
“Within hours of discovering Ms. Barber’s body her vehicle
was discovered parked a few blocks from the apartment complex.
The police dusted the car for prints. A fingerprint retrieved from
the interior window of the driver’s side of the car matched
[Hardin’s] prints. [Hardin] was arrested for the murder of Ms.
Barber on May 2, 1989.” (People v. Hardin (July 19, 1993,
B051873) [nonpub. opn.] (Hardin).)

B. The Charges
The People charged Hardin in an amended information
with murder (§ 187), residential robbery (§ 211), two counts of
burglary (§ 459), and grand theft of an automobile (former
§ 487(3)). The People alleged the murder occurred between

5
April 4 and April 8, 1989; the robbery occurred on or about
April 4; one burglary occurred on or about April 4; the second
burglary occurred on or about April 5; and the theft of the
automobile occurred on or about April 5.
As to the murder count, the People alleged Hardin
committed the murder while engaged in the commission of
robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)) and burglary (id.,
subd. (a)(17)(G)), and inflicted great bodily injury on a person 60
years of age or older (§ 1203.09, subd. (a)). As to the robbery and
burglary counts that occurred on or about April 4, the People
alleged Hardin inflicted great bodily injury on a person 60 years
of age or older. No other defendants were charged.

C. Relevant Jury Instructions
The trial took place in March 1990. As relevant here, the
trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC Nos. 8.10 (definition
of murder), 8.20 (first degree deliberate and premeditated
murder), 8.21 (first degree felony murder), 8.55 (definition of
proximate cause for homicide), 8.80 (introduction to special
circumstance), 8.81.17 (felony-murder special circumstance), and
17.24.1 (great-bodily-injury special circumstance).
Former CALJIC No. 8.10 (5th ed. 1988) provided, in
relevant part, the following definition of murder: “Every person
who unlawfully kills a human being with malice aforethought or
during the commission or attempted commission of robbery
and/or burglary, a felony inherently dangerous to human life[,] is
guilty of the crime of murder in violation of section 187 of the
Penal Code. [¶] In order to prove such crime, each of the
following elements must be proved: [¶] 1. A human being was
killed[,] [¶] 2. The killing was unlawful, and [¶] 3. The killing

6
was done with malice aforethought or occurred during the
commission or attempted commission of robbery or burglary, a
felony inherently dangerous to human life.”
CALJIC No. 8.20 further provided, in relevant part, as to
first degree murder: “All murder which is perpetrated by any
kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing with express
malice aforethought is murder of the first degree.”
Former CALJIC No. 8.21 (5th ed. 1988) provided as to first
degree felony murder: “The unlawful killing of a human being,
whether intentional, unintentional or accidental, which occurs
during the commission or attempted commission of the crime as a
direct causal result of . . . robbery and burglary is murder of the
first degree when the perpetrator had the specific intent to
commit such crime. [¶] The specific intent to commit robbery
and/or burglary and the commission or attempted commission of
such crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Former CALJIC No. 8.55 (5th ed. 1988) provided: “To
constitute murder there must be, in addition to the death of a
human being, an unlawful act which was a proximate cause of
that death. [¶] A proximate cause of a death is a cause which, in
natural and continuous sequence, produces the death, and
without which the death would not have occurred.”
Former CALJIC No. 8.80 (5th ed. 1988) provided, in
relevant part: “If you find the defendant in this case guilty of
murder of the first degree, you must then determine if one or
more of the following special circumstances are true or not true:
robbery and burglary.”
CALJIC No. 8.81.17 provided, in relevant part: “To find
that the special circumstance, referred to in the instructions as
murder in the commission of robbery or burglary is true, it must

7
be proved: [¶] 1a. The murder was committed while the
defendant was engaged in the commission of a burglary or a
robbery[,] 2. The murder was committed in order to carry out or
advance the commission of the crime of burglary or robbery or to
facilitate the escape therefrom or to avoid detection.”
CALJIC No. 17.24.1 provided: “It is further alleged that at
the time of the commission of the crimes charged . . . that
defendant Tony Hardin inflicted great bodily injury upon Norma
Barber, a person who was sixty years of age and older. [¶] If you
find defendant Tony Hardin guilty of the crimes charged . . . you
must determine whether or not the truth of this allegation has
been proved.”

D. Verdicts, Sentence, and Appeal
The jury convicted Hardin of first degree murder,
residential robbery, and grand theft of an automobile. The jury
found true the special-circumstance allegation that Hardin
committed the murder during a robbery. The jury also found true
that Hardin inflicted great bodily injury on a person 60 years of
age or older during the murder and robbery. The jury found
Hardin not guilty of both burglary counts and found not true the
burglary special circumstance.
The trial court sentenced Hardin to a state prison term of
life without parole for the special-circumstance murder.4 We
affirmed the judgment on appeal. (Hardin, supra, B051873.)

4 The trial court also sentenced Hardin to 16 months for the
robbery and eight months for the grand theft but stayed the
sentences under section 654.

8
E. Section 1172.6 Proceedings
On March 18, 2019, Hardin, in pro. per., filed a petition
under former section 1170.95; the People opposed. Without
appointing counsel for Hardin, the court summarily denied
Hardin’s petition. The court stated, “The court finds that the
defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree.”
On January 31, 2022, Hardin filed a second petition under
former section 1170.95. The court appointed counsel for Hardin
and informed the People that they did not need to file an
opposition since there was already one on file. At the hearing,
the court denied Hardin’s petition without issuing an order to
show cause. The court determined Hardin “was the actual killer”
because “there w[ere] no requests for the jury to find guilt[] or
malice under felony murder and . . . there was no codefendant nor
alleged other perpetrator.” The court also found that Hardin did
“not have a right to re-file an identical petition.”
Hardin timely appealed.5

DISCUSSION

A. Senate Bill 1437 and Section 1172.6
Effective 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)
(SB 1437) eliminated the natural and probable consequences
doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder
(People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 984; People v. Gentile
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843) and narrowed the felony-murder

5 Hardin also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus (case
No. B338163) in this court. By separate order, we deny the
habeas petition. (In re Tony Hardin (Feb. 10, 2025,
No. B338163).)

9
rule (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e); see People v. Curiel
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448-449 (Curiel); People v. Strong (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952,
957 (Lewis)). Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits
imputing malice based solely on one’s participation in a crime
and requires proof of malice to convict a principal of murder,
except under the revised felony-murder rule in section 189,
subdivision (e). The latter provision now requires the People to
prove that the defendant was the actual killer (§ 189,
subd. (e)(1)); an aider and abettor to murder who had the intent
to kill (id., subd. (e)(2)); or a major participant in an underlying
felony listed in section 189, subdivision (a), who acted with
reckless indifference to human life as described in subdivision (d)
of section 190.2. (§ 189, subd. (e)(3); see Curiel, at p. 448; People
v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 868-869; People v. Strong, at
p. 708; People v. Gentile, at pp. 842-843.)
SB 1437 also provided a procedure (codified in § 1172.6) for
“[a] person convicted of felony murder or murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime” to petition the superior court to
vacate the conviction and be resentenced on any remaining
counts if the petitioner could not now be convicted of murder
because of the changes to sections 188 and 189. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a).)
If a section 1172.6 petition contains all the required
information, the sentencing court must appoint counsel to
represent the petitioner if requested. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A),
(3); see also Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 962-963.) The
prosecutor must then file a response to the petition, the

10
petitioner may file a reply, and the court must hold a hearing to
determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie
showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c).) If the petitioner makes that showing, the court must
issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether to vacate the murder and resentence the
petitioner on any remaining counts. (Id., subds. (c), (d)(1).)
In deciding whether a petitioner has made a prima facie
showing for relief under section 1172.6, “ ‘ “the court takes
petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary
assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to
relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court
must issue an order to show cause.” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 971; see Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 460.) The court may
consider the record of conviction, which will “necessarily inform
the trial court’s prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6],
allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit
from those that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis, at p. 971; see
Curiel, at pp. 463-464.) “In reviewing any part of the record of
conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court should not
engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the
exercise of discretion.’ ” (Lewis, at p. 972; see People v. Eynon
(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967, 975.)
“Nevertheless, the court may appropriately deny a petition
at the prima facie stage if the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a
matter of law. ‘ “[I]f the record, including the court’s own
documents, ‘contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the
petition,’ then ‘the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner,’ ” ’ thereby deeming the
petitioner ineligible.” (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th

11
45, 52 (Harden); see Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 460; Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) “We review de novo whether the
trial court conducted a proper inquiry under section 1172.6,
subdivision (c).” (People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244,
1251; see People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14 (Lopez)
[denial at the prima facie stage “is appropriate only if the record
of conviction demonstrates that the petitioner is ineligible for
relief as a matter of law,” which “is a purely legal conclusion . . .
we review de novo”].)

B. The Superior Court Did Not Err by Denying Hardin’s
Section 1172.6 Petition
The superior court denied Hardin’s petition on two
grounds: It found Hardin (1) did “not have a right to re-file an
identical petition” and (2) “was the actual killer.”
Hardin contends, the People concede, and we agree the first
ground was erroneous. Because the superior court did not
appoint counsel to represent Hardin on his first petition, and
because the law has changed since Hardin filed his first petition
(see Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 957), Hardin’s second petition
is not procedurally barred as a successive petition. (See People v.
Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 951 [where the superior court
did not appoint counsel to represent the petitioner on his prior,
facially sufficient petition, and the second petition “was based on
new authority,” the second petition “was not procedurally barred
as a successive petition”].)
However, the superior court’s second ground for denial was
correct. The record of conviction conclusively shows Hardin was
convicted as the actual killer. Thus, Hardin is ineligible for
resentencing under section 1172.6 as a matter of law.

12
1. The jury instructions and verdict conclusively
establish the jury found Hardin was the actual killer
The trial court instructed the jury on two theories of first
degree murder: willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder
(CALJIC No. 8.20) and felony murder (former CALJIC No. 8.21).
The court did not instruct the jury on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or on aiding and abetting.
The jury found Hardin guilty of first degree murder but
was not asked to specify a theory of murder. If the jury found
Hardin killed Barber with malice, he is ineligible for resentencing
because section 1172.6 applies only where malice is imputed
based on a person’s participation in a crime. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a);
see Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 15 [“If the jury found
defendant guilty of malice aforethought murder, he would be
ineligible for relief as a matter of law because section [1172.6]
affords relief only to those convicted of felony murder, murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or murder
under any other theory under which malice is imputed based on a
person’s participation in a crime.” (Fn. omitted.)].) And if the
jury found Hardin guilty of killing Barber on a felony-murder
theory, he is ineligible for resentencing if he was the actual killer.
(See § 189, subd. (e)(1); Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 53
[“defendants convicted of felony murder are not eligible for relief
if they were the actual killer”].) Therefore, the only way Hardin
is eligible for relief under section 1172.6 is if the jury convicted
him of felony murder on a theory other than as the actual killer.
(Harden, at p. 54 [petitioner ineligible for relief under § 1172.6 if
it was not possible for jury to have found him guilty of felony
murder without also finding he personally killed the victim].) An
“ ‘actual killer’ ” is “the actual perpetrator of the killing, i.e., the

13
person (or persons) who personally committed the homicidal act.”
(People v. Vang (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 64, 88; accord, Lopez,
supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 4 [“the term ‘actual killer’ . . . refers
to someone who personally killed the victim”]; People v. Garcia
(2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 123, 152 [same].)
Hardin’s record of conviction rules out the possibility the
jury convicted him of felony murder on a theory other than as the
person who personally killed Barber. (Harden, supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 48, 53 [affirming summary denial of
§ 1172.6 resentencing petition where “the jury instructions and
verdicts conclusively establish—with no factfinding, weighing of
evidence, or credibility determinations—that in 2001 [defendant]
was convicted as the actual killer”].) The jury was not instructed
that it could convict Hardin as an aider and abettor, accomplice,
or major participant in the burglary and robbery who acted with
reckless indifference to human life. (See Harden, at p. 53 [to
determine if jury instructions left open the possibility defendant
was convicted on a theory other than being the actual killer, it is
helpful to examine instructions jury was not given]; but see
Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 20 [trial court’s decision not to
give CALCRIM No. 703 regarding requirements for finding a
defendant who is not the actual killer to be guilty of special
circumstances murder was “not dispositive” in determining if
record of conviction conclusively established defendant’s
ineligibility for relief under § 1172.6].)
Notably, as to felony murder, the trial court did not give
former CALJIC No. 8.27, on vicarious liability, which provided
that “[i]f a human being is killed by any one of several persons
engaged in the commission or attempted commission of the crime
of [robbery or burglary], all persons, who either directly and

14
actively commit the act constituting that crime, or who with
knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator of the crime
and with the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or
facilitating the commission of the offense, aid, promote,
encourage, or instigate by act or advice its commission, are guilty
of murder of the first degree.” (Former CALJIC No. 8.27, 5th ed.
1988.)
Likewise, the special circumstance instructions (former
CALJIC No. 8.80) omitted any reference to liability based on a
theory other than that Hardin was the actual killer. The
introductory instruction for those instructions did not include the
bracketed language that the Use Note explained “should be given
with respect to all special circumstances . . . where there is
evidence that the defendant is an aider and abettor rather than
the actual killer.” (Former CALJIC No. 8.80, 5th ed. 1988.)
Rather, the jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 8.10 that
“[e]very person who unlawfully kills a human being with malice
aforethought or during the commission or attempted commission
of robbery and/or burglary . . . is guilty of the crime of murder.”
“ ‘In common understanding, this [language] would refer to the
person who inflicted the fatal injury.’ ” (Harden, supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 54-55; accord, People v. Bell (2020)
48 Cal.App.5th 1, 16 [“This language [in CALJIC No. 8.10] on its
face tells the jury that ‘the person who unlawfully kills’ is guilty
of murder. In common understanding, this would refer to the
person who inflicted the fatal injury.”].) Where, as here, “[t]he
jury was instructed on no alternative definition of murder”
besides CALJIC No. 8.10, such as former CALJIC No. 8.27, a
defendant’s murder conviction “necessarily means the jury
determined [he] actually killed [the victim].” (Harden, at p. 55;

15
accord, People v. Bratton (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1100, 1123
[because the jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 8.10 and not
with former CALJIC No. 8.27, “the instructions indicated that to
be guilty of murder at all, defendant has to be the actual killer”].)
Accordingly, the jury necessarily found Hardin was the actual
killer.
The jury also found true the allegation that “Hardin
inflicted great bodily injury” on the victim within the meaning of
section 1203.09, subdivision (a).6 Hardin contends the jury was
not asked to find whether he “personally” inflicted the great
bodily injury on Barber, rendering it uncertain whether the jury
found Hardin himself inflicted the injury. (Cf. Harden, supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at p. 55 [holding jury’s finding that defendant
“personally inflicted great bodily injury” on the victim under
section 12022.7 supported conclusion jury necessarily found he
was the actual killer].) Considering the instructions as a whole,
we conclude there is no room for such ambiguity here. As
discussed, the trial court gave no instructions as to any possible
accomplice liability, nor did the court instruct with CALJIC
No. 3.00 on the concept of liability for “principals” in a crime.
(See former CALJIC No. 3.00 [providing “[e]ach principal,
regardless of the extent or manner of participation is equally
guilty”]; cf. § 12022.53, subd. (e)(1) [enhancement for personally

6 “[P]robation shall not be granted to, nor shall the execution
or imposition of sentence be suspended for, a person who commits
. . . one or more of the crimes listed in subdivision (b) against a
person who is 60 years of age or older . . . and who during the
course of the offense inflicts great bodily injury upon the person.”
(§ 1203.09, subd. (a).) Murder is a crime listed in subdivision (b).
(Id., subd. (b).)

16
discharging a firearm and proximately causing great bodily
injury or death applies “to any person who is a principal”].)
Without such additional instructions, there is no reasonable
likelihood the jury could have construed the language “Hardin
inflicted great bodily injury” to extend the infliction of injury to
someone other than Hardin. (People v. Williams (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1255-1256 [appellate court considering
denial of § 1172.6 petition at prima facie stage “must consider the
instructions together as a whole, to determine whether it is
reasonably likely a jury would interpret an instruction in a
particular way”].)
In any event, while the jury’s true finding as to the great
bodily injury allegation supports the conclusion the jury found
Hardin was the actual killer, it is not necessary for that
conclusion. As we have discussed, the verdict finding Hardin
guilty of first degree murder conclusively establishes the jury
determined he was the actual killer, because the jury was
instructed with only one definition of murder under CALJIC
No. 8.10—that “every person who unlawfully kills a human
being” is guilty of “murder.” (Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 54-55; accord, People v. Bratton, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1123.) Further, CALJIC No. 8.10 was followed by CALJIC
No. 17.24.1, which defined the great bodily injury special
circumstance. That instruction stated, “If you find defendant . . .
Hardin guilty of the crimes charged . . . you must determine
whether or not the truth of this allegation has been proved.”
Thus, “the jury would not even reach the issue of special
circumstances unless it first convicted [Hardin] of murder. And
as just explained, under CALJIC No. 8.10 a murder conviction
required a finding that [Hardin] ‘unlawfully killed’—that is, [he]

17
was the actual killer. A hypothetical juror who was not
persuaded that [Hardin] actually killed [Barber] could not have
voted that the special circumstance was true.”7 (Harden, at
p. 55.)
2. The proximate cause instruction did not create a
possibility the jury convicted Hardin without finding
he was the actual killer
Hardin contends that because his jury was instructed on
proximate cause with former CALJIC No. 8.55, which was not the
case in Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th 45, the jury could have
convicted him of murder without finding he personally committed
the homicidal act. (See Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 17 [a
person who only “commits an act that is the proximate cause of
the victim’s death” is not an “actual killer” if he or she did not
personally kill the victim].)
Former CALJIC No. 8.55 provided: “To constitute murder
there must be, in addition to the death of a human being, an
unlawful act which was a proximate cause of that death. [¶] A
proximate cause of a death is a cause which, in natural and
continuous sequence, produces the death, and without which the
death would not have occurred.” Hardin contends that, “[t]aken
together, the instructions permitted the jury to find Hardin guilty

7 Hardin also notes that unlike in Harden, his jury was not
instructed with CALJIC No. 8.80.1 that “[i]f you are satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant actually killed a
human being, you need not find that the defendant intended to
kill in order to find the special circumstance to be true.” (Harden,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 54, italics added.) However, no
additional confirmation is necessary to conclude the jury found
Hardin to be the actual killer.

18
of first degree felony murder by finding: 1) He specifically
intended to commit a robbery; 2) Barber was killed during the
robbery; and 3) her death was proximately caused by the
commission of the robbery.” Hardin thus argues his case is akin
to Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th 1, in which the proximate cause
instruction given during Lopez’s trial was central to the appellate
court’s decision to reverse the denial of Lopez’s section 1172.6
petition.
Lopez examined whether a section 1172.6 petitioner
convicted of murder was necessarily convicted as an “actual
killer.” Lopez was charged with the murder of a victim during a
robbery and was “prosecuted solely under the theory he was the
actual killer and committed the robbery alone.” (Lopez, supra,
78 Cal.App.5th at p. 15.) At trial Lopez testified he and his drug
dealer, Ivan Argueta, drove to the victim’s apartment to help
Argueta “ ‘move out’ ” after a fight with the victim, Argueta’s
boyfriend. (Id. at p. 9.) Lopez testified he remained in the living
room, drinking a glass of water, while Argueta was “screaming”
and “moving around” elsewhere in the house. (Ibid.) Lopez and
Argueta then left with belongings from the apartment, and the
victim was later found dead in the bedroom. (Id. at pp. 6-7, 9.)
The trial court instructed the jury that to find Lopez guilty
of murder the jury needed to find “[t]he defendant committed an
act that caused the death” of another person (CALCRIM No. 520);
and to find Lopez guilty of felony murder, it had to find he
“caused the death of another person” (CALCRIM No. 540A).
(Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 16.) The jury was further
instructed on proximate cause that “[a]n act causes death if the
death is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act
and the death would not have happened without the act.” (Ibid.)

19
“The verdicts [left] two possibilities: (1) the jury found defendant
guilty of first degree malice aforethought murder with a robbery-
murder special circumstance, or (2) the jury found defendant
guilty of first degree felony murder with a robbery-murder special
circumstance.” (Id. at p. 14.)
The Lopez court concluded the evidence and the jury
instructions “created the possibility” the jury found Lopez guilty
of murder without finding he personally killed the victim. (Lopez,
supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 20.) It reasoned “it was possible . . .
the jury believed [Lopez’s] testimony that he went to the victim’s
apartment with Argueta but disbelieved his testimony that he
did not go into the bedroom and was not involved in the robbery
or killing the victim.” (Ibid.) “The jury might have found
[Lopez], though not the actual killer, participated somehow in the
home invasion robbery, and the victim’s death was the direct,
natural, and probable consequence of an act committed in the
course of his participation.” (Id. at p. 20.)
Although Hardin’s jury received a proximate cause
instruction (former CALJIC No. 8.55) that bore similarities to the
one used in Lopez, Lopez is nevertheless distinguishable because
Hardin’s jury received CALJIC instructions on the definition of
murder that were materially different from the CALCRIM
instructions given in Lopez. The jury in Lopez was instructed
under CALCRIM No. 540A that to find Lopez guilty of felony
murder, it had to find the defendant “caused the death of another
person.” (Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 17, italics added.)
By contrast, at Hardin’s trial the jury was instructed it had to
find Hardin “kill[ed] a human being” (CALJIC No. 8.10). (See
Harden, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 57-58 [distinguishing Lopez based

20
on “materially different” jury instructions].)8 Considering the
effect of the proximate cause instruction in the context of the
other instructions—most importantly CALJIC No. 8.10—it is not
reasonably likely the jury could have determined it did not need
to find Hardin was Barber’s actual killer, but instead could have
found him guilty of felony murder merely because he was a
robbery participant who committed a non-homicidal act that
proximately caused her death. (People v. Pearson (2013)
56 Cal.4th 393, 476; People v. Williams, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1255-1256 [jury instructions must be viewed together as a
whole to determine whether it is reasonably likely a jury would
interpret an instruction in a particular way].)
In sum, Hardin’s record of conviction establishes, without
any factfinding, weighing of evidence, or credibility
determinations, that he was the actual killer. The superior court
properly denied Hardin’s section 1172.6 petition for failure to
make a prima facie showing. 3

///

///

8 Further, unlike in Hardin’s trial, the jury in Lopez made no
findings that the defendant inflicted great bodily injury on the
robbery victim. (See Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 58
[noting Lopez made “no mention . . . of any instructions regarding
the defendant’s personal infliction of great bodily injury”].)

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DISPOSITION

The order denying Hardin’s petition for resentencing is
affirmed.

STONE, J.
We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

PULOS, J.*


Judge of the San Diego County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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