CourtListener 10329313•Isobe v. Matsuhisa CA2/8
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Filed 2/7/25 Isobe v. Matsuhisa CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
RYUTARO ISOBE et al., B333628
Plaintiffs and Respondents, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23SMCV01686)
v.
YOKO MATSUHISA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Mark H. Epstein, Judge. Reversed.
Mayer Brown, Kevin Ranlett, Carmen Longoria-Green,
John Nadolenco, and Daniel D. Queen for Defendant and
Appellant.
Keith A. Fink & Associates, Keith A. Fink and Olaf J.
Muller for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
____________________________________
Defendant and appellant Yoko Matsuhisa appeals from an
order denying her motion to compel arbitration and to stay the
action filed by plaintiffs and respondents Kazan LLC (Kazan) and
Ryutaro Isobe. Matsuhisa argues the trial court erred when it
refused to submit respondents’ unconscionability challenge to the
arbitrator in the first instance based on a valid delegation
provision. We agree and reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Complaint
Isobe had created Kazan to own and operate Kazan Beverly
Hills, a restaurant that won a Michelin star just three years after
opening. Matsuhisa is the wife of famed restauranteur Nobu
Matsuhisa.
Isobe and Matsuhisa signed a written operating agreement
for Kazan whereby Matsuhisa would buy a minority membership
interest in Kazan for $1 million. Isobe alleged that while he
treated Matsuhisa as a minority member, Matsuhisa failed to pay
for her Kazan membership interest and has failed to pay the
contractually agreed sum of $1 million. He further alleged that
Matsuhisa’s failure to contribute the promised $1 million in
capital to Kazan caused tremendous hardship, leaving Kazan
with insufficient capital to properly operate with full staff or pay
vendors. As a result, Isobe had to work tremendous hours to
make up for this staffing shortfall, which significantly impacted
his health.
After failing to resolve the matter informally, Isobe sued
Matsuhisa, alleging breach of contract and other causes of action
based on the failed deal.
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II. Motion to compel arbitration
Matsuhisa moved to compel Isobe’s claims to arbitration,
citing the operating agreement attached to Isobe’s complaint.
Matsuhisa argued the operating agreement contained a valid
arbitration agreement compelling the parties to submit all
claims, defenses, and issues in the matter to binding contractual
arbitration. Matsuhisa also argued the arbitrator had
jurisdiction to determine the arbitrability of the dispute and
validity of the arbitration agreement per a delegation provision.
In support of her arguments, Matsuhisa cited to “Article
Seventeen” of the operating agreement, which provided: “The
Members and [Isobe] shall use the procedure outlined in this
Article to resolve any dispute, contest, or claim that may result
among any of the Members or between one or more of the
Members and [Isobe] and [Kazan] that may relate to this
Agreement. The purpose of the alternative dispute resolution
procedures in this Article is to resolve all disputes, contests, and
claims without litigation.” Article Seventeen required the parties
to follow a three-step dispute resolution process. First, the
parties were to try to resolve the issue through negotiation by
authorized representatives. If negotiations failed, the parties
were to submit the dispute to mediation. If the parties failed to
mediate the dispute, the parties were to submit the controversy
to mandatory and binding arbitration, applying the Commercial
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA
Commercial Rules). In turn, the AAA Commercial Rules
provided that, the arbitrator had “the power to rule on his or her
own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the
existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement or to the
arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim.” (Id., Rule R-7(a).)
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Isobe opposed the motion, asserting the arbitration terms
were fatally uncertain, violative of California law, and
substantively and procedurally unconscionable. Isobe also
argued that Matsuhisa had waived her right to arbitrate because,
although Isobe had only recently filed his lawsuit, the
controversy actually arose much earlier when Matsuhisa refused
to pay the $1 million for her membership interest in Kazan.
Isobe did not specifically challenge Matsuhisa’s argument that
the arbitrator had jurisdiction to determine the arbitrability of
Isobe’s claims.
After tentatively granting the motion, the trial court
reversed its decision and denied the motion. The trial court
found parts of the first two steps of the alternative dispute
resolution process were substantively unconscionable,
specifically, the required use of authorized representatives and
the potential that the mediator could force a binding settlement
onto the parties via their authorized representatives. The trial
court also found the alternative dispute resolution process to be
procedurally unconscionable insofar as all of the process
collectively imposed an unfair burden and cost onto Isobe, who
would have to pay for an authorized representative, and then
potentially pay for a mediator, expert witnesses, and the
arbitrator, as well as his own separate legal counsel and legal
costs, just to resolve any dispute with Matsuhisa.
In terms of procedural unconscionability, the trial court
found Isobe made a relatively weak showing. However, this was
sufficient given the strong showing of substantive
unconscionability. It also noted that Isobe’s procedural
unconscionability arguments were uncontested by Matsuhisa,
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and Isobe had less than equal bargaining power as compared to
Matsuhisa.
The trial court did not address Matsuhisa’s argument that
the delegation provision required Isobe and Kazan to submit
their claims that the arbitration agreement was void and invalid
to the arbitrator.
Matsuhisa appealed.
DISCUSSION
Although the parties raise various arguments in their
briefs, we find one determinative—the operating agreement’s
delegation provision deprived the trial court of authority to
determine whether the arbitration agreement as a whole was
valid and enforceable in the first instance.1 Because Isobe did not
challenge the delegation provision, instead arguing that the
entire arbitration agreement was invalid and unenforceable, we
conclude the trial court should have compelled this threshold
issue to arbitration.
I. Standard of review and governing law
“Under both federal and state law, arbitration agreements
are valid and enforceable, unless they are revocable for reasons
under state law that would render any contract revocable.
[Citations.] Reasons that would render any contract revocable
under state law include fraud, duress, and unconscionability.”
1 Matsuhisa requested judicial notice of various documents
on appeal. Because we are resolving this appeal on the discrete
issue of the validity of the delegation provision and those
documents are unnecessary to decide the appeal, the request is
denied.
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(Tiri v. Lucky Chances, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 231, 239
(Tiri).)
“A motion to compel arbitration is essentially a request for
specific performance of a contractual agreement. [Citation.] The
party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving
by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of an arbitration
agreement. [Citations.] The party opposing the petition bears
the burden of establishing a defense to the agreement’s
enforcement by a preponderance of the evidence. [Citations.] In
determining whether there is a duty to arbitrate, the trial court
must, at least to some extent, examine and construe the
agreement.” (Tiri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 239.)
“ ‘When a trial court’s order is based on a question of law,
we review the denial de novo. [Citation.] Decisions on issues of
fact are reviewed for substantial evidence. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]
‘Where . . . the evidence is not in conflict, we review the trial
court’s denial of arbitration de novo.’ ” (Mendoza v. Trans Valley
Transport (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 748, 764–765.)
II. Delegation provisions
“The parties to an arbitration agreement can agree in a
delegation provision ‘to arbitrate “gateway” questions of
“arbitrability,” such as whether the parties have agreed to
arbitrate or whether their agreement covers a particular
controversy.’ ” (J.R. v. Electronic Arts Inc. (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th
1107, 1114 (J.R.), quoting Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson
(2010) 561 U.S. 63, 70 (Rent-A-Center).) “An agreement to
arbitrate a gateway issue—otherwise known as a delegation
provision—‘is simply an additional, antecedent agreement the
party seeking arbitration asks . . . [a] court to enforce.’ ” (Ibid.)
Further, because each agreement is severable, the arbitration
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agreement is severable from the overarching agreement
containing it, and the delegation provision is severable from the
arbitration agreement containing it. (J.R., at p. 1117, citing
Rent-A-Center, at pp. 70–72.)
The party opposing the enforcement of a delegation
provision must challenge the delegation provision specifically.
(J.R., supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 1114.) “Absent such a
challenge, a court must treat the delegation provision as valid
and enforce it, ‘leaving any challenge to the validity of [the
arbitration agreement or] the [a]greement as a whole for the
arbitrator.’ ” (Ibid.)
Here, Matsuhisa has sufficiently established at least the
existence of a delegation provision in the parties’ agreement.
Under the terms of the AAA Commercial Rules, which were
incorporated into the agreement, the arbitrator had “the power to
rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with
respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration
agreement or to the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim.”
(Id., Rule R-7(a).) Neither Isobe nor Kazan specifically
challenged this delegation provision either in the trial court or on
appeal. Rather, their arguments have been directed to the
arbitration agreement as a whole. Because the delegation
provision was severable from the arbitration agreement, and
Isobe and Kazan failed to challenge that provision, the trial court
should have directed the gateway issue of the validity of the
arbitration agreement to the arbitrator. Further, because Isobe’s
and Kazan’s arguments on appeal are similarly directed towards
the arbitration agreement as a whole rather than the delegation
provision, we find reversal is warranted.
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DISPOSITION
The order is reversed. The trial court shall order the
threshold question of whether the arbitration agreement is valid
and enforceable to the arbitrator. Appellant shall be awarded her
costs on appeal.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
GRIMES, J.
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