CourtListener 10327825•In re J.C. CA2/7
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Filed 2/5/25 In re J.C. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
In re J.C. Jr., et al., Persons Coming B338908
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
_______________________________ (Los Angeles County Super.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Ct. No. 22CCJP00019A-B)
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
C.F.,
Defendant and Appellant,
and,
J.C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Marguerite D. Downing, Judge. Conditionally
reversed and remanded with directions.
Elizabeth Klippi, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant C.F.
Jamie A. Moran, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant J.C.
Office of the County Counsel, Dawyn R. Harrison, County
Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Peter
Ferrera, Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services.
__________________________
J.C. (Father) appeals from a juvenile court order denying
his petition under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 388
seeking reunification services for his children, J.C. Jr. and I.C.
C.F. (Mother) (joined by Father) appeals from the order
terminating their parental rights under section 366.26, but the
parents’ appeal is limited to the contention that the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services
(Department) failed to comply with the inquiry and notice
requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901
et seq.) (ICWA) and the California Indian Child Welfare Act
(§ 224 et seq.) (Cal-ICWA). The Department concedes the ICWA
error. We affirm the order denying the section 388 petition, but
we conditionally reverse the order terminating parental rights
and remand for full compliance with ICWA’s inquiry and notice
provisions.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Family History and Dependency Jurisdiction over the
Children Under Section 300, Subdivisions (b)(1) and (j)
When J.C. Jr. was born in 2017, he tested positive for
benzodiazepine, and Mother tested positive for morphine,
oxycodone, and benzodiazepine. In August 2017, the juvenile
court ordered J.C. Jr. removed from Mother and placed with
Father. When the court terminated jurisdiction in February
2018, it awarded Father sole physical custody of J.C. Jr. Mother
had supervised visitation after failing to complete the court-
ordered drug treatment, individual counseling, and psychiatric
evaluation.
When I.C. was born in December 2021, he tested positive
for cocaine and methadone. The Department filed a petition
under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j), citing Mother’s
substance abuse and Father’s failure to protect the children. The
petition alleged Mother had a history of substance abuse and
used cocaine and methadone during her pregnancy. A social
worker at the hospital reported that Mother admitted to using
Xanax and methadone.
The Department also alleged Father failed to protect the
children by allowing Mother to live in the home and have
unmonitored visits with J.C. Jr. in violation of the February 2018
exit order. Father acknowledged Mother’s history of drug use but
claimed he was unaware of any drug use during her pregnancy.
After both parents submitted to drug testing, Father tested
positive for marijuana and Mother tested positive for methadone.
At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing in March 2022,
the juvenile court sustained the petition but struck the
3
allegations that Father failed to protect the children from
Mother’s substance abuse. The court removed the children from
Mother and placed them with Father. The court ordered Mother
to complete a drug program with random weekly testing and
individual counseling. It also directed Father to complete a six-
month drug and alcohol program and five consecutive clean drug
tests and to participate in a family preservation program and
Nar-Anon. The court ordered Mother’s visitation to be
supervised, specifying that Father could not supervise the visits.
B. The Supplemental Petition and Subsequent Termination of
Father’s Reunification Services
In April 2022 the Department filed a section 387
supplemental petition alleging Father violated the March 2022
disposition orders by allowing Mother to have multiple visits with
the children without a Department-approved monitor present.
Even after the social worker warned both parents after the first
incident that further unauthorized visits would result in a
removal warrant, Father continued to take J.C. Jr. and, on at
least one occasion, I.C. for such visits with Mother. J.C. Jr. said
Father told him not to tell the social worker or he would be taken
away. After initial denials and falsehoods, Father admitted he
had taken J.C. Jr. to visit Mother and acknowledged he made a
bad decision. The children were detained from Father and placed
with paternal aunt A.Q.
Between April and June 2022, Father tested positive for
marijuana six times. He missed two tests in June and July 2022
and tested positive for marijuana three times in July. In August
2022, Father tested negative twice and told a social worker he
uses marijuana medicinally for pain and stress. During the same
4
period, Mother tested positive for alpha-hydroxy-alprazolam and
methadone three times and missed two tests. Although she
claimed to have a prescription for Ativan, she failed to provide
proof. The Department investigators noted Mother had slowed,
slurred speech and was incoherent at times.
In June 2022 the juvenile court sustained the supplemental
petition, removed the children from Father’s custody, and ordered
family reunification services for both parents. Father was
required to participate in individual counseling and random drug
testing. Initially, he was permitted unsupervised visits but, in
July 2022, after Father tested positive for cocaine and marijuana,
the court ordered Father’s visits be supervised.
In a December 2022 report, the Department noted the
children appeared happy in their placement with A.Q. J.C. Jr.
was attending therapy to address past trauma that left him with
fears of being left alone and not having enough to eat. A.Q.
reported that the parents had visited consistently for about a
month and a half but then began visiting only two to three times
per month. Their calls were also sporadic, sometimes weekly and
sometimes not at all. By this time, Father was in partial
compliance with his case plan. He was enrolled in drug testing
but not individual counseling. He tested positive for marijuana
four times in August 2022 and claimed to have a prescription for
its use. Father missed a scheduled test in December. He denied
being in a relationship with Mother, who was not compliant with
her case plan.
In February 2023, the juvenile court ordered continued
family reunification services for Father but terminated services
for Mother.
By August 2023, the Department reported that both
5
parents’ visits and phone calls had been minimal since the prior
hearing. Father called the children 12 times between January
and July 2023, with no calls in June, despite daily calls being
scheduled. When he visited, Father helped J.C. Jr. with
homework or shared meals with his children and was able to
divide his time equally between them. But Father was not in
compliance with his treatment programs and was limited in his
cooperation with the Department. Father stated he worked
seven days a week, which made compliance difficult. The parents
acknowledged they had rekindled their relationship. Mother
remained noncompliant with court-ordered programs and
minimally cooperative with the Department.
At the 12-month review hearing in September 2023, the
court terminated reunification services for Father and scheduled
a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing. The section
366.26 hearing was initially set for December 2023 but was
continued several times.
Father’s visits became “less and less frequent” and his
phone calls “ ‘minimal and random.’ ” In a March 2024 report,
the Department noted that Father had three visits in December
2023, three in January 2024, and two in February 2024. In that
period Father called the children two to four times a month.
Father stated it was difficult for him to visit due to his and A.Q.’s
work schedules. J.C. Jr. would get upset and cry when Father
missed visits. J.C. Jr. said he liked to spend time with Father
and felt sad when the visits ended.
During Father’s visits with the children, interaction was
limited because J.C. Jr. routinely would ask for Father’s phone
and then spend the visit focused on the phone while sitting on
Father’s lap. I.C. spent the visits happily running around the
6
park, but he did not interact much with Father and sought out
A.Q. when he needed something. It was difficult for Father to
supervise both children on his own, and he would rely on A.Q.’s
help.
The children were affectionate towards A.Q. J.C. Jr. called
her “tia” but also asked if he could call her “mom,” while I.C.
called her “mama.” J.C. Jr. had been diagnosed with a
developmental disability and was receiving services from the
Regional Center, along with weekly therapy and an after-school
tutoring program. A.Q. reported J.C. Jr. had a short attention
span and required constant redirection and supervision. I.C.,
also a Regional Center client, received weekly occupational,
developmental, and speech therapy. A.Q. reported he was very
active and had difficulty going to sleep. The Department
reported that A.Q. “continue[d] to ensure [I.C.] and [J.C. Jr.]
receive[d] the services necessary to meet their special needs.”
A.Q. informed the parents about the children’s needs, services,
and medical appointments, but the parents did not participate in
the services or appointments or ask for more information. A.Q.
also relayed that I.C., who was still preverbal, was
communicating with sign language, but the parents did not show
interest in learning the signs he knew.
The Department recommended adoption by A.Q. as a
permanent plan for the children. The Department assessed that
the relationship between the children and their parents was not
“of such significance that severing this relationship would cause
the children significant emotional instability,” and A.Q. provided
stability, safety, and security that the parents could not.
7
C. Father’s Section 388 Petitions and the Termination of
Parental Rights
Father filed a section 388 petition requesting the juvenile
court modify its September 2023 order and reinstate his family
reunification services. Father declared he had been enrolled in
counseling for over two months and in a six-month outpatient
program for about six weeks. In the declaration, Father said, “I
have finally acknowledged my co-dependency issue[s] with my
children’s mother and am working diligently to address them.
My children are the most important people to me, and I firmly
believe that we have an unbreakable bond.” Father attached a
letter confirming his outpatient treatment, which required a drug
test, one group session, and three individual therapy sessions per
week. Father also submitted a letter from his therapist, who
stated Father had attended eight sessions; was very cooperative,
motivated, eager to make changes; and “appear[ed] more
insightful and aware of his codependency issues with his
children’s mother.”
The juvenile court summarily denied Father’s section 388
petition, finding no new evidence or changed circumstances and
determining that reinstating services would not promote the
children’s best interests. The court noted Father had not
completed his case plan or provided program letters confirming
his progress.
In April 2024, A.Q. reported there had been no
improvement in the quality of Father’s visits. On one occasion,
while speaking with J.C. Jr. on the phone, Father passed the
phone to Mother. J.C. Jr. appeared upset and then regressed in
behaviors such as being afraid of the dark, hiding food, and
overeating.
8
That same month, Father filed a second section 388
petition reiterating his earlier assertions but adding details,
including that on nine drug tests he had tested negative (except
for marijuana on several occasions). The court again summarily
denied the petition. The following day, Father submitted an
“amended” petition, which was largely the same. Although the
court summarily denied that petition also, it ordered the
Department to submit a response.
In its response, the Department recommended the denial of
Father’s section 388 petition, given Father’s continuing
codependent relationship with Mother and the children’s need for
continued stability with A.Q. The Department reported that
Father’s visitation and phone calls were still inconsistent. When
asked about his visits with his father, J.C. Jr. said, “Me and my
dad and [I.C.] play. Daddy is nice to me and I.C. I feel happy,
and I want to go back to him (Father). I want to live with Tia
(Caregiver) too. I want to live with them both. Maybe my dad
can be here too.” When asked whether he would live with Father
or A.Q. if he had the choice, J.C. Jr. responded, “I don’t know.”
J.C. Jr. referred to his cousins as his brothers and sisters. I.C.
could not provide a meaningful statement but called A.Q. “mama”
several times during a social worker’s visit.
The Department reported that on May 1, 2024 A.Q. ran
into Mother and Father together at a store. A.Q. had heard
Father and Mother were together “on a daily basis” and spending
three nights a week together, and they “still [had] their issues.”
However, Father told the Department that he and Mother were
“taking a break” and were no longer living together, although he
would occasionally bring Mother food when she asked him to.
Father said he used poor judgement in allowing Mother to move
9
in before I.C. was born. Father admitted he saw Mother a few
weeks earlier when they ran an errand together. Paternal aunt
Alice C., with whom Father lived, said Mother used to see Father
once or twice a week, but Mother had not visited Father since
October 2023.
In June 2024, the Department consulted Father’s
substance abuse counselor and his therapist. The counselor
reported Father consistently tested negative, had learned to
manage stress better, was focused on trying to get his children
back, and had “pretty much” completed his six-month program
but continued to attend voluntarily. The therapist noted Father
had more confidence in setting boundaries with Mother, but still
“need[ed] more work on setting boundaries with his co-dependent
relationship” with Mother. While Father “ha[d] improved a lot
lately,” the therapist stated Father “can still be naive
sometimes.”
Father refiled his section 388 petition on June 27, 2024 in
order for it to be heard that same day as the section 366.26
hearing. At the contested hearing, the Department and minor’s
counsel recommended the court deny Father’s petition. Minor’s
counsel indicated J.C. Jr. “specifically allowed me to share with
the court while he does enjoy visits with Father, he wants to stay
with [A.Q.] forever.”
The juvenile court denied Father’s petition. The court was
concerned about Father and Mother’s continued relationship and
found there was no change in circumstances. The court
emphasized the children had been out of the parents’ care for two
and a half years. The court determined the children were
“comfortable” in their current placement and concluded that
reinstating reunification services was not in their best interests.
10
The court proceeded to the section 366.26 hearing and terminated
the parents’ parental rights.
Father and Mother both timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying Father’s
Section 388 Petitions Seeking Reunification Services
1. Applicable law and standard of review
“Section 388 provides for modification of juvenile court
orders when the moving party presents new evidence or a change
of circumstance and demonstrates modification of the previous
order is in the child’s best interest. [Citations.] ‘ “The petitioner
has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence
(1) that there is new evidence or a change of circumstances and
(2) that the proposed modification would be in the best interests
of the child.” [Citation.] “[T]he change in circumstances must be
substantial.” ’ ” (In re Malick T. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1109,
1122, fn. omitted; see In re Matthew M. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
1186, 1194.) “After the termination of reunification services, the
parents’ interest in the care, custody and companionship of the
child are no longer paramount. Rather, at this point ‘the focus
shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability’
[citation], and in fact, there is a rebuttable presumption that
continued foster care is in the best interests of the child.
[Citation.] A court hearing a motion for change of placement at
this stage of the proceedings must recognize this shift of focus in
determining the ultimate question before it, that is, the best
interests of the child.” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295,
317 (Stephanie M.); see In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295,
309; In re D.P. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1282, 1295 (D.P.); In re J.M.
11
(2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 833, 847.)
“We review a juvenile court’s denial of a section 388
petition for abuse of discretion, and review its factual findings for
substantial evidence. [Citation.] We may disturb the exercise of
the court’s discretion only when the court has made an
unreasonable or arbitrary determination.” (In re J.M., supra,
50 Cal.App.5th at p. 846; see Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at
p. 318; D.P., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 1291.) “We do not
inquire whether substantial evidence would have supported a
different order, nor do we reweigh the evidence and substitute
our judgment for that of the juvenile court. [Citation.] We ask
only whether the juvenile court abused its discretion with respect
to the order it made.” (In re Matthew M., supra, 88 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1195; see In re Maya L. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 81, 104,
fn. 6.)
2. Father did not show changed circumstances
In arguing circumstances had changed, Father highlights
his enrollment in a six-month outpatient program in February
2024, which he had completed by the hearing in May 2024.
During the program, Father attended group and individual
therapy three times a week, consistently tested negative for
substances (except marijuana on a few occasions), made progress
in managing stress, and continued attending voluntarily after
completing the program. He also began individual therapy in
January 2024 to address his codependency issues with Mother.
Even assuming Father had made substantial progress in
achieving lasting sobriety, “[n]ot every change in circumstance
can justify modification of a prior order.” (In re A.A. (2012)
203 Cal.App.4th 597, 612.) Here, the chief issue leading to the
removal of the children from Father was his codependent
12
relationship with Mother, whose addiction issues remained
unresolved. Father’s repeated violations of visitation orders and
his dishonesty with the Department stemmed from these
codependency issues. The juvenile court could reasonably
conclude that if Father did not end his relationship with Mother,
the children would remain at serious risk of harm.
While Father told the Department in mid-May 2024 that he
and Mother were “taking a break,” Father was seen with Mother
and admitted he would still occasionally bring Mother food. In an
April 2024 report, the Department noted that Father had passed
the phone to Mother so she could speak to the children, which
upset and confused J.C. Jr. Father’s therapist confirmed Father
still “needs more work on setting boundaries with his co-
dependent relationship” with Mother and could “still be naive
sometimes and gives the benefit of the doubt.” The court thus did
not abuse its discretion in finding Father had not shown a
substantial change in circumstances with respect to his
codependency issues. (See In re Ernesto R. (2014)
230 Cal.App.4th 219, 223 [“To support a section 388 petition, the
change in circumstances must be substantial.”].)
3. Father did not show that reunification would be in
the children’s best interests
Father also has not demonstrated that the juvenile court
abused its discretion in concluding that continuing reunification
services was not in the children’s best interests. At this stage in
the case, a “primary consideration” was “the goal of assuring
stability and continuity;” the focus had shifted from Father’s
“interest in the care, custody and companionship of the
child[ren]” to that need for permanency and stability. (Stephanie
M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317; see In re J.C. (2014)
13
226 Cal.App.4th 503, 527 [“[A]fter reunification services have
terminated, a parent’s petition for either an order returning
custody or reopening reunification efforts must establish how
such a change will advance the child’s need for permanency and
stability.”].)
Father failed to show how extending reunification
services—beyond the 21 months he already received—would
promote the children’s need for permanence and stability. The
evidence showed the opposite.
First, J.C. Jr. and I.C. required a high level of services for
their developmental delays, and it was apparent A.Q. was better
equipped than Father to ensure the children received the special
attention necessary to meet their needs. Both children were
Regional Center clients. J.C. Jr. had been diagnosed with a
developmental disability and attended weekly therapy and an
after-school program with tutoring. He had a short attention
span and needed constant redirection and supervision. I.C. also
received weekly occupational therapy, child development therapy,
and speech therapy. The Department reported that A.Q. ensured
the children attended all necessary services and addressed their
needs.
By contrast, Father demonstrated a lack of engagement or
ability to support the children’s needs. A.Q. would tell the
parents about the children’s needs and services, including
medical appointments, but the parents did not participate or
inquire beyond what A.Q. shared. They also did not show an
interest in learning basic sign language in order to communicate
with I.C. When supervising both children, Father relied on A.Q.
for assistance, highlighting his inability to manage their needs
independently. The record supports the court’s determination
14
that A.Q. could provide stability and tend to the children’s needs,
while Father could not. (See Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at
pp. 318-319 [where the child had “special needs,” the juvenile
court did not abuse its discretion in “placing special weight on the
child’s need for stability”].)
Moreover, the children were in a “loving and stable
placement” with A.Q., who had become a constant parental figure
in their lives after caring for the children for over two years, since
I.C. was three months old. (In re J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at
p. 526; see D.P., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 1295 [juvenile court
properly focused on the “ ‘positive and secure attachments’ ”
between the child and her foster family].) Reports consistently
noted the children were happy, well-adjusted, and integrated into
A.Q.’s family. J.C. Jr. asked A.Q. if he could call her “mom,” and
I.C. called her “mama.” And J.C. Jr. considered his cousins his
brothers and sisters.
Meanwhile, Father’s visitation was inconsistent and
increasingly infrequent. When the juvenile court terminated
Father’s reunification services in September 2023, it noted that
his visitation had been “minimal, at best.” His visitation
subsequently remained sporadic and tapered off even more over
time. Reports indicated Father failed to foster meaningful
interactions during visits, often allowing J.C. Jr. to use his phone
rather than engage with him. Although J.C. Jr. said he enjoyed
spending time with Father and felt sad when he had to leave at
the end of a visit, J.C. Jr. was detrimentally affected when
Father did not show up for a visit. (See In re J.T. (2014)
228 Cal.App.4th 953, 965 [proposed change not in the children’s
best interest when children had lived with paternal grandmother
for two years and mother had frequently failed to follow through
15
with scheduled visits].)
Given Father’s minimal progress in addressing the
children’s needs, his inconsistent visitation, and the stability and
care provided by A.Q., the juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that continued reunification services
were not in the children’s best interests.
B. Conditional Reversal of the Order Terminating Parental
Rights and Remand for ICWA Compliance Is Necessary
Both Mother and Father argue, the Department concedes,
and we agree that conditional reversal and remand is necessary
because extended family members who may have meaningful
information were not contacted regarding Indian ancestry.
1. Facts relevant to ICWA
Mother has three brothers, including Joseph F. and Johnny
A., and a great uncle, Moses A. Mother’s mother, Anna Marie A.,
is deceased, as is her father, Lupillo F., who was from Mexico.
Father has five sisters, including A.Q. and Alice, and four
brothers, one of whom is deceased.
In the ICWA-010(A) forms attached to the original petition,
the Department stated that neither Mother nor Father gave any
indication that the children might have Indian ancestry. In
December 2021, Father signed a form confirming he had no
information about Indian ancestry. In ICWA-020 forms filed in
January 2022, both parents denied Indian ancestry. At a hearing
in January 2022, the juvenile court found no reason to believe
ICWA applied. Mother and Father again denied Indian ancestry
in May and June 2022. A.Q. and Alice also denied Indian
ancestry.
In December 2023, Mother mentioned that she had heard of
16
possible Native American ancestry through her mother’s side of
the family but did not have any details. When asked if other
relatives might have more information, Mother’s grandmother,
Victoria A., said there was some Native American ancestry but
could not provide specifics. Mother gave the social worker her
brother Johnny’s phone number. When contacted, Johnny stated,
“We are Native American; Navajo,” and explained he was in the
early stages of gathering information for his family tree. He
added that their great-aunt, Lucille I., who had since passed
away, had told him she was “documented as Navajo Indian.”
Johnny also mentioned that their mother, Anna Marie, had been
adopted by Lucille. Father maintained that his family did not
have Native American ancestry but stated Mother might have
connections to the San Fernando Tataviam tribe. However, the
Department determined the San Fernando Tataviam Band of
Mission Indians was not a federally recognized tribe.
In January 2024, the Department investigator followed up
with Johnny, asking for additional information about possible
Native American ancestry and contact details for other maternal
relatives. He reiterated that Lucille was “documented as Navajo
Indian” and said he planned to meet with their uncle Moses in
two weeks to obtain more information. A month later, the
Department contacted Johnny again, but he had no new
information. When the investigator asked Mother for Moses’s
contact information, she stated she would get back to the
Department with his phone number. In March 2024, the
Department investigator told Mother he had not heard from
Moses, and Mother explained that Moses was dealing with a
medical condition and was unable to contact the Department.
The same month, as well as two months later, the Department
17
left Johnny voicemails seeking updates, but he did not respond.
At the section 366.26 hearing in June 2024, the court did
not address ICWA.
2. ICWA and the duty of inquiry
“ICWA establishes minimum standards for state courts to
follow before removing Indian children from their families and
placing them in foster care or adoptive homes and does not
prohibit states from establishing higher standards.” (In re Dezi
C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1129 (Dezi C.); see 25 U.S.C. §§ 1902,
1921; In re T.R. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 206, 206.) “[W]hen ICWA
applies, ‘the Indian child’s tribe shall have a right to intervene at
any point’ in a proceeding involving the removal of an Indian
child from their family.” (Dezi C., at p. 1129; see 25 U.S.C.
§ 1911(c); In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 8.) To ensure Indian
tribes can exercise their rights in dependency proceedings,
“[a]gencies and juvenile courts have ‘an affirmative and
continuing duty’ in every dependency proceeding to determine
whether ICWA applies by inquiring whether a child is or may be
an Indian child.” (Dezi C., at pp. 1131-1132, quoting § 224.2,
subd. (a).) Even if a court has already found ICWA does not
apply, “the court ‘shall reverse its determination if it
subsequently receives information providing reason to believe
that the child is an Indian child and order the social worker or
probation officer to conduct further inquiry . . . .’ (§ 224.2, subd.
(i)(2).)” (Dezi C., at p. 1134.)
The duty to inquire begins with a county’s initial contact
regarding a child, and “includes, but is not limited to, asking the
child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family
members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party
reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be,
18
an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2); see Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.481(a)(1); In re T.R., supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 206.)
ICWA and Cal-ICWA define “extended family member,” if not
separately defined by the law or custom of the tribe, as “a person
who has reached the age of eighteen and who is the Indian child’s
grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or
sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or
stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); see § 224.1, subd. (c)
[providing “extended family member” follows the definition stated
in ICWA].)
If the juvenile court or the Department has “reason to
believe” that an Indian child is involved, “further inquiry”
regarding the possible Indian status of the child is required.
(Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1132; see § 224.2, subd. (e).) “The
required further inquiry includes (1) interviewing the parents
and extended family members; (2) contacting the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) and State Department of Social Services;
and (3) contacting tribes the child may be affiliated with and
anyone else that might have information regarding the child’s
membership or eligibility in a tribe.” (Dezi C., at pp. 1132-1133;
see § 224.2, subds. (e)(2)(A)-(C)); Cal. Rules of Court, rule
5.481(a)(4).) “At this stage, contact with a tribe ‘shall, at a
minimum, include telephone, facsimile, or electronic mail contact
to each tribe’s designated agent for receipt of [ICWA] notices,’
and ‘sharing information identified by the tribe as necessary for
the tribe to make a membership or eligibility determination, as
well as information on the current status of the child and the
case.’ ” (Dezi C., at p. 1133; § 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(C).)
If the further inquiry “results in a reason to know the child
is an Indian child, then the formal notice requirements of section
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224.3 apply.” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1052; see
25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); § 224.3, subd. (a).) A “ ‘reason to know’ exists
under any of the following circumstances: ‘(1) A person having an
interest in the child, including the child, an officer of the court, a
tribe, an Indian organization, a public or private agency, or a
member of the child’s extended family informs the court that the
child is an Indian child[;] [¶] (2) The residence or domicile of the
child, the child’s parents, or Indian custodian is on a reservation
or in an Alaska Native village[;] [¶] (3) Any participant in the
proceeding, officer of the court, Indian tribe, Indian organization,
or agency informs the court that it has discovered information
indicating that the child is an Indian child[;] [¶] (4) The child who
is the subject of the proceeding gives the court reason to know [he
or she] is an Indian child[;] [¶] (5) The court is informed that the
child is or has been a ward of a tribal court[; and] [¶] (6) The
court is informed that either parent or the child possess an
identification card indicating membership or citizenship in an
Indian tribe.’ ” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1133; see § 224.2,
subd. (d).)
“[E]rror resulting in an inadequate initial Cal-ICWA
inquiry requires conditional reversal with directions for the child
welfare agency to comply with the inquiry requirement of section
224.2, document its inquiry in compliance with rule 5.481(a)(5),
and when necessary, comply with the notice provision of section
224.3. When a Cal-ICWA inquiry is inadequate, it is impossible
to ascertain whether the agency’s error is prejudicial. [Citations.]
‘[U]ntil an agency conducts a proper initial inquiry and makes
that information known, it is impossible to know what the
inquiry might reveal.’ ” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1136.)
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3. Remand for ICWA compliance is necessary
As the Department concedes, Johnny’s statement that his
great-aunt was “documented as Navajo Indian” was sufficient to
give rise to a “reason to believe” the children were Indian
children. This triggered a duty of further inquiry on the
Department’s part, requiring it to, among other duties, contact
the Navajo tribe and share information necessary for the tribe to
make a membership or eligibility determination. (§ 224.2,
subd. (e); Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1132.) However, the
Department did not contact the Navajo Tribe. Conceding error,
the Department indicates it “has no objection to an order that it
contact the tribe on remand.”
Mother also contends the Department fell short in its
initial inquiry duties by failing to contact six of Father’s living
siblings (his brothers and sisters other than Alice and A.Q.), the
paternal grandparents, two of her three brothers, and her great-
uncle Moses. The Department concedes it failed to satisfy its
obligation to inquire of the known paternal relatives.2 Regarding
Mother’s two brothers and Moses, the Department contends it
made repeated unsuccessful efforts to obtain contact information
from both Mother and Johnny. It appears the Department’s
efforts to obtain contact information for these maternal relatives
2 The Department points out that Mother, not Father,
contends the Department failed to contact the paternal
grandparents, but there is no reference in the record to whether
Father’s parents are still living. On remand, the Department
should inquire of Father or other paternal relatives whether the
paternal grandparents are still living, and if so, make reasonable
efforts to contact them.
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were sufficient. (See In re Q.M. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1082
[“[W]e cannot ask the agency to intuit the names of unidentified
family members or to interview individuals for whom no contact
information has been provided.”].) Nevertheless, the Department
states that because the matter will be remanded, it has no
objection to attempting to contact these relatives if contact
information is provided.
Accordingly, we conditionally reverse the order terminating
parental rights and remand the matter for the Department to
fulfill its duties under ICWA and for the court to thereafter hold
a hearing to determine anew whether ICWA applies. (See Dezi
C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1137 [“Upon a conditional reversal, the
Department will make additional inquiry and documentation
efforts consistent with its duties and the court shall hold a
hearing thereafter to determine whether, in light of the outcome
of the inquiry as documented, ICWA applies.”].)
DISPOSITION
The court’s June 27, 2024 order denying Father’s section
388 petition is affirmed. The court’s June 2024 orders
terminating Father’s and Mother’s parental rights are
conditionally reversed. We remand for the Department and the
juvenile court to comply with the inquiry and notice provisions of
ICWA and Cal-ICWA consistent with this opinion, including
inquiring of family members and contacting the Navajo tribe. If
based on the completed inquiry, the juvenile court finds there is
no reason to believe the children are Indian children, or if no
tribe or agency determines the children are Indian children after
notice has been provided pursuant to ICWA, the order
terminating parental rights shall be reinstated. If notices are
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sent and the juvenile court receives a response from a tribe
determining the children are Indian children, the juvenile court
shall proceed in accordance with ICWA.
STONE, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
SEGAL, J.
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