CourtListener 10327822•People v. Dunn CA5
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Filed 2/5/25 P. v. Dunn CA5
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F083390
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. MCR063302)
v.
TUESDEE DEANN DUNN, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Madera County. Mitchell C.
Rigby, Judge.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell and Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorneys General,
Eric L. Christoffersen, Christopher J. Rench and Kari Ricci Mueller, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Hill, P. J., Franson, J. and Peña, J.
This matter is before us on transfer from our Supreme Court for reconsideration in
light of People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730 (Lynch), which settled a division among
courts of appeal on the appropriate standard for assessing prejudice in the context of
noncompliance with the requirements of Penal Code1 section 1170, subdivision (b)(1),
(2), and (3) as modified by Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 567).
In accordance with the direction of the Supreme Court, we have vacated our earlier
decision and permitted supplemental briefing from the parties.
Defendant Tuesdee Deann Dunn was found guilty by a court trial of violating
probation. Her sentence included the upper term for her underlying count of force-likely
assault.2 On appeal, defendant contends that her sentence must be vacated, and the case
remanded for resentencing in light of Lynch and Senate Bill 567’s amendments to
section 1170, subdivision (b). The People acknowledge the error but argue it was
harmless. However, the People concede defendant’s sentence must nonetheless be
vacated and the matter remanded because the trial court’s statement is insufficiently
definitive to provide clear indication that it would have imposed the same sentence under
the new standard. We vacate defendant’s sentence and remand for full resentencing in
conformity with section 1170, subdivision (b). In all other respects, we affirm.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On October 18, 2019, the Madera County District Attorney filed an amended
information in case No. MCR063302 charging defendant with assault with a means of
force likely to cause great bodily injury (“force-likely assault”) (§ 245, subd. (a)(4);
count 1) and misdemeanor violation of a protective order (§ 273.6, subd. (a); count 2).
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
2 The court also sentenced defendant to 125 days in county jail, with 125 days’
credit for time served, for her misdemeanor violation of failing to comply with a
protective order (count two).
2.
That same day, defendant pled guilty to both counts.
On November 18, 2019, the trial court placed defendant on three years of
probation in case No. MCR063302.3
On February 11, 2020, a petition was filed to revoke defendant’s probation in case
No. MCR063302. It alleged that defendant had failed to report monthly as directed by
her probation officer. Defendant admitted the allegation. Her probation was revoked and
reinstated for a period of three years.
On March 17, 2020, a second petition to revoke defendant’s probation in case
No. MCR063302 was filed. The petition alleged that defendant had committed petty
theft (§ 459.5), which violated the term of her probation requiring her to obey all laws.
Defendant admitted the violation and her probation was revoked and reinstated for a
period of three years.
On April 27, 2021, a third petition to revoke defendant’s probation in case
No. MCR063302 was filed. The petition alleged that defendant violated the terms of her
probation requiring her to obey all laws by: (1) committing disorderly conduct (§ 647,
subd. (f)); (2) possessing a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a));
and (3) possessing paraphernalia used to smoke or ingest a controlled substance (Health
& Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a)). The petition further alleged that defendant failed to
report to her probation officer as required by the terms of her probation and that she had
violated the term prohibiting use or possession of a controlled substance because her
urine sample tested positive for THC and amphetamine.
On June 11, 2021, the trial court held a contested hearing regarding the
third probation revocation petition in case No. MCR063302. The trial court found that
3 During this proceeding, the trial court also sentenced defendant in case
No. MCR060039, after a violation of probation. The charges at issue here, in case
No. MCR063302, were the basis for the violation of probation allegation in case
No. MCR060039.
3.
defendant had violated her probation by failing to obey all laws and by not reporting to
her probation officer as alleged in the petition. The trial court found there was
insufficient evidence supporting the allegation that defendant’s urine test was positive,
but found that she had nonetheless violated the probation term prohibiting controlled
substance use or possession because she had been found in possession of
methamphetamine and amphetamine paraphernalia. At sentencing, the trial court
revoked defendant’s probation and declined to reinstate it. The trial court imposed
four years (the upper term) on count 1 (force-likely assault); and 125 days in county jail,
with 125 days’ credit for time served, deemed time served, on count 2 (misdemeanor
violation of a protective order).4 The trial court stated it found three aggravating
circumstances: (1) defendant had numerous prior convictions, (2) defendant was on
probation at the time the charged offenses were committed, and (3) defendant’s prior
performance on probation was unsatisfactory.
On September 29, 2021, defendant filed a notice of appeal in case
No. MCR063302.
On appeal, we held that two of the aggravating factors that the trial court relied on,
defendant’s prior convictions were numerous, and defendant’s performance on probation
was unsatisfactory, had been properly proven under section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) and
(3). (People v. Dunn (June 30, 2022, F083390) review granted Oct. 12, 2022 and opn.
ordered nonpub. Dec. 11, 2024, S275665.) We concluded the last aggravating factor, that
defendant was on probation when the offenses were committed, was not properly proven
under section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) and (3), but we found the error harmless. (Dunn,
supra, F083390)
4 The trial court also revoked defendant’s probation in case No. MCR060039. In
that case, her probation was revoked and not reinstated and she was sentenced to county
jail with credit for time served.
4.
On August 22, 2022, after we issued an opinion in this case, defendant filed a
petition for review.
On October 12, 2022, the California Supreme Court granted the petition and
deferred further action pending disposition of Lynch.
On August 1, 2024, the California Supreme Court issued its decision in Lynch.
(Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th 730.)
On December 11, 2024, the California Supreme Court transferred this case back to
our court with directions to vacate the decision and to reconsider the case under Lynch.
FACTS5
Count 1—Felony Force-Likely Assault
Defendant was married to B.O. and they had children together. B.O.’s previous
wife was J.S. On May 2, 2019, defendant arrived at J.S.’s residence for reasons unknown
to J.S. and J.S. told defendant to leave. After J.S. told defendant to leave a second time,
defendant lunged at J.S. and they began struggling and hitting each other. J.S. pushed
defendant away and saw a knife in defendant’s hand. J.S. immediately grabbed the knife
from defendant and cut her right thumb in doing so.
Count 2—Misdemeanor Violating a Court Order
Defendant had previously been served with a criminal protective order. On
June 7, 2019, while it was in effect, B.O. went to defendant’s father’s home to pick up
their children. Defendant was outside the residence waiting for B.O. When he put their
children in his car, defendant demanded the children. B.O. refused and drove away.
Defendant closely followed B.O. in her vehicle and told B.O. when they arrived at the
children’s daycare that she would follow them into the daycare. B.O. called the police to
report defendant’s violation of the protective order.
5 All facts are from the probation report.
5.
DISCUSSION
The parties agree the case should be sent back to the trial court for another
sentencing hearing. The People concede that all three aggravating factors relied upon by
the trial court to impose the upper term were not properly found true under Erlinger v.
United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821 (Erlinger), but argue harmless error can be found with
regard to all three of these factors under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.
However, the People concede remand is necessary because it is not clear that the trial
court would have imposed the upper term of three years on count 1 in case
No. MCR063302, had the court been aware of its limited discretion under Lynch to
impose the upper term. Defendant agrees. We conclude (1) two of the circumstances in
aggravation were not proved in compliance with section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) and (3);
(2) the evidence presented in support of the circumstances in aggravation does not permit
us to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury or the judge in a court trial would
have found the facts underlying two of the circumstances in aggravation true; and (3) the
record does not provide a clear indication that the trial court would have imposed the
upper term had it been aware of the new presumptive middle term.
A. Background
When selecting the upper term on count 1, the trial court relied on the probation
officer’s recommendation and found three aggravating factors: (1) defendant had
numerous prior convictions, (2) defendant was on probation at the time the charged
offenses were committed, and (3) defendant’s prior performance on probation was
unsatisfactory. The trial court stated at sentencing, “with regards to circumstances in
aggravation … defendant’s prior convictions are numerous, [she] was on probation when
the crime was committed, and her prior performance on probation was unsatisfactory.”
6.
Defendant admitted that she violated the terms of her probation on March 19,
2020, stipulating to unsatisfactory performance on probation. She waived the right to a
bench trial. However, she did not waive the right to a jury trial.
The probation officer’s report indicated that defendant was on probation at the
time she committed her offenses and identified defendant’s criminal history, which
included six prior misdemeanor convictions and 11 prior probation violations.
During the contested hearing, the trial court admitted into evidence a certified
copy of defendant’s criminal history report as People’s Exhibit 1.6
B. Compliance with Section 1170, Subdivision (b), as Modified by Senate
Bill 567
From March 30, 2007, to December 31, 2021, California’s determinate sentencing
law specified that “[w]hen a judgment of imprisonment [wa]s to be imposed and the
statute specifie[d] three possible terms, the choice of the appropriate term … rest[ed]
within the sound discretion of the court.” (§ 1170, former subd. (b).)
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill 567 amended section 1170, subdivision (b).
(Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) Section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) now provides, “The court
may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in
aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of” an upper term sentence, and “the
facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have
been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court
trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).) As an exception to the general rule, the court “may
consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified
record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.” (§ 1170,
6 While People’s Exhibit 1 is not included in the record on appeal, the prosecution
stated, “Your honor, at this time I would like to admit into evidence a certified copy of
the defendant’s criminal history report. I’ve previously shown it to the defense.” The
trial court responded, “All right. It will be admitted as Exhibit 1.”
7.
subd. (b)(3); see Erlinger, supra, 602 U.S. at p. 838 [“[A] judge may ‘do no more,
consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than determine what crime, with what elements,
the defendant was convicted of.’ ”])
In this case, neither a jury, nor the judge in a court trial, made any findings
regarding the aggravating circumstances nor did defendant admit any facts in support of
those circumstances. However, the trial court had before it a certified record of
defendant’s criminal history. Section 1170, subdivision (b)(3) permitted the trial court to
rely on the certified record of conviction to prove defendant’s prior convictions for
purposes of proving aggravating circumstances. As a result, the first aggravating
circumstance relied upon by the trial court—that defendant had suffered numerous
convictions—was proved in compliance with amended section 1170, subdivision (b).
However, in Erlinger, the United States Supreme Court recently imposed new
limits on the factors that a sentencing judge may rely upon to increase a sentence in the
absence of either a jury finding (or a court finding if the defendant waives his right to a
jury trial) or the defendant’s stipulation. Erlinger essentially overrules the California
Supreme Court’s decisions in People v. Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th 63 and People v. Black
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 799. Towne and Black concluded that judges could rely on records of
prior convictions to determine whether (1) the defendant’s prior convictions were
numerous or of increasing seriousness, (2) the defendant’s prior performance on
supervised release was unsatisfactory, (3) the defendant served a prior prison term, and
(4) the defendant committed the offense while on supervised release. (Towne, at pp. 80–
83; Black, at pp. 819–820.) In light of Erlinger, a sentencing judge may no longer
determine any of those aggravating factors.
The parties agree, as do we, that Fifth and Sixth Amendment principles, as set out
in Erlinger, prohibit the trial court from having made any of the aggravating
circumstance findings; each must have been found true by a jury or the judge in a court
8.
trial beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Erlinger, supra, 602 U.S. at pp. 835–838.)7 The
parties further agree that neither section 1170, subdivision (b)(3), nor the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments, permit a trial court to rely on a certified record of conviction to prove
any of the other two circumstances in aggravation—that defendant was on probation
when the charged offenses were committed and that defendant’s performance on
probation was unsatisfactory.8 (See Erlinger, at p. 838.)
Despite two of the aggravating circumstances having not been proved in
compliance with section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) and (3), and the parties’ agreement that
none of the aggravating circumstances findings comply with Erlinger, the upper term was
imposed on count 1.9 Therefore, unless imposition of the upper term on count 1 was
harmless, the sentence must be vacated and the matter remanded to the trial court for
resentencing in compliance with section 1170, subdivision (b).
7 The California Supreme Court has granted plenary review in People v. Wiley
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 676, review granted March 12, 2024, S283326, a case in which
the Court of Appeal relied on Towne and Black to hold that, under the Sixth Amendment
and the post-Senate Bill 567 version of section 1170, subdivision (b), a sentencing judge
could impose an upper term sentence based on the increasing seriousness of the
defendant’s offenses and his prior unsatisfactory performance on probation. We need not
weigh in on this issue to resolve this case. Moreover, as the issue is presently pending
before our Supreme Court in Wiley, weighing in on the issue would serve no broader
purpose.
8 While defendant admitted to violating the terms of her probation on March 19,
2020, thus stipulating to unsatisfactory performance on probation for purposes of
section 1170, she only waived the right to a bench trial, not the right to a jury trial.
9 We note that the law has changed since the trial court imposed the sentence in this
case. At the time the court imposed the sentence, it complied with the applicable law.
9.
C. Harmless Error
1. Legal Standard
In Lynch, our Supreme Court held that where a trial court employed a former
version of section 1170, subdivision (b), and relied on facts not proved in compliance
with section 1170, subdivision (b) to impose the upper term, the sentence must be vacated
and the matter remanded unless we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury
would necessarily have found the facts underlying all circumstances in aggravation relied
upon by the trial court true beyond a reasonable doubt. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
pp. 742–743, 761.) “In making this determination, we may ‘ “examine[] what the jury
necessarily did find and ask[] whether it would be impossible, on the evidence, for the
jury to find that without also finding the missing fact as well.” [Citation.]’ … We may
also find the omission harmless if we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt ‘that the
omitted [fact] was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence.’ ” (Id. at
p. 775.) Further, because Senate Bill 567 “altered the scope of the trial court’s
discretion,” for sentences imposed under the former version of section 1170,
subdivision (b), “the record must clearly indicate that the court would have found an
upper term justified had it been aware of its more limited discretion.” (Id. at p. 743; see
id. at p. 777 [providing examples of the “kind of definitive statements” that our Supreme
Court has found to clearly indicate a trial court “would not impose a lesser sentence
under any circumstances”].)
2. Analysis
The People contend that any error is harmless under Chapman because a jury or
the judge in a court trial would have found true all three of the aggravating circumstances
10.
relied upon by the court in imposing the upper term sentence in this case.10 However, the
People concede that the trial court’s statement is insufficient to indicate it would impose
the same sentence in light of the presumptive middle term, and accordingly, the sentence
must be vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing. Defendant does not address
whether the error is harmless under Chapman but agrees with the People’s concession
that, regardless of whether the error is harmless, the case must still be remanded to the
trial court for resentencing because the record is not clear whether the trial court would
have imposed the upper term on count 1 had it been aware of its limited discretion under
Lynch. We agree with the parties that, regardless of whether the error is harmless under
Chapman, the court’s statement is insufficient to indicate whether the court would
impose the same sentence in light of its limited discretion.
Returning to the aggravating circumstances relied upon by the trial court, we
first consider whether we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating
circumstances—although the second and third were not proved in compliance with
section 1170, subdivision (b) and none were proved in compliance with the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments as outlined by Erlinger—would nevertheless all have been found true
by a jury or the judge in a court trial beyond a reasonable doubt. (Lynch, supra, 16
Cal.5th at pp. 742–743, 761.)
Here, the trial court relied upon defendant’s admission that her performance on
probation was unsatisfactory, a certified copy of her criminal history showing her prior
convictions, and the probation officer’s report. (People v. Dunn, supra, F083390.)
10 See Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 775 [“Chapman provides the proper standard of
review” for omission of a jury trial for aggravating factors as required under the amended
statute]; People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 52–53 [applying Chapman where, in
violation of the Sixth Amendment, the trial court imposed the upper term based on
one aggravating circumstance and that circumstance was not proved to the jury].
11.
The People encourage us to rely on the probation report—and lack of objection
thereto—to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury or the judge in a court trial
would have found true beyond a reasonable doubt all facts necessary to support the
circumstances in aggravation. We cannot do so, as the probation officer’s report would
not have been admissible to prove any of the circumstances in aggravation. (See People
v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217, 221–222 [a probation report excerpt detailing the
defendant’s statement was inadmissible hearsay]; see Erlinger, supra, 602 U.S. at
pp. 841–843 [judicial records often contain “old recorded details, prone to error,
sometimes untested, often inessential, and the consequences of which a defendant may
not have appreciated at the time, [which] ‘should not come back to haunt [him] many
years down the road’ ”].) Our Supreme Court’s direction that to find omission of a jury
finding harmless we “conclude beyond a reasonable doubt ‘that the omitted [fact] was
uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence’ ”11 surely requires that the
evidence in the record be admissible evidence. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 775.) As
our Supreme Court recently reiterated, “ ‘although [the] defendant did have an incentive
and opportunity at the sentencing hearing to contest any aggravating circumstances
mentioned in the probation report …, that incentive and opportunity were not necessarily
the same as they would have been had the aggravating circumstances been tried to a
jury.’ [Citation.] This is so because the standard of proof at the sentencing hearing was
lower and the trial court had broad discretion in imposing a sentence.” (Id. at pp. 753–
754.) Trial “ ‘[c]ounsel’s strategy might have been different had the aggravating
circumstances been tried under a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof to a trier
of fact that was responsible only for determining whether such circumstances were
11 The Lynch court also explained that any fact necessarily found by the jury in light
of its verdict would be sufficient to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury
would have found the fact true. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 775.)
12.
proved (and not for making the ultimate sentencing decision).’ ” (Id. at p. 754.) While
the shift in trier of fact and standard of proof are not dispositive, they certainly weigh
against our reliance on defendant’s failure to object to the aggravating circumstances
findings below. For those reasons, we must decline to rely on information relayed by the
probation report in our determination of whether we can conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that a jury or the judge in a court trial would have found true beyond a reasonable
doubt all of the circumstances in aggravation relied upon by the trial court.
Here, the other evidence in the record we may consider in determining whether the
error was harmless are the certified record of conviction and defendant’s stipulation that
her performance on probation was unsatisfactory. However, as stated above, the certified
record of conviction relied upon by the trial court is not in the record on appeal, and
defendant did not waive the right to a jury trial when she stipulated to violating probation.
Our Supreme Court has “cautioned that a prejudice analysis following a change in the
law respecting proof of aggravating circumstances ‘can be problematic. The reviewing
court cannot assume that the record reflects all of the evidence that would have been
presented to the jury, or that the defendant had the same incentive and opportunity at a
sentencing hearing to contest the aggravating circumstance. [Citation.] … “[T]o the
extent a potential aggravating circumstance at issue in a particular case rests on a
somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be difficult for a reviewing court to
conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury would
have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the trial court.” [Citation.] … “Many
of the aggravating circumstances described in the rules require an imprecise quantitative
or comparative evaluation of the facts,” ’ with the victim’s particular vulnerability being
one example.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 775–776.) As the record here does not
reflect all of the evidence that would have been presented to the jury, and we cannot
assume defendant had the same incentive and opportunity at the sentencing hearing to
13.
contest the aggravating circumstances, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that the jury would have found beyond a reasonable doubt the other two aggravating
circumstances true. The error was therefore not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Further, an alternative basis to conclude the error was not harmless also exists on
this record: the trial court’s comments on the record are insufficient for us to conclude
that it gave a clear indication that it would not impose a lesser sentence under any
circumstances. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 777.)
As to whether the trial court would impose the same term in light of the change in
the standard for exercise of discretion, the People concede the record “ ‘does not
necessarily speak to how the court would have exercised its discretion under the weight
of the presumptive middle term maximum sentence that currently exists,’ ” as “ ‘the court
did not make the kind of definitive statements that we have found to clearly indicate it
would not impose a lesser sentence under any circumstances,’ ” “[n]or did its other
decisions clearly indicate it would have imposed the upper term even had it been aware
of the more limited discretion provided in section 1170, subdivision (b).” (See Lynch,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 777.) We agree.
Here, the trial court stated, “with regards to circumstances in aggravation …
defendant’s prior convictions are numerous, [she] was on probation when the crime was
committed, and her prior performance on probation was unsatisfactory.”
The Lynch court provided two examples of “definitive” statements: first, where
the trial court found the defendant was “ ‘ “deserving [of] the ultimate sentence of
death,” ’ [the] trial court observed that the defendant was ‘ “the worst of the worst,” ’ that
he ‘ “show[ed] absolutely no remorse” ’ and that ‘ “[i]t’s as if he has no soul” ’ ” (Lynch,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 777, citing People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 432); and
second, “where ‘the sentencing court announces that it is aware of forthcoming
legislation and then explains how it would exercise its discretion under that legislation.’ ”
14.
(Lynch, at p. 777, citing People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 431.) Neither is the
case here. In short, the trial court’s statement is insufficiently definitive to provide clear
indication that it would have imposed the same sentence under the new standard. (See
Lynch, at p. 777; Salazar, at p. 431.) For this separate reason, defendant’s sentence must
be vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing.12
DISPOSITION
Defendant’s sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded for full resentencing
in conformity with section 1170, subdivision (b). The People may elect to retry the
aggravating facts on remand. In all other respects, the sentence is affirmed.
12 “ ‘ “The proper remedy for this type of failure of proof—where … [aggravating
facts] were ‘never tried’ to the jury—is to remand and give the People an opportunity to
retry” ’ the aggravating facts.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 776.)
15.
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