CourtListener 10327819•People v. Mendoza CA1/4
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Filed 2/5/25 P. v. Mendoza CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A168233
v.
RAMIRO OCHOA MENDOZA, (Napa County
Super. Ct. No. 23CR000803)
Defendant and Appellant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Ramiro Ochoa Mendoza was convicted of a single count of assault by
means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, § 245(a)(4).)2
Mendoza entered postrelease community supervision (PRCS) on February 12,
2022, for a term set to end on February 11, 2025.
On April 14, 2023, the trial court found probable cause to believe that
Mendoza had violated the terms of his PRCS. It summarily revoked his
supervision and issued a bench warrant for his arrest. After absconding for
40 days, Mendoza was arrested on May 24, 2023, and remained in custody for
20 days pending his formal revocation hearing.
1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion pursuant to California
Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1. (See People v. Garcia
(2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 853–855.)
2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
During that hearing, the court found that Mendoza violated the terms
of his PRCS, revoked and reinstated him to supervision, and ordered him to
serve 150 days in jail, with credit for the days he spent in custody prior to the
hearing. When the court proposed to extend Mendoza’s PRCS by 60 days,
representing the time during which it had been revoked, Mendoza objected,
arguing that the court could extend it only by the 40 days during which he
had absconded and not by the time he had spent in custody awaiting the
hearing. The court allowed the parties to submit briefing on that issue, and
after a hearing two weeks later, extended the termination date by the full
60 days, to April 13, 2025. On appeal, Mendoza renews his argument that
any extension beyond the 40-day period of his abscondment exceeded the
court’s authority. We are unpersuaded.
Individuals who have served prison sentences for non-serious and non-
violent felonies are placed on PRCS. (§§ 3451, subds. (a), (b), 3455, subd. (e),
3456, subd. (a)(1).) Generally, the maximum period for PRCS is three years.
(§ 3455, subd. (e).) If there is probable cause to believe that the person has
violated the terms of PRCS the supervising agency may order “immediate,
structured, and intermediate sanctions.” (§ 3454, subd. (b).) If intermediate
sanctions are not appropriate, the supervising agency is to petition the court
to revoke, terminate, or modify the individual’s supervision. (§ 3455,
subd. (a).) Revocation involves two steps. First, the court may summarily
revoke supervision and issue a bench warrant for the individual’s arrest.
(§ 1203.2, subd. (a).) Second, the prosecution must prove at a required formal
revocation hearing that there was a violation. (§ 3455, subd. (c).) If the court
finds a violation, it may (1) reinstate PRCS with modifications, (2) revoke and
terminate supervision, or (3) refer the person to a reentry court. (§ 3455,
subds. (a), (d).)
2
In his opening brief, Mendoza focuses on section 3456, subdivision (b),
which provides that “[t]ime during which a person on postrelease supervision
is suspended because the person has absconded shall not be credited toward
any period of postrelease supervision.” Mendoza notes that in People v.
Johnson (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1050, the court wrote that “the fact that
this one circumstance, and no other, is identified as not counting toward the
PRCS period suggests that the Legislature did not intend the length of PRCS
to be extended due to periods of revocation.” As two subsequent decisions
have pointed out, however, Johnson concerned whether the duration of PRCS
was extended automatically, not whether the court had discretion to extend
it. (People v. Braud (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 962, 969 (Braud); People v.
Ornelas (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1305, 1315–1316.)
More importantly, Mendoza’s opening brief fails to address the statute
that expressly governs extensions of PRCS beyond three years and the court’s
analysis of that statute in Braud. Section 3455, subdivision (e) provides that
“[a] person shall not remain under supervision or in custody pursuant to this
title on or after three years from the date of the person’s initial entry onto
postrelease community supervision, except when his or her supervision is
tolled pursuant to Section 1203.2 or subdivision (b) of Section 3456.”
Subdivision (a) of section 1203.2 states that a revocation of supervision,
“summary or otherwise, shall serve to toll the running of the period of
supervision.” Reading these provisions together, the court in Braud held that
a trial court may extend a person’s PRCS beyond three years to account for
any time supervision is tolled either during a period of abscondment under
§ 3456, subdivision (b), or during a period of revocation under section 1203.2.
(Braud, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at pp. 967–969.) Like the court in Braud,
“[w]e decline to interpret Johnson as contradicting the plain language of
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section 3455, subdivision (e).” (Id. at p. 969.) The 60-day extension of
Mendoza’s termination date corresponds to the 60-day period during which
his supervision was summarily revoked under section 1203.2; on its face, this
extension was consistent with section 3455, subdivision (e).
In his reply brief, Mendoza contends that there is no authority
establishing that tolling under section 1203.2 “continues once a person has
been placed in custody,” and that Braud did not expressly address “whether
time in custody can be used to extend a PRCS termination date.” We deem
these arguments forfeited both because they are entirely perfunctory and
because they follow Mendoza’s failure to address the relevant authority in his
opening brief. (See Sviridov v. City of San Diego (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 514,
521; Dameron Hospital Assn. v. AAA Northern California, Nevada & Utah
Ins. Exchange (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 971, 982.) The mere assertion that
there is no authority establishing that tolling continues once an individual in
revoked status has been placed in custody is not a reasoned argument for
implying an exception that is not contained in the statute’s language. “We
are not bound to develop appellants’ arguments for them.” (In re Marriage of
Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830.)
DISPOSITION
The order extending the expiration date of Mendoza’s PRCS by 60 days
is affirmed.
GOLDMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
STREETER, Acting P. J.
SIMONDS, J. *
* Judge of the Superior Court of Sonoma County, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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