CourtListener 10327719•Itkin v. Greenfield CA2/3
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Filed 2/5/25 Itkin v. Greenfield CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
GARRY ITKIN, B332503
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22STCV20177)
v.
JON GREENFIELD et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Gregory Keosian, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of Aleksandr Gruzman and Aleksandr Gruzman
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Schorr Law, Zachary D. Schorr, Carina Woo, and Jayant
Tripathy for Defendants and Respondents.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Plaintiff and appellant Garry Itkin appeals the trial court’s
order sustaining the demurrer to his first amended complaint
without leave to amend. Itkin filed suit against defendants and
respondents 21326 Ventura, LLC (Ventura) and its managing
member, Jon Greenfield (together, respondents), alleging causes
of action for breach of contract, specific performance, and
declaratory relief. He alleged that he sent an e-mail to
Greenfield offering to purchase a property in which Ventura had
a majority interest and Greenfield’s response, which agreed to
the offer pending an attorney’s review and proposed two
additional terms, constituted acceptance of that offer. Itkin
conceded that Greenfield did not sign a later-dated letter of
intent (LOI) concerning the sale of the property. We find no error
and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In June 2022, Itkin filed his original complaint against
Greenfield, Robert Greenfield, Ventura, and Summitridge Realty,
LLC (Summitridge) for breach of written contract, specific
performance, and declaratory and injunctive relief.1 Itkin alleged
that Greenfield was Ventura’s managing member and that
Ventura owned 77.5 percent of the subject property, a commercial
property located in Los Angeles. Robert, Greenfield’s brother,
was the managing member of Summitridge, which owned
22.5 percent of the subject property.
The complaint alleged that the parties had a binding
contract as of February 8, 2022, based on the terms reflected in a
subsequent LOI. The complaint alleged the parties entered into
1 Because Greenfield and Robert Greenfield share the same
last name, we refer to Robert Greenfield as Robert. Robert and
Summitridge are not parties to this appeal.
2
the LOI on March 21, 2022, when Itkin signed the document.
Robert signed the LOI on behalf of Summitridge on April 30,
2022. Although Greenfield “ha[d] not physically signed the LOI,”
the complaint alleged that he “approved it and . . . bound himself
and Ventura LLC to its terms . . . .”
The essential terms of the LOI were: 1) Itkin would
purchase the subject property for $5.3 million, with 77.5 percent
payable to Ventura and 22.5 percent payable to Summitridge;
2) Itkin would place a non-refundable deposit of $250,000 into a
mutually acceptable escrow account within three business days of
opening, with the cost of escrow to be split evenly between Itkin
and the defendants; 3) defendants would assign Itkin all of their
rights, title, and interest in all leases currently in place with
respect to the subject property; 4) the transaction required Itkin’s
approval of a title report and appraisal but was not contingent
upon him obtaining financing; 5) Itkin would continue to occupy
the property while it was in escrow pursuant to the terms of a
sublease dated November 25, 2019, and would continue to pay
rent under the terms of a sublease dated January 23, 2012, until
close of escrow; 6) no agent or broker commissions would be
generated; 7) a purchase agreement would be prepared
containing the foregoing terms and conditions and “all other
usual representations, agreements, indemnifications, warranties,
and other provisions commonly found in such agreements”; and
8) the parties were to act in good faith to make their best efforts
to negotiate and execute a purchase agreement based on the LOI.
According to the complaint, on February 8, 2022,
Greenfield sent an e-mail to Itkin stating: “ ‘I agree with the offer
pending our attorney’s review of the offer with the following—any
side deals with any participant be disclosed—buyer pays for
3
appraisal—Jon Greenfield.’ ” The complaint alleged that “the
offer” referred to the later-dated LOI. Itkin replied: “ ‘Dear Jon: I
agree. Please instruct your attorney. I am ready to move
forward.’ ” Greenfield replied: “ ‘It appears that you and Robert
are working together. Please have your attorney draft the
purchase documents and I will have an attorney for the trust
review them.’ ”
Although the causes of action in the complaint were alleged
against all defendants, the complaint asserted Robert, acting on
Summitridge’s behalf, was “ready, willing and able to
consummate the transaction and to sell the Property to Plaintiff
on the terms set forth in the LOI,” but Ventura breached its
obligations by refusing to open escrow on the terms set forth in
the LOI. It further alleged that Itkin “performed all of his
obligations and covenants under the LOI except for those
obligations and covenants for which performance was excused.”
Respondents demurred to the complaint in October 2022.
They argued the breach of contract cause of action failed because:
1) neither Greenfield nor Ventura signed the alleged contract for
sale of land; 2) there was no enforceable contract for the sale of
land as Greenfield’s e-mail stated that acceptance was “pending
our attorney[’]s review”; 3) the complaint alleged a binding
written contract as of February 8, 2022, but failed to attach the
contract or plead its legal effect, and instead relied on an
unsigned LOI dated March 21, 2022; 4) the alleged breach by
respondents was not an identified obligation of the LOI; and
5) Itkin’s allegations of performance or excuse were insufficient.
They further contended Itkin’s other causes of action failed
because his breach of contract cause of action was deficient, and
4
that all causes of action against Greenfield failed because he was
not the owner of the property and could not convey it.
The trial court sustained the demurrer with leave to
amend. The court agreed that the statute of frauds barred the
alleged agreement because the e-mails sent in February 2022 did
not indicate acceptance of the LOI dated March 2022, and also
did not establish acceptance of any contractual term because any
acceptance was conditional or qualified. The court further
concluded the complaint did not properly allege any claims
against Greenfield individually. Agents authorized to act on
behalf of a corporation are generally not parties to the contract in
their personal capacity and Itkin identified no relevant exception.
The court also sustained the demurrer on the derivative causes of
action. The court granted Itkin leave to amend within 30 days.
In March 2023, Itkin filed a first amended complaint (FAC)
asserting the same causes of action. The FAC added the
allegation that Greenfield “warranted that he was authorized to
act on behalf of [Ventura], as its managing member, and to bind
it to the terms of the Contract,” and would be liable to Itkin if,
“notwithstanding that representation, [Greenfield] refuses to
cause [Ventura] to honor its obligations under the terms of the
Contract.” The FAC additionally alleged that on February 7,
2022, Itkin, acting on behalf of himself and his son, sent an e-
mail to Greenfield and Robert offering to purchase the subject
property. The e-mail set forth the following terms: 1) a purchase
price of $5.1 million, plus $250,000 to compensate the sellers for
shortcomings in rental payments under the lease agreement
dated January 23, 2012; 2) sellers would assign to buyer all
rights under the January 2012 lease agreement “to try and
recoup advances buyer previously made to Auto Gallery”; 3) close
5
of escrow would occur within 90 days of acceptance of the offer
with costs to be evenly divided between buyer and sellers;
4) buyer would deposit a non-refundable deposit of $250,000 into
an escrow account within three working days of the escrow
account being opened; 5) the offer would be contingent upon a
satisfactory title report and appraisal; 6) no agents or brokers
would be involved; 7) buyer would continue occupying the
property while in escrow pursuant to a sublease dated November
25, 2019, and would pay monthly rent to sellers under the terms
of the January 2012 lease agreement; and 8) the transaction was
to be written up in a mutually acceptable purchase and sale
agreement with all reasonable and customary terms. Itkin asked
Greenfield and Robert to “let [him] know if [they were] happy
with above terms,” and stated that he had financing in place and
was ready to proceed.
The FAC, like the original complaint, alleged that
Greenfield responded via e-mail that he agreed, pending his
attorney’s review. He also proposed the two additional terms
described above. The FAC further alleged the parties entered
into the LOI on March 21, 2022, and that the terms of the LOI
were “essentially the same terms agreed to by [Greenfield] and
Ventura” in his prior e-mail. The LOI attached to the FAC was
not signed on behalf of Ventura. The FAC further alleged that
Greenfield sent a second e-mail on February 8, 2022, in which he
asked Itkin to have his attorney prepare purchase documents,
which respondents’ attorney would review. The FAC omitted the
allegation included in the original complaint concerning an
intervening e-mail from Itkin.
Respondents demurred to the FAC, arguing that it failed to
establish the existence of a contract signed by Ventura for the
6
purchase of the subject property. They further asserted the court
had already concluded that the e-mail from Greenfield did not
establish acceptance of any contractual term and the FAC failed
to remedy that shortcoming. Moreover, Itkin had again failed to
allege facts demonstrating that he performed his obligations
under the contract. Respondents pointed out that Itkin had not
amended the derivative causes of action. Finally, they argued
that all causes of action against Greenfield still failed because the
FAC did not identify any basis for him to be held liable in his
individual capacity.
The trial court sustained the demurrer to the FAC without
leave to amend and entered judgment in favor of Greenfield and
Ventura.
Itkin timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
We independently review a trial court’s order sustaining a
demurrer to determine whether the operative complaint alleges
sufficient facts to state a cause of action under any legal theory.
(Centinela Freeman Emergency Medical Associates v. Health Net
of California, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 994, 1010; Lee v. Hanley
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1230.) We accept as true all material
facts properly pleaded in the operative complaint, but not
contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Winn v.
Pioneer Medical Group, Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 148, 152; Evans v.
City of Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 6.) On appeal, we review a
trial court’s ruling, not its rationale. (Mendoza v. Town of Ross
(2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 625, 631.)
“When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, ‘we
decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect
7
can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has
abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no
abuse of discretion and we affirm.’ [Citation.] Plaintiff has the
burden to show a reasonable possibility the complaint can be
amended to state a cause of action.” (Hamilton v. Greenwich
Investors XXVI, LLC (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1602, 1609; accord,
State Dept. of State Hospitals v. Superior Court (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 1069, 1076.) A trial court does not abuse its
discretion by denying leave to amend if the proposed amendment
is not “apparent or consistent” with the plaintiff’s original theory
of the case. (Dey v. Continental Central Credit (2008) 170
Cal.App.4th 721, 731.)
II. The FAC Failed to Allege Facts to Support the
Causes of Action Alleged Against Greenfield in His
Individual Capacity
The FAC alleges that Greenfield is a managing member of
Ventura and Ventura, not Greenfield, owns an interest in the
subject property. Respondents contend that Greenfield is not a
proper party to the action because he could not enter into a
contract for sale of the subject property in his individual capacity
and was not a party to the contract merely because he had
authority to act as an agent on behalf of Ventura. We agree that
the allegations of the FAC are insufficient to subject Greenfield to
personal liability.
The Corporations Code provides that, in a manager-
managed limited liability corporation, “[e]very manager is an
agent of the limited liability company for the purpose of its
business or affairs, and the act of any manager, including, but
not limited to, the execution in the name of the limited liability
company of any instrument for apparently carrying on in the
8
usual way the business or affairs of the limited liability company
of which the person is a manager, binds the limited liability
company, unless the manager so acting has, in fact, no authority
to act for the limited liability company in the particular matter
and the person with whom the manager is dealing has actual
knowledge of the fact that the manager has no such authority.”
(Corp. Code, § 17703.01, subd. (b)(2).) It further provides that the
“debts, obligations, or other liabilities of a limited liability
company, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise,” are
“solely the debts, obligations, or other liabilities of the limited
liability company to which the debts, obligations, or other
liabilities relate.” (Id., § 17703.04, subd. (a)(1).) They “do not
become the debts, obligations, or other liabilities of a member or
manager solely by reason of the member acting as a member or
manager acting as a manager for the limited liability company.”
(Id., subd. (a)(2).)
Citing Civil Code section 2343, Itkin argued in opposition
to the demurrer to the original complaint that Greenfield was
properly named as a defendant because an agent is responsible as
a principal for acts in the course of his agency when: 1) “with his
consent, credit is given to him personally in a transaction”; 2) “he
enters into a written contract in the name of his principal,
without believing, in good faith, that he has authority to do so”;
or 3) “his acts are wrongful in their nature.”2 (§ 2343.) In
sustaining the demurrer to the original complaint, the trial court
concluded that Itkin failed to “identify in the Complaint or in
opposition which of the circumstances named in the statute—
credit extended to agent personally, agent enters transaction
2 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Civil Code.
9
without a good faith belief in authority to act, or when agent acts
wrongfully—applies to this case.”
The FAC does not allege that Greenfield lacked a good faith
belief in his authority to act on behalf of Ventura, nor does it
allege any of the other statutory exceptions that permit an agent
to be subject to liability as a principal. Indeed, on appeal, Itkin
contends the FAC alleges that Greenfield “warranted that he was
authorized to act as a managing member on behalf of [Ventura].”
The trial court therefore properly sustained the demurrer to the
FAC as to Greenfield.
III. The Trial Court Correctly Sustained the Demurrer to
the Breach of Contract Cause of Action
A. The FAC fails to allege that Greenfield
unconditionally accepted the offer on behalf of
Ventura
“[T]he elements of a cause of action for breach of contract
are (1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or
excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the
resulting damages to the plaintiff.” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v.
Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.) Under the statute of
frauds, a contract for the sale of real property is “invalid, unless
[it], or some note or memorandum thereof, [is] in writing and
subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party’s agent.”
(§ 1624, subd. (a).) As Itkin conceded in the original complaint,
Greenfield did not sign the LOI on behalf of Ventura. However,
the FAC alleges that Greenfield agreed to the terms of the
February 7, 2022 offer in his February 8, 2022 e-mail.
Essential to the existence of a contract is the consent of the
parties. (§ 1550.) “An acceptance must be absolute and
unqualified, or must include in itself an acceptance of that
10
character which the proposer can separate from the rest, and
which will conclude the person accepting. A qualified acceptance
is a new proposal.” (§ 1585.) “To be effective an acceptance must
be unequivocal and positive and must comply with the terms of
the offer. [Citation.] It must be approved in the terms in which
it is made. The addition of any condition or limitation is
tantamount to a rejection of the original offer and the making of a
counteroffer.” (Ajax Holding Co. v. Heinsbergen (1944) 64
Cal.App.2d 665, 669; see Panagotacos v. Bank of America (1998)
60 Cal.App.4th 851, 855 [where appellants signed copy of real
estate purchase offer but attached letter containing an additional
term, they did not accept offer and the proposal in the letter
constituted a counteroffer].)
“ ‘The interpretation of a written instrument, even though
it involves what might properly be called questions of fact
[citation], is essentially a judicial function to be exercised
according to the generally accepted canons of interpretation so
that the purposes of the instrument may be given effect.
[Citations.] . . . It is therefore solely a judicial function to
interpret a written instrument unless the interpretation turns
upon the credibility of extrinsic evidence.’ [Citation.]” (Oceanside
84, Ltd. v. Fidelity Federal Bank (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1441,
1451.) Because Itkin does not allege any extrinsic facts that
would support that Greenfield’s words have a special meaning,
the interpretation of their meaning is properly a judicial function.
“The words of a written instrument are generally to be
understood in their ordinary and popular sense. [Citation.] The
objective intent as evidenced by the words of the instrument, not
the parties’ subjective intent, governs our interpretation.
[Citation.] ‘[T]he outward manifestation or expression of assent
11
is controlling [citation], and . . . what the language of an
[instrument] means is “a matter of interpretation for the courts
and not controlled in any sense by what either of the parties
intended or thought its meaning to be. . . .” [Citation.]’
[Citation.]” (Beck v. American Health Group Internat., Inc. (1989)
211 Cal.App.3d 1555, 1562 (Beck), superseded by statute on other
grounds as stated in Epic Medical Management v. Paquette
(2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 504, 516.)
In his initial e-mail on February 8, 2022, Greenfield stated
that he agreed to the proposed terms pending an attorney’s
review of the same. Oxford English Dictionary defines “pending”
as “[w]hile awaiting; until the occurrence or appearance of; until”
when used as a preposition and “[r]emaining undecided;
continuing; awaiting decision or settlement” when used as an
adjective.3 In his second e-mail, Greenfield asked that Itkin
prepare purchase documents, which he would have an attorney
review. Taken in their ordinary sense, the words of Greenfield’s
e-mails manifest an intent that no binding contract could come
into being until Greenfield’s counsel had reviewed the terms of
the proposal or the purchase agreement Greenfield asked Itkin to
prepare. Itkin contends that Greenfield’s statements do not
suggest that he required his attorney’s approval. Even so,
Greenfield declined to provide unconditional acceptance of the
proposed terms until he received input from an attorney.
Moreover, in addition to stating that he wished to obtain an
attorney’s review of the offer, Greenfield proposed two additional
3 Oxford English Dict. Online (2025)
<https://www.oed.com/dictionary/pending_prep?tab=meaning_an
d_use#31051531> [as of Feb. 4, 2025], archived at
<https://perma.cc/C9QH-YT6A>.
12
terms. The FAC does not allege that this counteroffer was
accepted. The additional terms proposed by Greenfield are not
reflected in the LOI.
Itkin cites Guzman v. Visalia Community Bank (1999) 71
Cal.App.4th 1370, for the propositions that “it is not necessarily
true that any communication other than an unequivocal
acceptance is a rejection,” and “an acceptance is not invalidated
by the fact that it is ‘grumbling,’ or that the offeree makes some
simultaneous ‘request.’ ” (Id. at p. 1376.) Yet, Guzman further
recognized that “it must appear that the ‘grumble’ does not go so
far as to make it doubtful that the expression is really one of
assent” and that “the ‘request’ must not add additional or
different terms from those offered.” (Ibid.) Here, Greenfield
conditioned his acceptance on his attorney’s review of the offer,
thus creating doubt as to whether his response was one of assent,
and he added additional or different terms to those offered.
Itkin further contends that Greenfield’s agreement pending
an attorney’s review of the terms was “ ‘no more than an intent to
further reduce the informal writing to a more formal one’ . . . . ”
(Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299,
307 (Harris).) Under such circumstances, a prior informal
contract is not negated by the failure to execute a more formal
writing. (Ibid.) However, the Harris court acknowledged that
“where the writing shows it was not intended to be binding until
a formal written contract is executed, there is no contract.”
(Ibid.)
In Harris, “[t]he [l]etter, drafted by respondents’ own
counsel and signed by respondents . . . , purport[ed] to embody
the ‘essential terms’ of the agreement” and was “signed under a
signature block noting ‘[a]ccepted and agreed.’ ” (Harris, supra,
13
74 Cal.App.4th at p. 308.) The Harris court concluded that this
was sufficient to survive a demurrer. (Ibid.) It distinguished the
circumstances before it from those in a prior decision, Beck,
supra, 211 Cal.App.3d 1555. In Beck, the Court of Appeal
affirmed the trial court’s order sustaining a demurrer to a breach
of written contract claim, where “the writing at issue stated, ‘ “It
is a pleasure to draft the outline of our future agreement,” ’ ” and
“ ‘ “When we have a draft, we will discuss it and hopefully shall
have a completed contract and operating unit in the very near
future.” ’ [Citation.]” (Harris, at pp. 307–308, quoting Beck, at
pp. 1562–1563.) The Beck court concluded that “the terms of the
writing demonstrated a manifest ‘intention of the parties that no
binding contract would come into being until the terms of the
letter were embodied in a formal contract to be drafted by
corporate counsel.’ [Citation.]” (Harris, at p. 308, quoting Beck,
at p. 1563.) The circumstances alleged here, in which Greenfield
expressly requested that a formal document be drafted by Itkin’s
attorney, for review by respondents’ attorney, are therefore more
comparable to Beck than to Harris.
Citing Harris, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at page 308, Itkin
further contends that the FAC “ascrib[es] meaning to [the]
otherwise ambiguous language” of Greenfield’s e-mail and thus
states a cause of action. We disagree. The allegation in the FAC
concerning the meaning of Greenfield’s e-mail advances legal
arguments based on the plain language of Greenfield’s e-mail. It
does not contend that the language was ambiguous. And unlike
in Harris, Itkin does not allege “facts evidencing an oral
agreement,” or that the parties “engaged in several
14
communications, ‘both written and telephonic’ which ‘culminated
in a[n] . . . agreement.’ ” (Ibid.)4
The circumstances alleged here are also distinguishable
from Moreland Development Co. v. Gladstone Holmes, Inc. (1982)
135 Cal.App.3d 973, in which the parties signed an agreement
containing a provision that conditioned the buyer’s obligations to
purchase and close escrow upon the approval of the transaction
by the buyer’s board of directors. (Id. at pp. 975–976.) The
respondent, who was the seller, argued this provision rendered
the contract illusory. (Id. at p. 977.) The Court of Appeal
observed that “ ‘the condition of board approval does not give
respondent corporation the absolute right to escape its
obligations under the agreement since there is an implied
obligation on the part of the seller’s officers to carry out the
objectives of the contract in good faith by submitting the proposal
to the board.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Jacobs v. Freeman (1980) 104
Cal.App.3d 177, 190 (Jacobs).) The court noted the “pertinent”
rule that “ ‘ “[i]n every contract there is an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing that neither party will do anything
which injures the right of the other to receive the benefits of the
agreement. [Citations.]” ’ ” (Moreland, at p. 978.) Here,
4 Itkin cites Patel v. Liebermensch (2008) 45 Cal.4th 344,
345, multiple times in his opening brief for the proposition that
“the parties reached an enforceable sale of real property
agreement which was enforced by specific performance, despite
an absence of agreement on duration of the escrow.” The court in
Patel focused its analysis on whether a contract was enforceable
in the absence of terms specifying the time and manner of
payment. (Id. at p. 349.) The parties had all signed the relevant
agreements and amendments. (Id. at p. 347.) Thus, Patel is not
instructive on the issue of acceptance.
15
Greenfield did not condition Ventura’s performance of its
obligations under the alleged agreement on an attorney’s
approval. Rather, the fact of acceptance itself, and thus the
existence of an enforceable contract, was conditioned on
Greenfield obtaining an attorney’s opinion.5 A party is not
subject to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
unless they are party to a contract. (Racine & Laramie, Ltd. v.
Department of Parks & Recreation (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1026,
1031.)
Karahadian v. Lockett (1917) 33 Cal.App. 411
(Karahadian), similarly fails to support the conclusion that the
FAC alleges that Greenfield’s response constituted acceptance of
the February 7 offer. In Karahadian, the plaintiff had an
agreement with the defendant which authorized him to sell real
property on behalf of the defendant and receive any deposit that
might be paid on the purchase price. (Id. at p. 412.) The
plaintiff, acting on behalf of the defendant, entered into a
contract to sell real property containing terms not authorized by
the defendant. (Ibid.) However, the defendant ratified the
contract in writing and accepted money the purchaser had paid to
the plaintiff. (Ibid.) “In addition to containing all of the
essentials of a valid and enforceable contract of purchase and
sale, the contract in question provided that ‘upon a favorable
report of the attorneys’ for the purchaser concerning the title to
the property, the parties thereto would enter into an agreement
5 The court in Jacobs, supra, 104 Cal.App.3d 177,
distinguished cases in which “the evidence was clear that the
parties intended the contract to take effect only when the
necessary approval was obtained” from a case in which
performance was contingent on board approval. (Id. at p. 189.)
16
for the purchase of the property ‘upon the terms and conditions
therein mentioned.’ ” (Ibid.) The attorney for the purchaser
rejected the title based on non-existent or readily curable defects
and the purchaser refused to perform the contract. (Ibid.) Under
the plaintiff’s agreement with the defendant, the plaintiff was
entitled to receive 5 percent of the purchase price in the event of
a sale. (Ibid.) The trial court granted judgment in the plaintiff’s
favor on the ground that he “had procured a purchaser for
defendant’s property who had entered into a valid and
enforceable contract binding him to purchase.” (Id. at p. 413.)
The Court of Appeal affirmed. (Karahadian, supra, 33
Cal.App. at p. 413.) It concluded that the clause concerning the
necessity of a favorable title report from the purchaser’s
attorneys “did not have the effect of making the contract here
involved merely an agreement for an option to purchase, rather
than a completed contract of purchase and sale.” (Ibid.) “The
[purchaser’s] payment of the deposit of two hundred dollars on
account of the purchase price was an acceptance of the terms and
conditions of the contract . . . .” (Ibid.) The court observed that
the defendant could have compelled the purchaser to perform the
contract and the plaintiff was therefore entitled to receive his
commission. (Ibid.) Here, in contrast, Itkin alleges no
comparable acts by Greenfield indicating acceptance of the terms
and conditions of the proposed contract.
B. The FAC does not allege the existence of an oral
contract or implied in fact contract
Itkin additionally contends that “[a]t a minimum the
parties have an oral contract or an implied in fact contract.”
Neither argument is persuasive.
17
The FAC does not allege the existence of any conversations
between Itkin and Greenfield that would support the existence of
an oral contract. Moreover, an oral agreement for the sale of real
property is invalid under the statute of frauds. (§ 1624,
subd. (a)(3).) The FAC does not allege facts that would support
that Ventura is estopped from relying on the statute of frauds.
(See Jones v. Wachovia Bank (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 935, 944
[“To estop a defendant from asserting the statute of frauds, a
plaintiff must show unconscionable injury or unjust enrichment if
the promise is not enforced.”].)
“An implied contract is one, the existence and terms of
which are manifested by conduct.” (§ 1621.) “The true implied
contract, then, consists of obligations arising from a mutual
agreement and intent to promise where the agreement and
promise have not been expressed in words.” (Silva v. Providence
Hospital of Oakland (1939) 14 Cal.2d 762, 773; accord, Retired
Employees Assn. of Orange County, Inc. v. County of Orange
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 1171, 1178.) Although the existence of an
implied contract is usually a question of fact (Unilab Corp. v.
Angeles-IPA (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 622, 636), the FAC did not
allege the existence of an implied contract based on the parties’
conduct and Itkin did not advance any argument on this point
below. (See Pacific Bay Recovery, Inc. v. California Physicians’
Services, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 200, 216 [affirming judgment
on appeal from order sustaining demurrer where the complaint’s
allegations did “not exhibit any mutual intent as to the essential
terms of the implied contract”].) The FAC does not allege any
conduct by Greenfield or Ventura beyond the express written
language of Greenfield’s February 8 e-mails. Thus, to the extent
18
this argument was not forfeited by Itkin’s failure to raise it before
the trial court, it nevertheless fails.6
C. The FAC does not allege the existence of a
contract to negotiate a future agreement
Alternatively, Itkin contends that the trial court erred in
sustaining the demurrer to the FAC because it alleged a contract
to negotiate an agreement. We disagree.
“ ‘The law does not provide a remedy for breach of an
agreement to agree in the future, and the court may not
speculate upon what the parties will agree.’ ” (Alaimo v. Tsunoda
(1963) 215 Cal.App.2d 94, 99; see also Vons Companies, Inc. v.
United States Fire Ins. Co. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 52, 59 [courts
“do not have the power to create for the parties a contract that
they did not make and cannot insert language that one party now
wishes were there”].)
However, the court in Copeland v. Baskin Robbins U.S.A.
(2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1251 (Copeland), recognized that a breach
of contract cause of action may lie for breach of a contract to
negotiate an agreement “in an appropriate case.” (Id. at p. 1256.)
It explained that “[a] contract to negotiate the terms of an
agreement is not, in form or substance, an ‘agreement to agree.’
If, despite their good faith efforts, the parties fail to reach
ultimate agreement on the terms in issue the contract to
negotiate is deemed performed and the parties are discharged
6 In support of these arguments, Itkin cites Harris, supra, 74
Cal.App.4th at page 1564, a page that does not exist in that
opinion. In any event, in Harris, unlike here, the complaint
alleged “facts evidencing an oral agreement.” (Id. at p. 308.) To
the extent Itkin intended to cite Beck, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at
page 1564, it does not support his claim that he pleaded the
existence of an oral or implied contract.
19
from their obligations. Failure to agree is not, itself, a breach of
the contract to negotiate. A party will be liable only if a failure to
reach ultimate agreement resulted from a breach of that party’s
obligation to negotiate or to negotiate in good faith. For these
reasons, criticisms of an ‘agreement to agree’ as ‘absurd’ and a
‘contradiction in terms’ do not apply to a contract to negotiate an
agreement.” (Id. at p. 1257, fns. omitted.)
In Copeland, the plaintiff sought to purchase the
defendant’s ice cream manufacturing plant and “made clear from
the outset his agreement to purchase the plant was contingent on
[defendant’s] agreeing to purchase the ice cream he
manufactured there,” i.e., a “co-packing agreement.” (Copeland,
supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1253, 1254.) The parties signed a
contract that provided they would negotiate a “ ‘separate co-
packing agreement.’ ” (Id. at p. 1254.) However, they could not
agree on outstanding issues with respect to that agreement.
(Ibid.) The Court of Appeal held that a plaintiff claiming a
breach of a contract to negotiate can recover for the “injury the
plaintiff suffered in relying on the defendant to negotiate in good
faith . . . encompass[ing] the plaintiff’s out-of-pocket costs in
conducting the negotiations,” but “cannot recover for lost
expectations (profits) because there is no way of knowing what
the ultimate terms of the agreement would have been or even if
there would have been an ultimate agreement.” (Id. at pp. 1262–
1263, fns. omitted.)
Although Itkin cites 12 paragraphs of the FAC he contends
support a cause of action based on a contract to negotiate an
agreement, he does so without discussion of the allegations set
forth therein. These allegations do not support his claim.
Rather, the FAC alleges that a binding contract for the purchase
20
of the subject property existed as of February 8, 2022, and
Ventura breached that contract “by refusing to open escrow on
the terms [as] set forth in the Contract in order to consummate
the sale of the Property to Plaintiff.” It does not allege that the
parties contracted to negotiate an agreement or that Ventura
breached that contract by failing to negotiate in good faith.
Further, Itkin’s cause of action for specific performance seeks an
order that the defendants “transfer[ ] the property to [Itkin]
under the terms set forth” in the parties’ contract, not an order
that the parties negotiate in good faith to reach an agreement for
the sale of the subject property.
We therefore reject Itkin’s claim that the FAC alleged a
contract to negotiate a future agreement.
IV. The Trial Court Correctly Sustained Respondents’
Demurrer to the Specific Performance and
Declaratory Relief Causes of Action
Itkin advances no arguments concerning his specific
performance and declaratory relief causes of action on appeal and
thus forfeits any contention that the trial court erred in
sustaining the demurrer as to these causes of action. “On appeal,
we presume that a judgment or order of the trial court is correct,
‘ “[a]ll intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it
on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be
affirmatively shown.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Giordano (2007) 42
Cal.4th 644, 666.)
Even if the argument were not forfeited, we would conclude
the trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrer as to both
causes of action. A claim for specific performance necessarily
fails in the absence of an enforceable contract. (Darbun
Enterprises, Inc. v. San Fernando Community Hospital (2015)
21
239 Cal.App.4th 399, 409 [“To obtain specific performance, a
plaintiff must make several showings, in addition to proving the
elements of a standard breach of contract. [Fn. omitted.]”];
Dunner v. Hoover (1941) 43 Cal.App.2d 753, 757 [“In order to
entitle a litigant to the specific performance of a contract, he
must first allege an enforceable contract and his passing of an
adequate consideration.”].)
Further, “ ‘[d]eclaratory relief operates prospectively,
serving to set controversies at rest. If there is a controversy
which calls for a declaration of rights, it is no objection that past
wrongs are also to be redressed; but there is no basis for
declaratory relief where only past wrongs are involved. Hence,
where there is an accrued cause of action for an actual breach of
contract or other wrongful act, declaratory relief may be denied.
[Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Baldwin v. Marina City Properties, Inc.
(1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 393, 407.) In Baldwin, a panel of this
Division held the trial court correctly sustained a demurrer to a
declaratory relief cause of action that was based on the conduct
alleged in connection with the complaint’s other causes of action,
there was no allegation of a continuing relationship between the
parties, and there were “no claims by plaintiffs that an actual
controversy exists between plaintiffs and [the defendant]
concerning any future rights.” (Id. at p. 408.)
Similarly, here, Itkin’s declaratory relief cause of action
rests on the same conduct alleged with respect to his breach of
contract cause of action. Further, it alleges “[a]n actual
controversy exists between Plaintiff and Defendants concerning
the Contract,” but does not allege the existence of any ongoing
relationship between the parties or that the controversy concerns
any future rights.
22
The trial court therefore properly sustained the demurrer
as to the specific performance and declaratory relief causes of
action.
V. Itkin Fails to Establish that the Trial Court Abused
Its Discretion in Sustaining the Demurrer to the FAC
Without Leave to Amend
To satisfy the burden of proving there is a reasonable
possibility of amendment, “a plaintiff ‘must show in what manner
he can amend his complaint and how that amendment will
change the legal effect of his pleading.’ [Citation.] The assertion
of an abstract right to amend does not satisfy this burden.
[Citation.] The plaintiff must clearly and specifically set forth
the ‘applicable substantive law’ [citation] and the legal basis for
amendment, i.e., the elements of the cause of action and
authority for it. Further, the plaintiff must set forth factual
allegations that sufficiently state all required elements of that
cause of action.” (Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service
(2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.)
The only argument Itkin appears to make about the
possibility of amendment, located under the heading claiming the
existence of a contract to negotiate an agreement, is that Itkin
could claim promissory estoppel and “allege reliance on
[Greenfield]’s promise based on securing loan financing for this
transaction on March 24, 2022.” However, adding an allegation
concerning reliance fails to remedy the fact that the February 8 e-
mail does not contain any promise to negotiate a contract, nor
does it address the defects in Itkin’s breach of contract cause of
action. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining
the demurrer without leave to amend.
23
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
HANASONO, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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