Frye v. Fore the Ladies CA4/1

CourtListener 10324868CalctappJan 31, 2025

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Filed 1/31/25 Frye v. Fore the Ladies CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

STEVE FRYE et al., D083759

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2023-
00005945-CU-CR-NC)
FORE THE LADIES, INC. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Cynthia A. Freeland, Judge. Affirmed.

Allen L. Lanstra, Mayra T. Aguilera, Michelle E. Portillo, and
Sophia M. Difilippo for Defendants and Appellants.
Law Offices of Daniel J. Williams and Daniel J. Williams for Plaintiffs
and Respondents.
Steve Frye and Alex Maystrenko (together, Respondents) sued Fore the

Ladies, Inc. (FTL) and its founder, Abby Liebenthal (together, Appellants),1

1 Respondents also sued Goat Hill Park, LLC and 21 other individuals
and vendors. These parties did not join the motion to strike.
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated alleging causes of
action under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (the Unruh Act) (Civil Code § 51)
and Civil Code section 51.5. Specifically, Respondents alleged Appellants
discriminated against them as men when they “created, organized,
advertised, marketed, promoted, employed, hosted, held, incited, and/or aided
in women-only golf events at Goat Hill Park in Oceanside, California, on or
about June 13, 2021.”
In response, Appellants filed a special motion to strike under Code of

Civil Procedure2 section 425.163 arguing that the conduct alleged in the
complaint arose from protected activity. Specifically, they alleged the
conduct involved “public statements and activity in furtherance of free speech
rights connected to issues of public interest—namely, addressing the
inequality in golf that denies women opportunities in the workplace, in
addition to needed access to athletics generally.” The trial court denied the
motion, and Appellants appealed.
Appellants argue the court erred in finding that their anti-SLAPP
motion failed to identify the specific causes of action they were challenging
and in concluding Respondents’ causes of action did not arise out of protected
activity. We agree that Appellants sufficiently identified the causes of action

2 Statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless
otherwise indicated.
3 Section 425.16 is commonly referred to as the anti-SLAPP statute
because a special motion thereunder seeks to strike a “ ‘[s]trategic lawsuit
against public participation,’ ” or SLAPP. (Wilson v. Cable News
Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 882, fn. 2 (Wilson).) The Legislature
authorized anti-SLAPP motions “[t]o combat lawsuits designed to chill the
exercise of free speech and petition rights.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of
California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1060 (Park).)

2
they were challenging. However, because we do not otherwise find fault with
the court’s ultimate determination, we affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.
The Complaint
As previously noted, Respondents’ primary allegation is that
Appellants “created, organized, advertised, marketed, promoted, employed,
hosted, held, incited, and/or aided in women-only golf events at the golf
course commonly known as Goat Hill Park in Oceanside, California, on or
about June 13, 2021.” They allege Appellants advertised the women-only golf

events on social media pages4 and on www.eventbrite.com (Eventbrite).
The Eventbrite advertisement stated:
“We’re heading to Goat Hill Park to introduce you to the
game of golf! Join us for an afternoon of drinks, instruction
& more!

“About this event

“Fore the Ladies is heading to the San Diego area! If you’ve
never picked up a golf club or have minimal experience
with the game, but want to give it a try ― this event is for
you! We know there will be something for everyone at this
$40 event, hosted at the legendary Goat Hill Park.

“We’ll warm up with some bevs and light introductory
instruction from the pros. They’ll show you the basics of
the game so you can decide if you’d like to continue your
journey with golf!

4 The record does not contain evidence of what was posted on social
media sites, which sites were used, or who had access to these posts.
Respondents’ declarations also do not indicate that they viewed any social
media pages or posts.

3
“Don’t have golf clubs? No problem, we’ll have sets on hand
for you to try.

“For more info on Fore the Ladies, visit our website [here].

“Who is this event for?

“• Women who have never played golf or have minimal
experience with the game

“• Women who don’t have access to a country club or
regular spot to try the game

“• Women who love golf and want to hang with
others/find a new playing partner!

“• Women who want to give golf a try with an open mind
in a social atmosphere

“Thank you to our Fore the Ladies Clinic supporters!

Frye and Maystrenko both saw Appellants’ advertisement and claim
they “desired and intended to participate in the event.” On or about
February 11, 2021, Frye contacted Appellants via e-mail to ask if the event
was just for women, or if he could join in too. Appellants responded by
stating: “Thanks for reaching out and your interest in attending our FTL
event! At this time, we are going to leave it only open to women. If we reach
the week of and there are spots remaining, we will open it up.” Respondents
allege that, “[a]s such, [Appellants] . . . excluded [Respondents] from
participating in the women-only golf event that took place on June 13, 2021.”
On or about June 9, 2021, Frye claims he contacted Defendant Goat
Hill Park, LLC, and Defendant Eli Ivey, via e-mail to ask if the June 13, 2021
event was just for women, or if he could participate. Respondents allege
these defendants responded that “[u]nfortunately the event is only fore the
ladies.” There is no evidence FTL or Liebenthal were included in this e-mail
exchange.
4
Based on this conduct, Respondents allege Appellants excluded them
“from receiving the same full and equal accommodations, advantages,
facilities, privileges, or services that [Appellants] . . . provided only to women
at the women-only golf event that occurred on June 13, 2021” and
“discriminated against and denied [Respondents] on the basis of their sex,
gender, and/or gender identity.” They further assert Appellants’ “actions in
relation to their women-only golf events were intentional, arbitrary,
unreasonable, malicious, and/or invidious discrimination in violation of Civil
Code §§ 51 and 51.5.”
II.
The Anti-SLAPP Motion
In their anti-SLAPP motion, Appellants rely on Liebenthal’s
declaration to explain that FTL is an Ohio nonprofit corporation focused on
addressing longstanding gender inequality in golf. Although Liebenthal had
played since childhood, she found that the overwhelming majority of golfers
were male. Liebenthal said she had met more and more women who wanted
to learn how to play but faced obstacles, lack of opportunity, and
intimidation. She created FTL in 2019 “to advocate for the role of women in
golf, ‘introduc[e] more women’ to the game, and bring women together to
play, watch and participate in everything golf has to offer with the hope that
golf becomes ‘more accessible and approachable while removing the expected
barriers such as cost, intimidation and access.’ ”
FTL has a board of directors but no paid employees. It has a weekly
podcast and holds meetups and clinics. According to Liebenthal, the
organization’s work has been written about in notable publications.
Liebenthal explained that the Oceanside Event was an introduction to
golf for beginners. The event occupied just a portion of the Goat Hill driving

5
range for two hours, leaving the remainder of the range and all of the
eighteen-hole golf course open to the public. Participants paid $40 and were
provided a large bucket of golf balls. The vendor area was open to the public,
and male and female participants and non-participants visited the booths.
Appellants pointed out that neither Frye nor Maystrenko attended the
event, and Frye never followed up with Appellants in response to
Liebenthal’s e-mail to inquire whether spots remained.
In Appellants’ view, the complaint arises from protected activity
because the allegations concern statements made in a public forum—social
media sites and the Eventbrite website—in connection with an issue of public
interest or involve conduct in furtherance of the exercise of Appellants’ free
speech rights. They assert that golf inequality has been a matter of public
interest for decades and cite to several sources. Specifically, they attach:
(1) Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, which they
characterize as an anti-discrimination law focused on disparate treatment of
women that legislatively promotes equalizing the opportunities for women in
sports; (2) a report from the U.S. Department of Labor’s Federal Glass
Ceiling Commission, established in 1991 to focus on “eliminating artificial
barriers to the advancement of women” and “increasing the opportunities and
developmental experiences of women . . . to foster advancement . . . to
management and decisionmaking positions in business” (Civil Rights Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071); (3) information about San
Diego’s Commission on the Status of Women, which focuses on alleviating the
inequities women face in social and business pursuits; (4) A Miami
University and the University of Cincinnati study which dubbed the lack of
female access to golf the “Grass Ceiling” because golf and country clubs have
historically been female-exclusionary and created a platform for businessmen

6
to establish rapport and engage in friendly business interactions outside the

office;5 and (5) a study explaining that golf’s history has resulted in women
on a golf course appearing unusual and obvious. They also highlight the 2004
“Fair Play Act,” which states the Legislature’s intent that girls be accorded
athletics opportunities “equal, both in quality and scope, to those accorded to
boys.” (Gov. Code, § 53080, subd. (e).)
According to Liebenthal, everything FTL does is in furtherance of free-

speech activity directed to this issue of public interest (golf inequality).6
III.
The Order on the Anti-SLAPP Motion
Following a hearing, the court denied the motion. It found the motion
deficient because Appellants failed to sufficiently identify the specific causes
of action they were challenging. Even if the court construed the motion as
challenging both causes of action, it concluded Appellants had not met their
burden of demonstrating that the challenged causes of action arose from
protected activity. It determined that the “gravamen” of the complaint was
that Appellants allegedly discriminated against Respondents and the class by
precluding them from participating in women’s-only golf events. Appellants’
use of websites and social media to advertise did not form the basis of
Respondents’ claims, but rather were merely ancillary actions that
purportedly led to the liability-creating activity. Because the court found

5 They add that CEOs who golf also are less likely to include women on
their executive team.
6 Appellants also argued at length in their motion that Respondents
could not demonstrate a probability of success on the merits. Because the
court did not reach this issue and Appellants do not ask us to address it on
appeal, we will omit facts related to this portion of the motion.

7
Appellants had not met their burden, it did not address whether Respondents
could demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing on the challenged causes of
action.

DISCUSSION7
“[T]he anti-SLAPP statute is designed to protect defendants from
meritless lawsuits that might chill the exercise of their rights to speak and
petition on matters of public concern. [Citations.] To that end, the statute
authorizes a special motion to strike a claim ‘arising from any act of that
person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the
United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with
a public issue.’ ” (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 883–884.)
“Litigation of an anti-SLAPP motion involves a two-step process. First,
‘the moving defendant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged

7 We note at the outset that Respondents attempt to renew and
incorporate by reference the objections they made below to Appellants’
evidence. They also claim to incorporate by reference the memorandum of
points and authorities, declarations, notice of lodgment, and exhibits they
filed with the trial court in opposition to Appellants’ initial anti-SLAPP
motion. They offer no authority that permits such incorporation and nothing
in the California Rules of Court allows this practice. To the contrary,
California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) requires that appellate briefs
“support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority.”
Additionally, as our high court has made clear, “[i]t is well settled that the
Court of Appeal does not permit incorporation by reference of documents filed
in the trial court.” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th
260, 294, fn. 20; see also Guarino v. County of Siskiyou (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th
1170, 1179 [“An ‘appellant may not simply incorporate by reference
arguments made in papers filed in the trial court, rather than briefing them
on appeal’ ”].) The same is true for objections. Although objections may be
preserved for appeal if the lower court did not rule on them, the burden is on
the proponent to renew their objections on appeal by advancing relevant
argument. (White v. Smule, Inc. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 346, 353, fn. 2.)
Accordingly, we disregard these purported incorporations by reference.

8
allegations or claims “aris[e] from” protected activity in which the defendant
has engaged.’ [Citation.] Second, for each claim that does arise from
protected activity, the plaintiff must show the claim has ‘at least “minimal
merit.” ’ [Citation.] If the plaintiff cannot make this showing, the court will
strike the claim.” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995,
1009 (Bonni).) At the first step, we only “ ‘review[ ] the parties’ pleadings,
declarations and other supporting documents to determine what conduct is
actually being challenged, not to determine whether the conduct is
actionable.’ ” (People ex rel. Fire Ins. Exchange v. Anapol (2012)
211 Cal.App.4th 809, 822.) If the defendant fails to meet its burden at the
first step, we need not address the second step.
I.
Failure to Identify the Challenged Causes of Action
The trial court concluded as a threshold matter that the motion could
be denied on the grounds that Appellants failed to sufficiently identify the
specific causes of action they were challenging. Appellants dispute this
conclusion, asserting that they may and did move to strike the entire
complaint.
An anti-SLAPP motion may be directed at an entire complaint. (See
Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 87; Moss Bros. Toy, Inc. v. Ruiz
(2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 424, 434.) However, the focus remains on “the
defendant’s activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability—and
whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning.” (Navellier,
at p. 92.) In their motion, Appellants identified the relevant acts as
“statements made on social media and on the publicly accessible website
Eventbrite.com” and also mentioned, although not in the argument portion of

9
their motion, the e-mail exchange with Frye.8 The trial court expressed
concern during the hearing that Appellants did not clearly explain which of
the activities alleged in the complaint (e.g. creating, organizing, advertising,
marketing, hosting, holding, etc. the women-only golf event) were the subject
of the motion. While we understand the court’s concern, and Appellants
could have been clearer in addressing this issue below, the motion did contain
facts highlighting the discrepancy between the expansive list of actions listed
in the two causes of action and the more limited factual allegations targeted
only to Appellants’ advertisement, website, and e-mail. Appellants’ counsel
also confirmed during the hearing that they did seek to strike the entire
complaint. Thus, there was some basis in the record for understanding that,
although Appellants sought to dismiss the entire complaint, they had not
addressed all the actions alleged (again, creating, organizing, hosting,
holding, etc.) because they did not believe the facts related any of this
conduct to harm actually suffered by Frye or Maystrenko.
Furthermore, as our high court has explained, if a party fails to
sufficiently specify which subparts of a cause of action it seeks to strike, the
problem is resolved by “attention to the allocation of the applicable burden of
proof. If a cause of action contains multiple claims and a moving party fails
to identify how the speech or conduct underlying some of those claims is
protected activity, it will not carry its first-step burden as to those claims.”
(Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1011.) Because it is undisputed that
Respondents did not attend the event, which does make it unclear how some

8 Given that Appellants did, at least, identify these acts from the
complaint and provide argument as to why they were protected, we decline
Respondents’ invitation to find forfeiture based on Appellants’ failure in the
initial motion to identify “each paragraph or sentence in the complaint that
comprises a challenged claim” and to explain the claim’s elements.

10
of these verbs apply to their claims, we conclude Appellants sufficiently
identified the causes of action they were challenging. Thus, we now consider
whether Appellants have met their burden of showing that these allegations
arose from protected activity.
II.
Anti-SLAPP Analysis
The anti-SLAPP statute identifies four categories of protected activity.
(§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1)–(4).) Appellants invoke two of them. Section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(3) protects “any written or oral statement or writing made in a
place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of
public interest.” (Id., subd. (e)(3).) Subdivision (e)(4) covers “any other
conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or
the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an
issue of public interest.” (Id., subd. (e)(4).) “We determine de novo whether
any of the acts from which challenged claims arise are protected under these
provisions.” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1009.)
“A claim arises from protected activity when that activity underlies or
forms the basis for the claim. [Citations.] Critically, ‘the defendant’s act
underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have been an act in
furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.’ [Citations.] ‘[T]he mere
fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean
the action arose from that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP
statute.’ ” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1062–1063.) In making this
determination, the court looks at what actions by the defendant supply the
elements of the challenged claim and “ ‘whether that activity constitutes
protected speech or petitioning.’ ” (Id. at p. 1063.)

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A. The “Gravamen” Test
Our Supreme Court has made clear that, whether the defendant seeks
to strike the entire cause of action or merely parts of it, the proper focus is on
the specific actions by the defendant. In so doing, the court rejected the
gravamen test “to determine the essence or gist” of a cause of action because
employing such a test would “risk saddling courts with an obligation to settle
intractable, almost metaphysical problems about the ‘essence’ of a cause of
action that encompasses multiple claims.” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 1011–1012.) Here, the court concluded that the gravamen of the
complaint was that Appellants discriminated against Respondents and other
men and nonbinary persons based on their sex, gender, and/or gender
identity by precluding them from participating in a women’s-only golf event

in violation of the Unruh Act.9 Appellants contend this was error.
Although our high court rejected the gravamen test when it is used to
summarize the gist of a cause of action, the court acknowledged that not
every court that continues to label its approach the gravamen test has erred.
(Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1012.) The term may be used “to determine
whether particular acts alleged within the cause of action supply the
elements of a claim [citation] or instead are incidental background.” (Ibid.)

9 “The purpose of the [Unruh] Act is to create and preserve ‘a
nondiscriminatory environment in California business establishments by
“banishing” or “eradicating” arbitrary, invidious discrimination by such
establishments.’ [Citations.] ‘The Act stands as a bulwark protecting each
person’s inherent right to “full and equal” access to “all business
establishments.” [Citations.]’ In enforcing the Act, courts must consider its
broad remedial purpose and overarching goal of deterring discriminatory
practices by businesses. [Citations.] We have consistently held that ‘the Act
must be construed liberally in order to carry out its purpose.’ ” (White v.
Square, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1019, 1025.)

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Such incidental or collateral background allegations are not subject to
section 425.16. (Bonni, at p. 1012.) In other words, “ ‘Allegations of protected
activity that merely provide context, without supporting a claim for recovery,
cannot be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute.’ ” (Ibid.) We therefore
conclude the trial court did not err in its reference to the “gravamen” of
Respondents’ claims.
B. Respondents’ Discrimination Claims Do Not Arise from Protected
Activity

In denying the anti-SLAPP motion, the trial court relied on the holding
of Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th 1057. Citing Park, the trial court explained:
“Defendants’ use of websites and/or social media to advertise women’s-only
golf events does not form the basis of Plaintiffs’ claims – they are merely
ancillary actions that purportedly led to the liability-creating activity,
i.e., discrimination based on sex, gender, and/or gender identity.”
We conclude that the trial court correctly applied Park. In Park, a
professor alleged that he had been denied tenure based on his national origin.
The employer responded with an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that its
decision to deny tenure and numerous communications leading up to and
following the decision were protected communications. (Park, supra,
2 Cal.5th at p. 1061.) The Supreme Court disagreed that the professor’s
lawsuit was based on protected activity. It concluded that “in ruling on an
anti-SLAPP motion, courts should consider the elements of the challenged
claims and what actions by the defendant supply those elements and
consequently form the basis for liability.” (Id. at p. 1063.) The court noted
that the elements of the plaintiff’s discrimination claim did not depend on
any communications “but only on the denial of tenure itself and whether the
motive for that action was impermissible.” (Id. at p. 1068.) The court
explained: “The tenure decision may have been communicated orally or in
13
writing, but that communication does not convert Park’s suit to one arising
from such speech. The dean’s alleged comments may supply evidence of
animus, but that does not convert the statements themselves into the basis
for liability.” (Ibid.)
More broadly, the Supreme Court held that “a claim is not subject to a
motion to strike simply because it contests an action or decision that was
arrived at following speech or petitioning activity, or that was thereafter
communicated by means of speech or petitioning activity. Rather, a claim
may be struck only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong
complained of, and not just evidence of liability or a step leading to some
different act for which liability is asserted.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at
p. 1060.)
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court cited multiple Court of
Appeal opinions distinguishing between protected “activities that form the
basis for a claim and those that merely lead to the liability-creating activity
or provide evidentiary support for the claim.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at
pp. 1064–1067.) One of the cases the Supreme Court discussed was Nam v.

Regents of University of California (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1176.10 (Park, at
p. 1066.) After summarizing the holding of Nam, the Supreme Court in Park
concluded: “Nam illustrates that while discrimination may be carried out by
means of speech, such as a written notice of termination, and an illicit
animus may be evidenced by speech, neither circumstance transforms a
discrimination suit to one arising from speech.” (Ibid.)
As the trial court concluded, Park is controlling here. The basis for
Respondents’ claims is the Appellants’ alleged conduct in holding golf events

10 The Supreme Court later disapproved of Nam on other grounds in
Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 892.

14
for women only, not their speech promoting or publicizing those events.
Respondents are suing on behalf of themselves and a putative class of male
and non-binary persons who were allegedly denied the same
accommodations, advantages, privileges, or services provided to women in the
women-only golf events sponsored by Appellants. The complaint alleges that
this unequal treatment based on sex, gender, or gender identity violates the
Unruh Act and Civil Code section 51.5. Whatever the merits of these
discrimination claims, the trial court correctly ruled that they are not subject
to the anti-SLAPP statute under the holding of Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at
pp. 1065–1066. Park made clear that although discrimination may be
evidenced or carried out or communicated by means of speech, that does not
transform a discrimination suit into one arising from speech. (Park, at
p. 1066.)
As the Supreme Court has since emphasized, the holding of Park
means it is a “relatively unusual case in which the discrimination or
retaliation defendant does meet its first-step burden of showing that its
challenged actions qualify as protected activity . . . .” (Wilson, supra, 7
Cal.5th at p. 891, italics added; see also id. at p. 890 [“Cases that fit that
description are the exception, not the rule”].) In Wilson, for example, a
television news network’s decision to terminate an employee for plagiarism
was protected activity in furtherance of its speech rights as a news
organization, even though the plaintiff alleged discrimination. (Id. at
pp. 897–898.) By contrast, this is a more typical case of discrimination not
asserted against an entity whose core mission is speech.
Appellants contend that their protected activity supplies the basis for
Respondents’ discrimination claims because the only acts supporting
Respondents’ claims are that Appellants advertised and emailed concerning a

15
women-only golf event; Respondents were deterred from participating in the
June 13, 2021 event solely by the advertising and email; neither Respondent
actually attempted to participate in the event; the vendor area was open to
men; and three spots remained open in the clinic on the day of the event.
We are not convinced. None of this alters the fact that Respondents are
suing over alleged discrimination by Appellants in excluding men and non-
binary people from their golf events. The advertising and emails may supply
evidence of the alleged discrimination, and they may be the means of
carrying out or communicating or publicizing the alleged discrimination, but
speech is not the actual basis for the discrimination claim and does not
“supply elements of the challenged claim.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at
p. 1064.) “What gives rise to liability is not that the defendant spoke, but
that the defendant denied the plaintiff a benefit, or subjected the plaintiff to
a burden, on account of a discriminatory or retaliatory consideration.” (Id. at
p. 1066.) And to the extent Appellants are arguing that Respondents could in
fact have participated if they had showed up on the day of the June 13, 2021
golf event, that goes to the merits of the discrimination claims rather than
the basis for them.
We conclude that Respondents’ discrimination claims are not subject to
the anti-SLAPP statute because they do not arise from Appellants’ protected
activity. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order denying the anti-
SLAPP motion without deciding whether Appellants’ speech was made in
connection with an issue of public interest or whether Respondents showed a
probability of prevailing on their claims.

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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to their costs on
appeal.

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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