People v. Crawley CA2/3

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Filed 1/31/25 P. v. Crawley CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B330276

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA114789)
v.

GILBERT CRAWLEY,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Richard M. Goul, Judge. Affirmed.
Mary Jo Strnad, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and John Yang, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

A jury found defendant and appellant Gilbert Crawley
guilty of the second degree murder of Archie Harris (Pen. Code,
§ 187, subd. (a))1 and of possession of a firearm by a felon
(§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). On appeal, Crawley contends the trial
court erred by denying his request for a jury instruction on
involuntary intoxication. He further asserts that his trial
counsel’s conduct when requesting the instruction constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel. Crawley also claims the trial
court erred by admitting gang evidence. Finally, Crawley
contends the trial court erred by imposing a sentence on the
possession of firearm count that was prohibited by section 1170.1,
and by failing to dismiss a firearm enhancement pursuant to
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2). We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 28, 2020, Crawley shot and killed Archie Harris.
The shooting was recorded by a surveillance camera. Video
showed Crawley and Harris walking at 10:02 p.m. Crawley took
a gun from his waistband, racked the slide, shot Harris once in
the head and, after Harris fell to the ground, Crawley shot him
twice more. Video also showed Crawley running away on foot.
Law enforcement found a vial of phencyclidine (PCP) in Harris’s
hand. A toxicology report indicated Harris was under the
influence of PCP when he died. Law enforcement also found a
box of cigarettes and a lighter on the ground, just outside of
Harris’s pocket.

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

2
Harris and Crawley both grew up in Long Beach and were
friends. Harris was associated with the Insane Crips gang, while
Crawley was associated with the Rolling 20’s Crips gang. There
were several gangs in their neighborhood growing up, and
members of the same family and friends were often in different
gangs. At trial, Crawley admitted there was a “known rivalry”
between the Insane Crips and the Rolling 20’s Crips. However,
Crawley and Harris never had any issues with each other, or any
history of disagreements. Crawley moved away to Spokane,
Washington, where there are other Rolling 20’s Crips members,
in approximately 2013. Crawley testified that as of June 2020,
when he killed Harris, he was no longer “active” with the Rolling
20’s Crips. He was 48 years old and had not been active in the
gang since his early 30s.
On June 26 or 27, 2020, Crawley flew back to Long Beach
to visit friends and family. He intended to visit a friend he
considered a sister, his friend Daynara, and a man named “Little
Goldie.” Little Goldie is the brother of Ellis Spillman. Spillman
was killed by a single gunshot to the head at 9:51 p.m. on June
28, 2018.2 Spillman was a member of the Rolling 20’s Crips.
After Harris’s murder, a friend of Crawley’s, Mark Morton, told a
Long Beach Police Department officer that Crawley had returned
to Long Beach for a funeral or gathering honoring Spillman’s
death.
The first night Crawley returned to Long Beach, he stayed
with Cory Hunter, a Rolling 20’s Crips member. Hunter loaned
Crawley a gun for protection. Crawley testified that he had the

2 At the time of trial, law enforcement had not solved
Spillman’s murder.

3
gun with him on June 28, 2020, because he had heard that a
Hispanic gang in Long Beach was targeting Black people.
On the morning of June 28, 2020, Raynell Young, Harris’s
cousin and Crawley’s old friend, was driving in Long Beach.
Young had been a Rolling 20’s Crips gang member. While
driving, Young noticed Crawley. He stopped and picked Crawley
up. They bought alcohol and went to Young’s house to drink and
hang out.
While at Young’s house, Crawley took a shower and put on
a yellow and black t-shirt with the Pittsburgh Steelers logo on it
and names of Rolling 20’s Crips members who had died on the
back. Crawley had gotten it the night before from a friend who
sells Long Beach memorabilia. Crawley testified that black and
gold colors and the Pittsburgh Steelers logo are associated with
the Rolling 20’s Crips.
Crawley and Young left to visit Spillman’s father. Spillman
had been their “good friend.” The father did not have a “big
memorial” for Spillman; Crawley and Young just stopped by to
pay their respects. Morton was at Young’s apartment at the
time. He remembered that before they left, Crawley and Young
mentioned that it was the anniversary of Spillman’s murder.
After visiting Spillman’s father, Crawley and Young went
to a park to talk to younger gang members. Next, they went to a
street to drink and hang out with old friends, which included
people affiliated with the Rolling 20’s Crips.
Crawley and Young returned to Young’s apartment around
8:30 or 9:00 p.m. Harris was at the apartment, and he and
Crawley hugged and shook hands. Crawley was happy to see
Harris because they were friends and had not seen each other for
a long time. Morton was also at the apartment. He testified that

4
Crawley and Harris were happy to see each other. Crawley,
Young, Harris, and Morton did not argue; everyone “greeted each
other in good friendship.”
Harris and Crawley decided to go to the store together.
According to Crawley, going to the store was Harris’s idea.
Crawley borrowed a blue jacket to cover his yellow and black
Rolling 20’s Crips shirt because he did not want people to “gang
bang” on him. Harris was wearing a jacket with a Raider’s logo,
a team associated with the Insane Crips.
Crawley testified that before they left, Harris asked if
Crawley “ ‘still smoke[d],’ ” which Crawley took to refer to
smoking marijuana. He said that he did. Harris passed Crawley
something the size of half a blunt or a cigarette, about four inches
long. When Crawley inhaled it, he experienced a “real funny,”
“chemically” taste, which he did not recognize to be marijuana.
When Crawley remarked that it was not marijuana, Harris was
laughing and made a comment but Crawley was not sure what he
said. Crawley knew it was PCP because he had known people
who used PCP in the past. However, he had not seen PCP since
the 1980’s or 1990’s. By 2020, PCP use was not common among
Crawley’s friends, and he had never used it.
Neither Young nor Morton saw Crawley smoke anything at
Young’s house. Around five minutes after Crawley and Harris
left the house, Young and Morton heard gunshots.
Crawley testified he did not remember anything from the
remainder of June 28, 2020. The next thing he recalled was
waking up at a friend’s house the following day. At trial, Crawley
admitted that the surveillance video showed him shooting Harris,
but he testified that he did not remember doing so and did not
want to shoot Harris because he was a friend. Crawley’s cell

5
phone records from June 28, 2020, indicated that his phone was
powered off, in airplane mode, or without cell service from
approximately 9:45 p.m. until 10:13 p.m. No similar half-hour
gap occurred that day.
On June 29, 2020, Crawley was arrested for Harris’s
murder. The police found him in his friend Daynara’s car.
Daynara was wearing a Pittsburgh Steelers jersey and socks, in
black and gold. The police also found the t-shirt Crawley had
been wearing when he shot Harris.
Expert Testimony
At the time of trial, Officer Sean Magee had worked for the
Long Beach Police Department for almost 19 years. He spent
eight years working on gang detail and gang-related work
through the counterterrorism unit. Through his work, he is
familiar with the Rolling 20’s Crips and the Insane Crips. Their
rivalry has been “constant” since the mid-to-late 1980’s. It was
ongoing at the time of trial.
Despite the rivalry, there is crossover within families
because both gangs originate from the same street in Long Beach.
However, the gang “becomes your family” and being family does
not give rivals a “pass.” The primary loyalty is to the gang and
the “enemy” is the rival gang.
The anniversary of the death of a gang member can be
significant to the remaining members. These anniversaries are
commemorated with vigils and visits to the location where the
person died, and with t-shirts in memory of deceased members.
Gangs also kill members of rival gangs on anniversary dates.

6
This sends a message to the rival gang that “this is tit for tat,
this is an eye for an eye, we will get our revenge.”
The colors black and yellow or gold are associated with the
Rolling 20’s Crips, as are the team logos for the Pittsburgh
Steelers and the Pirates. The Insane Crips wear silver and black,
and they identify with the Raiders logo.
In addition to Long Beach, Rolling 20’s Crips members also
reside in other areas of the United States, including Spokane. At
one point, the “gang problem became so bad” in Spokane that
some of its law enforcement officers visited Long Beach to learn
from its gang unit about the city’s gangs, like the Rolling 20’s
Crips. Gang members are known to travel to other parts of the
country to commit crimes and evade detection from local police.
Magee testified that during the course of his investigations, he
had found suspects traveling between Washington and Long
Beach, “or committing crimes in both Spokane and Long Beach.”
A defense medical expert testified that PCP may cause
blackouts, delusions, hallucinations, and violent behavior. The
effects of PCP can begin within two to five minutes of
consumption, and they peak within one hour. In reviewing the
surveillance video, the expert did not see overt symptoms of PCP
use in Harris or Crawley.
The Trial Proceedings
The People charged Crawley by information with the
murder of Harris (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1) and with one count of
possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 2).
The information also alleged that in the commission of the
murder, Crawley personally used a firearm within the meaning
of section 12022.5, subdivision (a).

7
In February and March 2023, Crawley was tried by jury.
Crawley moved to exclude all gang evidence pursuant to
Evidence Code section 352. The trial court denied the motion.
The People asked the jury to find Crawley guilty of first degree
murder. The jury found Crawley guilty of the second degree
murder of Harris and found true the allegation that Crawley
personally used a firearm in the commission of the murder. The
jury further found Crawley guilty of possession of a firearm by a
felon.
The trial court imposed a sentence of 25 years to life plus 2
years in state prison. The sentence consisted of a term of 15
years to life on count 1, plus an additional 10 years for the
firearm enhancement. On count 2, the court imposed a
consecutive midterm sentence of two years.
Crawley timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court’s Denial of the Defense Request for
an Involuntary Intoxication Instruction Was
Harmless and Did Not Violate Crawley’s
Constitutional Rights
On appeal, Crawley challenges the trial court’s ruling
denying a defense request for a jury instruction on involuntary
intoxication. We conclude that any error was harmless.
A. Background
Defense counsel requested jury instructions on involuntary
intoxication, CALCRIM No. 3427, and unconsciousness,
CALCRIM No. 3425.3 Relying on People v. Velez (1985) 175

3 CALCRIM No. 3427, “Involuntary Intoxication,” provides:

8
Cal.App.3d 785 (Velez), the prosecutor objected to any instruction
on involuntary intoxication. In Velez, the court held the trial
court properly denied a request for an involuntary intoxication
instruction where the evidence indicated the defendant
voluntarily smoked marijuana, unaware that it was laced with
PCP. Defense counsel argued Velez was no longer controlling as
it was decided before marijuana use became legal in California.
The trial court rejected defense counsel’s requests in favor
of a voluntary intoxication instruction, CALCRIM No. 626.
CALCRIM No. 626, “Voluntary Intoxication Causing
Unconsciousness: Effects on Homicide Crimes” as given to the
jury stated:

“Voluntary intoxication may cause a person to
be unconscious of his or her actions. . . .

[¶] . . . [¶]

“Consider any evidence that the defendant was
involuntarily intoxicated in deciding whether the
defendant had the required (intent/ [or] mental state)
when (he/she) acted.

“A person is involuntarily intoxicated if he or she
unknowingly ingested some intoxicating liquor, drug, or
other substance, or if his or her intoxication is caused by
the (force/[,] [or] duress/[,] [or] fraud/[,] [or] trickery) of
someone else, for whatever purpose[, without any fault on
the part of the intoxicated person].”

CALCRIM No. 3425 states in relevant part that “[t]he
defense of unconsciousness may not be based on voluntary
intoxication.” Crawley does not contend the trial court erred in
failing to give CALCRIM No. 3425.

9
“When a person voluntarily causes his or her
own intoxication to the point of unconsciousness, the
person assumes the risk that while unconscious he or
she will commit acts inherently dangerous to human
life. If someone dies as a result of the actions of a
person who was unconscious due to voluntary
intoxication, then the killing is involuntary
manslaughter.

“Involuntary manslaughter has been proved if
you find beyond a reasonable doubt that:

“1. The defendant killed without legal justification or
excuse;
2. The defendant did not act with the intent to kill;
3. The defendant did not act with a conscious
disregard for human life;
AND
4. As a result of voluntary intoxication, the defendant
was not conscious of (his/her) actions or the nature of
those actions.

“The People have the burden of proving beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not
unconscious. If the People have not met this burden,
you must find the defendant not guilty of murder.”

B. Any error was not reversible per se
Crawley argues the trial court’s error in refusing to instruct
the jury on involuntary intoxication is structural error and
therefore reversible per se. We disagree.
Whether an error is considered reversible per se or
reviewed under a harmless error standard depends on the type of
error. (See People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 196
(Gonzalez).) “Structural errors” are reversible per se and differ
from “trial errors” that are subject to the harmless error

10
standard. “[T]rial errors can be fairly examined in the context of
the entire record and are amenable to harmless error review.
Structural errors, on the other hand, go to the very reliability of a
criminal trial as a vehicle for determining guilt or innocence and
are reversible per se.” (People v. Anzalone (2013) 56 Cal.4th 545,
554 (Anzalone).)
Structural error is the “ ‘exception and not the rule,’ ” and
there is a strong presumption that error is susceptible to
harmless error analysis. (People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th
151, 178; People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 410 (Mil) [listing
“ ‘ “very limited” ’ ” class of cases constituting structural error and
thus subject to automatic reversal].) Even “ ‘most constitutional
errors can be harmless.’ [Citation.]” (Neder v. United States
(1999) 527 U.S. 1, 8 [structural error applies in a very limited
class of cases, including complete denial of counsel, biased trial
judge, racial discrimination in the selection of grand jury, denial
of self-representation, denial of public trial, and defective
reasonable doubt instruction].) Structural errors “ ‘are those that
go to the very construction of the trial mechanism—a biased
judge, total absence of counsel, the failure of a jury to reach any
verdict on an essential element.’ ” (Avitia v. Superior Court
(2018) 6 Cal.5th 486, 495–496.)
Instructional errors are structural or reversible per se
when they “ ‘categorically “ ‘vitiat[e] all the jury’s findings’ ” ’ ”
(Mil, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 412), and the effect on the verdict is
“ ‘ “necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate.” ’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Aranda (2012) 55 Cal.4th 342, 364 (Aranda).) For
example, an “instruction that effectively lowers the prosecution’s
burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is structural
error because it ‘vitiates all the jury’s findings’ and its effect on

11
the verdict is ‘necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate.’
[Citations.]” (Id. at p. 365; Hedgpeth v. Pulido (2008) 555 U.S.
57, 61 [harmless-error analysis applies to instructional errors so
long as the error at issue does not categorically “ ‘ “vitiat[e] all
the jury’s findings” ’ ”].)
Here, the trial court’s refusal to instruct on involuntary
intoxication, like most instructional errors, is subject to harmless
error analysis. (See, e.g., Gonzalez, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 199
[failure to instruct on affirmative defense and lesser included
offenses subject to harmless error review]; Mil, supra, 53 Cal.4th
at p. 414 [omission of elements of special circumstance
instruction subject to harmless error review]; Aranda, supra, 55
Cal.4th at p. 364 [omission of standard reasonable doubt
instruction in connection with gang charge subject to harmless
error review].)
Indeed, even where, as here, involuntary unconsciousness
would be a complete defense to a murder charge, courts have held
the failure to instruct on the defense is subject to harmless error
review.4 (Mathson, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1301

4 Voluntary intoxication is not a complete defense to
homicide. “When a person renders himself or herself unconscious
through voluntary intoxication and kills in that state, the killing
is attributed to his or her negligence in self-intoxicating to that
point, and is treated as involuntary manslaughter.
‘Unconsciousness is ordinarily a complete defense to a charge of
criminal homicide. [Citation.] If the state of unconsciousness
results from intoxication voluntarily induced, however, it is not a
complete defense.’ ” (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 423.)
“The question of whether intoxication is voluntary or involuntary
focuses on whether the intoxication is induced through the
defendant’s fault or the fault of another or whether the defendant

12
[instruction on CALCRIM No. 3425, unconsciousness, was
flawed, but harmless error].) For example, in People v. Boyer
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 412 (Boyer), our high court held that, in a
capital murder trial, the trial court’s failure to instruct on the
“complete defense of unconsciousness” was harmless. (Id. at
p. 470.) As in this case, the jury was instructed on voluntary
intoxication but was not instructed on the defendant being
intoxicated for reasons outside of his control. (Id. at p. 471.)
Boyer considered the failure to instruct on the “complete defense
of unconsciousness” under the harmless error test. (Id. at p. 470.)
The court found the error harmless because of the ample evidence
that the defendant committed the murder and was conscious.
(Ibid.) We find no reason to depart from the analysis employed in
Boyer.
Crawley acknowledges that errors rarely fall outside of
harmless error review, yet he asserts that this is such a case. He
cites the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for the proposition that
“[t]he right to have the jury instructed as to the defendant’s
theory of the case is one of those rights ‘so basic to a fair trial’
that failure to instruct where there is evidence to support the
instruction can never be considered harmless error.” (United
States v. Escobar de Bright (9th Cir. 1984) 742 F.2d 1196, 1201.)
Here, however, the jury was instructed on Crawley’s general
theory of the case, namely that he was not responsible because he

knows or has reason to anticipate the intoxicating effects of the
substance he or she ingests. If intoxication is the result of the
defendant’s own fault or the defendant knows or has reason to
anticipate the intoxicating effects, the intoxication is voluntary.”
(People v. Mathson (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1313
(Mathson).)

13
was unconscious. This was covered by a portion of the voluntary
intoxication instruction: “The People have the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not
unconscious. If the People have not met this burden, you must
find the defendant not guilty of murder.”
Crawley also cites People v. James (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th
794, for the point that “[w]here a defendant provides evidence of
involuntary unconsciousness, ‘the refusal of a requested
instruction on the subject, and its effect as a complete defense if
found to have existed, is prejudicial error. [Citations.]’
[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 804.) For this proposition, James cited
People v. Newton (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 359, which reasoned:
“Where evidence of involuntary unconsciousness has been
produced in a homicide prosecution, the refusal of a requested
instruction on the subject, and its effect as a complete defense if
found to have existed, is prejudicial error.” (Id. at p. 377.)
Neither case held that error in failing to instruct on involuntary
unconsciousness is reversible per se. James referred to
prejudicial error (James, at p. 804), and the Newton court applied
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson) in determining
that the error was prejudicial and required reversal in that case.
(Newton, at p. 378.) Moreover, the two cases are distinguishable
from the one before us. In both James and Newton, the jury was
not instructed on any theory of unconsciousness. (James, at p.
802; Newton, at p. 377.) Further, in Newton, the jury was
instructed on diminished capacity and found the defendant guilty
of only voluntary manslaughter, suggesting a reasonable
probability that the jury may have believed the defendant’s
testimony and accepted a complete defense of unconsciousness
had it been available. (Newton, at pp. 375, 378.)

14
Here, the jury did determine the material issue of
Crawley’s consciousness. This case is therefore closer to Boyer, in
which our high court was concerned with the “complete defense of
unconsciousness” and the argument that the failure to instruct on
it “violated [the defendant’s constitutional] rights to have the jury
consider every material fact presented by the evidence.” (Boyer,
supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 468.) Yet, Boyer found any error subject to
harmless error analysis. We follow its precedent. (See Auto
Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
In sum, any error only deprived the jury of determining
whether the asserted intoxication was involuntary, rather than
voluntary. This error would not affect the fairness or reliability
of the entire trial. (Anzalone, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 554–555.)
The trial court’s refusal to instruct on involuntary intoxication is
subject to review for prejudicial error. (Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th
at p. 471.)
C. Any instructional error was harmless under
any standard
We need not decide whether the trial court erred in denying
Crawley’s request for an involuntary intoxication instruction.
The record establishes that, even if the court erred, any error was
harmless, under any standard. (Chapman v. California (1967)
386 U.S. 18, 24 [federal constitutional error is reversible unless it
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt]; accord, People v.
Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 244 [Chapman requires reversal
unless the court concludes no rational juror could have had
reasonable doubt regarding the findings necessary to convict
absent the instructional error]; Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 837
[state law error is reversible if it is reasonably probable that the

15
defendant would have obtained a more favorable result without
the error].)
The failure to give a jury instruction is harmless where
“ ‘the factual question posed by the omitted instruction was
necessarily resolved adversely to the defendant under other,
properly given instructions. In such cases the issue should not be
deemed to have been removed from the jury’s consideration since
it has been resolved in another context, and there can be no
prejudice to the defendant . . . .’ ” (People v. Wright (2006) 40
Cal.4th 81, 98; accord, People v. Lujano (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th
187, 195–196 [“Omission of an instruction is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt if ‘ “the factual question posed by the omitted
instruction was necessarily resolved adversely to the defendant
under other, properly given instructions.” ’ ”].)
Boyer is again instructive. In that case, the defendant was
charged with murder, among other crimes. (Boyer, supra, 38
Cal.4th at p. 418.) The defense offered evidence that the
defendant had consumed alcohol, a PCP cigarette, and cocaine
before the murder. (Id. at p. 423.) A doctor testified that the
defendant may have hallucinated. A pharmacist testified that
PCP separates the consciousness from the body and can produce
hallucinations and delusions. (Id. at p. 424.) At trial, the jury
was instructed that “if, while unconscious as the result of
voluntary intoxication, [the defendant] killed without malice or
intent to kill, the crime was not murder, but involuntary
manslaughter.” (Id. at p. 468.) The court also instructed the jury
to consider the effect of the defendant’s voluntary intoxication
when determining whether he formed the requisite intent for the
charged specific intent crimes. (Ibid.)

16
On appeal, the defendant contended the trial court erred in
failing to instruct sua sponte on the complete defense of
unconsciousness. He argued there was substantial evidence that
he killed the victims while he was hallucinating, and was
therefore unconscious, “for reasons not related to the immediate
effects of voluntary intoxication—including the lingering effects
of chronic drug abuse and past head injuries.” (Boyer, supra, 38
Cal.4th at p. 469, italics omitted & fn. omitted.) The California
Supreme Court concluded that if error occurred, it was harmless
under any standard. In addition to describing the strong
evidence that the defendant executed the killings while
conscious, the court considered the jury’s rejection of the
voluntary intoxication theory.
The Boyer court reasoned: “[T]he jury was instructed that
‘voluntary’ intoxication warranted a verdict of involuntary
manslaughter, rather than murder. While the instructions did
not specify what the jury should do if it found he was unconscious
for reasons beyond his control, such as brain damage, it is
inconceivable the jury would believe that, in such a circumstance,
it should (1) convict him of murder, a crime greater than
manslaughter, then (2) find true special circumstances rendering
him death-eligible, then (3) sentence him to death. [Citation.]
The only logical inference is that the jury rejected defendant’s
claim of unconsciousness entirely. Hence, an instructional failure
to explain the jury’s duty in the event it found involuntary
unconsciousness can have caused no prejudice.” (Boyer, supra, 38
Cal.4th at p. 471, fn. omitted.)
In People v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946 (Heard), the
defendant was charged with murder and several sex crimes,
including raping the victim, which required specific intent. (Id.

17
at p. 950.) The primary defense theory of the case was that the
defendant committed the underlying conduct but lacked the
requisite mental state for the charged crimes due to being
impaired from alcohol and cocaine consumption. (Id. at p. 956.)
The jury was instructed that it had to find the defendant acted
with specific intent and that it should consider whether he was
intoxicated in determining whether he acted with the required
mental state. The jury determined the defendant had the
required mental state, despite his having consumed drugs and
alcohol. However, on appeal, the defendant argued the trial court
should have instructed the jury on involuntary manslaughter,
based on defense evidence offered at trial that he was suffering
from the combined effects of alcohol and cocaine, and therefore
could have been unaware of and unable to control his behavior.
(Id. at p. 981.)
Our high court rejected this argument, concluding in part
that even if the trial court erred, the error was harmless. In
convicting the defendant of the charged sexual offenses, “the jury
necessarily determined that defendant formed the requisite
specific intent despite his consumption of drugs and alcohol.”
(Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 982.) As a result, “the jury could
not have concluded he was unconscious and therefore guilty only
of involuntary manslaughter. Thus, even if the court had erred
in its instructions, we would find that such error was clearly
harmless.” (Ibid.)
Likewise, in People v. Barrick (1982) 33 Cal.3d 115, the
jury was instructed to consider evidence that the defendant was
intoxicated from a combination of alcohol, marijuana, and PCP at
the time he stole a car, to determine whether he had the specific
intent to commit theft and unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle.

18
(Id. at pp. 120, 133.) The court reasoned that “[b]y finding
defendant guilty of the charged offense, the jury necessarily
rejected defendant’s claim that he was unconscious due to
intoxication.” (Id. at p. 133.)
In this case, the jury was instructed with CALCRIM
No. 626 on voluntary intoxication causing unconsciousness. The
instruction given here stated that to find voluntary intoxication
causing unconsciousness, the jury must find: “As a result of
voluntary intoxication, the defendant was not conscious of
(his/her) actions or the nature of those actions.” Critically, it
went on to instruct: “The People have the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not
unconscious. If the People have not met this burden, you must
find the defendant not guilty of murder.” The jury found Crawley
guilty of second degree murder. Thus, “[t]he only logical
inference is that the jury rejected defendant’s claim of
unconsciousness entirely. Hence, an instructional failure to
explain the jury’s duty in the event it found involuntary
unconsciousness can have caused no prejudice.” (Boyer, supra, 38
Cal.4th at p. 471, fn. omitted.)
As in Boyer, it is inconceivable that, had the jury found
Crawley was unconscious for reasons beyond his control, it would
have convicted him of murder, a crime greater than
manslaughter. Further, the jury’s verdict finding Crawley guilty
of second degree murder established it concluded the People met
their burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was “not unconscious.” (CALCRIM No. 626; People v.
Gana (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 598, 611.) Any error in the court’s
refusal to instruct on involuntary intoxication was harmless
under any standard of prejudice.

19
We therefore also reject Crawley’s argument that he was
deprived of the effective assistance of counsel because his trial
attorney failed to know the relevant law regarding involuntary
intoxication. Crawley cannot establish that any error by defense
counsel in advocating for the involuntary intoxication instruction
prejudiced him. As explained above, the jury rejected the
defense’s theory that Crawley was unconscious when he killed
Harris. Thus, any deficient performance on the part of counsel
with respect to the involuntary intoxication instruction did not
prejudice the defense. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S.
668, 687.)5
II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion or
Violate Crawley’s Constitutional Rights By
Admitting Gang Evidence
Crawley also argues that the trial court erred by denying
his request to exclude gang evidence under Evidence Code
section 352. We disagree.
Under Evidence Code section 352, “[t]he court in its
discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
will . . . create substantial danger of undue prejudice . . . .” We

5 Although we need not decide the issue, we note Crawley
also fails to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was
deficient. The record reflects that defense counsel knew the
relevant law on involuntary intoxication. In arguing for the
involuntary intoxication instruction, defense counsel
distinguished Velez. Counsel articulated why Velez should not
preclude the requested instruction and also referred to the facts
of a second relevant involuntary intoxication case, People v. Scott
(1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 823. Given this record, Crawley has not
established that counsel was not reasonably competent.

20
review claims of error under Evidence Code section 352 for an
abuse of discretion. (People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 29
(Chhoun).) Under this standard, we do not reverse a trial court
unless it exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or
patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage
of justice. (Id. at p. 26.) Where a trial court does not abuse its
discretion under state law, a defendant’s constitutional claims
also fail. (Ibid.)
“The People are generally entitled to introduce evidence of
a defendant’s gang affiliation and activity if it is relevant to the
charged offense.” (Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 31.)
“ ‘Evidence of the defendant’s gang affiliation— including
evidence of the gang’s territory, membership, signs, symbols,
beliefs and practices, criminal enterprises, rivalries, and the
like—can help prove identity, motive, modus operandi, specific
intent, means of applying force or fear, or other issues pertinent
to guilt of the charged crime.’ [Citation.] Even when it is
relevant, however, ‘courts should carefully scrutinize evidence of
a defendant’s gang membership because such evidence “creates a
risk the jury will improperly infer the defendant has a criminal
disposition and is therefore guilty of the offense charged.” ’
[Citations.]” (Ibid.; accord, People v. Holmes, McClain and
Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 772.)
“Common gang motives include ‘criminal activity against a
rival . . . or a suspected rival . . . [and] retaliation for a prior
attack upon a gang member . . . .’ [Citation.]” (People v. Huynh
(2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 969, 980–981.) Evidence of the “ ‘concept
of payback within gang culture’ [citation] ha[s] been found
relevant to show motive and intent in murders committed for the
benefit of a gang.” (Id. at p. 981.)

21
Crawley argues that the gang evidence was only minimally
probative of motive. He asserts there was no evidence he was
currently a gang member such that his gang loyalty motivated
him to kill Harris. However, there was ample evidence that
Crawley was still associated in some respect with the Rolling 20’s
Crips. On his first night in Long Beach he stayed with a gang
member who loaned him a gun. The day of the murder, he wore a
t-shirt with the names of deceased Rolling 20’s Crips members,
the gang’s colors, and the gang’s symbol. He also visited
Spillman’s father to pay his respects. Spillman was a member of
the Rolling 20’s Crips. Crawley visited gang members at the
park and went to a street to drink and hang out with old friends,
which included people affiliated with the Rolling 20’s Crips.
When he was arrested, Crawley was in Daynara’s car (one of the
three people he traveled to Long Beach to visit), and she was
wearing clothing with the Rolling 20’s Crips colors and affiliated
symbols. Even if, as Crawley asserts, he was no longer an
“active” gang member, there is certainly evidence that he still
associated with Rolling 20’s Crips.
Crawley also argues there was no evidence an Insane Crips
member killed Spillman. But the evidence regarding Spillman’s
death suggested Crawley’s possible motive in killing Harris.
There was evidence Harris was an Insane Crips member in his
youth and was still associated with the gang to the extent that he
was wearing a Raider’s jacket at the time of his murder. There
was also evidence that the Insane Crips and Rolling 20’s Crips
were long-standing rivals. Spillman, a Rolling 20’s Crips
member, was killed two years earlier, on the same day, at nearly
the exact time, and in the same way, as Crawley shot Harris.
This similarity, accompanied by the evidence that gang members

22
often retaliate on anniversaries, was probative of Crawley’s
motive in killing Harris. The “gang affiliation evidence gave
context to the shooting” (People v. Duong (2020) 10 Cal.5th 36,
64), and was a counterpoint to the defense theory that Crawley
killed Harris simply because he was under the influence of PCP.
Crawley relies on People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897
(Cardenas), and People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214
(Albarran), to support his argument that the gang evidence was
improperly admitted. Yet, both cases are materially different
from the case at bar.
In Cardenas, the defendant was charged with robbing a 7-
Eleven store. The issue at trial was whether the defendant was
the perpetrator. (Cardenas, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 901.) He
denied any involvement, and several witnesses testified on his
behalf, supporting his alibi. (Id. at pp. 902–903.) The
prosecution attacked the credibility of those witnesses by eliciting
testimony that the witnesses and the defendant were in the same
gang. (Id. at p. 903.) The Cardenas court held that the probative
value of the gang evidence was “minimal at best” because it was
offered only to show the bias of the defense witnesses in favor of
the defendant, and the prosecution had already “amply
established” that they all lived in the same neighborhood and
were friends. (Id. at p. 904.) Evidence about hostilities between
the defendant’s gang and another gang was irrelevant. (Id. at
p. 905.) Further, although the prosecution did not offer evidence
indicating the crime was gang-related, the prosecutor pursued a
line of questioning that suggested the attempted robbery was a
gang operation and that the gang was generally involved in
criminal activities. (Id. at pp. 905–906.) The Cardenas court
concluded the trial court erred in admitting the gang evidence

23
because it was not probative and the prosecutor’s improper
questions “made it a near certainty that the jury viewed
appellant as more likely to have committed the violent offenses
charged against him” because of his gang membership. (Id. at
p. 906.)
In Albarran, a jury convicted the defendant of crimes
relating to a shooting at a party and a subsequent carjacking.
(Albarran, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at pp. 217–218.) Although the
defendant was charged with a gang enhancement, the prosecutor
admitted there was no percipient witness or evidence to prove the
crime was gang-related or motivated. (Id. at p. 219.) As in
Cardenas, the defendant presented an alibi. (Id. at p. 222.) At
trial, the only evidence the prosecution presented to show the
shooting was gang-related was that it occurred in Palmdale, at a
party, and involved more than one shooter. (Id. at pp. 220–221.)
The trial court allowed gang evidence, which included that the
defendant was a member of a gang, and descriptions of the gang’s
activities, including threats against police officers and an ongoing
gang “war.” (Ibid.) Among other things, the prosecution argued
that the defendant’s alibi was unbelievable because he was a
gang member. (Id. at p. 222.)
The Court of Appeal concluded the gang evidence was
irrelevant and prejudicial. It reasoned, “[t]here is nothing
inherent in the facts of the shooting to suggest any specific gang
motive. In the final analysis, the only evidence to support the
respect motive is the fact of Albarran’s gang affiliation.”
(Albarran, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 227, fn. omitted.) “Even
if we were to conclude that evidence of Albarran’s gang
membership and some evidence concerning gang behavior were
relevant to the issue of motive and intent, other extremely

24
inflammatory gang evidence was admitted, which had no
connection to these crimes. The prosecution presented a panoply
of incriminating gang evidence, which might have been
tangentially relevant to the gang allegations, but had no bearing
on the underlying charges.” (Ibid.)
In contrast to Cardenas and Albarran, the gang evidence
here was probative of motive and intent. It provided a specific
reason why Crawley may have shot Harris, as opposed to simply
suggesting he committed a crime because he was a gang member.
Moreover, in contrast to Cardenas and Albarran, there was
significantly less risk of prejudice here. As our high court has
“ ‘repeatedly explained,’ ” under Evidence Code section 352
“prejudicial” is not synonymous with “damaging.” (Chhoun,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 29.) Rather, the prejudice Evidence Code
section 352 seeks to avoid is that which uniquely tends to evoke
an emotional bias against the defendant and which has very little
effect on the issues. (Ibid.) It was undisputed that Crawley shot
Harris in the head. Indeed, the jury was shown a video of the
murder. The gang evidence did not run the risk of suggesting
that Crawley was guilty of a crime simply because he was a gang
member.
Further, the gang evidence was not highly inflammatory.
Most of the evidence concerned various individuals’ gang
affiliations, why gang anniversaries are relevant, and the ties
between Spokane and Long Beach for Rolling 20’s Crips gang
members. This was probative of Crawley’s gang membership and
motive. The expert briefly mentioned that he had “responded to
several violent crimes” involving the Rolling 20’s Crips and their
rivals, the Insane Crips, in order to establish his expertise on the
two gangs. This general testimony was less prejudicial than the

25
evidence showing Crawley shooting Harris in the head. (Chhoun,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 29 [no abuse of discretion where evidence
of gang crime was less inflammatory than the charged crime].)
Nor was there any wholly irrelevant, incendiary evidence here
about the gang’s violence.
Crawley asserts that by questioning him about the names
listed on his t-shirt and whether they were killed by Insane
Crips, the People prejudicially associated him with violence. But
the People did not question Crawley about violence by his gang,
nor did the gang expert discuss any specific violence committed
by the Rolling 20’s Crips. While the prosecutor’s questions about
the names on the shirt did not prove particularly probative, this
line of questioning was not prejudicial because it did not elicit
any answers from Crawley about how the individuals were killed,
thus failing to suggest the deaths were the result of the Rolling
20’s and Insane Crips rivalry. Crawley did not know the
circumstances surrounding the individuals’ deaths.
Crawley additionally argues that the gang expert was
permitted to testify to matters “far afield.” He refers to photos of
his gang tattoos that were shown to the jury, which he received
when he was 18 years old, and the gang expert’s testimony that
there are Rolling 20’s Crips members in Spokane and a bad gang
problem there, without identifying a timeframe. However, this
evidence was probative of Crawley’s association with the Rolling
20’s Crips and his motive, and was related to more current
evidence of his gang association. We cannot conclude that this
evidence was so far afield that the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting it. (E.g., People v. Williams (1997) 16
Cal.4th 153, 194 [evidence of gang behavior and areas of
influence is probative in gang cases].)

26
Finally, Crawley relies on People v. Bojorquez (2002) 104
Cal.App.4th 335, to argue that the gang expert’s testimony in this
case was too broad. In Bojorquez, the defendant testified at trial.
In that testimony, he admitted his gang membership but denied
that he had previously admitted to law enforcement that he was
in a gang. The defendant also denied being an active gang
member at the time of the crime. A gang expert subsequently
testified, providing evidence to impeach the defendant’s
testimony. But the expert also provided wide-ranging testimony
about gangs in Long Beach and their criminal activities. On
appeal, the court concluded the evidence relevant to impeach the
defendant was properly admitted, but the additional gang
evidence was not. (Id. at pp. 344–345.) The additional gang
evidence was of “minimal, if not nonexistent” probative value,
and the Bojorquez court reasoned that “[e]rroneous admission of
gang-related evidence, particularly regarding criminal activities,
has frequently been found to be reversible error, because of its
inflammatory nature and tendency to imply criminal disposition,
or actual culpability.” (Id. at pp. 343, 345.)
Here, in contrast, there was no extraneous gang evidence.
The gang evidence was probative of motive, a central issue in the
case. Given the undisputed video evidence that Crawley killed
Harris, the gang evidence did not prejudicially suggest Crawley
was guilty of the crime merely because he was associated with a
gang. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
III. Crawley Has Not Established Sentencing Error
Crawley asserts two sentencing errors. We reject both
claims of error.

27
A. Section 1170.1 error
First, Crawley contends that the sentence on count 2
violates section 1170.1. Crawley argues that because the 15-
years-to-life sentence on count 1 was the “principal” term and
count 2 the “subordinate” term, the trial court erred in sentencing
him to the full midterm of two years on count 2, rather than the
one-third of the midterm, or 8 months. (People v. Catarino (2023)
14 Cal.5th 748, 752.)
The trial court did not err. Section 1170.1 applies when
both terms are determinate. Where, as here, a determinate
sentence is consecutive to the indeterminate sentence, the
determinate sentence is imposed in full and is not limited to one-
third of the midterm. (People v. Reyes (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 852,
856, citing People v. Day (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 932, 936–937; see
also People v. Garza (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1094; People v.
Lyons (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1228.) “A life sentence is
‘indeterminate,’ i.e., not for a fixed period. When a defendant is
sentenced to both a determinate and an indeterminate sentence,
the determinate sentence is served first. Nonetheless, neither
term is ‘principal’ or ‘subordinate.’ They are to be considered and
calculated independently of one another. [Citation.] Thus, if
count II is not subordinate to count I, the period of imprisonment
is not limited to one-third of the midterm. The full term may be
imposed.” (Reyes, at p. 856.)
B. Section 1385 error
Crawley also asserts that the trial court was required to
dismiss the 10-year firearm enhancement pursuant to
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C).
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 81) amended section 1385. (Stats. 2021,

28
ch. 721, § 1.) Subdivision (c)(1) now provides that “the court shall
dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do
so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any
initiative statute,” and subdivision (c)(2) provides that “the court
shall consider and afford great weight” to evidence of certain
enumerated mitigating circumstances. (Italics added.) “[T]he
presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in
favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that
dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.”
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) One of those listed mitigating
circumstances, section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C), provides: “The
application of an enhancement could result in a sentence of over
20 years. In this instance, the enhancement shall be dismissed.”
As an initial matter, Crawley has forfeited his argument by
failing to assert any error below. Defense counsel did not object
to the sentence on the enhancement, or any part of the sentence.
(People v. Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709, 724–725
(Coleman) [failure to raise Sen. Bill 81 in trial court constitutes
forfeiture on appeal], quoting People v. Carmony (2004) 33
Cal.4th 367, 375–376 [“any failure on the part of a defendant to
invite the court to dismiss under section 1385 . . . waives or
forfeits his or her right to raise the issue on appeal”]; see also
People v. Velasquez (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1503, 1511 [“by
failing to object, Velasquez has forfeited his claim the upper
terms are improper because the trial court did not state its
reasons for selecting those terms”].) Crawley has not submitted a
reply brief or otherwise asserted that his argument is not
forfeited.
Regardless, the argument fails on the merits. While this
appeal was pending, the California Supreme Court clarified the

29
trial court’s discretion regarding section 1385, subdivision (c)(2),
in People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1028 (Walker).6 The
court rejected the lower court’s holding that section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2) created a rebuttable presumption in favor of
dismissal that could only be overcome by a finding that the
dismissal would endanger public safety. (Ibid.) Instead, the
court reasoned that “absent a finding that dismissal would
endanger public safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or
dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns significant value
to the enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are
present. [Citation.] In other words, if the court does not find that
dismissal would endanger public safety, the presence of an
enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the
dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds
substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may
nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating
circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in
furtherance of justice.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1029.)
Thus, dismissal of the enhancement was not mandatory, as
Crawley contends. Moreover, in considering the firearm
enhancement, the trial court stated that it selected the high term
of 10 years because of Crawley’s “admission that he served a
prior prison term and that he engaged in violent conduct that
indicated a serious danger to society . . . .” (Italics added.) Thus,
the court impliedly found that dismissal of the enhancement
would endanger public safety. Crawley bears the burden of

6 Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th 1024, was decided on August 15,
2024. Crawley’s reply brief was due on September 23, 2024.
Thus, Crawley had an opportunity to explain the impact of
Walker on his argument.

30
establishing that the trial court misunderstood its sentencing
discretion when it did not strike his firearm enhancement. “We
assume the trial court was aware of and followed applicable law.”
(Coleman, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 724.) Crawley has not met
this burden.

31
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

EGERTON, Acting P. J.

HANASONO, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

32

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