P.v. Williams CA2/5

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Filed 1/30/25 P.v. Williams CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B331966

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. A778951)

BERNELL WILLIAMS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Craig E. Veals, Judge. Reversed.
Lise M. Breakey, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Chung L. Mar and Daniel C. Chang,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Bernell Williams (defendant) pled
guilty to murder in 1986. In 2019, he filed a petition for
resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 (former Penal
Code section 1170.95).1 That petition was denied, and this court
affirmed. In 2022, defendant filed a second section 1172.6
resentencing petition, which the trial court again denied. In this
appeal from that denial, we are asked to decide whether the
doctrines of issue preclusion or law of the case foreclose section
1172.6 relief and, if not, whether defendant has made a prima
facie case for relief such that further process is required.

I. BACKGROUND
A. The Charges and Plea
The Los Angeles County District Attorney charged
defendant in a felony complaint with murder in violation of Penal
Code section 187, subdivision (a). The complaint additionally
alleged defendant personally used a handgun in the commission
of the offense. (§ 12022.5.)
A certificate and order of magistrate dated March 1986
certified defendant pled guilty to “violation section 187a PC a
felony.” Defendant was sentenced to 17 years to life in prison
with the possibility of parole. His abstract of judgment states the
sentence was imposed for a conviction of second degree murder.

1
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.

2
B. Defendant’s First Petition for Resentencing2
In January 2019, defendant filed his first section 1172.6
petition for resentencing. In his form petition, defendant checked
boxes declaring (1) “[a] complaint . . . was filed against [him] that
allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony
murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine[;]” (2) he “pled guilty or no contest to 1st or 2nd degree
murder in lieu of going to trial because [he] believed [he] could
have been convicted of 1st or 2nd degree murder at trial pursuant
to the felony murder rule or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine[;]” and (3) he “could not now be convicted
of 1st or 2nd degree murder because of changes made to Penal
Code §§ 188 and 189 . . . .” Defendant also checked a box
declaring he “was convicted of 2nd degree murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or under the 2nd
degree felony murder doctrine and [he] could not now be
convicted of murder because of changes to Penal Code § 188 . . . .”
At a hearing on the petition, the trial court stated the
documentation presented to the court was a “makeshift file that
contain[ed] the pre-plea report” and indicated defendant “was the
actual shooter.” The trial court denied the petition without
issuing an order to show cause after determining the “facts of the
case” demonstrated defendant “was the actual killer and
therefore was properly convicted of murder notwithstanding the
amendments to Penal Code § 189 . . . .”
Defendant appealed the denial of the petition and his
appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979)

2
The People asked this court to take judicial notice of the file
in defendant’s prior appeal, and we granted the request.

3
25 Cal.3d 436.3 Defendant submitted a supplemental brief
arguing, among other things, that malice may not be imputed
under the amended murder statutes and claiming he did not
intend to kill Hunter. This court affirmed the trial court’s denial
of the petition, reasoning the facts (derived from “the probation
and sentence report”) established “defendant was the person who
shot Hunter and his guilt d[id] not rest on a natural and probable
consequences theory of liability.” (People v. Williams (B297940),
Feb. 3, 2020 [nonpub. opn.].)

C. The Resentencing Petition at Issue in This Appeal
In May 2022, defendant filed another form petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6. The petition declared (1) “[a]
complaint . . . was filed against [him] that allowed the
prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on
that person’s participation in a crime, or attempted murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine[;]” (2) he
“accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which [he] could have
been convicted of murder[;]” and (3) he “could not presently be
convicted of murder . . . because of changes made to Penal Code
§§ 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019 . . . .”
The trial court appointed counsel for defendant, though in
doing so it stated it had considered “an identical petition filed by

3
Our Supreme Court subsequently held a defendant
appealing from an order denying postconviction relief, including
under section 1172.6, is not entitled to independent review
pursuant to Wende. (See People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th
216.)

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petitioner in 2019 . . . .” The People opposed the petition for
resentencing and argued issue preclusion required denial of
defendant’s petition.
The trial court held a hearing and denied the petition. The
minute order issued in connection with the hearing sets forth the
trial court’s ruling: “The facts of the case show that petitioner
became embroiled in an argument with the victim, Anthony
Hunter, at a liquor store. As the conflict escalated, petitioner
produced a firearm and shot the victim twice in the chest. As the
victim stumbled away for cover, petitioner fired several more
shots at him. The victim subsequently died at the hospital from a
single gunshot wound to his chest. [¶] As the court determined
following its consideration of an identical petition filed by
petitioner in 2019, the facts demonstrate petitioner was the
actual killer and is thereby precluded from receiv[ing] the relief
he requests. [Citation.]”

II. DISCUSSION
Our Supreme Court has granted review and heard
argument in a case that may impact the appropriate disposition
of this appeal. (People v. Patton (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 649,
review granted Jun. 28, 2023, S279670.) Pending further
guidance from our Supreme Court in Patton, however, we
conclude reversal of the trial court’s order is warranted.
Defendant’s second petition for resentencing is not barred by the
doctrines of collateral estoppel or law of the case under an
exception that applies where, as here, there are intervening
changes in the law. In addition, we believe defendant’s section
1172.6 petition otherwise states a prima facie case for relief.

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A. Defendant’s Section 1172.6 Petition Is Not Barred by
Issue Preclusion or Law of the Case Principles
Section 1172.6 does not expressly prohibit individuals from
filing more than one petition for resentencing. A second,
subsequent petition, however, may be barred by the doctrine of
issue preclusion. (People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942,
950; People v. Beaudreaux (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1242, fn.
5.) “‘As traditionally understood and applied, issue preclusion
bars relitigation of issues earlier decided “only if several
threshold requirements are fulfilled. First, the issue sought to be
precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a
former proceeding. Second, this issue must have been actually
litigated in the former proceeding. Third, it must have been
necessarily decided in the former proceeding. Fourth, the
decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the
merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought
must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former
proceeding.”’ [Citation.] ‘The party asserting [issue preclusion]
bears the burden of establishing these requirements.’” (People v.
Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 451-452.) But even if all of these
requirements are met, there are still exceptions.
One established exception “‘holds that preclusion does not
apply when there has been a significant change in the law since
the factual findings were rendered that warrants reexamination
of the issue.’ [Citation.] ‘This exception ensures basic fairness by
allowing for relitigation where “the change in the law [is] such
that preclusion would result in a manifestly inequitable
administration of the laws.” [Citation.] It also reflects a
recognition that in the face of this sort of legal change, the
equitable policies that underlie the doctrine of issue preclusion—

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“preservation of the integrity of the judicial system, promotion of
judicial economy, and protection of litigants from harassment by
vexatious litigation” [citation]—are at an ebb.’” (Curiel, supra, 15
Cal.5th at 454; see also People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698,
716 [even when the threshold requirements for issue preclusion
are met, the doctrine “does not apply when there has been a
significant change in the law since the factual findings were
rendered that warrants reexamination of the issue”].)
Defendant filed his first petition for resentencing under
former section 1170.95 in 2019, it was denied, and we affirmed
the trial court’s denial in 2020. In reaching its decision, the trial
court stated it had been presented with “a makeshift file that
contain[ed] the pre-plea report.”4 Our prior opinion stated we
derived our statement of facts from the “probation and sentence
report.” There is no indication in the record that defendant
stipulated any of those documents were the factual basis of his
plea. And the probation report, which is hearsay, is the only
document in the appellate record that purports to describe the
facts of the crime.
After our resolution of defendant’s first appeal, our
Supreme Court decided People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 and
the Legislature substantially amended the statute that is now
section 1172.6. As a result of Lewis and the amendments to
section 1172.6, a trial court may no longer engage in factfinding
involving the weighing of evidence, rely on factual statements in
prior appellate opinions (except in a limited respect), or rely on
hearsay without an applicable exception, to conclude that a

4
The appellate record does not contain a copy of any “pre-
plea report.”

7
petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 does not state a
prima facie case. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at 971-972; People v. Owens (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1026;
People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 292; People v.
Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 988, fn. 9.) Because
defendant’s 2022 petition was “based on new authority which
challenged the primary ground for the superior court’s summary
denial of his 2019 petition,” it falls within the exception to the
issue preclusion doctrine and is not barred by the prior
proceedings. (Farfan, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at 951.)
The People also argue defendant’s second petition is barred
by the law of the case doctrine. “‘“The doctrine of the law of the
case is this: That where, upon an appeal, the [reviewing] court,
in deciding the appeal, states in its opinion a principle or rule of
law necessary to the decision, that principle or rule becomes the
law of the case and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent
progress, both in the lower court and upon subsequent appeal,
and . . . in any subsequent suit for the same cause of action . . . .”’
The principle applies to criminal as well as civil matters
[citations] . . . .” (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764,
786.) However, “the doctrine will not be adhered to where its
application will result in an unjust decision, e.g., where there has
been a ‘manifest misapplication of existing principles resulting in
substantial injustice’ [citation], or the controlling rules of law
have been altered or clarified by a decision intervening between
the first and second appellate determinations [citation].” (Id. at
787; see also People v. Jimenez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 994, 1006-
1007.) As discussed above, the amendments to section 1172.6
altered or clarified the controlling rules of law at the prima facie

8
stage. As a result, the law of the case doctrine does not foreclose
relief in this case.

B. The Petition Presents a Prima Facie Case for Relief
“A petitioner is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of
law if the record of conviction conclusively establishes, with no
factfinding, weighing of evidence, or credibility determinations,
that . . . the petitioner was the actual killer . . . .” (People v. Lopez
(2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14.) In determining whether a
petitioner makes a prima facie case for relief, the court may
review the record of conviction. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 971-
972 & fn. 6.) “When the petitioner’s conviction resulted from a
guilty plea rather than a trial, the record of conviction includes
the facts ‘the defendant admitted as the factual basis for a guilty
plea.’ [Citations.] However, the court may only consider facts the
defendant stipulated to as part of the factual basis or otherwise
admitted as true. [Citations.] ‘[A]llowing inquiry into the
historical facts that may appear in the court’s files but that were
never admitted by the petitioner as the factual basis for a
plea . . . would . . . convert the prima facie inquiry into a factual
contest.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Gaillard (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th
1206, 1211-1212.)
When the trial court found defendant was not entitled to
relief as a matter of law, it relied on its factual understanding
that defendant was the victim’s actual killer. The record on
appeal consists of the felony complaint filed against defendant,
his probation report, a certificate and order of magistrate for
defendant’s guilty plea, the abstract of judgment, and what
appears to be a court log of the proceedings. The complaint
charged defendant with one count of murder and alleged he

9
personally used a firearm in the commission of the offense. It
provides no other detail. Defendant’s plea is no more
illuminating. The document memorializing the plea recites only
that defendant pled guilty to murder as defined in section 187,
subdivision (a). His abstract of judgment reflects he was
sentenced for second degree murder. These facts, alone, provide
no insight into the facts and circumstances surrounding the
murder, and they are insufficient to establish defendant was the
victim’s actual killer. There is no indication defendant admitted
any facts constituted the factual basis of his plea. The probation
report is the only document that purports to provide a recitation
of the relevant facts, but its factual summary is comprised of
hearsay statements drawn from the “D.A. file.”5

5
The probation report, which was prepared after defendant
pled guilty, also describes statements defendant made to the
probation officer regarding the crime. In People v. Trujillo (2006)
40 Cal.4th 165, 179, our Supreme Court held that “a defendant’s
statements, made after a defendant’s plea of guilty has been
accepted, that appear in a probation officer’s report prepared
after the guilty plea has been accepted are not part of the record
of the prior conviction, because such statements do not ‘reflect[ ]
the facts of the offense for which the defendant was convicted.’”

10
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition is
reversed. The matter is remanded to the superior court with
directions to issue an order to show cause and to thereafter
proceed as required by section 1172.6, subdivision (d).

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

MOOR, J.

KIM (D.), J.

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