CourtListener 10324841•People v. Rosberg CA1/4
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Filed 1/30/25 P. v. Rosberg CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
A167186
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (San Francisco City & County
Super. Ct. Nos. CT21011497
AARON ROSBERG, & SCN234743)
Defendant and Appellant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
After a jury convicted Aaron Rosberg of assault with force likely to
commit great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)), he was sentenced to two
years’ probation. In this appeal, he argues there is insufficient evidence to
support the jury’s finding that the force Rosberg used was, in fact, likely to
cause great bodily injury. We disagree and therefore affirm the judgment.
“ ‘When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable
to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence —
that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value — from which
1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds. Jud.
Admin., § 8.1.) We provide a limited factual summary because our opinion is
unpublished and the parties know, or should know, “the facts of the case and
its procedural history.” (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851.)
All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. [Citation.] . . . We presume in support of the judgment the existence of
every fact the trier of fact reasonably could infer from the evidence.
[Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings,
reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances
might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. [Citation.] A
reviewing court neither reweighs evidence nor reevaluates a witness’s
credibility.’ ” (People v. Medellin (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 526–527.)
Section 245, subdivision (a)(4), provides for the punishment of “[a]ny
person who commits an assault upon the person of another by any means of
force likely to produce great bodily injury.” “ ‘Great bodily injury is bodily
injury which is significant or substantial, not insignificant, trivial or
moderate.’ [Citation.] ‘Likely’ has not been defined precisely,” but our
Supreme Court in In re B.M. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 528, 534, cited “dictionary
definitions such as ‘probable’ and ‘very probable’ ” in rejecting the “argument
that ‘likely’ merely means ‘possible.’ ” (People v. Drayton (2019)
42 Cal.App.5th 612, 614, 618.)
Here, the assault transpired at a bus stop, where the 81-year-old victim
had turned his back on Rosberg. According to the victim’s testimony, as he
was walking away from Rosberg, the victim felt he “was being shoved and
[then] fell” before fainting. The force of the shove felt “like some force that
came from behind and above” him. It was “[p]retty forceful.” Immediately
after the shove, witnesses saw the victim lying on a concrete sidewalk. From
this evidence, a jury could reasonably infer that Rosberg had pushed the
victim from behind, with enough force to cause the victim to fall down and
forward, ultimately losing consciousness. A second reasonable inference from
these facts is that shoving the 81-year-old victim was, under the
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circumstances, likely to send him falling forward onto the concrete sidewalk.
And the jury — who was able to see the victim in person, less than nine
months after the assault — could reasonably draw the third inference that
the victim would probably suffer great bodily injury from such a fall.
Finally, we reject Rosberg’s comparisons of his case to In re B.M. (2018)
6 Cal.5th 528, In re Brandon T. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1491, and In re
Beasley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1078. None of these cases involved
circumstances materially analogous to those in the instant case, where
Rosberg, coming from behind, applied force to an unsuspecting elderly man
who, as a result, was likely to fall down and forward onto an extremely hard
surface.2
In sum, substantial evidence supports the verdict.
DISPOSITION
We affirm.
2 Cf. People v. Russell (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 776, 788: “In the present
case it is not necessarily the force of appellant’s push, so long as it was
sufficient to propel [the victim] into the street when [a certain] car was
approaching. It is the injury-producing potential of the moving automobile
that supplies the likelihood of great bodily injury or worse.”
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SIMONDS, J.*
We concur:
BROWN, P. J.
STREETER, J.
People v. Rosberg (A167186)
* Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Sonoma, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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