Pich v. Laseraway CA2/4

CourtListener 10322430CalctappJan 28, 2025

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Filed 1/28/25 Pich v. Laseraway CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR

HEATHER PICH, B331219
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
v. Super. Ct. No.
23STCV01082)
LASERAWAY, LLC, et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Carolyn B. Kuhl, Judge. Affirmed.
Epstein Becker & Green, Michael S. Kun and Kevin D.
Sullivan for Defendants and Appellants.
Yoffe & Cooper, Alexander Yoffe; Rosen Saba, Ryan D.
Saba and Michael Forman for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION

Heather Pich filed a putative class action against her
former employers, LaserAway, LLC, and LaserAway Medical
Group, Inc. (collectively, LaserAway), alleging various wage and
hour claims under the Labor Code arising out of her
employment.1 In response, LaserAway moved to compel
arbitration, strike the class claims, dismiss the tenth cause of
action for penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act
(PAGA), and dismiss or stay the litigation. The trial court denied
the motion on the ground that LaserAway failed to prove the
existence of an agreement between the parties to arbitrate. For
the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

LaserAway hired Pich in May 2021. Pich electronically
signed several employment related documents using LaserAway’s
computerized onboarding process, including one entitled Mutual
Agreement to Arbitrate Employment Related Disputes (the
agreement).
The agreement provides, in relevant part that it “is made
and entered into by and between Heather Pich and LaserAway
(the ‘Company’).” It further provides: “The Company and I
understand and agree that we will arbitrate disputes and claims
under this Agreement instead of a court trial before a judge
and/or a jury. The Company and I understand and agree that, by
signing this Agreement, we are expressly waiving any and all
rights to a trial before a judge and/or a jury regarding any

1 For purposes of the motion to compel arbitration,
LaserAway does not contest Pich’s allegation that she was jointly
employed by both companies.

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disputes and claims which we now have or which we may in the
future have that are subject to arbitration under this
Agreement.” The last page of the agreement includes an
“Acknowledgement” in capital letters, which states in relevant
part: “The parties acknowledge and agree that each has read this
agreement carefully and understand that by signing it, each is
waiving all rights to a trial or hearing before a judge or jury of
any and all disputes and claims subject to arbitration under this
agreement.” Following the acknowledgement is a checkbox next
to the statement “I understand that checking this box constitutes
a legal signature confirming that I, Heather Pich, acknowledge
and agree to the above Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate
Employment Related Disputes.” The box is checked.
Pich stopped working for LaserAway in July 2022. In 2023,
Pich filed a putative class action complaint against LaserAway
for: alleged violations of the Labor Code; violation of the Business
and Professions Code; and civil penalties under PAGA. In
response, LaserAway moved to compel arbitration, strike class
claims, dismiss the PAGA cause of action, and stay or dismiss the
action. Pich opposed the motion, arguing in part that an
enforceable agreement was not formed between the parties
because neither LaserAway nor Pich signed the agreement.
Following a hearing, the trial court issued a comprehensive
order denying the motion on the ground that LaserAway failed to
prove the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. The trial court’s
conclusion rested on two independent grounds: (1) LaserAway did
not sign the agreement despite language in the agreement
indicating signatures from both parties are required; and (2)
LaserAway did not meet its burden of proving Pich assented to
the arbitration agreement.

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LaserAway timely appealed the order denying its motion.

DISCUSSION

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides arbitration
agreements are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract . . . .” (9 U.S.C. § 2.)2 “‘[E]ven when the [FAA] applies,
[however], interpretation of the arbitration agreement is
governed by state law principles . . . . Under California law,
ordinary rules of contract interpretation apply to arbitration
agreements. . . . “‘The fundamental goal of contractual
interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention of the
parties. . . . ’”’” (Valencia v. Smyth (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 153,
177.) Although federal and California law favor enforcement of
valid arbitration agreements, “‘“[t]here is no public policy
favoring arbitration of disputes which the parties have not agreed
to arbitrate.”’” (Metters v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2008) 161
Cal.App.4th 696, 701.)
“[W]hen a petition to compel arbitration is filed and
accompanied by prima facie evidence of a written agreement to
arbitrate the controversy, the court itself must determine
whether the agreement exists and, if any defense to its
enforcement is raised, whether it is enforceable. Because the
existence of the agreement is a statutory prerequisite to granting
the petition, the petitioner bears the burden of proving its
existence by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Rosenthal v.
Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.)

2 The agreement provides that the arbitration and the
agreement shall be governed by the FAA.

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The issue we decide on appeal—i.e., whether LaserAway
was required to sign the agreement to demonstrate the existence
of a valid arbitration agreement—presents a contract
interpretation question. “When, as here, no conflicting extrinsic
evidence is introduced to aid the interpretation of an agreement
to arbitrate, the Court of Appeal reviews de novo a trial court’s
ruling on a petition to compel arbitration.” (California
Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State of California (2006) 142
Cal.App.4th 198, 204.)3

B. LaserAway Did Not Prove the Existence of an
Agreement to Arbitrate
As noted above, the same rules govern an arbitration
agreement as any other contract. “The existence of a contract
under California law requires four essential elements: parties
capable of contracting; their consent; a lawful object; and a
sufficient cause or consideration.” (Fleming v. Oliphant
Financial, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 13, 21.)
It is undisputed LaserAway did not sign the agreement.
LaserAway nevertheless contends its assent should be presumed
because: it drafted the agreement; language in the agreement
obligates LaserAway to its terms; and LaserAway presented the
agreement to Pich upon hire. LaserAway is correct that the
absence of the employer’s signature is not always dispositive. But
here, the plain language of the agreement requires LaserAway’s

3 The parties submitted conflicting evidence regarding
whether Pich signed the agreement. We do not reach this issue,
because, as discussed in detail below, even if Pich signed the
agreement, no enforceable agreement exists due to LaserAway’s
failure to sign.

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signature to form an agreement to arbitrate, and none was ever
provided.
The agreement’s terms clearly state LaserAway’s signature
is necessary to form an agreement to arbitrate: “The Company
and I understand and agree that, by signing this Agreement, we
are expressly waiving any and all rights to a trial before a judge
and/or a jury . . . .” (Italics added.) The signature requirement is
repeated again under the “Acknowledgment” heading: “The
parties acknowledge and agree that each has read this agreement
carefully and understand that by signing it, each is waiving all
rights to a trial or hearing before a judge or jury of any and all
disputes and claims subject to arbitration under this agreement.”
(Italics added.) Because LaserAway did not sign the agreement
per its unambiguous terms, the parties never formed an
agreement to arbitrate.
The court in Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Investment
Brokerage Co. v. Hock Investment Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 83
(Marcus) similarly held signatures are required to form an
agreement to arbitrate when the language of the agreement
imposes that requirement. In Marcus, the agreement stated in
part: “‘By initializing in the space below you are agreeing to have
any dispute arising out of the matters included in the
“Arbitration of Disputes” provision decided by neutral arbitration
. . . .’” (Id. at p. 86.) Although the buyers initialed the provision,
the sellers did not. (Ibid.) The Marcus court thus concluded that
“the contract contemplated that the arbitration of disputes
provision would be effective only if both buyers and sellers
assented to that provision by initialing it [and] [s]ince the sellers

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did not initial that provision, it did not become effective.” (Id. at
p. 92.)4
The cases relied on by LaserAway, in which courts have
enforced arbitration agreements that were not countersigned by
the employer, are easily distinguishable. (See Serafin v. Balco
Properties Ltd., LLC (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 165 (Serafin); Cruise
v. Kroger Co. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 390; Fuentes v. Empire
Nissan, Inc. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 919.) Critically, none of those
cases involved arbitration agreements indicating a signature
from both parties is necessary to form an agreement. For
example, in Serafin, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 171, the
agreement stated: “‘[I]t is the policy of [the employer] that the
disputed matter shall be submitted to binding arbitration under
the Rules of the American Arbitration Association applicable to
employment disputes. All employees will be required to sign an
acknowledgement stating that they understand this policy and
will comply with it.’” Because the agreement did not require the
employer’s signature, the Serafin court looked to the presence or
absence of evidence of the employer’s intent to be bound by the
agreement. It then concluded the employer’s intent to be bound
by the agreement could be inferred because the agreement was
drafted by the employer, the agreement was printed on the
employer’s letterhead, and the employer filed a motion to stay the
litigation and compel arbitration. (Id. at pp. 176-177.) But here,

4 We are unpersuaded by LaserAway’s argument that
Marcus is inapplicable because the agreement in that case,
unlike here, included a signature line for the sellers. Construing
the agreement as a whole, the lack of a signature line for
LaserAway does not negate the unambiguous language in the
agreement requiring signatures by both parties.

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we cannot, as LaserAway urges us to do, presume it assented to
the agreement when the terms of the agreement specifically call
for signatures from both parties and LaserAway did not sign it.5
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err by
finding LaserAway failed to prove the existence of an agreement
to arbitrate, and denying LaserAway’s motion to compel
arbitration on that basis.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. Pich is awarded her costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

CURREY, P. J.
We concur:

MORI, J.

ZUKIN, J.

5 We reject LaserAway’s argument that it signed the
agreement because its “name is printed on the [a]greement and
[the agreement is] offered to all newly hired employees through a
secure, online portal bearing its name.” Nothing in the agreement
indicates that LaserAway’s name in the agreement equates to a
signature. If that were the case, signatures would hardly—if
ever—be required because the parties to an agreement are
generally defined in its terms.

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