People v. Spencer CA2/3

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Filed 1/28/25 P. v. Spencer CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B331308

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA050609)
v.

VICTOR SPENCER,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Sam Ohta, Judge. Affirmed.
Elana Goldstein, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Kathy S. Pomerantz, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
In 1991, Victor Spencer participated in setting a fire that
killed five people. A jury convicted Spencer of multiple counts of
first degree murder with true findings on special circumstance
allegations. The trial court sentenced him to life without parole.
Years later, Spencer petitioned for resentencing under Penal
Code section 1172.6,1 which limited accomplice liability for
murder. After an evidentiary hearing under that section, the
trial court found that Spencer was a major participant in a felony
who acted with reckless indifference to human life and denied the
petition. Spencer now appeals from the trial court’s order
denying his petition, contending there was insufficient evidence
to support the trial court’s findings. We disagree and affirm the
order.
BACKGROUND
I. Evidence at the trial of Spencer and Harold Mangram for
murder and arson
Spencer was jointly tried with Harold Mangram for murder
and arson. A third participant in the crimes, Frank Villareal,
pled guilty to five counts of voluntary manslaughter and testified
at Mangram and Spencer’s trial.
A. The fire
In September 1991, Juan Zuniga was living with 16 family
members in Unit 481, a two-story apartment in the Jordan

1
All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to
section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)

2
Downs complex. The family had problems with drug users who
would hang out near their front door and harass the family.
Zuniga’s wife had to wash her porch daily because people would
urinate on it. She complained to the housing authority twice a
week.
Zuniga slept downstairs in the kitchen with his wife and
three children. Just before 6:00 a.m. on the morning of
September 7, 1991, Zuniga heard a noise. He went outside and
saw three men near his front door. One man was a bit further
away from the other two men. Zuniga went back inside and got
his gun, but he then smelled gas and felt a flame. Gasoline was
coming through the front door mail slot. Zuniga went upstairs to
help family members jump out of a window, not realizing other
family members remained in another upstairs room. Zuniga
returned downstairs, saw a man (Gregory Moore), and shot him,
unaware that Moore was a neighbor who had come to help.
Zuniga went outside and tried to get the rest of his family out of
the apartment, but was unable to save 65-year-old Marguerite
Hernandez, 22-year-old Martha Zuniga, four-year-old Juan
Zuniga, four-year-old Claudia Zuniga, and one-year-old Veronica
Lopez.
B. Roderick Garner’s testimony
Garner used to live in Jordan Downs, and he had known
Mangram for 35 years, Spencer for a few years, and Villareal for
a few months. Mangram was known as “Grandad” and Villareal
as “Little Man.” Garner, Mangram, Spencer, and Villareal
abused drugs.
The day before the fire, Mangram told Garner that he had
a job for him and asked Garner to get gasoline. Garner agreed,
thinking they would be “burning” someone out to get dope.

3
Garner asked if he could be the one to throw the gasoline.
Garner also thought they were just going to scare people, and
nobody was supposed to get hurt. Later that night, Garner
unsuccessfully tried to siphon gasoline from cars.
About 20 or 30 minutes before the fire started, Garner saw
Mangram and Spencer at base station,2 a vacant house used as a
“dope house.” At the preliminary hearing, Garner testified that
when he was at base station, Mangram told Spencer to get
gasoline. At trial, however, Garner retracted that testimony,
saying he had lied at the preliminary hearing. Garner also saw
on a porch a couple of houses away a plastic milk container filled
with a goldish-brown liquid, which he later learned was gasoline.
Spencer showed the container to Mangram by gesturing to it.
Spencer and Mangram walked in the direction of Zuniga’s
apartment, and Garner noticed that the container was no longer
on the step.
About 15 or 20 minutes before the fire broke out, Garner
saw Villareal riding a bike in a parking lot west of Zuniga’s
apartment.
About 15 or 20 minutes after the fire broke out, Mangram
knocked on Garner’s door, and when Garner opened it, he could
hear screaming and hollering. However, Garner gave statements
to the police that Mangram and Spencer came to his door,
Mangram smelled of gasoline, and Mangram changed his shirt
while Spencer left. After seeing the fire, Garner wandered to
another apartment near base station. Spencer was at this

2
The dope house is referred to as bay station and base
station in the record.

4
apartment with another person, and they were packing their
things to leave.
C. Villareal’s testimony
Villareal testified that he saw Mangram the morning before
the fire. Mangram said he was going to make some money, and
he had an empty plastic milk container.
Villareal saw Spencer later that night, around 6 or 7 p.m.,
on a street next to the projects. Spencer was riding a bicycle, and
he let Villareal ride it. Two hours later, Villareal saw Spencer
sitting on a porch with two women. Mangram came around the
corner and left.
Sometime around 2 or 3:00 a.m., Villareal saw Spencer
with Mangram, who was holding an empty plastic container.
Spencer and Mangram walked in the direction of Zuniga’s
apartment. About an hour later, Villareal saw Spencer and
Mangram on Zuniga’s front porch trying to pour liquid from the
container through the mail slot. Villareal helped them by tearing
a piece of cardboard off a nearby box, bending it, inserting the
cardboard into the mail slot, and holding it as Mangram funneled
gasoline through the mail slot. Spencer was holding a cigarette
lighter. At that point, someone inside the apartment said
something, so Villareal ran away. Villareal did not plan to kill
anyone.
About an hour later, Villareal saw Mangram and asked if
he had anything. Mangram gave him a rock of cocaine. A bit
later, Villareal saw Spencer at a bus stop, and Spencer said he
was never coming back to the projects. Villareal asked Spencer if
he had any dope, and Spencer said no.

5
D. Gregory Moore’s testimony
For the months prior to the fire, Moore had been staying
with his sister at Jordan Downs. On the morning of the fire,
Moore was up early, preparing to go to work when he saw smoke
coming out of Zuniga’s apartment. Looking out his window, he
saw Mangram and Spencer in the parking lot, and Mangram was
holding a red and yellow gas can.3 Moore went into Zuniga’s
apartment to help, but Zuniga shot him.
Moore later told the police that one of the men he saw that
night wore a Raiders jacket.
E. Expert testimony
An arson investigator testified that the fire was reported at
6:09 a.m. and was extinguished 12 minutes later. The
investigator determined that the fire was intentionally set and
that just under one gallon, to perhaps slightly over two gallons, of
a flammable combustible liquid had been poured through the
mail slot and ignited with an open flame device. The fire then
progressed quickly, producing a toxic smoke that shuts out light
and causes disorientation within seconds of breathing it and loss
of consciousness seconds later.
II. Verdict and sentence
A jury found Spencer guilty of five counts of first degree
murder with true findings on special circumstance allegations
that he committed the murders while engaged in arson of an
inhabited structure. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) The

3
Moore had testified at preliminary hearing that Spencer
had the can.

6
jury also found him guilty of arson causing great bodily injury to
the five victims.4 (§ 451, subd. (a).) In 1994, after a penalty
phase, the trial court sentenced Spencer to five life without
parole terms.
III. Postconviction petition for resentencing
In March 2022, Spencer petitioned for resentencing under
section 1172.6. The People agreed that Spencer made a prima
facie case for relief, so the trial court scheduled an evidentiary
hearing. At the evidentiary hearing, the parties submitted on the
reporter’s and clerk’s transcripts from the underlying trial and
stipulated to enter into evidence two exhibits, a transcript of
Moore’s initial statement to the police and a police report about
that statement. The parties also stipulated to entering into
evidence the testimony of Ahmad Spencer (no relation to
defendant) as follows: Ahmad Spencer (1) knew Mangram,
Spencer, and Villareal before the murders, (2) frequently saw
Villareal wearing a Raiders jacket, and (3) Villareal was wearing
that jacket at about 10 to 11 a.m. on the morning of the fire.
After hearing the parties’ arguments, the trial court framed
the issue as whether Spencer could now be convicted of murder
as (1) the actual killer, (2) an aider and abettor who acted with
intent to kill, or (3) a major participant who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.5 First, the trial court found there was

4
The jury found Mangram guilty of the same crimes and
special circumstance allegations.
5
Spencer had argued that he was entitled to resentencing
because a witness misidentified him and Villareal’s testimony
was not credible. The trial court rejected these arguments

7
no evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that Spencer was the
actual killer because the evidence was open to the reasonable
interpretation that Mangram or Spencer lit the fire. Second, the
trial court could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that Spencer
harbored express malice when committing the arson.
Turning to the third theory of liability, however, the trial
court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Spencer was a major
participant in the arson who acted with reckless indifference to
human life. The trial court found that Spencer helped plan the
arson by showing the container filled with gasoline to Mangram,
obtaining gasoline, being present while the gasoline was being
poured into the apartment, failing to restrain his accomplices,
and either lighting the fire or giving the lighter to Mangram to
light it. Based on these factors, the trial court found that
Spencer was a major participant in the arson. Turning to the
reckless indifference prong, the trial court found that Spencer
knew most, if not all, of the apartment’s residents would be
asleep. Setting fire to an apartment at that time of day therefore
was “an act that involved grave risk of death to many innocent
human beings. . . . [¶] The only reasonable and rational
circumstantial inference is that [Spencer] acted with reckless
indifference to human life.”
The trial court accordingly denied Spencer’s petition.

because they had “nothing to do with changes to section 188 or
189.” Spencer does not address the trial court’s ruling on that
ground, although he continues to assert that Villareal’s testimony
cannot support the trial court’s order because that testimony was
not credible.

8
DISCUSSION
I. Senate Bill No. 1437
To the end of ensuring a person’s sentence is commensurate
with the person’s individual criminal culpability, Senate Bill
No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) limited
accomplice liability under the felony-murder rule, eliminated the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to
murder, and eliminated convictions for murder based on a theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime. (See generally People v. Reyes
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 986; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952,
957, 959; People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843.) As
relevant here, Senate Bill 1437 amended the felony-murder rule
by adding section 189, subdivision (e), which provides that a
participant in the perpetration of qualifying felonies is liable for
felony murder only if the person (1) was the actual killer, (2) was
not the actual killer but, with the intent to kill, acted as a direct
aider and abettor, or (3) the person was a major participant in
the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to
human life, as described in section 190.2, subdivision
(d). (Gentile, at p. 842.)
Senate Bill 1437 also created a procedure, codified at
section 1172.6, for a person convicted of murder under the former
law to be resentenced if the person could no longer be convicted of
those crimes under the current law. (People v. Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 959; People v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 847.)
A defendant commences that procedure by filing a petition
containing a declaration that, among other things, the defendant
could not presently be convicted of murder under the current law.
(People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.)

9
If a petition establishes a prima facie case for relief, the
trial court must appoint counsel if requested, issue an order to
show cause, and hold an evidentiary hearing at which the parties
may offer new or additional evidence and the trial court sits as an
independent factfinder to determine beyond a reasonable doubt
whether the defendant is guilty of murder under a valid theory.
(§ 1172.6, subds. (b)(3), (c), & (d)(1); People v. Garrison (2021) 73
Cal.App.5th 735, 745.)
II. Standard of review
On appeal, we review the trial court’s findings after a
section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), evidentiary hearing for
substantial evidence. (People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
276, 298; accord, People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575,
591 (Mitchell).) Under that standard of review we “ ‘ “examine
the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is,
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value that
would support a rational trier of fact in finding [the defendant
guilty] beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (Clements, at p. 298.) We
presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact
that can be reasonably deduced from the evidence. (People v.
Owens (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1022 (Owens).) We do not
resolve credibility issues or evidentiary conflicts. (Ibid.)
Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and any
reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. (People v.
Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57.) Before we may set aside a trial
court’s order, it must be clear that “ ‘ “upon no hypothesis
whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support
[it].” ’ ” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)

10
III. Banks/Clark factors
The trial court found Spencer guilty of felony murder as a
major participant in a felony who acted with reckless indifference
to human life under current law. This area of law has its genesis
in two United States Supreme Court cases: Enmund v. Florida
(1982) 458 U.S. 782 and Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137.
Enmund held that the death penalty could not constitutionally be
imposed on an armed robbery getaway driver who was a minor
participant in the crime, was not present when the murder was
committed, and had no intent to kill. (Enmund, at pp. 798, 801.)
In contrast, Tison v. Arizona, supra, 481 U.S. at page 139,
did not preclude imposing the death penalty for two defendants,
brothers, who had helped their father and his cellmate—both
convicted murderers—escape from prison. The defendants gave
them guns, and the group later kidnapped a family of four. The
defendants then stood by while their father debated whether to
kill the family and proceeded to shoot the family, including a
toddler and a teenager. (Id. at pp. 139–141.) The court held that
the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit imposing the death
penalty on a nonkiller who lacked the intent to kill, but whose
“participation [in the crime] is major and whose mental state is
one of reckless indifference to the value of human life.” (Id. at
p. 152; see also id. at pp. 157–158.)
Years later, in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788
(Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), our
Supreme Court addressed Enmund and Tison and substantially
clarified the “major participant” and “reckless indifference to
human life” requirements. Banks, at page 794, considered “under
what circumstances an accomplice who lacks the intent to kill
may qualify as a major participant.” The court listed various

11
factors that should be considered in making that determination:
“What role did the defendant have in planning the criminal
enterprise that led to one or more deaths? What role did the
defendant have in supplying or using lethal weapons? What
awareness did the defendant have of particular dangers posed by
the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past experience or
conduct of the other participants? Was the defendant present at
the scene of the killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the
actual murder, and did his or her own actions or inaction play a
particular role in the death? What did the defendant do after
lethal force was used?” (Id. at p. 803, fn. omitted.)
The court then turned its attention to “reckless indifference
to human life” in Clark. Reckless indifference to human life is
“ ‘implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to
carry a grave risk of death.’ ” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 616.)
It “encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist another in
killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not
specifically desire that death as the outcome of his actions.”
(Id. at p. 617.) Recklessness has both a subjective and an
objective component. (Ibid.) Subjectively, the defendant must
consciously disregard risks known to him. Objectively,
recklessness is determined by “what ‘a law-abiding person would
observe in the actor’s situation,’ ” that is, whether defendant’s
conduct “ ‘involved a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a law-abiding person in the actor’s situation would
observe.’ ” (Ibid.)
Clark listed factors to consider when determining whether
reckless indifference existed: “Did the defendant use or know
that a gun would be used during the felony? How many weapons
were ultimately used? Was the defendant physically present at

12
the crime? Did he or she have the opportunity to restrain the
crime or aid the victim? What was the duration of the interaction
between the perpetrators of the felony and the victims? What
was the defendant’s knowledge of his or her confederate’s
propensity for violence or likelihood of using lethal force? What
efforts did the defendant make to minimize the risks of violence
during the felony?” (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677
(Scoggins) [summarizing Clark factors].)
In evaluating the sufficiency of evidence to support a trial
court’s finding that the Banks/Clark factors are established, no
one factor “ ‘is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily
sufficient.’ ” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 618.) Rather, we
evaluate the factors under the totality of the circumstances to
determine a petitioner’s place on the culpability spectrum.
(Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 675.)
IV. Sufficiency of the evidence to support finding that Spencer
was a major participant in a felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life
Spencer contends there was insufficient evidence to support
both prongs of the Banks/Clark analysis; that is, he was neither a
major participant in the arson nor did he act with reckless
indifference to human life. We disagree.
A. Major participant prong
The first factor we consider in evaluating the sufficiency of
the evidence that Spencer was a major participant in the arson is
his role in planning it. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.) As
Spencer points out, the evidence tends to show that Mangram
was the arson’s mastermind. Even so, while being a crime’s
mastermind would certainly weigh heavily in favor of the major

13
participant prong (see, e.g., Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 612),
Spencer cites no authority for the notion that one must be the
mastermind to be a major participant. Instead, we consider the
totality of circumstances. (Banks, at p. 802.) And here, the trial
court found that Spencer helped plan the arson because he
showed the container of gasoline to Mangram. Thus, there was
some evidence that Spencer was involved in planning the arson,
even if he did not mastermind it. In any event, even if this single
factor does not weigh heavily in favor of the major participant
prong, we must still consider the other Banks factors.
The next factor we therefore consider is Spencer’s role in
supplying the lethal devices, here the gasoline and the lighter.
There was evidence Spencer supplied the gasoline. Mangram
had asked Garner to get gasoline, but Garner was unable to
siphon gasoline from cars. This raised a reasonable inference
that Mangram turned to someone else to get gasoline. Garner
testified at the preliminary hearing that Mangram told Spencer
to get gasoline. Although Garner said at trial that he had lied at
the preliminary hearing, the trial court was entitled to credit
Garner’s preliminary hearing testimony. Garner also testified
that he saw a container of gasoline on a porch and saw Spencer
gesture toward it in a way to show Mangram where it was. This
further buttressed a finding that Spencer obtained the gasoline;
otherwise, why would Spencer have to show Mangram where the
gasoline was? Spencer and Mangram then walked in the
direction of Zuniga’s apartment, and Garner noticed that the
container was no longer on the porch. As for the lighter, Villareal
testified that Spencer had it on the porch just before the fire was
set. It is therefore reasonable to infer that Spencer also supplied
the lighter based on his possession of it on the porch.

14
The third Banks factor is whether Spencer was aware of
the particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons
used, or past experience or conduct of the other participants. It is
more than reasonable to infer that Spencer knew that pouring
gasoline into an occupied two-story apartment and lighting the
gasoline on fire was extremely dangerous. By its very nature,
setting fire to an inhabited structure cannot be committed
without creating a substantial risk someone will be killed, and
therefore the act is inherently dangerous. (People v. Nieves
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 464.)
Fourth, the evidence showed that Spencer was at the scene
of the killings, in a position to facilitate or prevent them, and his
actions played a role in the deaths. Spencer was with Mangram
on Zuniga’s porch, helping Mangram pour gasoline through the
mail slot. And given that Spencer possessed the lighter while on
Zuniga’s porch, it is reasonable to infer he played perhaps the
most critical role in furtherance of the crimes: lighting the
gasoline.
In sum, substantial evidence of Spencer’s role in obtaining
the gasoline, helping Mangram pour it into Zuniga’s apartment,
and lighting the gasoline on fire supported the trial court’s
finding that Spencer was a major participant in the arson.
Spencer’s primary response to the evidence supporting the
trial court’s finding on the major participant prong is that it was
contradictory, open to interpretation, and based on unreliable
witnesses. Spencer thus argues that even if there was evidence
Mangram asked him to get gasoline, it is unclear that Spencer
followed that instruction or knew what use Mangram had
planned for the gasoline, which Spencer notes has “many other
non-deadly uses.” Spencer also argues that Villareal was not

15
credible because, for example, he had a criminal record,6 he
abused drugs, his plea agreement gave him a motive to lie, he
lied to law enforcement when initially interviewed in this case,
and he was equally culpable in these murders because he helped
pour the gasoline through the mail slot.
The trial court, however, was well aware of the evidence at
the criminal trial and of any issues regarding Villareal’s
credibility, having reviewed the trial transcripts. As the
independent trier of fact at the evidentiary hearing (§ 1172.6,
subd. (d)(3)), its role was to determine whether Spencer could be
convicted of murder under current law beyond a reasonable
doubt. In that role, the trial court was entitled to weigh the
evidence and make credibility findings. Our role on appeal,
however, is to review the trial court’s findings for substantial
evidence, meaning we may not reweigh the evidence or make
credibility findings. (People v. Clements, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at
p. 298; accord, Mitchell, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 591; Owens,
supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 1022.) We therefore decline to find
Villareal not credible or resolve evidentiary conflicts in Spencer’s
favor. Instead, the evidence being more than sufficient to
support the trial court’s finding that Spencer was a major
participant in the crime, we must affirm it.
B. Reckless indifference to human life prong
Moving to the second prong of the inquiry, the same factors
that support the trial court’s finding on the major participant
prong support its finding that Spencer acted with reckless

6
Villareal’s criminal history included stabbing a sheriff’s
deputy while incarcerated for these crimes. His plea bargain
included resolving the charges for stabbing the deputy.

16
indifference to human life. (See generally Clark, supra, 63
Cal.4th at p. 615 [significant overlap exists between factors
establishing two prongs].)
That is, the first Clark factor, Spencer’s knowledge that
lethal weapons would be used, heavily supports the trial court’s
reckless indifference finding. Spencer personally used and knew
that a lethal “weapon”—gasoline and a lighter—would be used
during the felony. (See generally Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
p. 17.) The evidence shows that Spencer obtained gasoline,
helped Mangram pour it through the mail slot, and then lit the
gasoline on fire. Moreover, Spencer was with Mangram at all
crucial steps of these crimes. Garner saw them together at base
station 20 or 30 minutes before the fire started. Spencer and
Mangram then walked in the direction of Zuniga’s apartment.
Villareal saw Spencer and Mangram at Zuniga’s apartment,
trying to pour gasoline through the mail slot. Fifteen or 20
minutes after the fire broke out, Mangram knocked on Garner’s
door, and, according to Garner’s preliminary hearing testimony,
Spencer was with him. Therefore, there was evidence that
Spencer was with Mangram before, during, and after the arson.
(See, e.g., Mitchell, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 592 [“Mitchell was
physically present at every stage of the crime: planning,
execution, dividing the spoils, and flight.”].)
Yet, there is no evidence that at any point Spencer tried to
restrain Mangram or Villareal. Instead, Spencer helped
Mangram pour gasoline through the mail slot, and Spencer either
lit the gasoline on fire or gave the lighter to Mangram so that
Mangram could light the gasoline on fire. This exhibited a
reckless indifference to human life. (Compare People v. Bascomb
(2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1077, 1089 [defendant enabled murder by

17
using gun to keep victims at bay during bank robbery], with
Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 679 [quickness of shooting
suggested defendant lacked control over accomplices’ actions];
People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 989 [defendant
lacked meaningful opportunity to intervene when he and shooter
were on opposite sides of victim’s car, and attempted carjacking
was quickly executed]; In re Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434,
452 [defendant present during robbery but not “ ‘close enough’ ”
to restrain shooter].)
There is also no evidence Spencer tried to minimize the risk
of violence. To the contrary, Spencer committed the arson in the
early morning when the apartment’s occupants were home and
likely asleep, and therefore particularly vulnerable. Moreover,
when Zuniga heard a noise at his front door, he went outside and
saw the arsonists, so it is reasonable to infer that they saw him.
Therefore, Spencer could not have doubted that someone was in
the apartment when he lit the fire. Also, Spencer and Mangram
poured one to two gallons of accelerant into the apartment,
causing a quick burning fire and toxic smoke which would have
promptly disabled the apartment’s occupants. Spencer therefore
committed the arson in a manner designed to maximize the risk
of violence. (Compare Owens, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 1024
[bank robbery posed high risk of violence because it occurred
during business hours with 20 people present and robbers were
armed], with Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 621–622 [plan to rob
closed store minimized risk of violence]; Scoggins, supra,
9 Cal.5th at p. 677 [defendant’s plan to beat victim and steal his
money did not involve use of weapons].)
Next, there is little direct evidence that Spencer knew
about any propensity for violence Mangram might have had.

18
(See generally People v. Nieber (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 458, 479
[although Nieber did not know about cohorts’ likelihood of killing,
he knew they brought a weapon and were using it]; In re Bennett
(2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1002, 1025 [finding “ ‘significant’ ” the lack
of evidence that the petitioner knew of his confederates’ “violent
propensities”].) However, Spencer and Mangram abused drugs
and needed money. Garner said that when Mangram asked him
to get gasoline, Garner understood that they were going to burn
someone out to get dope. Villareal similarly testified that he had
previously seen houses burned down in Jordan Downs. Garner’s
and Villareal’s testimony therefore raised a reasonable inference
that setting fire to people’s homes had happened before at Jordan
Downs, and Spencer, as someone who frequented Jordan Downs,
may have known of that practice.
The next factor we examine is the crime’s duration, because
there is generally a greater opportunity for violence when victims
are restrained for prolonged periods. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
p. 620.) This crime differs from the more usual murder occurring
during the course of an armed robbery. This crime involved
Spencer and Mangram lighting a fire from outside Zuniga’s
apartment, and therefore there was no “restraint” of the victims
as might occur during a robbery. Even so, Spencer lit fire to a
confined space, a two-story apartment from which it would not be
easy for the victims, especially the ones asleep upstairs, to
escape. Thus, although the victims were not restrained by, for
example, rope or at gunpoint, they were nonetheless restrained
by virtue of being in a dwelling lit on fire, which would quickly
cut off escape routes. Moreover, Clark considered that the longer
a crime lasts, the chance of violence increases. But in the case of

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arson, a longer duration is unnecessary to increase the violence.
Indeed, a point of arson may be that fire spreads quickly.
There is no evidence Spencer tried to help the apartment’s
occupants. If he had no intent to kill and intended just to scare
the apartment’s occupants, he still had the opportunity to help
Zuniga and his family get out of the apartment once he saw the
extent of the fire. Instead, unlike Zuniga’s neighbor Moore,
Spencer packed up his things and left. Such callous behavior
supports the reckless indifference finding. (See, e.g., Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619; In re Parrish (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th
539, 544 [reckless indifference shown by failure to aid or comfort
victim]; People v. Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1, 10 [petitioner
“displayed no interest in moderating violence or in aiding his
bloody and suffering victim,” and instead picked his pocket].)
Spencer’s reliance on In re Taylor (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th
543 to support his argument that his flight and failure to help the
victims did not evidence a reckless indifference to human life is
misplaced. In that case, the defendant fled the scene despite
knowing that the victim had been shot. (Id. at p. 559.) There
was no evidence the defendant knew how badly the victim was
wounded, and there was evidence the defendant thought help
was arriving. (Ibid.) In contrast, Spencer knew, or it is
reasonable to infer he knew, that Zuniga’s two-story apartment
was on fire, there were people inside, and time was of the essence
to help people escape. Indeed, Garner testified that when
Mangram and Spencer came to his door 15 or 20 minutes after
the fire started, Garner could hear screaming and hollering.
Despite hearing this, Spencer still did not help the victims.
Substantial evidence therefore supports the findings that
Spencer knew lethal items (gasoline and a lighter) would be used,

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helped pour the gasoline and light it on fire or gave the lighter to
Mangram, did not try to restrain his accomplices or aid the
victims, and performed the arson in a way designed to maximize
violence. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s ultimate finding that Spencer was a major participant in
the arson who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Victor Spencer’s Penal Code section
1172.6 petition is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

EGERTON, J.

HANASONO, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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