CourtListener 10321062•E.B. v. V.L. CA6
Full text
Filed 1/27/25 E.B. v. V.L. CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
E.B., H051904
(Monterey County
Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 23PT000213)
v.
V.L.,
Respondent;
MONTEREY COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES,
Intervener and Respondent.
E.B. appeals from a judgment declaring him and V.L. the parents of M. and O.
(two minors) and, among other terms, requiring him to pay child support to the Monterey
County Department of Child Support Services (the Department). Identifying no error, we
will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In July 2023, E.B. apparently filed a petition to determine parental relationship
using Judicial Council form FL-200, naming V.L. as the respondent.1 The Department
1
The limited record E.B. designated on appeal does not include the petition. But,
in its statement of decision, the trial court quoted text from the petition indicating that
E.B. used the Judicial Council form alerting him to the possibility that “ ‘[t]he court may
make orders for support of the children and issue an earnings assignment without further
intervened because V.L. had assigned it her support rights to secure public assistance for
the children.
That December the Department moved for a judgment (1) establishing that E.B. is
the parent of M. and O.; (2) requiring E.B. to pay $671 per month in child support,
commencing July 26, 2023; and (3) requiring E.B. and V.L. to equally share childcare
costs and uncovered medical, dental, and/or optical costs for the children. The
Department submitted a declaration of paternity for one of the children and a voluntary
declaration of parentage for the other, both of which identified E.B. as the father.2
In a document he captioned as an affidavit of special appearance not general
appearance, E.B. announced that he would appear for the hearing on the Department’s
motion “under THREAT, DURESS, and COERCION.” He included a lengthy objection
to the proceeding. His main contentions appear to have been that (1) the superior court
was without power to order child support, either because it lacked jurisdiction to do so or
because ordering child support is necessarily a deprivation of due process and a violation
of equal protection; and (2) he contested the Department’s proof of parentage, and in any
event contended that a paternity test (to which he would not submit), or perhaps some
other “competent or expert witness testimony,” was required.
The trial court heard the motion with E.B., V.L., and the Department present. On
appeal, E.B. elected to proceed without a record of the oral proceedings. In his appellate
brief, E.B. indicates that the trial court attempted to elicit testimony from him during the
hearing, but E.B. objected and refused to answer unspecified questions he believed were
irrelevant.
notice to either party.’ ” We take some contextual background from the statement of
decision.
2
E.B.’s surname is slightly misspelled on one of the forms, but his birth date, first
name, and middle name are the same on both forms.
2
In a written statement of decision, the trial court ruled that (1) it had subject matter
jurisdiction over the case and personal jurisdiction over E.B.; (2) the Department’s role in
the proceedings was proper; (3) E.B.’s claim of constitutional violations were
unsubstantiated and he had ample opportunity to respond to the motion and submit
evidence; (4) parentage was properly at issue and the Department’s evidence established
E.B.’s parentage; and (5) E.B. was to pay $671 per month in child support beginning
July 26, 2023. E.B. filed a notice of appeal.
The trial court thereafter entered a judgment that declared E.B. the parent of M.
and O. and required him to pay a combined total of $671 for child support to the
Department effective July 26, 2023. The judgment also allocated responsibility for
healthcare expenses. We deemed E.B.’s notice of appeal filed on the date of judgment.
II. DISCUSSION
“Child support awards are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Y.R. v. A.F. (2017)
9 Cal.App.5th 974, 982 (Y.R.).) But because “ ‘California has a strong public policy in
favor of adequate child support,’ . . . ‘ “determination of a child support obligation is a
highly regulated area of the law,” ’ and . . . ‘ “the only discretion a trial court possesses is
the discretion provided by statute or rule.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 983.)
As in any appeal, the trial court’s order is presumed correct. (See Jameson v.
Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609 (Jameson).) E.B. must overcome the presumption
by demonstrating error on the record before us. (Id. at p. 609.) As a self-represented
litigant, he “is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants and
attorneys” and “is held to the same restrictive rules of procedure as an attorney.” (Nelson
v. Gaunt (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 623, 638–639.) These rules of procedure require,
among other things, organizing one’s brief into separate points and supporting each point
with reasoned argument, authority, and record citations. (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu
Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153 (United Grand).) Although as a matter
of discretion we will “consider arguments for which we can discern a legal or factual
3
basis in the briefs,” we will neither “ ‘make other arguments for’ ” an appellant nor
“ ‘speculate about which issues [appellant] intend[ed] to raise.’ ” (Ibid.)
With those principles in mind, we turn to E.B.’s appellate contentions. E.B.
asserts that the trial court denied him “procedural fairness and due process” (some
capitalization omitted) and abused its discretion by considering “matters irrelevant to
[E.B.’s] concerns,” including child custody matters. None of his appellate contentions
are supported by the record.
It is unclear what procedural unfairness E.B. is claiming on appeal, but the limited
record he has supplied discloses none. “The essence of procedural due process is notice
and an opportunity to respond.” (Gilbert v. City of Sunnyvale (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th
1264, 1279.) E.B. does not dispute that he had adequate notice. E.B. was present at the
hearing3 and was, as he explains in his appellate brief, given an opportunity to respond.
Indeed E.B. represents that he “consistently” told the court, “ ‘I have no interest in [the
court’s] question and I do not consent.’ ” E.B. identifies no argument the trial court
failed to address: His brief does not acknowledge the statement of decision, in which the
court identifies and responds to a series of arguments it attributed to E.B. Save for his
unilateral refusal to answer questions he deemed irrelevant, he has supplied no reason to
doubt that his opportunity to be heard was adequate. So we are left with the contention
that the trial court violated E.B.’s due process by proceeding with the hearing in the face
of E.B.’s refusal to answer questions. That contention is meritless.
As for E.B.’s contention that the trial court erred by considering irrelevant matters,
the only specific matter E.B. identifies is child custody, and we discern no error in the
trial court’s consideration of the parents’ timeshare. E.B. elaborates that the trial court
3
E.B. represents that he appeared at the hearing and “made it clear that he was
present ‘by special appearance and [in] propria persona,’ stating for the record, ‘I reserve
all my rights and waive none.’ ” But nothing in the record or in his appellate briefing
identifies any defect in the trial court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction.
4
violated Family Code section 4053 by failing “to properly separate child support and
custody matters” in a way that “created confusion and led to an improper judgment.” But
“each parent’s . . . level of responsibility for the children” is relevant to the child support
assessment. (Fam. Code, § 4053, subd. (c).) “The ‘ “statewide uniform guideline”
[under section 4055] determin[es] child support according to a complex formula based on
each parent’s income and custodial time with the child.’ ” (S.P. v. F.G. (2016)
4 Cal.App.5th 921, 930, fn. omitted.) The Department submitted evidence that E.B. was
the noncustodial parent and did not visit the children. The trial court calculated E.B.’s
child support obligation using the guidelines, treating E.B. as the noncustodial parent, and
applied the low end of the guideline range it calculated. (See ibid. [“ ‘The term
“guideline” . . . is a euphemism’ [citation] because the amount generated by the guideline
formula is presumptively correct”]; see also Y.R., supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 983.)
Nothing in the decision or judgment purports to address any custody dispute or regulate
the parties’ custodial time.4 And without a record of oral proceedings or clear argument
from E.B., we will not speculate what other topics E.B. viewed as irrelevant. (See
Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 608–609; United Grand, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at
p. 153.) E.B. has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion by considering
irrelevant issues.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
4
The limited record available to us does not divulge a custody dispute of any kind.
Rather, E.B.’s briefing in the trial court focused on disputing parentage and the trial
court’s authority to award child support.
5
_____________________________________
LIE, J.
WE CONCUR:
_____________________________________
DANNER, Acting P. J.
_____________________________________
BROMBERG, J.
E.B. v. V.L.
H051904
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