CourtListener 10320674•People v. Velasquez CA2/8
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Filed 1/24/25 P. v. Velasquez CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B333338
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA085707
v.
RUBEN VELASQUEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Tomson T. Ong, Judge. Affirmed.
Jared G. Coleman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Shezad H. Thakor,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________________
SUMMARY
Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (c), as amended
effective January 1, 2022 (section 1385(c)), requires the trial
court to dismiss an enhancement “if it is in the furtherance of
justice to do so,” unless dismissal is prohibited by an initiative
statute. (§ 1385(c)(1).) (All statutory citations are to the Penal
Code.) Section 1385(c) further specifies that nine enumerated
mitigating circumstances “weigh[] greatly in favor of dismissing
the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety.” (§ 1385(c)(2).) One
of the mitigating circumstances occurs when multiple
enhancements are alleged in a single case, in which instance “all
enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall be dismissed.”
(§ 1385(c)(2)(B).) Another mitigating circumstance exists when
application of an enhancement could result in a sentence of over
20 years, in which instance “the enhancement shall be
dismissed.” (§ 1385(c)(2)(C).)
In this appeal after his resentencing, defendant Ruben
Velasquez contends the trial court was required to dismiss a 25-
years-to-life firearm enhancement, and a five-year prior serious
felony enhancement, based on the two mitigating circumstances
just described.
We conclude, based on People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th
1024 (Walker) and multiple Court of Appeal decisions, that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The Crime
Both parties recite the facts of the crime as we described
them when we affirmed defendant’s conviction, and we will do
the same, omitting quotation marks. (See People v. Velasquez
(June 21, 2012, B232578) [nonpub. opn.].)
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On May 17, 2010, between 10:00 p.m. and 10:30 p.m.,
defendant shot and killed Brandon Hanson at a bar. The killing,
and many of the events leading up to the killing, were captured
on videotape. At defendant’s trial, his counsel told the jury,
before any evidence was presented, that defendant pulled out a
gun and shot the victim, but that it was a case of manslaughter,
not murder. Events unfolded as follows.
At about 6:00 p.m., Angela Chavez, who was defendant’s
sister or stepsister, arrived at the bar with the victim Brandon
Hanson, who was her boyfriend and a “regular” at the bar. After
drinking for a while with her stepcousin, A.L., Chavez left the
bar, picked up two other men in her car (Salvador Melena and
Christopher Castaneda) and returned to the bar with them. Still
later, Chavez left the bar again and returned with defendant.
The bar’s videotape shows defendant and the victim
shaking hands, apparently being introduced. Thereafter, the
four-hour videotape shows no physical contact between the two
until immediately before the shooting. After defendant arrived at
the bar with Chavez, the victim sat in the back of the bar by
himself, and “kept to himself.” During this time, defendant and
Chavez were drinking, dancing, taking photographs of each
other, and “just hanging out.” Defendant and Chavez were
“bumping and grinding,” “not really groping,” but “rubbing
against one another in a sexual manner . . . .” The victim was in
the bar observing Chavez and defendant, but not getting
involved. The bartender, J.G., thought the victim “seemed upset.
Bothered, mostly,” which J.G. thought was because of the way
Chavez and defendant were dancing. But at no time does the
videotape show the victim approaching or confronting defendant.
After the dancing, the videotape shows defendant taking off
his sweatshirt and tank top. Defendant and Melena, one of the
two men Chavez brought to the bar earlier, showed each other
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their gang tattoos, and defendant took off his shirt to do so.
Defendant had tattoos that showed him to be a West Side Wilmas
gang member, and Melena had been a member of the same gang.
When he took his shirt off, the video did not show that defendant
had anything tucked in his waistband, front or rear.
After defendant put his sweatshirt back on, he walked out
of the bar area. Almost immediately, the victim left his table and
approached Chavez at the bar. Shortly after the victim began to
talk to Chavez, defendant reentered the bar and went directly to
the victim and Chavez. The videotape shows the butt of a
handgun sticking out from defendant’s pants that was not visible
before he left the bar area.
The videotape shows that the victim continued to talk with
Chavez, defendant took a step closer, and then defendant and the
victim exchanged words with each other. The victim had his
hands turned inward toward his (the victim’s) chest as he was
talking, and Chavez appeared to try to push defendant back, as
did Melena. Castaneda (the other man Chavez brought to the
bar earlier) and A.L. were also in the immediate proximity of the
two men. Defendant threw a punch at the victim while “the
victim’s hands were down to his side.” The victim staggered
back, trying to regain his balance, and defendant reached to his
(defendant’s) back, “in the direction where we saw the butt of the
gun,” and brought his hand upward. The victim was “backed up
to the bar,” where he could not back up any further.
The victim made a sweeping motion with his left hand as
defendant’s hand went up, and then there was a muzzle flash.
The victim slumped down, and defendant fired again as the
victim slumped over. Then, the victim fell to the ground without
using his hands to break his fall, and lay there motionless.
Defendant leaned closer, bent over, and fired again twice into the
victim’s buttocks. Defendant then kicked the victim’s body twice,
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and stomped on his head. Castaneda, who had been observing
what was going on, kicked his left foot toward the victim’s head,
and defendant then “stomp[ed] straight down on [the victim’s]
head,” making “three stomping motions on top of his head.”
Castaneda then raised his beer up, motioning in A.L.’s direction
in “some type of salute,” and defendant left with Castaneda just
behind him. They got into Chavez’s car and Chavez drove them
away.
The victim, who was shot five times, twice in the neck, bled
out and died. A short time after the shooting, the police stopped
Chavez’s car. A police officer saw defendant, who was in the
front seat, make a tossing motion toward the driver’s seat
floorboard, and found a revolver there with six live rounds and
one spent casing in the cylinder. Four other spent casings were
found in the car.
In April 2011, a jury convicted defendant of murder in the
first degree, and found true the allegation that he discharged a
firearm proximately causing death. The court imposed a prison
sentence of 81 years to life. The sentence consisted of 25 years to
life for the murder, doubled to 50 years because of a prior strike;
a consecutive 25 years to life for the firearm use; a consecutive
determinate term of five years for a serious prior felony
conviction; and a consecutive one-year term for a prior prison
term.
We affirmed the conviction in our 2012 decision, in which
the only claim on appeal concerned the admission of gang-related
evidence.
2. The Resentencing Proceedings
Effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature invalidated pre-
2020 sentence enhancements for prior prison terms (except for
sexually violent offenses) and required the courts to recall such
sentences and resentence the defendants. (§ 1172.75, subds. (a),
5
(c).) The legislation also required the resentencing court to apply
any other changes in law that reduced sentences or provided for
judicial discretion to do so. (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) Among
these was Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.; Stats. 2021,
ch. 721, § 1), adding subdivision (c) to section 1385, as described
at the outset.
The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
identified defendant as serving a term that included a prior
prison term enhancement. The sentencing court reviewed the
case and on November 28, 2022, determined defendant “may be
entitled to be resentenced.” The court appointed counsel and set
a status conference to discuss procedures and a date for the
resentencing hearing.
After various continuances, on August 23, 2023, defense
counsel filed a motion for full resentencing, contending several
ameliorative changes in the law applied to the case, first among
them the section 1385(c) provisions on dismissal of
enhancements. Counsel argued defendant “does not pose a
continued public safety risk when he is already serving an
indeterminate life term for murder and he does not qualify for
youthful offender parole or elder parole.”
Defendant sought a total aggregate sentence of 35 years to
life. This would consist of 25 years to life (instead of 50) for the
murder (by reconsidering a Romero motion (People v. Superior
Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497) to strike defendant’s prior
strike); “[i]mpos[ing] a lesser-included gun enhancement,” adding
“a consecutive 10 years” to the murder count (instead of
25 years); and striking the five-year enhancement for defendant’s
prior serious felony conviction.
At the resentencing hearing on August 25, 2023, the court
(the same judge who sentenced defendant in 2011) stated it was
“very familiar with the case,” and had “read the [defense] brief in
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its entirety.” Defense counsel then submitted on the brief, and
the court stated:
“Let me just indicate a couple of things. Okay. The first
thing is that I asked for the C.D.C.R. disk because I want to know
the full picture.” The court outlined defendant’s prison record.
“On November 22nd, 2016, discipline for serious violation of
using controlled substance based solely on positive test. [¶] On
May 1st, 2017, disobeying an order, which is a serious violation.
[¶] And he is guilty of all these charges. [¶] [On] May 30, 2017,
behavior that could lead to violence. [¶] On July 24, 2017,
battery with a deadly weapon. [¶] On December 2nd, 2018,
battery on a prisoner. [¶] On July 18, 2019, battery on a
prisoner. [¶] On August 5, 2021, which is very recent, possession
of a deadly weapon. [¶] And he was absent twice on assignment
on November 9, 2022, and December 8, 2022.”
The court then stated that the resentencing motion was
“very well written,” but that “[t]his is a very hard case for [the
defense]. I don’t know if you read the appellate decision and also
watched the video, but the whole murder was caught on video.”
The court described defendant’s actions punching the victim,
shooting him, firing more rounds when the victim was motionless
on the floor, then kicking the victim in the head and stomping on
his head. The court then observed the defense in its sentencing
motion “made an issue” about the court having given an
instruction on voluntary manslaughter, and explained why the
court had given that instruction. (Defense counsel had said in his
opening statement that he would try to prove voluntary
manslaughter, and the court did not want the case to come back
to be retried.) The court emphasized that “this [was] not a close
case for voluntary manslaughter.”
Proceeding to the sentence, the court first denied the
motion under Romero to strike the strike. The court stated the
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defendant “previously served a prior prison term. The defendant
also has become more violent over time. And his record of violent
felonies from robbery to murder demonstrate his increased
seriousness.”
The court then denied the motion to strike the five-year
enhancement for defendant’s previous serious felony conviction
(§ 667, subd. (a)), stating: “This is a discretionary imposition.
And the court’s viewing of the totality of the defendant’s history
and record reimposes the [five-year] enhancement.”
Next, the court denied the defense’s request to
to reduce the 25-year-to-life firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53) to
a lesser gun enhancement. (The defense resentencing motion
contended that, “[i]f the court is not inclined to strike and dismiss
the gun enhancement altogether under its [section] 1385 power,
as requested . . . , imposing the lesser-included gun use
enhancement under [section] 12022.53, subsection (b), still
accounts for and sufficiently punishes [defendant’s] conduct in
this case”; “it would still mean that [defendant] still has over two
decades to serve before reaching the parole board.”)
The court made no finding that dismissal of either
enhancement would endanger public safety.
On the firearm enhancement, the court observed that
defendant cited the district attorney’s policy “of not desiring to
impose the 25-year-to-life gun enhancement,” but stated that
“Mr. Gascon’s internal office policy is not the law. The law is
what is stated in the statute. And the jury found beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant used a gun to kill the
unarmed victim. [¶] That being the case, the salient facts of the
case can be summarized in the Court of Appeal decision affirming
the sentence. . . . [¶] . . . The decision is the law of the case.”
8
Finally, the court stated that “S.B. 483 requires this court
to strike a 667.5(b) [prior prison term] enhancement, which the
court will, and re-sentence the defendant.”
The court then resentenced defendant to 80 years to life,
striking the one-year prior prison term enhancement “as a matter
of law,” but otherwise imposing the same sentence it had initially
imposed.
Defendant filed a timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
1. The Legal Principles
a. Section 1385(c)
As described earlier, section 1385(c) provides that the court
“shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice
to do so,” unless dismissal is prohibited by an initiative statute.
(§ 1385(c)(1).)
In exercising its discretion under section 1385(c), “the court
shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the
defendant to prove” that any of nine “mitigating circumstances”
is present. (§ 1385(c)(2).) “Proof of the presence of one or more of
these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety.” (Ibid.)
“ ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that
the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury
or other serious danger to others.” (§ 1385(c)(2).)
We quote the full text of the mitigating circumstances in
section 1385(c)(2) relevant to this appeal:
“(B) Multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case. In
this instance, all enhancements beyond a single enhancement
shall be dismissed.
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“(C) The application of an enhancement could result in a
sentence of over 20 years. In this instance, the enhancement
shall be dismissed.”
b. Walker
The California Supreme Court has recently described the
principles that govern a trial court’s exercise of sentencing
discretion under section 1385(c). It is now clear that a trial court
may rely on “countervailing aggravating factors, apart from a
danger to public safety, to uphold an enhancement, despite the
presence of one or more mitigating circumstances.” (Walker,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1029.)
Walker concluded that “[s]pecifically, absent a finding that
dismissal would endanger public safety, a court retains the
discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it
assigns significant value to the enumerated mitigating
circumstances when they are present.” (Walker, supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 1029.) The court continued: “In other words, if the
court does not find that dismissal would endanger public safety,
the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will
generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the
sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of
countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even the
great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal
of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.’ ” (Ibid.,
quoting People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1098, review
granted Apr. 12, 2023, S278894, review dism. Oct. 23, 2024.)
c. Other relevant precedents
Both of the mitigating circumstances defendant raises,
unlike the other seven, contain the words, “shall be dismissed.”
Walker noted that language, but did not consider whether a
mitigating circumstance with those words was entitled to a
10
different construction than the others.1 (Walker, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1035, fn. 5.) However, Court of Appeal cases
decided before Walker have done so, and all of them, on varying
facts, have rejected the proposition that dismissal of all but one
enhancement, and/or enhancements resulting in a sentence of
more than 20 years, is mandatory. (E.g., People v. Mazur (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 438, 445, review granted Feb. 14, 2024, S283229,
review dism. Oct. 30, 2024 (Mazur); see also People v. Cota (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 318, 335 (Cota) [argument that the phrase “shall
be dismissed” is mandatory and requires dismissal of all
enhancements beyond a single enhancement “has been rejected
by every court that has considered it”].)
2. This Case
On appeal, defendant contends his sentence “was illegal
because it included multiple enhancements and exceeded 20
years.” He asks this court to “reverse the judgment and remand
with instructions to strike the firearm enhancement imposed
under section 12022.53, subdivision (d) because it increased the
sentence beyond 20 years.”2 Elsewhere he claims that the
1 Walker noted that section 1385(c)(2)(B) provides that “when
‘[m]ultiple enhancements are alleged in a single case . . . all
enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall be
dismissed.’ ” (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1035, fn. 5.) Walker
observed that the defendant had not made any assertion that
section 1385(c)(2)(B)’s “ ‘shall be dismissed’ language entitles that
mitigating circumstance to a different construction than the
others, and we have no occasion to consider that question here.”
(Walker, at p. 1035, fn. 5.)
2 To be clear, on its face section 1385(c)(2)(C) applies only
when “application of an enhancement could result in a sentence of
11
sentences “for all of the enhancements must be dismissed,” and
states the issue as “whether the word ‘shall’ in
[section 1385](c)(2)(B) and (C) requires” dismissal of one of the
enhancements.
As may be apparent from the precedents just cited, we
reject defendant’s assertions. In the end, his claim is that the
authorities—all of which conclude the word “shall” does not
require mandatory dismissal—were wrongly decided. We think
not.
We see no reason to opine at length on this point. Instead,
we refer the reader to several cases that involve one or both of
the mitigating circumstances defendant raises here. These cases
discuss at length the statutory language and the legislative
history supporting the conclusion that use of the word “shall” in
section 1385(c)(2)(B) and (C) does not “require[] the trial court to
dismiss all but one of the sentencing enhancements and/or any
enhancement that could result in a sentence of more than
20 years.” (People v. Anderson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233, 239,
239-241, review granted Apr. 19, 2023, S278786, review dism.
Oct. 23, 2024; see also Mazur, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 445-
447; Cota, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 335-338.)
over 20 years.” (Italics added.) Here, the base term on the
murder charge was 25 years to life (doubled), so it is not the
application of the enhancement that “could result in” a sentence
of over 20 years. (See Couzens et al., Sentencing California
Crimes (The Rutter Group 2024) ¶ 12:11.F.3. [“There will be no
entitlement to relief unless it is the application of the term for
the enhancement that results in a sentence of longer than
20 years.”].)
12
Mazur is particularly apt. Mazur, citing Anderson and
other cases, makes several points. Mazur agrees with other cases
that the statutory phrase “shall be dismissed” cannot be read in
isolation. (Mazur, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 445.) “Construed
as a whole, the statute makes clear that all the mitigating
circumstances listed in [section 1385](c)(2) merely guide the
court’s discretion in determining whether a dismissal is in
furtherance of justice.” (Ibid.) The “shall be dismissed” language
“only requires the court to dismiss the enhancement if it first
finds that dismissal is ‘in the furtherance of justice.’ ” (Ibid.) The
trial court here made no such finding; to the contrary, the trial
court made clear its view that dismissal of more than the one-
year enhancement was not in the furtherance of justice.
Further, Mazur, like other cases, rejected the contention
that dismissal of multiple enhancements (or an enhancement
that could result in a sentence of more than 20 years) is
mandatory “whenever the court makes no finding that it would
endanger public safety.” (Mazur, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at
p. 445.) Mazur explains: “The ‘endanger public safety’ language
applies only as an exception to the requirement that the court
must give ‘great weight’ to the presence of any mitigating
circumstance. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) But the controlling
‘furtherance of justice’ standard is broader and allows the court to
consider factors beyond public safety in exercising its discretion
whether to dismiss an enhancement, including the nature and
circumstances of the crimes and the defendant’s background,
character, and prospects.” (Id. at p. 446.) That is exactly what
the trial court did here.
Mazur, in rejecting the defendant’s contrary argument, also
observed: “[W]e would have to construe the phrase ‘weighs
13
greatly’ to mean ‘weigh[s] dispositively’ for the two mitigating
circumstances listed in [section 1385](c)(2)(B) and (C), but not for
the other seven mitigating circumstances. [Citation.] ‘But that is
not what the statute says, and we are not allowed to rewrite the
statute.’ ” (Mazur, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 445-446.)
Mazur also points out that the purpose of section 1385 “ ‘is
to grant trial court discretion to dismiss enhancements,’ ” and
continues: “ ‘And the purpose of Senate Bill No. 81 . . . is to
encourage exercise of that discretion by making dismissal
mandatory if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so.’
[Citations.] ‘In other words, the dismissal of the enhancement is
conditioned on the court’s finding dismissal is in the interest of
justice.’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he ultimate question before the trial court
remains whether it is in the furtherance of justice to dismiss an
enhancement.’ ” (Mazur, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 446.)
Here, the trial court explained at length the bases for
declining to dismiss (or reduce) any enhancements (see ante, at
pp. 7-9), and the court clearly did not find that dismissal of either
of them would be “in the furtherance of justice.” We see no abuse
of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
GRIMES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J. WILEY, J.
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