CourtListener 10320046•Helix Media v. Clark CA2/4
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Filed 1/23/25 Helix Media v. Clark CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
HELIX MEDIA LLC, B332861
Plaintiff, (Los Angeles County
v. Super. Ct. No.
21GDCV00658)
NATALIE CLARK et al.,
Defendants,
ROBERT JAMES WINKLER,
Objector and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, William Crowfoot, Judge. Affirmed.
Marshall Law and Daniel E. Marshall for Appellant Robert
James Winkler.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent Helix Media
LLC.
INTRODUCTION
Helix Media LLC (Helix) sued Natalie Clark (Clark), Freya
Holdings LLC (Freya), and 41 limited liability companies for 25
causes of action sounding in both contract and tort. Clark and
Freya moved to strike several causes of action in the operative
complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-
SLAPP statute.1 The trial court (Hon. Ralph C. Hofer) denied the
motion, and this court affirmed the denial order. (Helix Media
LLC v. Natalie Clark, et al. (Nov. 17, 2022, B315990) [nonpub.
opn.] (Helix I).)
The trial court (Hon. William Crowfoot) subsequently
granted Helix’s motion for attorneys’ fees against Clark, Freya,
and their attorneys of record, for filing a frivolous anti-SLAPP
motion. (§ 425.16, subd. (c)(1).) In this appeal, Robert Winkler
(Winkler), Clark and Freya’s attorney of record in the
proceedings below, contends the trial court erred by granting the
attorneys’ fee motion because: (1) the trial court granted the
motion without a finding of subjective bad faith; (2) the order did
not adequately describe the conduct warranting sanctions; (3) the
anti-SLAPP motion was not frivolous; and (4) the trial court
improperly awarded fees incurred on appeal. For the reasons
discussed below, we reject these contentions and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We set forth the factual and procedural background as
outlined by Helix I.
1 SLAPP is the acronym for strategic lawsuit against public
participation. All further undesignated statutory references are
to the Code of Civil Procedure.
2
“The first amended complaint (FAC) alleges the following
facts. Helix is a consulting company that helps individuals create
passive income through the creation of e-commerce businesses
(LLCs) that sell health supplements and skin care products. Once
each LLC is established, Helix leverages its connections with
manufacturers, payment processing companies, and its own
expertise to run each e-commerce business itself. Through this
model, each LLC owner earns several thousand dollars of passive
income per year.
“As part of its work for each LLC, Helix is given access to
the LLCs’ operating bank accounts. Each LLC sets up a reserve
account held by various payment processing companies who
administer the e-commerce financial transactions. The reserve
accounts hold back a small percentage of income generated by the
business as insurance for the processing company in the event
the business has an inordinately high number of returns or
chargebacks. Under the agreements entered into between Helix
and each of the LLCs, Helix is entitled to 99 percent of the net
profits, and each LLC owner is entitled to the remaining 1
percent.
“This business model is based on policies enacted by
payment processing companies, which only allow a limited
number of payments to be processed by each LLC per year. By
operating dozens of LLCs, Helix has managed to leverage
economies of scale while still remaining within the processing
companies’ policies—a business model that the processing
companies are fully aware of and encourage by working directly
with Helix on behalf of all of its LLC clients.
“In 2018, Helix engaged Clark to help identify and recruit
individuals interested in the business model. As an independent
3
contractor, Clark’s role was that of an outside lead generator,
salesperson, and recruiter. She was to identify interested
individuals, explain the business model, and have them execute
the necessary agreements. Between 2018 and 2021, Clark
recruited over 20 individuals who created approximately 44 LLCs
(the Merchant LLCs). Clark was compensated based on her
success. Between August 2018 and January 2021, Helix paid
Clark a total of $114,718.22.
“The FAC further alleges that, because she was not
satisfied with the money she earned, Clark decided to steal the
entire business. In late January and early February 2021, Clark
stole login credentials for each of the Merchant LLC’s bank
accounts; unlawfully accessed those bank accounts and changed
the passwords to the online accounts, eliminating Helix’s access
to the accounts; transferred approximately $460,000 from the
Merchant LLC bank accounts into Freya’s bank account—an
entity Clark formed on January 27, 2021, which she owned,
managed and controlled; and stole from Helix all the agreements
executed by the LLCs since 2019 and/or failed to have the LLC
owners sign the agreements in the first instance.
“As part of her scheme, the FAC alleges that on January
28, 2021, Clark sent an email to the Merchant LLCs (the January
28 email). The email accused Helix of the following: that Helix
materially breached its agreements with the LLCs by not paying
each of the LLC owners his or her full 1 percent commission; that
Helix was put on notice of these alleged breaches several months
ago; and that Helix refused to remedy the breaches. The email
went on to state that Clark transferred ‘the funds held in the
merchant accounts into a trust account while the impeding [sic]
litigation ensues.’ In the same email, Clark then offered to
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purchase each LLC and claimed that this purchase would allow
each LLC owner to ‘be entirely and immediately absolved of the
foregoing legal matters.’
“After receiving the January 28 email, a majority of the
Merchant LLCs (41 total) refused to respond to Helix’s inquires,
refused to cooperate, and refused to instruct Clark to return the
funds.
“Based on these allegations, Helix sued Clark, Freya, and
41 of the Merchant LLCs for 25 causes of action sounding in both
contract and tort. Helix subsequently filed the FAC on July 1,
2021.” (Helix I, supra, B315990 [nonpub. opn.].)
“Clark moved to strike the following causes of action in the
FAC under the anti-SLAPP statute: breach of oral contract (sixth
cause of action); breach of the implied-in-fact contract (seventh
cause of action); breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing (eighth cause of action); intentional interference with
contractual relations (eleventh cause of action); libel per se
(twelfth cause of action); trade libel (thirteenth cause of action);
defamation (fourteenth cause of action); conversion (sixteenth
cause of action); breach of fiduciary duty (twenty-second cause of
action); and unfair competition under California Business and
Professions Code section 17200 (twenty-third cause of action).
She contended those causes of action should be stricken from the
FAC because the January 28 email was a communication in
‘anticipation of litigation’ and thus, she argued, it is protected
under both the anti-SLAPP statute (specifically, section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(2)) and the litigation privilege (Civ. Code § 47,
subd. (b)).
“In opposition, Helix argued the January 28 email was not
written in anticipation of litigation because ‘no litigation was
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seriously contemplated at the time . . . Clark sent the January 28
. . . email.’ Alternatively, Helix claimed that even if the January
28 email constitutes protected activity, it was Clark’s alleged
actions (i.e., stealing passwords to the Merchant LLC’s bank
accounts, removing Helix’s access to those accounts, and
transferring money out of those accounts into an account she
controlled) that form the basis of Helix’s claims against Clark,
not the January 28 email. And, even if the January 28 email
constituted protected activity, Helix argued it demonstrated a
probability of prevailing on its claims.
“After a hearing on the special motion to strike, the trial
court [Hon. Ralph C. Hofer] denied the motion. The trial court
held Clark ‘failed to meet [her] burden under the circumstances
of establishing that there was at the time of the [January 28
email] any pending litigation or that at the time litigation was or
could have been seriously contemplated. [Helix] did not yet know
about any of the circumstances indicated in the [January 28
email] and [Clark] . . . failed to show that [she] intended at that
point to pursue litigation [herself], or that such was or could have
been contemplated in good faith. . . . [I]t is defendant’s burden to
establish those essential matters, and the motion fails to do so.
The reply does not offer to provide further evidence on this issue.’
The trial court therefore denied the motion, concluding: ‘[T]he
[m]otion is based on an argument that the [January 28 email]
was a communication made in anticipation of litigation but has
failed to sufficiently establish that there was at the time of the
communication litigation which was seriously contemplated to be
pursued or was contemplated in good faith.’” (Helix I, supra,
B315990 [nonpub. opn., fn. omitted].)
6
Helix then moved for attorneys’ fees and costs under
section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1) against Clark, Freya, and their
attorneys of record. Helix argued the anti-SLAPP motion was
frivolous because Clark “and her counsel knew all along that the
January 28, 2021 [e]mail was not sent in anticipation of
litigation” and the motion was solely intended to cause
unnecessary delay.
A few days later, Clark and Freya appealed the trial court’s
order denying their anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court stayed
the action pending appeal. As previously noted, a different panel
of this court affirmed the trial court’s order denying Clark and
Freya’s anti-SLAPP motion, concluding Clark failed to meet her
burden of demonstrating she engaged in protected activity. That
opinion issued on November 17, 2022. (Helix I, supra, B315990
[nonpub. opn.].)
On January 19, 2023, the remittitur issued. The trial court
(Hon. William A. Crowfoot) subsequently lifted the stay and set
the hearing on Helix’s attorneys’ fee motion. After a hearing, the
trial court issued a written ruling granting Helix’s motion on the
ground the anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous, and awarded
attorneys’ fees and costs in the reduced amount of $81,193.45
against Clark, Freya, Winkler, and Gabriel Vadasz (a former
attorney of record).2 Winkler appeals from the order.
2 Vadasz filed a motion to vacate the attorneys’ fees order
against him. The court granted his motion on grounds not
relevant here, including that Vadasz reasonably believed he was
no longer considered counsel of record, and he had no
involvement in the frivolous anti-SLAPP motion.
7
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“A trial court is required to award costs and attorney fees
to a plaintiff who prevails in defending against an anti-SLAPP
motion ‘pursuant to [s]ection 128.5’ upon a finding that the
motion was ‘frivolous or . . . solely intended to cause unnecessary
delay.’ (§ 425.16, subd. (c)(1).)” (Rudisill v. California Coastal
Com. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1070 (Rudisill).) “The reference
to section 128.5 means that ‘“a court must use the procedures and
apply the substantive standards of section 128.5 in deciding
whether to award attorney fees under the anti-SLAPP statute.”’”
(Rudisill, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 1070.)
“‘[T]o impose sanctions under section 128.5, there must be a
showing the action or tactic was meritless or frivolous and that it
was pursued in bad faith, and whether the action is taken in bad
faith must be judged by a subjective standard.’” (Jespersen v.
Zubiate-Beauchamp (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 624, 633, original
italics (Jespersen).) A trial court may infer subjective bad faith
from the pursuit of a frivolous tactic. (Ibid.) “‘Frivolous in this
context means that any reasonable attorney would agree the
motion was totally devoid of merit.’” (L.A. Taxi Cooperative, Inc.
v. The Independent Taxi Owners Assn. of Los Angeles (2015) 239
Cal.App.4th 918, 932 (L.A. Taxi Cooperative).)
“‘An order awarding attorneys’ fees pursuant to section
128.5, as incorporated in section 425.16, subdivision (c), is
reviewed under the abuse of discretion test. [Citation.] A ruling
amounts to an abuse of discretion when it exceeds the bounds of
reason, and the burden is on the party complaining to establish
that discretion was abused.’” (Alfaro v. Waterhouse Management
Corp. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 26, 36-37 (Alfaro).)
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B. Analysis
Winkler contends the trial court erred by awarding
attorneys’ fees under section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1) without
finding the motion was filed in bad faith. But as explained below,
this argument ignores the doctrine of implied findings.
“‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed
correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to
support it on matters as to which the record is silent . . . .’”
(Denhman v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564, italics
omitted.) “Thus, in the absence of contrary findings, ‘we must
presume in favor of the judgment every finding of fact necessary
to support it [that is] warranted by the evidence.’” (Summers v.
City of Cathedral City (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1047, 1070-1071, fn.
19 (Summers).) “Accordingly, were a trial court to expressly find
that an action was frivolous, as this one did, and then impose
sanctions on the plaintiff, we would interpret the imposition of
sanctions as an implied finding that the action was also brought
in bad faith.” (Id. at p. 1071, fn. 19)
Here, the trial court expressly concluded that the anti-
SLAPP motion was frivolous. The court noted in its order that
“Clark and Freya Holdings cited primarily to one case in their
Anti-SLAPP Motion to show that the January 28 [e]mail is
protected activity . . . . The Court also notes that the [C]ourt of
[A]ppeal, in affirming Judge Hofer’s denial of the Anti-SLAPP
Motion, thoroughly distinguished the facts in [that case].” The
trial court further explained: “In opposition to this motion, Clark
belatedly declares that she ‘became aware’ that Helix was paying
the Merchants less than the amount due under the reseller
agreements and that she informed Kim Ng [Helix’s CEO] ‘via
Skype and email’ that she ‘was aware of this situation, [sic] and
9
demanded that he correct it.’ [Citation.] She also declares that at
the time she sent the January 28 [e]mail, ‘it was evident that [a
lawsuit] was going to be filed – if not by Helix, then by [herself] to
protect the interests of each LLC against any further
wrongdoings by or at the behest of Helix.’ [Citation.] [¶] As Helix
observes, this declaration raises questions about the intent and
reasonableness of the Anti-SLAPP Motion. Two explanations are
possible for the earlier failure to include this declaration: either
(1) Clark and Freya Holdings filed a motion premised on a single
factually distinguishable case with no other evidence than the
January 28, 2021 [e]mail because they were confident in the
merits of their position, or (2) Clark and Freya Holdings did not
want to spend the time and money to bolster a motion that was
already being brought on questionable grounds. The former
strains credulity and requires finding some degree of ineptitude
in counsel, therefore the latter is more likely. But regardless of
the reasons for Clark and Freya Holding[s’] tactics, the Court
concludes that the Anti-SLAPP Motion was, in fact, frivolous.”
Because the trial court expressly found the motion was
frivolous, and imposed sanctions based on that finding, we must
“interpret the imposition of sanctions as an implied finding that
the action was also brought in bad faith.” (Summers, supra, 225
Cal.App.3d at p. 1071, fn. 19; see also Jespersen, supra, 114
Cal.App.4th at p. 633 [a trial court may infer subjective bad faith
from the pursuit of a frivolous tactic].)
Winkler asserts evidence in the record “affirms that [he]
acted in good faith as he took every reasonable step to confirm his
analysis of the FAC that an anti-SLAPP motion was justified for
the causes of action that relied on the January 28, 2021 e-mail”
including having “an attorney with over 20 years’ experience in
10
anti-SLAPP law to review [it], before the filing of the [a]nti-
SLAPP [m]otion.” Presenting facts “‘“‘which merely afford an
opportunity for a different opinion’”’” however, is insufficient to
find an abuse of discretion. (Shelton v. Rancho Mortgage &
Investment Corp. (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1345.) Winkler has
not demonstrated the trial court “‘exceed[ed] the bounds of
reason’” (Alfaro, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 37) in impliedly
finding the motion was brought in bad faith.3
We likewise reject Winkler’s argument that the trial court
did not adequately describe the conduct warranting sanctions.
(See § 128.5, subd. (c) [“An order imposing expenses shall be in
writing and shall recite in detail the action or tactic
or circumstances justifying the order”].) The trial court issued a
detailed ruling after a hearing on the attorneys’ fee motion,
excerpts of which are quoted above. According to Winkler,
however, the order is insufficient because it does not specifically
reference him when analyzing the conduct warranting sanctions.
We are unpersuaded.
As discussed above, the trial court’s order noted the motion
cited primarily to one case, which was distinguishable on the
facts. The trial court further observed that Clark and Freya did
not file a declaration in support of their anti-SLAPP motion
perhaps because they “did not want to spend the time and money
to bolster a motion that was already being brought on
3 Relying on statements made by the court at oral argument,
Winkler contends the trial court was “confus[ed]” about whether
a plaintiff seeking attorneys’ fees under section 425.16,
subdivision (c)(1) must show the motion was frivolous and
brought in bad faith. “[A] judge’s comments in oral argument[,
however,] may never be used to impeach the final order.”
(Jespersen, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 633.)
11
questionable grounds.” Because Winkler represented Clark and
Freya in the proceedings below, he is ultimately responsible for
the motion’s lack of legal and evidentiary support. We therefore
conclude the trial court’s written order recites with “‘reasonable
specificity’” (Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights v.
Garamendi (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1389) the conduct or
circumstances leading to the award of attorneys’ fees.
Winkler next argues the trial court erred by finding the
motion was frivolous. We agree with Winkler that a moving party
is not required to submit evidence to show the claims arose from
protected activity. As we explained in Helix I, however, in this
case, the lack of evidence demonstrating either that Clark
intended to sue Helix at the time she sent the January 28 email,
or that Helix was contemplating legal proceedings at the time
Clark sent the email, was fatal to her motion. (Helix I, supra,
B315990 [nonpub. opn.].) We cannot, therefore, say the court
abused its discretion in finding the anti-SLAPP motion was
frivolous given the complete lack of evidence.4
Winkler also claims that Helix did not meet its burden to
show “‘any reasonable attorney would agree the motion was
totally devoid of merit’” (L.A. Taxi Cooperative, supra, 239
Cal.App.4th at p. 932) as is required to show frivolousness under
section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1). Winkler relies on a declaration
submitted in support of his opposition to the motion for attorneys’
4 Winkler also argues “the court appeared to rely on
arguments by [Helix] which were not in evidence – namely, that
Defendant Clark and her counsel both knew that they would be
submitting a false declaration.” But the trial court’s order
concludes that “regardless of the reasons for Clark and [Freya’s]
tactics, . . . the [a]nti-SLAPP [m]otion was, in fact, frivolous.”
12
fees, in which an attorney who reviewed the anti-SLAPP motion
before Winkler filed it, declared: “I felt – and still feel – strongly
that the email discussing litigation and used as evidence in this
matter satisfied the first prong of the [anti-SLAPP statute],
placing this case under the umbrella of the litigation privilege.”
While helpful to Winkler’s position, this declaration (as well as
Winkler’s appellate counsel’s declaration stating the same) does
not mandate a finding that reasonable attorneys would believe
the anti-SLAPP motion had merit. We acknowledge a different
opinion of frivolousness is possible, but we are constrained by the
deferential abuse of discretion standard. We are “‘“neither
authorized nor warranted in substituting [our] judgment for the
judgment of the trial judge”’” under this standard of review, when
the trial court’s judgment was inside the bounds of reason. (580
Folsom Associates v. Prometheus Development Co. (1990) 223
Cal.App.3d 1, 20, italics omitted.)
Winkler lastly argues that even if we disagree that the trial
court should have denied the motion in its entirety, the trial
court erred by awarding Helix its attorneys’ fees incurred in
responding to the appeal in Helix I. In making this argument,
Winkler confuses section 907, which authorizes a Court of Appeal
to award sanctions for a frivolous appeal,5 with section 425.16,
subdivision (c)(1), which mandates sanctions for filing a frivolous
anti-SLAPP motion in the trial court. “A statute authorizing an
attorney fee award at the trial court level [such as section 425.16,
subdivision (c)(1)] includes appellate attorney fees unless the
5 Section 907 provides: “When it appears to the reviewing
court that the appeal was frivolous or taken solely for delay, it
may add to the costs on appeal such damages as may be just.”
13
statute specifically provides otherwise.” (Evans v. Unkow (1995)
38 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1499.) Section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1)
does not preclude fees in responding to an appeal of an order
denying an anti-SLAPP motion. Thus, those fees are recoverable,
and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding
them.6
6 In De La Carriere v. Green (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 270, 278
the sole case relied on by Winkler, the Court of Appeal held
section 128.5 does not permit a trial court to impose sanctions
against a party for pursuing a frivolous appeal. That is not what
occurred here, however. Rather, the trial court awarded Helix
attorneys’ fees under section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), which has
been interpreted to include fees incurred in opposing the frivolous
motion and in responding to an appeal of an order denying the
motion. (See Carpenter v. Jack in the Box Corp. (2007) 151
Cal.App.4th 454, 461 [“The trial court’s authority to award fees
and costs under section 425.16, subdivision (c) includes authority
to award fees incurred in responding to an appeal of an order
granting or denying a special motion to strike . . . ”].)
14
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Helix is awarded its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
CURREY, P. J.
We concur:
COLLINS, J.
ZUKIN, J.
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