CourtListener 10320031•Poolside Gardens v. Lee CA2/4
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Filed 1/23/25 Poolside Gardens v. Lee CA2/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
POOLSIDE GARDENS B338390
INCORPORATED,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Super. Ct. No. 23STCV30557)
Respondent,
v.
LILLIAN LEE,
Defendant and
Appellant.
APPEAL from order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Randolph M. Hammock, Judge. Affirmed.
Turner Dhillon, William M. Turner, for defendant and
appellant.
No appearance for plaintiff and respondent.
______________________________________________
Plaintiff and respondent Poolside Gardens Incorporated
(Poolside) remodeled a swimming pool at the home of defendant
and appellant Lillian Lee (Lee). Lee tendered a claim against
Poolside’s contractor’s bond to the issuing surety, alleging
Poolside’s work was defective. After learning of the bond claim,
Poolside filed a civil complaint against Lee that sought, among
other relief, a judicial declaration that Lee herself damaged the
pool and violated applicable warranties and was not entitled to a
monetary recovery. Lee filed a special motion to strike the entire
complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 425.161 (the anti-
SLAPP motion). The trial court denied her motion. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
A. Poolside’s Complaint
The following facts are taken from the allegations of
Poolside’s complaint.
In early 2022, Lee engaged Poolside to remodel her pool.
Their agreement included Poolside’s preparation of the pool,
installation of tile, lights, and other features, and certain
services, but it did not include installation of river rock or
restarting the pool.
Restarting a pool following construction work is a
“specialized and technical process” that includes “daily
maintenance and cleaning for approximately seven to ten days to
ensure that there is no damage to the pool plaster.” After
completing its work, Poolside recommended that Lee engage a
1 Unless otherwise specified, statutory references in this opinion
are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
2
professional to restart the pool, but Lee indicated that she would
restart the pool herself.
In September 2022, Lee informed Poolside of a pinhole-
sized leak where a submerged light cover was located. Poolside
determined that there was no risk of physical danger and that
the leak was “easily fixable” by tightening the fixture or applying
a small amount of sealer. Poolside notified Lee that it would fix
the issue, but Lee would not allow it to do so.
About a year later, Poolside learned that Lee had tendered
a claim to the surety that issued Poolside’s contractor’s bond,
Hartford Insurance Company (Hartford). Lee asserted that the
plastering work was defective, and she claimed she was entitled
to the amounts she paid to Poolside, repair and replastering
costs, and the expense of installing river rock.
According to Poolside, any problems with the plaster were
easily correctable, and the pool was damaged by Lee when it was
improperly restarted. River rock installation was excluded from
the parties’ contract, and future expenses associated with “non-
identified and non-existent” leaks were speculative. Poolside
described Lee’s bond claim as “flush with false allegations, facts,
and damages claims” and “insurance fraud.” Poolside asserted
that, “[i]f successful, [the claim] would harm [Poolside] because it
could result in [its] having to erroneously ‘indemnify’ the bonding
company . . . .”
In the first cause of action for “breach of contract
warranty,” Poolside alleged that Lee violated warranties provided
to her “under California law.” In the second cause of action for
declaratory relief, Poolside alleged that a controversy had arisen
that was not limited to the bond dispute but included other issues
3
relating to the pool. The particular allegations are discussed,
infra.
B. Lee’s Anti-SLAPP Motion
Lee filed her anti-SLAPP motion in early 2024, and in a
declaration, attested to the following facts.
The parties memorialized their agreement in a one-page
“Scope of Work” document that described work, materials, and a
total price of $60,000. Later, the agreement was orally modified.
Lee paid $62,500 to Poolside.
Lee deemed Poolside’s work to be “defective and
substandard” and notified Poolside of leaks and other problems.
Poolside did not cure these issues and ceased communicating
with Lee, requiring her to engage another contractor.
Lee filed the bond claim in August 2023. In early 2024,
Hartford informed her that it was aware that Poolside was
pursuing litigation. Hartford stated that, as a surety, it “is not in
a position to determine which party is correct in such a dispute,”
and that “it is appropriate for Hartford to direct you to work with
Poolside to achieve resolution of the dispute. Hartford will
continue to monitor the situation until confirmation of resolution
has been received.”
In the anti-SLAPP motion, Lee argued that the “gist” of
Poolside’s complaint was that her “statutory bond claim has no
merit.” The complaint, she argued, “arises out of Lee’s protected
activity in furtherance of her statutory right to petition and free
speech in connection with a public issue in that Poolside has sued
Lee for making a statutory claim against Poolside’s contractor’s
bond.” Lee alleged her claim was required by law and for the
benefit and protection of the public. Alternatively, she argued,
4
her bond claim “constitutes a communication with Hartford that
is part of an official proceeding.” Lee also argued that Poolside
could not prevail on either of its two causes of action, and she
asked the court to strike the entire complaint.
In its opposition, Poolside argued that its complaint did not
involve a claim of wrongdoing arising from protected activity, as
it did not allege Lee was liable for, or engaged in wrongdoing by,
making the bond claim. Instead, Poolside argued, its causes of
action seek a determination of whether Lee “breached her one
year implied contractual warranty by her own conduct by
improperly re-starting the resurfaced swimming pool,” whether
her other “‘pool damage items’” have any factual or legal basis,
and whether she is entitled to a refund of the amounts she paid.
After a hearing, the trial court denied the anti-SLAPP
motion, finding Lee did not demonstrate that “the action here is
protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.” The court found that Lee
failed to demonstrate that “this private dispute” implicated an
“issue of public interest,” as required by section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(4). As for her alternative argument, the court
assumed without deciding that the bond claim was an “official
proceeding” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2)), but it found that Lee did not
demonstrate the action arose from that proceeding. The court
reasoned that a claim is the proper subject of an anti-SLAPP
motion “‘only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the
wrong complained of, and not just evidence of liability or a step
leading to some different act for which liability is asserted,’” and
the “‘fact that a cause of action arguably may have been triggered
by protected activity does not entail that it is one arising from
such.’ [Citation.]” Poolside, the court found, “does not seek to
impose liability against [Lee] for her having filed a bond claim
5
with the surety. Instead, now that [Lee] has done so, [Poolside]
merely seeks to adjudicate the merits of the dispute in this
forum. In substance, this action resembles a defense to the bond
claim. In other words, liability is based not on the bond claim,
but rather, the conduct that gave rise to the bond claim.” (Italics
omitted.)
Although the trial court found it unnecessary to rule on
Poolside’s probability of prevailing, it examined both causes of
action. The court found Poolside had not shown a probability of
prevailing on the cause of action for breach of contract warranty
because it did not demonstrate this was a recognized or viable
cause of action. However, Poolside satisfied its minimal burden
on the second cause of action by establishing a proper subject for
declaratory relief: a dispute over “who is to blame for the
defective conditions at the property.”
Lee timely appealed from the trial court’s order denying
her anti-SLAPP motion.
DISCUSSION
A. Anti-SLAPP Statute
“A cause of action arising from a person’s act in furtherance
of the ‘right of petition or free speech under the United States
Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a
public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless
the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there
is a probability’ that the claim will prevail.” (Monster Energy
Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788, citing § 425.16,
subd. (b)(1).) “[S]ection 425.16 requires that a court engage in a
two-step process when determining whether a defendant’s anti-
SLAPP motion should be granted.” (City of Cotati v. Cashman
6
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 76 (Cotati).) “First, the court decides
whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the
challenged cause of action is one ‘arising from’ protected activity.
(§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) If the court finds such a showing has
been made, it then must consider whether the plaintiff has
demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.” (Ibid). If
the defendant fails to meet his or her burden on the first step, the
court should deny the motion and need not address the second
step. (Symmonds v. Mahoney (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 1096, 1103–
1104 (Symmonds).)
To satisfy the first step, a defendant must demonstrate
“that the ‘conduct by which plaintiff claims to have been injured
falls within one of the four categories described in subdivision (e)
[of section 425.16]’ [citation], and that the plaintiff’s claims in fact
arise from that conduct [citation].” (Rand Resources, LLC v. City
of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 620.) Lee contends her bond
claim fell within two of these categories: “any written or oral
statement or writing made in connection with . . . any other
official proceeding authorized by law, . . .” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2))
and “any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the
constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free
speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public
interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).)
We review de novo the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion.
(Park v. Board of Trustees of California State Univ. (2017)
2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 (Park).)
7
B. Denial of the Anti-SLAPP Motion Was Proper
Because Lee Failed to Demonstrate That the Entire
Complaint Arises from Protected Activity
The trial court correctly denied Lee’s anti-SLAPP motion
based on her failure to carry her first-step burden. Lee argued
below and argues in this appeal that her bond claim was
protected activity, that the entire complaint arises from the bond
claim, and therefore, the complaint should be stricken. She did
not analyze individual claims in the complaint, and she did not
ask the trial court to strike particular claims or allegations. As
we will explain, the consequence of proceeding in this all-or-
nothing fashion was that Lee could not satisfy her first-step
burden as long as Poolside “present[ed] at least one claim that
does not arise from protected activity.” (Park v. Nazari (2023) 93
Cal.App.5th 1099, 1108 (Nazari).) Even assuming her bond claim
was protected activity, multiple claims in Poolside’s complaint do
not arise from the bond claim. She could not carry her first-step
burden, and her motion was properly denied.
Although the parties did not raise Nazari in the trial court,
we are compelled to consider it because it bears directly on Lee’s
first-step burden. Further, “[o]n appeal, ‘[w]e do not review the
trial court’s reasoning, but rather its ruling.’ [Citation.] Thus,
we may affirm the trial court’s ruling ‘on any basis presented by
the record whether or not relied upon by the trial court.’
[Citation.]” (McClain v. Octagon Plaza, LLC (2008) 159
Cal.App.4th 784, 802 [reviewing court could rely on statutes not
raised or discussed before the trial court].)
8
1. First-Step Burden When an Anti-SLAPP Motion
Seeks an Order Striking Only the Entire Complaint
In Nazari, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1106, the complaint
alleged multiple causes of action concerning attorney liens
recorded against real property and a claim against a state
cleanup fund. In their anti-SLAPP motion, the defendants
argued that “‘the gravamen of the suit challenges a litigation
funding decision and the communications made in connection
with that decision,’” and they sought an order striking the entire
complaint. (Id. at p. 1105.) At the hearing, the defendants
argued that the trial court could strike some of the plaintiffs’
claims, even if it did not strike the entire complaint. The trial
court rejected this argument because the narrower relief was not
sought in the motion, and further, the defendants maintained
throughout their papers that the entire complaint arose from
protected activity. (Ibid.)
Our colleagues in Division Five affirmed the trial court’s
order denying the motion. (Nazari, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1109.) “As our Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, the
moving party bears the burden ‘to identify what acts each
challenged claim rests on and to show how those acts are
protected under a statutorily defined category of protected
activity.’” (Ibid., quoting Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009 (Bonni).) “Following Baral [v.
Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396 (Baral)], ‘most Courts of Appeal
have taken a claim-by-claim approach to the anti-SLAPP
analysis, rather than attempting to evaluate a cause of action as
a whole.’” (Ibid., quoting Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1010.)
Our high court rejected a minority approach that allowed courts
to “analyze whether the ‘gravamen’ of a pleaded cause of action
9
concerns protected activity.” (Ibid., citing Bonni, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 1011.)
“[W]hile courts may strike less than the entirety of a
complaint or pleaded cause of action, the trial court is not
required to take on the burden of identifying the allegations
susceptible to a special motion to strike.” (Nazari, supra, 93
Cal.App.5th at p. 1108.) “If a defendant wants the trial court to
take a surgical approach, whether in the alternative or not, the
defendant must propose where to make the incisions. This is
done by identifying, in the initial motion, each numbered
paragraph or sentence in the complaint that comprises a
challenged claim and explaining ‘the claim’s elements, the actions
alleged to establish those elements, and wh[y] those actions are
protected.’” (Ibid., quoting Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1015.)
Thus, plaintiffs and courts are not required “to perform the
claim-by-claim analysis prescribed in Baral,” and a “‘nonmovant
should not be put to the burden of parsing the cause of action in
the moving party’s stead.’” (Nazari, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1108; Young v. Midland Funding LLC (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th
63, 99–100 [“on appeal, the reviewing court should not be put to
[the] burden” of “pars[ing] the cause of action” and “make the
moving party’s case for it”]; see also, Littlefield v. Littlefield
(2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 815, 827.) “Where a defendant moves to
strike the entire complaint and fails to identify, with reasoned
argument, specific claims for relief that are asserted to arise from
protected activity, the defendant does not carry his or her first-
step burden so long as the complaint presents at least one claim
that does not arise from protected activity.” (Nazari, supra, 93
Cal.App.5th at p. 1108.)
10
The Nazari defendants “not only failed to identify specific
claims for relief arising from protected activity, they expressly
asked the court to perform the type of gravamen analysis
disapproved in Bonni.” (Nazari, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1108.) They did not identify the activity on which each
challenged claim rested and did not demonstrate that the activity
was protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. (Ibid.) Moreover,
“there are obviously claims in the complaint that do not arise
from anti-SLAPP protected activity,” such as a claim that the
defendants were interfering with the plaintiffs’ ability to obtain
funding from a public cleanup fund. (Ibid.) Thus, the defendants
“did not carry their first-step anti-SLAPP burden.” (Ibid.)
In this case, Lee gave notice that her anti-SLAPP motion
sought to “strike Plaintiff Poolside Gardens Incorporated’s
Complaint.” Her notice of motion did not request that specific
claims or allegations be stricken, and none were identified by
paragraph number or sentence.
The request to strike the entire complaint is echoed in the
memorandum of points and authorities. Lee did not separately
analyze each claim in the complaint. Instead, she urged the trial
court to apply the kind of “gravamen” analysis our high court
rejected in Bonni, arguing that the “gist of Poolside’s Complaint
is that Lee’s statutory bond claim has no merit.” She asserted
that, in its entirety, “the Complaint clearly arises out of Lee’s
protected activity.” In these critical respects, Lee’s anti-SLAPP
motion was like the motion in Nazari, and therefore, she bears
the first-step burden of establishing that the entire complaint
arises exclusively from protected activity. (Nazari, supra, 93
Cal.App.5th at p. 1108.)
11
2. Multiple Claims in Poolside’s Complaint Do Not Arise
from the Bond Claim
As we undertake our review of the complaint, we bear in
mind that the bond claim was the only activity that Lee
contended was protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. For
purposes of our analysis, we will assume, without deciding, that
Lee’s bond claim was protected activity. (§ 425.16, subd. (e).)
Thus, if we determine that a claim in the complaint does not
arise from the bond claim, it also does not arise from protected
conduct.
In deciding whether the complaint presents a claim that
arises from the bond claim, we are guided by Park, supra,
2 Cal.5th 1057, where our high court discussed the requisite
nexus between the claims an anti-SLAPP motion challenges and
protected activity. (Id. at p. 1062.) “A claim arises from
protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis
for the claim.” (Ibid.) “[A] claim may be struck only if the speech
or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of, and not
just evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act for
which liability is asserted.” (Id. at p. 1060.) “[C]ourts should
consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions
by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form
the basis for liability.” (Id. at p. 1063.) “That a cause of action
arguably may have been triggered by protected activity does not
entail that it is one arising from such.” (Cotati, supra, 29 Cal.4th
at p. 78.)
Lee did not conduct a first-step analysis regarding the first
cause of action, either in her anti-SLAPP motion or her brief on
appeal, and therefore, has forfeited any argument that the first
cause of action arises from the bond claim or protected activity.
12
(Kaufman & Broad Communities, Inc. v. Performance Plastering,
Inc. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 212, 226 [failure to raise argument in
the trial court forfeits the argument on appeal]; Dieckmeyer v.
Redevelopment Agency of Huntington Beach (2005) 127
Cal.App.4th 248, 260 [appellant’s failure to raise an argument in
its opening brief waives the issue on appeal].)
Lee cannot establish the first cause of action arises from
the bond claim in any event. Poolside alleged that warranties
given to Lee were violated when she incorrectly restarted the
pool, failed to notify Poolside and its subcontractor of problems
with the plaster, and failed to notify Poolside before installing
river rock. These violations “proximately caused any and all of
the damages alleged in [her] bond complaint.” The “wrong[s]
complained of” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1060) were Lee’s acts
and omissions in violation of warranties. The bond claim is
mentioned only as a document in which she described the
damages she believes she is owed, and as such, was merely
evidence related to liability. (Ibid.) Accordingly, we conclude the
first cause of action does not arise from the bond claim, and
hence, does not arise from protected activity.
Under Nazari, we need not proceed further because the
presence of even a single claim based on unprotected activity
precludes Lee from carrying her first-step burden. We observe,
however, that the second cause of action for declaratory relief
reveals additional claims that do not arise from the bond claim.
To state a claim for declaratory relief, “there must be an ‘actual
controversy’ relating to the legal rights and duties of the parties.”
(Country Side Villas Homeowners Assn. v. Ivie (2011) 193
Cal.App.4th 1110, 1118, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.)
13
Lee argues that Poolside simply “seeks a declaratory relief
in the form of a judgment finding that Lee’s bond claim has no
merit and is fraudulent . . . ,” and in support of this argument,
cites generally to all 10 pages of the complaint. Poolside’s actual
allegations, however, undermine this argument.
Poolside alleged that the controversy underlying the
declaratory relief cause of action is “not necessarily limited to”
Lee’s bond claim. It alleged, “[t]here are many main and sub-
issues that are in controversy.” The main issues concern whether
Poolside “was lawfully excused from having to complete the Pool
following Lee’s failure to perform . . . .” The controversy, Poolside
alleged, includes whether Lee herself caused the damage to the
pool, whether the damage was caused during Lee’s restart of the
pool, and whether she notified Poolside of the condition of plaster
after restarting the pool and prevented Poolside and its
contractor from investigating and servicing problems. The
controversy is also alleged to include whether Poolside caused
any damage other than the “tiny” water leak in the area of the
submerged light.
If we were to excise all mention of the bond claim from the
declaratory relief cause of action, the remaining allegations still
would describe disputes over the quality of Poolside’s work, the
cause and extent of damage to the pool, and the amounts, if any,
that Lee is entitled to recover. (See Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at
p. 1068 [elements of discrimination claim did not depend on
protected statements and communications during an official
tenure process; plaintiff “‘could have omitted allegations
regarding communicative acts or filing a grievance and still state
the same claims’”].) These disputes ripened before Lee filed her
14
bond claim, were proper subjects for declaratory relief, and were
not protected activity.
In sum, we conclude the complaint includes claims that do
not arise from the bond claim—the only conduct Lee contends
was protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. The presence of
these claims precludes a finding that the entire complaint arises
from protected conduct, and consequently, Lee failed to carry her
first-step burden. The trial court properly denied the motion.
(Nazari, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1108.)
Because we have concluded that Lee failed to meet her
burden on the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, we need not
address the second step. (Symmonds, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1103–1104.) We take no position on the merits of Lee’s
causes of action.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Lee’s anti-SLAPP motion is affirmed.
MORI, J.
We concur:
COLLINS, Acting P. J.
ZUKIN, J.
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