CourtListener 10318833•People v. Charowhas CA4/3
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Filed 1/22/25 P. v. Charowhas CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G064123
v. (Super. Ct. No. FVI22003774)
MARK LEE CHAROWHAS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Christopher S. Pallone, Judge. Affirmed.
Alex Kreit, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa
A. Mandel and Joseph C. Anagnos, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
* * *
Two deputies pulled over motorcyclist Mark Lee Charowhas for
traffic violations at night. Charowhas was wearing a thick jacket, and he had
a pocketknife clipped to his hip in plain view. He also appeared nervous, was
extremely shaky, would not answer certain questions, would not maintain
eye contact, seemed as if he intended to fight or flee, and kept moving his
hand toward different parts of his body, including his pockets. The deputies
patted him down for additional weapons, and as they did so, Charowhas
admitted to having metal knuckles in his pocket.
Charowhas was charged with possession of metal knuckles,
among other things. Before trial, the defense moved to suppress all physical
evidence obtained during the search. The trial court denied the motion,
finding the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. A jury
convicted Charowhas of possessing metal knuckles.
Charowhas contends the trial court erred in denying his
suppression motion. We disagree. Considering the totality of the
circumstances, a reasonably prudent officer would have suspected Charowhas
might be armed and dangerous; the deputies therefore had reasonable
suspicion to conduct a patdown search for weapons.
FACTS
The following facts are derived from the hearing on Charowhas’s
motion to suppress. (People v. Moore (2006) 39 Cal.4th 168, 171 [“review of
ruling on suppression motion limited to record of suppression hearings”].)
One evening in March 2022, at about 9:30 p.m., two Sheriff’s
deputies in a patrol car observed a motorcycle with an obstructed license
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plate run a stop sign. They pulled over the motorcyclist, later identified as
Charowhas.
The first officer, Deputy Geerlings, introduced himself, explained
why he pulled Charowhas over, and asked for his driver’s license. Deputy
Geerlings took the license back to the patrol car to run a records check while
his partner, Deputy Adams, stayed with Charowhas.
Deputy Adams then asked Charowhas several questions, and
although Charowhas answered some, Deputy Adams “had to re-ask” others.
Deputy Adams also observed that Charowhas “seemed uneasy [and]
unsettled,” as he kept moving his hand around his chest, on his person, down
his sides, and towards his pockets. He also kept turning his head from side to
side, and his eyes darted around, as if he was looking for a place to run to or
was considering whether to assault the deputies. Charowhas also had a
pocketknife visible on his hip and was wearing a thick motorcycle jacket,
which Deputy Adams knew, based on his training and experience, was
capable of concealing weapons.
While conducting the records check in his patrol car, Deputy
Geerlings observed Charowhas moving his hands up near his torso area,
looking around as if searching for a path to flee, and not keeping eye contact
with Deputy Adams; Charowhas was also “extremely shaky” and “appeared
to be nervous.” Worried that Charowhas might try to flee or strike his
partner, Deputy Geerlings got out of his vehicle and approached Deputy
Adams and Charowhas.
Deputy Adams asked Deputy Geerlings to remove the
pocketknife clipped to Charowhas’s hip pocket, and Deputy Geerlings did so.
The deputies then conducted a patdown search for weapons.
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Deputy Geerlings asked Charowhas “if he had anything illegal on
him.” Charowhas nodded and said he had “a little bit of dope” in his front
right pocket. Both deputies saw a plastic bag poking out of that pocket;
Deputy Adams removed that and another bag with Charowhas’s permission.
Deputy Geerlings then asked Charowhas if he had anything else.
Charowhas answered that “he had forgot [sic] but he had brass knuckles.”
Deputy Geerlings asked Charowhas where they were, and Charowhas replied
they were in “the pocket you’re about to open”—that is, his lower left pocket.
Deputy Geerlings then removed a pair of brass knuckles from that pocket.
The entire encounter lasted about five minutes, and Charowhas was “field
released” at its conclusion.
PROCEDURE
Charowhas was charged with transportation of a controlled
substance (methamphetamine) for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379,
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subd. (a); count 1), possession of metal knuckles (Pen. Code, § 21810;
count 2), and various aggravating circumstances (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2)).
Before trial, defense counsel moved to suppress all physical
evidence seized as a result of the deputies’ warrantless search of Charowhas,
asserting any evidence arising from the search was the fruit of the poisonous
tree. (See § 1538.5; U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 10 & 13.)
The People opposed the motion, asserting Charowhas’s possession of a
pocketknife, and his conduct which suggested an intent to fight or flee, gave
the deputies reasonable suspicion to conduct a patdown search, and any
evidence arising from the search was lawfully obtained and admissible. After
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All further undesignated statutory references are to this code.
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hearing testimony from both deputies, the trial court found the search was
reasonable and denied Charowhas’s motion.
A jury convicted Charowhas of count 2 (possession of metal
knuckles), but was unable to reach a verdict on count 1 (transportation of a
controlled substance for sale). The trial court declared a mistrial on that
count and dismissed it on the People’s motion. Charowhas admitted the
aggravating circumstance that his prior convictions are numerous or of
increasing seriousness.
The trial court sentenced Charowhas to 16 months in county jail.
Charowhas filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches
and seizures.” (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.) Evidence seized by law enforcement
as a result of an unreasonable search is suppressed and therefore not
available for use by the prosecution at trial. (See id.; § 1538.5; Cal. Const.,
art. I, §§ 10 & 13; People v. McWilliams (2023) 14 Cal.5th 429, 437.)
A brief investigatory detention, known as a “Terry stop,” is
deemed reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the officer “has ‘a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person
stopped of criminal activity.’” (Kansas v. Glover (2020) 589 U.S. 376, 380
(Glover); see Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (Terry).) The detaining
officer must be able to “point to specific articulable facts that, considered in
light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective
manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity.”
(People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231.) If a reasonably prudent officer
would believe the suspect may be armed and dangerous, the officer may
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conduct a limited patdown search of the suspect for weapons, and any
weapons seized may be introduced in evidence. (Terry, supra, at pp. 30-31.)
“‘The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.’”
(People v. Ramirez (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 315, 326.) “As a matter of
precedent and as a matter of sound reason, the establishment of reasonable
suspicion will always be contextual. It will be informed by the totality of
circumstances and objective scrutiny of the reasons given [by the officer].”
(People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1051 (Flores).) “‘Although a mere
“hunch” does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion the
standard requires is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a
preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for
probable cause.’” (Glover, supra, 589 U.S. at p. 380.)
“‘“In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress
evidence, we defer to that court’s factual findings, express or implied, if they
are supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] We exercise our
independent judgment in determining whether, on the facts presented, the
search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”’ [Citation.]
In doing so we do not consider each fact in isolation. Instead, ‘we must
consider “the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.”’” (Flores,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1043.)
Applying those principles here, we must determine whether the
circumstances gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that Charowhas was
involved in criminal activity or that he was armed and dangerous. If so, the
officers’ conduct was justified.
Looking objectively at the totality of circumstances, we conclude
the patdown search was reasonable. To begin with, Charowhas’s extreme
shaking, his nervous glancing and apparent search for a place to flee, his
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inability or unwillingness to answer certain questions, and his arm
movements toward his pockets were all suspicious. (Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th
at p. 1050 [although a person may certainly decline to engage in a consensual
encounter with the police, “it remains true that ‘nervous, evasive behavior’
need not be ignored” and “is ‘a pertinent factor in determining reasonable
suspicion’ based on all the circumstances”].)
Next, Charowhas was wearing a thick motorcycle jacket, which
Deputy Adams knew, based on his training and experience, was capable of
concealing weapons. (See Pennsylvania v. Mimms (1977) 434 U.S. 106, 112
[“any man of ‘reasonable caution’ would likely have conducted the ‘pat down’”
given the “large bulge under [the driver’s] sports jacket”]; People v. Collier
(2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1374, 1376, 1378 [patdown of passenger reasonable
where the car smelled of marijuana smoke, passenger was taller than deputy,
and passenger wore baggy clothes capable of concealing a weapon].)
Finally, the presence of a weapon (the pocketknife), albeit a legal
one, supported a reasonable suspicion that more weapons might be nearby.
(See U.S. v. Vinton (D.C. Cir. 2010) 594 F.3d 14, 20–21 [sheathed fishing
knife in plain view suggested that “additional weapons might be hidden
elsewhere in the vicinity”; “even a lawfully-possessed fishing knife can be
used as a dangerous weapon”]; State v. Beane (N.D. 2009) 770 N.W.2d 283,
288 [“Having seen [the folding knife in his pocket] and [his] furtive gestures,
the officers certainly had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Beane
was armed and possibly dangerous”]; see also Michigan v. Long (1983)
463 U.S. 1032, 1052, fn.16 [“we have expressly rejected the view that the
validity of a Terry search depends on whether the weapon is possessed in
accordance with state law”].)
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In sum, given Charowhas’s shaking, nervous glancing, inability
or unwillingness to answer questions, visible pocketknife, thick jacket
capable of concealing weapons, and suspicious arm movements, a prudent
officer under the circumstances would reasonably suspect that Charowhas
may be armed and dangerous. The trial court therefore properly denied
Charowhas’s motion to suppress.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
GOETHALS, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, J.
DELANEY, J.
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