People v. Newell CA5

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Filed 1/22/25 P. v. Newell CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F087337
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BF195195A)
v.

ARTHUR DEL MARTAIKAWADZA NEWELL, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Eric Bradshaw,
Judge.
Vicki Hightower, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and John W.
Powell, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Hill, P. J., Detjen, J. and Peña, J.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Arthur Del Martaikawadza Newell pleaded no contest to possession of
ammunition, after having been previously convicted of felonies, and agreed to a court
trial as to whether his prior Oregon convictions were “strikes” under the “Three Strikes”
law (Pen. Code,1 §§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)). The trial court ruled
that the prior convictions were strike offenses under California law and, after striking the
convictions, placed defendant on a two-year term of probation. Defendant argues that the
evidence was insufficient to prove that his prior Oregon convictions were serious felony
convictions under California law. The People concede that the trial court’s decision was
not supported by sufficient evidence. We accept the concession and remand for the
prosecution to decide whether to seek retrial of the prior strike conviction allegations.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The District Attorney of Kern County filed an information on September 1, 2023,
charging defendant with possession of a firearm after having been previously convicted
of a felony (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and possession of ammunition after having been
previously convicted of a felony (§ 30305, subd. (a)). The information also alleged one
prior strike conviction within the meaning of the Three Strikes law2 and that defendant
served a prior prison term (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(3)). Defendant pleaded not
guilty to the charges and denied all allegations.
As part of an agreement with the prosecution, defendant agreed to plead no contest
to possession of ammunition, admit that he was previously convicted of two felonies in
Oregon, and agree to a court trial as to whether his prior felony convictions qualified as
strikes under the Three Strikes law. The prosecution agreed to dismiss the possession of

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The prosecution later orally amended the information to allege a second prior strike
conviction arising from the same Oregon case in which the original strike had arisen.

2.
a firearm charge and that defendant would serve a two-year term of probation and no
further time in custody. The court indicated that it would strike the prior convictions at
the time of sentencing. Defendant then pleaded no contest to possession of ammunition
and admitted having two prior strike convictions. The trial court granted the
prosecution’s motion to dismiss the possession of a firearm charge.
The information as amended alleged that defendant had been convicted in Marion
County, Oregon of second degree robbery (Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.405) and third degree
assault (Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.165). After a court trial on December 12, 2023, the trial
court issued its ruling that both Oregon convictions qualified as serious felony
convictions pursuant to sections 667.5, subdivision (c)(9) and 1192.7, subdivision (c)(10)
and (19).
On December 14, 2023, the trial court granted defendant’s motion to strike his
prior strike convictions, suspended defendant’s sentence, and imposed a two-year term of
probation. The court also ordered that defendant pay a $300 restitution fine (§ 1202.4,
subd. (b)), a suspended $300 probation revocation restitution fine (§ 1202.44), a
$30 criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373), and a $40 court operations
assessment (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)).
Defendant timely appealed on December 14, 2023.
DISCUSSION
I. Background
On July 30, 2015, the District Attorney of Marion County filed an information in
the Circuit Court of Oregon that charged defendant and three other individuals with four
counts of second degree robbery (Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.405; counts 1, 3, 5, 6) and three
counts of third degree assault (Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.165; counts 2, 4, 7).3 Each robbery

3 The People’s evidence did not contain a copy of the amended information filed on
December 10, 2015.

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count alleged that defendant “did unlawfully and knowingly, while in the course of
committing theft, with the intent of compelling [the victim][4] to deliver the property, and
being aided by another person actually present, use and threaten the use of physical force
upon [the victim].” Each assault count alleged that defendant, “[a]s part of the same
transaction,” “did unlawfully and intentionally, while being aided by another person
actually present, cause physical injury to [the victim].”
As part of an agreement with the prosecution, defendant pleaded guilty to all
charges, except for counts 1 and 6, and pleaded guilty to a lesser included offense as to
count 7. Defendant agreed to the factual basis for his pleas “per language of the charging
instrument as to Counts 2, 3, 4, 5, and amended 7 (lesser included).” The court sentenced
him to a five-year term of probation and one year in county jail with credit for time
served.
II. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to sustain the prior conviction
sentence enhancements under section 667. The People concede this issue, and we accept
the concession.
An out-of-state or foreign conviction may be found to be a strike offense in
California if the conviction “is for an offense that includes all of the elements of a
particular violent felony as defined in subdivision (c) of [s]ection 667.5 or serious felony
as defined in subdivision (c) of [s]ection 1192.7.” (§ 667, subd. (d)(2); see also
§ 1170.12, subd. (b)(2).) Thus, “[a] defendant whose prior conviction was suffered in
another jurisdiction is … subject to the same punishment as a person previously
convicted of an offense involving the same conduct in California.” (People v. Myers

4 Although all charges in the Oregon information allege to have occurred on the same day,
counts 1 and 2 involved one victim, counts 3 and 4 involved a second victim, count 5 involved a
third victim, and counts 6 and 7 involved a fourth victim.

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(1993) 5 Cal.4th 1193, 1201.) Robbery is a serious felony under California law.5
(§§ 667.5, subd. (c)(9), 1192.7, subd. (c)(19).) If a defendant’s prior robbery conviction
in another state qualifies as a strike, he or she is subject to a doubled term for his or her
current offense (§§ 667, subd. (e), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)) and a five-year additional term
(§ 667, subd. (a)).
“To qualify as a serious felony, a conviction from another jurisdiction must
involve conduct that would qualify as a serious felony in California.” (People v. Avery
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 53.) To determine whether a prior conviction from another state
contains all the elements of the California felony, the trier of fact may not look outside
the record of conviction. The court may consider any evidence in the record of
conviction “if not precluded by the rules of evidence or other statutory limitation.”
(People v. Myers, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 1201.) If the record does not disclose any of the
facts of the offense committed, the court will presume the prior conviction was for the
least offense punishable under the law of that jurisdiction. (Id. at p. 1200.)
“ ‘[I]n determining the truth of an alleged prior conviction when … the necessary
elements of that conviction do not establish that it is a serious felony, and thus subject to
California’s Three Strikes law, the trier of fact must decide whether the defendant’s
conduct, as demonstrated in the record of the prior conviction, shows that the crime was a
serious felony.’ ” (People v. Gallardo (2017) 4 Cal.5th 120, 135 (Gallardo).) In that

5 The prosecution additionally argued that because defendant was charged with separate
counts of robbery and assault in the Oregon information, that these charges are serious offenses
pursuant to section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(19), which makes assault with intent to commit
robbery a serious felony. This offense was formerly proscribed by section 220 but was deleted
from that statute in 1978. (Stats. 1978, ch. 579, § 12, p. 1982; People v. Pinette (1985)
163 Cal.App.3d 1122, 1125 & fn. 4 [not reaching the issue whether a post-1978 foreign
conviction for assault with intent to commit robbery may be the basis for imposition of a five-
year enhancement pursuant to § 667, subd. (a)].) We note that 667.5 defines “violent felony” to
include “[a]ssault with intent to commit a specified felony, in violation of [s]ection 220.”
(§ 667.5, subd. (c)(15).) However, because we find that the elements of robbery in Oregon are
different than those in California, this difference necessarily excludes Oregon’s crimes from the
definition of serious felony relative to assault with intent to commit robbery.

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regard, “[t]he trial court’s role is limited to determining the facts that were necessarily
found in the course of entering the conviction. To do more is to engage in ‘judicial
factfinding that goes far beyond the recognition of a prior conviction.’ ” (Id. at p. 134.)
The court may rely on facts that “the jury was necessarily required to find to render a
guilty verdict, or that the defendant admitted as the factual basis for a guilty plea.” (Id. at
p. 136.) The sentencing court cannot make “ ‘a disputed determination about “what the
defendant and state judge must have understood as the factual basis of the prior plea.” ’ ”
(Id. at pp. 133–134.)
III. Analysis
Robbery in the state of California is defined as “the felonious taking of personal
property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against
his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.” (§ 211.) “It has been settled law for
nearly a century that an essential element of the crime of robbery is that property be taken
from the possession of the victim.” (People v. Nguyen (2000) 24 Cal.4th 756, 762.)
In Oregon, a person commits the crime of robbery in the second degree if the
person violates Oregon Revised Statute section 164.395 (robbery in the third degree) and
also either “[r]epresents by word or conduct that the person is armed with what purports
to be a dangerous or deadly weapon” or “[i]s aided by another person actually present.”
(Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.405(1)(a),(b).) Oregon Revised Statute section 164.395 is violated
“if in the course of committing or attempting to commit theft … the person uses or
threatens the immediate use of physical force upon another person with the intent of: [¶]
(a) Preventing or overcoming resistance to the taking of the property or to retention
thereof immediately after the taking; or [¶] (b) Compelling the owner of such property or
another person to deliver the property or to engage in other conduct which might aid in
the commission of the theft .…” (Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.395(1)(a),(b).)
One can readily discern that the elements of robbery in Oregon do not require that
the property be taken from the person or the person’s immediate presence as is required

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by section 211. According to one learned treatise, most modern statutes do not contain
the “ ‘person or presence’ ” requirement and follow the Model Penal Code on this point
to “encompass some other situations which ought to be included within the crime of
robbery.” (3 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law (3d ed. 2018) § 20.3(c), pp. 233–234.)
Oregon is included in the list of states that do not have the “person or presence”
requirement. (Id. at p. 234, fn. 42.) The Model Penal Code provides an example of a
scenario that would be a robbery in states without the “person or presence” requirement:
“ ‘an offender might threaten to shoot the victim in order to compel him to telephone
directions for the disposition of property located elsewhere or the threat may be to one
person in order to secure property from another who is not then present.’ ” (3 LaFave,
supra, § 20.3(c), p. 234, fn. 44, quoting Model Pen. Code & Commentaries, com. to
§ 221.1, p. 112.)
As our Supreme Court has recognized in People v. Nguyen, supra, 24 Cal.4th 756,
California has not adopted the approach of the Model Penal Code whose language is
quite different from section 211. (Id. at pp. 763–764 & fn. 4 [recognizing that Oregon is
a state which does not require the property be taken from the possession of the victim];
cf. People v. Rodriguez (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 121, 129–130 [finding similar robbery
statute from Texas did not require property be taken from the person or immediate
presence of victim].) California law requires that the property be taken from the
possession of the victim. (Nguyen, at p. 762.) Because a conviction for robbery in
Oregon may involve conduct that would not qualify as a serious felony in California
according to the elements of the crime, defendant’s conviction can only be a serious
felony for purposes of section 667 if defendant’s conduct “ ‘as demonstrated in the record
of the prior conviction, shows that the crime was a serious felony.’ ” (Gallardo, supra,
4 Cal.5th at p. 135.) The records in this case, however, do not allege any additional facts
of the robbery that would establish that defendant took property within the possession or

7.
immediate presence of the victim, as the factual basis for the plea refers only to the
language in the information, which does not include these facts.
Therefore, we agree with the parties that the prosecution’s evidence was not
sufficient to establish that defendant’s Oregon convictions were “serious felonies” within
the meaning of section 667.5 or section 1192.7. We reverse the trial court’s findings on
the prior Oregon convictions and remand for the People to be given an opportunity to
decide whether to retry the prior strike conviction allegations. (See Gallardo, supra,
4 Cal.5th at p. 138.)
DISPOSITION
We reverse the trial court’s findings as to the prior strike conviction allegations
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The judgment is
otherwise affirmed.

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