In re A.S. CA2/4

CourtListener 10318209CalctappJan 21, 2025

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Filed 1/21/25 In re A.S. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re A.S. et al., Persons Coming B333872
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20LJJP00593)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JUSTIN S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Jennifer W. Baronoff, Commissioner.
Conditionally reversed and remanded.
Carol A. Koenig, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Sally Son, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________

INTRODUCTION
In January 2023, A.S. (born February 2017) and her sister
E.S. (born August 2021) were declared juvenile dependents and
removed from parental custody based on sustained allegations of
sexual and substance abuse. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300,
subd. (b); In re A.S. et al. (June 7, 2024, B328799) [nonpub. opn.]
(In re A.S.).)1 At a six-month status review hearing (§ 366.21,
subd. (e)), the juvenile court found compliance with reunification
services by parents, Samantha S. (mother) and Justin S. (father),
was not substantial.
On appeal from the status review hearing, father raises one
contention: He avers the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) and court failed to comply
with the inquiry provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1900, et seq.) and related California law, the
California Indian Child Welfare Act (Cal-ICWA; Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 224 et seq.). DCFS has not filed an appellate brief
challenging the merits of this contention. Instead, it has filed a
motion to dismiss the appeal as moot, based entirely on a motion
to take additional evidence and judicial notice of post-judgment

1 Subsequent unspecified references to statutes are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code.

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evidence. For the reasons that follow, we deny both motions and
conditionally reverse the status review order.

DISCUSSION
The parties are familiar with the facts and procedural
history of this case. We discuss only facts and history relevant to
deciding father’s appeal.

A. Governing Law: ICWA and Cal-ICWA
Federal ICWA regulations were enacted “to promote the
stability and security of Indian tribes and families by
establishing minimum standards for removal of Indian children
from their families and placement of such children ‘in foster or
adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian
culture . . . .’” (In re Levi U. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 191, 195,
quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1902.) ICWA recognizes “‘“the tribe has an
interest in the child which is distinct from but on a parity with
the interest of the parents.’” [Citation.].” (Dwayne P. v. Superior
Court (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 247, 253.)
“ICWA establishes minimum standards for state courts to
follow before removing Indian children from their families and
placing them in foster care or adoptive homes and does not
prohibit states from establishing higher standards. (25 U.S.C.
§ 1921; 25 C.F.R. § 23.106 (2024); see also In re Elizabeth M.
(2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 768, 783.) Indeed, ICWA expressly yields
to state laws that provide ‘a higher standard of protection to the
rights of the parent or Indian custodian of an Indian child . . . .’
(25 U.S.C. § 1921; § 224, subd. (d).)” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16
Cal.5th 1112, 1129 (Dezi C.).)

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“After the federal ICWA regulations were adopted in 2016,
California made conforming amendments to Cal-ICWA, including
portions of the Welfare and Institutions Code related to ICWA
inquiry and notice requirements.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 1131.) In relevant part, Cal-ICWA imposes on agencies and
juvenile courts “‘an affirmative and continuing duty’ in every
dependency proceeding to determine whether ICWA applies by
inquiring whether a child is or may be an Indian child. (§ 224.2,
subd. (a).)” (Id. at pp. 1131–1132; accord, In re Kenneth D. (2024)
16 Cal.5th 1087, 1099 (Kenneth D.).) This duty begins with
initial contact and continues throughout dependency, including
placement of the child into temporary custody of a county welfare
department. (Dezi C., supra, at p. 1132.)
The duty of inquiry “‘includes, but is not limited to, asking
the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended
family members, others who have an interest in the child, and
the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or
may be, an Indian child.’” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1132,
quoting § 224.2, subd. (a).) “Extended family member” refers to
any “person who has reached the age of eighteen and who is the
Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister,
brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second
cousin, or stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); see also § 224.1,
subd. (c) [adopting ICWA definition].)
Whenever the child welfare agency “has ‘reason to believe’
that an Indian child is involved, further inquiry regarding the
possible Indian status of the child is required. (§ 224.2, subd. (e);
see also [Cal. Rules of Court,] rule 5.481(a)(4).) The required
further inquiry includes (1) interviewing the parents and
extended family members; (2) contacting the Bureau of Indian

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Affairs (BIA) and State Department of Social Services; and
(3) contacting tribes the child may be affiliated with and anyone
else that might have information regarding the child’s
membership or eligibility in a tribe. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A)–
(C).)” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1132, fn. omitted.) Contact
with a tribe “‘shall, at a minimum, include telephone, facsimile,
or electronic mail contact to each tribe’s designated agent for
receipt of [ICWA] notices,’” and “‘sharing information identified
by the tribe as necessary for the tribe to make a membership or
eligibility determination, as well as information on the current
status of the child and the case.’” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(C).)
Sharing information with tribes “at this inquiry stage is distinct
from formal ICWA notice, which requires a ‘reason to know’—
rather than a ‘reason to believe’—that the child is an Indian
child.” (Dezi C., supra, at p. 1133.)
The juvenile court may find “an agency’s inquiry and due
diligence were ‘proper and adequate,’ and the resulting record
provided no reason to know the child is an Indian child, so ICWA
does not apply. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th
at p. 1134.) Even after making this finding, the agency and court
have a continuing duty under ICWA, and the court “‘shall reverse
its determination if it subsequently receives information
providing reason to believe that the child is an Indian child and
order the social worker or probation officer to conduct further
inquiry . . . .’ (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)” (Ibid.; accord, Kenneth D.,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1100.) The juvenile court’s factual finding
ICWA “does not apply is ‘subject to reversal based on sufficiency
of the evidence.’ (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)” (Dezi C., supra, at
p. 1134.)

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B. Relevant Background
At the commencement of this case, DCFS filed several form
documents (Indian Child Inquiry Attachment [ICWA-010 form];
Parental Notification of Indian Status [ICWA-020 form])
reporting no reason to believe the children were or may be Indian
children. In December 2022, parents denied having Indian
heritage. At the January 2023 detention hearing, the court found
ICWA did not apply. Noting, however, DCFS’s “duty of further
inquiry and an obligation to investigate any claims of [Indian]
ancestry throughout the case,” the court ordered interviews of
maternal and paternal relatives for Indian ancestry.
In mid-January 2023, parents again denied having Indian
ancestry. During the adjudication hearing later that month, the
court asked maternal grandmother, Anita G., about her Indian
heritage. Anita G. indicated she had “some” Cherokee heritage
but was unsure of the details. She did not know if she had
relatives living on a reservation or who received funding from any
tribe, though she thought her mother (maternal great-
grandmother) might have additional information.2 The court
ordered DCFS to follow up with maternal great-grandmother and
all other known relatives and to notify the Cherokee tribes, BIA,
and Secretary of the Interior.
In February 2023, DCFS interviewed Anita G. and
maternal great-grandmother, Della D. Each relative reported
possible Cherokee ancestry through various relatives and
provided DCFS their known information. With the exception of
maternal great-grandfather (Gary D.), every relative identified

2 At the same hearing, the court noted the presence of paternal
grandmother, Claudia A. The court did not inquire of Claudia A.’s
heritage.

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was deceased. The same month, DCFS attempted unsuccessfully
to telephonically interview paternal uncle, Christopher L.
The same month, DCFS sent ICWA Notices (ICWA-030
forms) with biographical information obtained from maternal
relatives to the Cherokee Nation, the United Keetoowah Tribe,
the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, the BIA, and the
Secretary of the Interior. The notices informed the tribes each
child was “or may be eligible for membership.”3 As of March
2023, the United Keetowah Band of Cherokee Indians and
Cherokee Nation informed DCFS the children were not members
or eligible for membership.4
At the April 2023 disposition hearing, the court stated,
“[W]e can go forward with disposition, but we will set an I.C.W.A.
progress [hearing] for any responses from the tribes and
interviews with the paternal relatives.” It does not appear the
court scheduled such hearing.
DCFS filed a status review report in October 2023,
reporting on additional interviews with maternal relatives. Anita
G. denied having any Indian ancestry, while Della D. reported
possible heritage through her own great-great-grandmother
(Minnie T.).5

3 The notices listed biographical information for mother, father,
maternal grandmother (Anita G.), maternal grandfather (Gregory G.),
maternal great-grandparents (Della D. and Gary D.), and four other
maternal relatives. The notices listed paternal grandmother’s name
(Claudia A.) but provided no other information on paternal relatives.
4 The response by United Keetowah Band of Cherokee Indians
reported on E.S.’s eligibility status and not A.S.’s.
5 The ICWA notices previously sent to the three tribes identified
Minnie T. and listed her birthplace and birthday.

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On November 30, 2023, the court held a six-month status
review hearing (§ 366.21, subd. (e)), finding parents were not in
substantial compliance with their case plan. The court continued
removal and reunification services and set the matter for a
further status review hearing. The court made no ICWA findings
or orders. Father timely appealed from the order issued after the
status review hearing.

C. Analysis
Father contends DCFS’s inquiry at the time of the status
review hearing was insufficient because DCFS did not interview
“available paternal extended family members who may have been
able to offer meaningful information about Indian ancestry.” In
support, he identifies paternal aunt (Alyssa R.) and paternal aunt
or great aunt (Nancy A.) as persons with whom DCFS had
contact or contact information.
DCFS has not filed a respondent’s brief in this case. It has
instead filed: (1) a motion to take additional evidence on appeal
or judicial notice of post-judgment evidence; (2) a motion to
dismiss the appeal as moot; and (3) a letter brief purporting to
confirm its “further inquiry into the children’s possible [Indian]
ancestry.” The four documents attached to DCFS’s motion to
take additional evidence appear to be reports on its further
inquiry into Indian ancestry or court orders requiring DCFS’s
updated compliance.
Father opposes both motions filed in this case. Relying on
the recent decisions in Dezi C. and Kenneth D., father argues we
may not take “judicial notice of evidence not presented to the trial
court absent exceptional circumstances” not present here. (Citing
Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1106.) We agree with father.

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In Kenneth D., our Supreme Court held, “absent
exceptional circumstances, a reviewing court may not generally
consider postjudgment evidence to conclude [ICWA inquiry error]
was harmless. The sufficiency of an ICWA inquiry must
generally be determined by the juvenile court in the first
instance.” (Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1094.) The facts
and issue in this case resemble those in Kenneth D.
In that case, as in this one, the child welfare department
acknowledged its prior failure to adequately inquire into father’s
possible Indian heritage “but argue[d] any failure of inquiry at
the trial court level was cured by its later, postjudgment
interview” of additional relatives. (Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th
at p. 1100.) In rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court
stated:
“Ordinarily, appellate courts review a trial
court’s judgment based on the record as it existed
when the trial court ruled. [Citation.] It is
ultimately within the purview of the juvenile court to
make determinations of credibility and assessments
of adequacy because it is uniquely positioned to reach
these conclusions based on its familiarity with the
case and those involved. The department’s assertion
that its postjudgment report rendered any prior
failure of inquiry harmless ‘necessarily requires that
we treat the factual assertions therein as undisputed,
which we cannot do’ because, absent exceptional
circumstances, ‘[t]his type of factfinding is precisely
what must occur in the juvenile court in the first
instance [citation], where additional and possibly
competing evidence may be offered; and the court, on
a more fully developed record, will assess weight and
credibility as appropriate, and make its factual
findings.’ [Citation.]” (Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th

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at p. 1101, quoting In re E.C. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th
123, 150.)

With these principles in mind, the Kenneth D. Court
discussed the postjudgment evidence offered by the department,
finding “the nature of this evidence only highlights why it should
be presented to the juvenile court rather than for the first time on
appeal.” (Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1105 [memorandum
detailed new interview in which relative “was unaware of any
Native American heritage and assumed her DNA test results
[suggesting Indian heritage] were due to her Mexican ancestry”].)
The Court concluded the juvenile court was the appropriate
forum in which to review this type of potentially disputed
evidence and make a finding in the first instance as to “whether
the department’s efforts constituted ‘proper and adequate further
inquiry and due diligence. . . .’” (Id. at pp. 1105–1106, quoting
§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)
The postjudgment evidence offered in this case purports to
describe DCFS’s further inquiries of relatives and two court
orders requiring additional compliance. The evidence does not
include a judicial determination on the adequacy of this
postjudgment inquiry. While we “‘“‘may take judicial notice of
the existence of each document in a court file, [we] can only take
judicial notice of the truth of facts asserted in documents such as
orders, findings of fact and conclusions of law, and judgments.’”’
[Citation.]” (Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1106.) Until the
juvenile court makes a determination on the adequacy of DCFS’s
postjudgment inquiry in the first instance, we cannot treat the
factual assertions in the postjudgment evidence presented as
undisputed or determinative on the issue of ICWA compliance.
(Ibid.; accord, conc. opn., Groban, J., Kenneth D., supra, at

10
pp. 1108–1110 [agreeing “the department’s postjudgment
memorandum [did] not constitute a proper use of judicial
notice”].)
We thus conclude the requisite inquiry into the children’s
Indian ancestry at the time of the status review hearing from
which father appealed “did not satisfy statutory mandates.”
(Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1107.) As DCFS has not
identified any exceptional circumstances in this case, we further
conclude we may not consider postjudgment evidence of its
inquiry to deem father’s appeal moot. We deny DCFS’s motions
to dismiss the appeal as moot and take additional evidence on
appeal, conditionally reverse the juvenile court’s status review
order, and remand the matter for a proper inquiry and further
proceedings.

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DISPOSITION
The six-month status review order is conditionally
reversed. The matter is remanded for compliance with the
inquiry and notice requirements of sections 224.2 and 224.3. If
on remand the juvenile court finds a proper and adequate
inquiry, conducted with due diligence, has taken place and there
is no reason to know either child is an Indian child, making
ICWA inapplicable, the court shall reinstate the six-month status
review order. If the juvenile court concludes ICWA applies, it
shall proceed in conformity with ICWA and Cal-ICWA provisions.

MORI, J
We concur:

CURREY, P. J.

COLLINS, J.

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