In re Z.B. CA2/6

CourtListener 10318208CalctappJan 21, 2025

Full text

Filed 1/21/25 In re Z.B. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re Z.B., a Person Coming 2d Juv. No. B338641
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Super. Ct. No. 22JD-00347)
(San Luis Obispo County)

SAN LUIS OBISPO COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J.B. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

J.B. (Mother) and D.C. (Father) appeal from the juvenile
court order terminating their parental rights as to their son, Z.B.,
and selecting adoption as the permanent plan. (Welf. & Inst.
Code,1 § 366.26.) They contend the juvenile court erred when it
denied their petitions to change court orders (§ 388) and found
inapplicable the parental-benefit exception (§ 366.26, subd.
(c)(1)(B)(i)). They also contend the San Luis Obispo County
Department of Social Services (Department) failed to make
adequate inquiries pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related provisions of
California law (§ 224 et seq.). We accept the Department’s
concession regarding ICWA, conditionally reverse, and remand
for additional ICWA inquiries.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The parents have extensive criminal records and
longstanding substance abuse issues. Mother’s convictions
include narcotics offenses and prison terms for child cruelty.
Father’s criminal convictions included burglary, false
imprisonment, grand theft, child cruelty, and multiple probation
violations. Father maintained sobriety while incarcerated but
consistently relapsed shortly after being released.
Both parents had children from prior relationships for
whom they lost parental rights. Based on Mother’s “substance
abuse, dangerous behavior, and associated neglect,” her twins
were placed in custody in 2016. She successfully reunified with
them but then lost her parental rights when she relapsed and
neglected the children. Mother reported sobriety of three and a
half years after the twins were removed. Father lost parental
rights as to one child in 2018 because of substance abuse,
domestic violence, neglect, and failure to comply with family

1 Subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

2
reunification services. In 2020 a child welfare case was opened
for a younger child based on substance abuse; Father was not
offered reunification services and the child was reunified with her
mother.
On November 30, 2022, Mother arrived at the probation
department under the influence of drugs and tested positive for
methamphetamine and fentanyl. Probation officers found Z.B.,
then 10 months old, at home with Father, who also appeared to
be under the influence of drugs. Mother admitted she and Father
had been using methamphetamine and fentanyl for the past
several months. Both parents were arrested and incarcerated for
probation violations. Father was thereafter sentenced to three
years in prison. With both parents incarcerated, Z.B. was placed
in a foster home in San Luis Obispo County.
The juvenile court sustained the juvenile dependency
petition. (§ 300, subds. (b)(1), (g), (i).) The court ordered
reunification services for Mother. The court denied reunification
services for Father, who remained incarcerated. (§ 361.5, subds.
(b)(10) & (11), (e)(1).)
Z.B. was moved to a second foster home in May 2023. In
July, the court placed Z.B. with Mother for a 30-day trial visit
and then reunified him with Mother.
On October 31, 2023, while living with Z.B., Mother
overdosed on fentanyl, was found unconscious in her bathroom,
and was revived by law enforcement. A baggie believed to
contain fentanyl was within Z.B.’s reach. Z.B. was placed in a
third foster home.
Mother was incarcerated for violating probation and
charged with child cruelty. The juvenile court sustained a
supplemental petition (§ 387), found the previous disposition had

3
not been effective in protecting the child, and terminated
Mother’s reunification services. Z.B. was placed in a fourth foster
home, located in Fresno County. The court set the matter for a
permanency hearing (§ 366.26).
The parents filed petitions to modify court orders that
sought reunification services and, for Mother, additional
visitation. (§ 388.) The court held an evidentiary hearing to
concurrently consider the section 388 petitions and permanency.
The court denied the section 388 petitions. The court found the
parental benefit exception did not apply (§ 366.26, subd.
(c)(1)(B)(i)), terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights,
and set adoption as the permanent plan.
DISCUSSION
Petitions for modification
The parents contend the juvenile court erred when it
denied their respective petitions to change court orders (§ 388).2
Mother sought reinstatement of her reunification services, an
increase in visitation, elimination of supervised visits, and a
30-day trial visit. Father requested he receive reunification

2 Father’s notice of appeal challenges both the permanency
determinations (§ 366.26) and denial of his petition for change
order (§ 388). Mother’s notice of appeal specifies only the
permanency determinations and does not check the box to appeal
the denial of her section 388 petition. Because the section 388
and 366.26 issues were heard together and respondent is not
prejudiced by the omission, we exercise our discretion to liberally
construe Mother’s notice of appeal and consider both issues.
(Ellis Law Group, LLP v. Nevada City Sugar Loaf Properties,
LLC (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 244, 251; Corenbaum v. Lampkin
(2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1324, fn. 5.)

4
services. We conclude the court did not err.
“Any parent . . . may, upon grounds of change of
circumstance or new evidence, petition the court . . . for a hearing
to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously
made.” (§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) “Section 388 provides the ‘escape
mechanism’ that . . . must be built into the process to allow the
court to consider new information.” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5
Cal.4th 295, 309.)
“The petitioner has the burden of showing by a
preponderance of the evidence (1) that there is new evidence or a
change of circumstances and (2) that the proposed modification
would be in the best interests of the child.” (In re Mickel O.
(2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 615.) “We review the juvenile court’s
denial of a section 388 petition for an abuse of discretion.” (Id. at
p. 616.) “ ‘ [“]The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is
whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two
or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the
reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for
that of the trial court.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
1. Mother’s showing
Mother’s abuse of opiates began at least in 2012 when she
gave birth to twins. She was in a residential treatment program
at the beginning of her pregnancy with Z.B. and completed the
program when she gave birth. She completed another residential
program after Z.B. was removed in November 2022. Before the
petition here was filed, Mother had attended NA (Narcotics
Anonymous), AA (Alcoholics Anonymous), and other group and
individual drug and alcohol sessions, and had seen a therapist
weekly. At the time of her relapse in October 2023, Mother was
receiving drug and alcohol services including POEG (Perinatal

5
Outpatient Extended Group).
In her section 388 petition, Mother stated she was now
prioritizing her mental health, taking medication for depression,
and attending substance abuse programs.
Mother testified she had not used illegal drugs for almost a
year before her relapse in October 2023. Before that relapse, she
had discontinued prescription medication for depression. She
relapsed despite receiving injections of an opiate “blocker.” After
her relapse, she realized she was suffering from depression as
well as a drug problem, resumed taking the anti-depressant drug,
and began taking other medication. She now understood the
importance of that medication to maintaining her sobriety.
Mother had remained sober for seven months after the October
31 relapse.
When she was released from custody after her relapse,
Mother resumed drug and alcohol services and attending NA and
AA meetings. She attended weekly POEG sessions. She also
began seeing a private therapist. She started random drug
testing around January 2024 and had no positive tests. She
testified her engagement with services was different than before
because she was now “taking it a lot more seriously.” She
testified she learned tools through recent drug treatment that
would support her sobriety, including to “pause, think and pause
before reacting.”
At the permanency hearing a witness from a local church
testified that for the last year and a half, Mother was regularly
participating in a faith-based recovery program and worship
services. She observed that Mother was “engaged” and
“attentive” when she interacted with Z.B., and he appeared
happy.

6
Mother felt Z.B. had a strong bond with her. Mother
continued working as a caregiver for an elderly woman, which
she began before her relapse.
2. Father’s showing
Father had struggled with alcohol issues since he was a
teenager and started using hard drugs in his mid-20s. He
graduated from a drug and alcohol program in 2018. He was
released from custody eight days after Z.B. was born, then
entered a sober living home. He relapsed two months later. He
had not used drugs since he was arrested in November 2022. In
the 10 years before that, the longest period of sobriety he had was
15 months in 2018.
Father’s section 388 petition cited as changes in
circumstances that he had been released from custody, was fully
engaged in his treatment plan, obtained full-time employment,
and demonstrated his commitment to sobriety. He testified the
biggest change was he had reached out to his family.
Father was currently participating in drug programs,
attended church meetings, was seeing a private therapist weekly,
and completed a 12-step program. He was in a random drug
testing program and had no dirty tests.
Father testified he was with Z.B. “pretty solidly for about
eight months” shortly after his birth until Father’s incarceration.
During visits, Z.B. was “ecstatic” to see him.
3. Ruling
The Department and Z.B.’s counsel opposed the section 388
petitions and recommended parental rights be terminated so Z.B.
could be freed for adoption. The Department noted the high
number of moves Z.B. had made were challenging to him, he
needed stability to progress in his developmental milestones, and

7
insufficient time remained for the parents to demonstrate their
safety and stability. The social worker testified that continued
reunification services would be detrimental to Z.B. because it
would put him at risk for having to change placements again.
The juvenile court found “[i]nsufficient evidence for change
of circumstances” and denied the section 388 petitions. The court
noted that “both parents’ addiction is long term, and their history
of relapses after periods of sobriety has repeated itself.” Because
it could not consider the petitions to change court orders “in a
vacuum,” but had to “look at the circumstances with a wider
lens,” the court found the period of sobriety insufficient to
establish lasting changes.
4. Discussion
To prevail in a section 388 petition, “the petitioner must
show changed, not changing, circumstances.” (In re Mickel O.,
supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 615.) “The change in circumstances
supporting a section 388 petition must be material” and
“ ‘substantial.’ ” (In re N.F. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 112, 120-121.)
In our view, Mother and Father did not make that showing here.
“[A] showing of materially changed circumstances requires
more than a relatively brief period of sobriety or participation in
yet another program.” (In re N.F., supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at
p. 121; In re Ernesto R. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219, 223.)
Although both parents were participating in therapy and other
programming to address addiction, they had also done so before
their most recent drug use. We commend the parents for their
recent sobriety and accept the juvenile court’s conclusion that
their intent to change was sincere. Because their “periods of
sobriety alternated with recurring drug use” (In re Cliffton B.
(2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 423), however, it was not an abuse of

8
discretion for the juvenile court to conclude the parents had not
shown a substantial change of circumstances.
The parents contend the statutory scheme provides
inadequate time to demonstrate sobriety. But our Supreme
Court has concluded the dependency timeframes constitutionally
serve the state’s interest in providing children with stable,
permanent homes. (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 309;
see Tonya M. v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 836, 845.)
“When custody continues over a significant period, the
child’s need for continuity and stability assumes an increasingly
important role. [Citation.] That need often will dictate the
conclusion that maintenance of the current arrangement would
be in the best interests of that child.” (In re Angel B. (2002) 97
Cal.App.4th 454, 464 [affirming denial of § 388 petition].) Such is
the case here. At the age of two years and five months, Z.B. had
been removed from Mother’s custody twice and placed in four
foster homes. The Department reported he suffered “two very
traumatic removals from his mother’s care” and “exhibits
unsecured attachment symptoms” with “a very low tolerance for
stress.”
“Childhood does not wait for the parent to become
adequate.” (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 310.) Denial
of further reunification services was necessary to serve Z.B.’s
“ ‘need for prompt resolution of his . . . custody status, the need to
provide children with stable environments, and [reduce] the
damage to a minor of prolonged temporary placements.’ ” (In re
Abbigail A. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 83, 95.) The juvenile court did not

9
abuse its discretion in denying the section 388 petitions.
Parental-benefit exception
The parents contend the juvenile court erred when it failed
to apply the parental-benefit exception to bar adoption as the
permanent plan (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)). We are not
persuaded.
After reunification services have been terminated, the court
sets a section 366.26 hearing “ ‘to select and implement a
permanent plan for the child.’ ” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th
614, 630 (Caden C.).) The court has the options of adoption with
termination of parental rights, tribal adoption, guardianship,
permanent relative care, or foster care. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).) The
statutory preference is for adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (b)(1).)
The parental-benefit exception allows the court to choose
an option other than adoption “ ‘in exceptional circumstances.’ ”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.) The exception has three
elements: “(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2)
a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child
such that (3) the termination of parental rights would
be detrimental to the child.” (Ibid.; § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
The parent must establish these three elements by a
preponderance of the evidence. (Caden C., at p. 629.)
We review for substantial evidence the first two elements—
consistent visitation and benefit from continuing the relationship.
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640.) Substantial
evidence here supports the juvenile court’s finding that the first
two elements were present. The parents visited with Z.B.
consistently. Z.B. was happy and excited to see them. Their
interactions were positive and loving without negative effects.

10
As to the third element, the juvenile court found that
terminating the parental relationship would not be detrimental
to the child when balanced against the benefits of the adoptive
home. We review this element for substantial evidence as to
factual determinations such as “specific features of the child’s
relationship with the parent,” “the harm that would come from
losing those specific features,” and “the benefit of adoption.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) We review for abuse of
discretion the “delicate balancing” of “the harm of losing the
relationship against the benefits of placement in a new, adoptive
home.” (Ibid.) “A court abuses its discretion only when ‘ “ ‘the
trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making
an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination’ ” ’ ”
such that “ ‘ “ ‘no judge could reasonably have made the
order.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 641.)
“ ‘A showing the child derives some benefit from the
relationship is not a sufficient ground to depart from the
statutory preference for adoption.’ ” (In re A.G. (2020) 58
Cal.App.5th 973, 995.) “Friendly or affectionate visits are not
enough.” (In re G.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 15, 25.) “ ‘To
overcome the preference for adoption and avoid termination of
the natural parent’s [parental] rights, the parent must show that
severing the natural parent-child relationship would deprive the
child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that
the child would be greatly harmed.’ ” (Ibid.)
We conclude the juvenile court’s finding that the benefits of
adoption outweighed the detriment of terminating the parental
relationship was supported by substantial evidence and was not
an abuse of discretion. Z.B.’s need for stability was
overwhelming. He was traumatized by the two removals from

11
Mother’s custody, and had been transferred to four different
foster homes.
The record does not support the parents’ contention that
the juvenile court relied upon improper factors or
overemphasized minor factors. The court appropriately
mentioned Z.B.’s young age (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p.
632), but did not suggest his “age alone” justified denial of the
parental-benefit exception. The court mentioned the parents’
relapses and failure to resolve their drug abuse, but that
discussion pertained to the section 388 petitions, not the section
366.26 determination.
Nor does the court’s passing reference to whether the
parents fulfilled “a parental role” constitute reversible error.
Caden C. does not prohibit consideration of whether the parent
occupied a “parental role” and is silent on that point. (In re A.L.
(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1157.) But because the phrase can
have several meanings, unexplained reliance upon it can require
reversal. (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303, 319-321;
In re L.A.-O. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 197, 210-212.) The
appropriate “ ‘focus is whether there is a substantial, positive
emotional attachment between the parent and child.’ ” (Id. at p.
211.) Here, the juvenile court properly explained that it
considered “a parental role in the child’s life that results in a
significant positive emotional attachment.” No error has been
shown.
ICWA
Mother and Father contend the case should be remanded
for compliance with ICWA’s inquiry requirements. The
Department discussed possible Native American ancestry with
the parents and with an individual variously described as a

12
paternal “uncle” or “distant cousin.” The record includes
information regarding the maternal grandparents and uncle and
the paternal grandfather and Father’s second cousins, but there
is no evidence the Department attempted to contact them.
Because it did not ask Z.B.’s extended family members whether
he “is, or may be, an Indian child,” the Department concedes it
did not comply with its initial duty of inquiry. (§ 224.2, subds.
(b)(2), (c).) We accept the concession, conditionally reverse, and
remand for further proceedings. (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th
1112, 1136.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order terminating Mother’s and
Father’s respective parental rights to Z.B., entered June 13, 2024,
is conditionally reversed, and the matter is remanded for
compliance with the initial inquiry requirements of ICWA and
related California law. After these inquiries have been made, the
court shall make ICWA findings at a noticed hearing. If the court
finds ICWA inapplicable, it shall reinstate its June 2024 order
terminating parental rights. If the court concludes that ICWA
does apply, however, it shall conduct further proceedings
consistent with this opinion, including a new section 366.26
hearing that conforms with all relevant provisions of ICWA and
the Welfare and Institutions Code.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J. CODY, J.

13
Gayle S. Peron, Judge

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

______________________________

Christopher Blake, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant J.B. (Mother).
Robert McLaughlin, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant D.C. (Father).
Rita L. Neal, County Counsel, Vincent M. Uberti, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.