CourtListener 10316673•People v. Ramirez CA6
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Filed 1/16/25 P. v. Ramirez CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H051009
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. C2014652)
v.
EDWARD LEGASPI RAMIREZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
I. INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted defendant Edward Legaspi Ramirez of all 12 counts listed in the
second amended information: four counts of sexual penetration with a child 10 years of
age or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (b); counts 1–4);1 one count of assault with
intent to commit a lewd or lascivious act on a child (§§ 220, subd. (a)(2), 288, subd. (a);
count 5); six counts of lewd or lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14 (§ 288,
subd. (a); counts 6–11); and one count of sending harmful matter to a minor (§ 288.2,
subd. (a)(2); count 12). Concerning counts 5–12, the second amended information
alleged that the victim was particularly vulnerable and that defendant took advantage of a
position of trust or confidence to commit the offenses. (§ 1170, subd. (b); Cal. Rules of
Court, rules 4.421(a)(3), 4.421(a)(11).) Defendant waived his right to a jury trial on these
1
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
alleged aggravating circumstances, and the trial court found the alleged aggravating
circumstances true. The trial court sentenced defendant to a total prison term of 15 years
to life consecutive to five years.
On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony
concerning Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS) and that the trial
court erroneously instructed the jury that CSAAS evidence could be considered to
evaluate the believability of the alleged victim, depriving defendant of his right to due
process. For reasons that we will explain, we will affirm the judgment.
II. BACKGROUND
Defendant lived in the same home as the victim, J.D.2 Defendant was J.D.’s
cousin, but he was nearly 40 years older than J.D. and J.D. referred to defendant as an
uncle. In October 2020, a domestic disturbance occurred between J.D.’s parents. J.D.,
who was 11 years old at the time, positioned herself between her parents and told them
that defendant had been touching her. J.D. told a police officer who responded to the
domestic disturbance that defendant had twice touched her “private part,” meaning her
vagina. In a later interview and then at trial, J.D. described more numerous and extensive
incidents of sexual abuse by defendant against her starting when she was five years old
including that he touched her vaginal area, inserted his finger inside her vagina, and
masturbated while touching her vaginal area.
At trial, the prosecution called six witnesses: J.D., J.D.’s mother, J.D.’s cousin,
two police officers, and clinical psychologist Dr. Blake Carmichael. Prior to trial, the
trial court ruled that Dr. Carmichael could testify as to CSAAS, but it ordered certain
limits on Dr. Carmichael’s testimony and stated that it would provide the instruction
outlined in CALCRIM No. 1193 concerning the limited relevance of this testimony.
2
A pseudonym was used for the victim’s last name in the information and at trial.
We refer to her by the initials of the name used in the proceedings below to protect her
privacy interests. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).)
2
At trial, Dr. Carmichael testified that CSAAS was developed “to educate people,
to help inform people about kids who have been sexually abused, because then and still
today there are myths and misconceptions or preconceived notions that people have about
expectations for how they hope a kid would react or how they hope a kid would tell about
the sexual abuse.” He testified that CSAAS “helps people understand the context of the
abuse and why there’s such a wide variety of ways that kids respond to and tell about
sexual abuse.” After the trial court recognized Dr. Carmichael as an expert in CSAAS,
Dr. Carmichael testified that he was not familiar with any of the facts of this case. He
identified five “categories or components to CSAAS”: secrecy; helplessness; entrapment
and accommodation; delayed, unconvincing, and conflicted disclosure; and recantation or
retraction. Concerning these five categories, Dr. Carmichael testified: “It’s not a
checklist. They’re concepts that were kind of presented to help people understand the
context of abuse and why there’s a variety of things. So there’s no diagnosis. There’s no
checklist or test you can use to determine if a kid was abused or not. That’s why we have
the legal process and juries. So it really does help people understand the context in which
abuse does occur.” Asked if there is “anything about CSAAS that’s used to determine
that sexual abuse has occurred,” Dr. Carmichael responded: “No. That’s backwards.
You can’t use CSAAS or anything else for that matter to say abuse occurred really. So
we’re talking about kids who were abused and describing those experiences so people
can better understand them, support them, and treat them. So that’s how it’s used: To
educate.” Dr. Carmichael then testified in more detail concerning each of the five
CSAAS categories without reference to the facts of the instant case. In concluding his
direct examination of Dr. Carmichael, the prosecutor asked: “[A]re you here today to
provide any sort of opinion about whether anyone in this case was sexually abused?”
Dr. Carmichael replied: “No. That’s the jury’s responsibility, and I would not form such
an opinion.”
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The defense called one witness, a social worker who interviewed J.D. five weeks
before J.D.’s October 2020 disclosure in response to a different report of domestic
violence in the home. The social worker testified that J.D. denied in this earlier interview
that she had experienced any sexual abuse. Defendant did not testify.
The appellate record provides nothing to demonstrate that defendant objected to
the trial court instructing the jury in accordance with CALCRIM No. 1193, which
addresses CSAAS testimony. In his trial brief, defendant stated that CALCRIM
No. 1193 is “specifically on point” concerning his request to limit or restrict CSAAS
testimony should such testimony be permitted. In discussions concerning the
prosecution’s motion in limine to restrict defense cross-examination of Dr. Carmichael,
the trial court noted that CALCRIM No. 1193 “limits how a jury is supposed to
understand CSAAS testimony,” and defendant expressed no concerns regarding this
instruction. Accordingly, the trial court instructed the jury consistent with CALCRIM
No. 1193 as follows: “You have heard testimony from Blake Carmichael regarding Child
Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome. Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation
Syndrome relates to a pattern of behavior that may be present in child sexual abuse cases.
Testimony as to the Accommodation Syndrome is offered only to explain certain
behavior of an alleged victim of child sexual abuse. Blake Carmichael’s testimony about
Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome is not evidence that the defendant
committed any of the crimes charged against him. You may consider this evidence only
in deciding whether or not [J.D.’s] conduct was consistent with the conduct of someone
who has been molested, and in evaluating the believability of her testimony.”
The prosecutor’s argument to the jury stated that in evaluating J.D.’s testimony,
the jury could consider J.D.’s testimony and demeanor on the stand, her prior statements
to law enforcement, and “the other thing you can use when you’re evaluating [J.D.’s]
testimony specifically is these concepts you learned from Dr. Carmichael about Child
Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome.” Later in his argument, the prosecutor
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addressed Dr. Carmichael’s testimony, recounting the five CSAAS categories and stating
that “I want to re-emphasize to you . . . that these are not things that you look at, try to
decide did [J.D.] have these things[;] therefore, something happened to her.” The
prosecutor argued that CSAAS evidence could explain why J.D. “may have acted in
some ways that you might, without knowing this information, have thought that’s a little
weird.” For example, the prosecutor argued that CSAAS testimony could help explain
why J.D. would be reluctant to report the abuse and why she first disclosed only two
instances of defendant touching her. Defendant’s trial counsel also addressed
Dr. Carmichael’s testimony in argument, arguing that there were “red flags” in
Dr. Carmichael’s testimony because CSAAS was not recognized by certain organizations
and because CSAAS is “circular” in that “[e]verything can be true.” Defendant’s trial
counsel argued: “So I’m just asking to not let CSAAS as a concept dilute your diligence
and how critical you are into approaching the evidence in our case.”
This appeal followed after the jury’s verdicts and sentencing.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Expert CSAAS Testimony
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting Dr. Carmichael’s
testimony and that the admission of Dr. Carmichael’s testimony violated his right to due
process “because it allowed the jury to make the unreasonable inference that, because
[J.D.] acted in ways that children who have been molested act, as described by
Dr. Carmichael, she was a credible witness, despite evidence to the contrary.”
Additionally, defendant argues that admission of the CSAAS testimony prejudiced him,
requiring reversal of the judgment, and that if this issue is considered forfeited by his trial
counsel’s failure to more specifically object to Dr. Carmichael’s testimony, he received
ineffective assistance of counsel. The Attorney General responds that no error occurred
in admitting Dr. Carmichael’s testimony because “[a]lthough the admissibility of CSAAS
evidence has been limited in some jurisdictions, California courts have properly allowed
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the use of such evidence for limited credibility evaluation purposes.” Alternatively, the
Attorney General argues that defendant was not prejudiced by admission of this evidence,
and that defendant’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to specifically object to
CSAAS testimony on the grounds he now asserts on appeal. We find no error in the
admission of Dr. Carmichael’s testimony.
1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
Expert opinion testimony is admissible in part when the subject matter is “beyond
common experience” and the opinion would “assist the trier of fact.” (Evid. Code, § 801,
subd. (a).) “ ‘When expert opinion is offered, much must be left to the trial court’s
discretion.’ [Citation.] The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to admit
or exclude expert testimony [citation], and its decision as to whether expert testimony
meets the standard for admissibility is subject to review for abuse of discretion.
[Citations.]” (People v. McDowell (2012) 54 Cal.4th 395, 426 (McDowell).)
“Trial courts may admit CSAAS evidence to disabuse jurors of five commonly
held ‘myths’ or misconceptions about child sexual abuse. [Citation.] While CSAAS
evidence is not relevant to prove the alleged sexual abuse occurred, it is well established
in California law CSAAS evidence is relevant for the limited purpose of evaluating the
credibility of an alleged child victim of sexual abuse. [Citations.]” (People v. Lapenias
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 162, 171 (Lapenias).) CSAAS evidence “is admissible solely for
the purpose of showing that the victim’s reactions as demonstrated by the evidence are
not inconsistent with having been molested.” (People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d
385, 394.) “For instance, where a child delays a significant period of time before
reporting an incident or pattern of abuse, an expert could testify that such delayed
reporting is not inconsistent with the secretive environment often created by an abuser
who occupies a position of trust.” (Ibid.) CSAAS evidence “is not admissible to prove
that the complaining witness has in fact been sexually abused; it is admissible to
rehabilitate such witness’s credibility when the defendant suggests that the child’s
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conduct after the incident -- e.g., a delay in reporting -- is inconsistent with his or her
testimony claiming molestation. [Citations.] ‘Such expert testimony is needed to
disabuse jurors of commonly held misconceptions about child sexual abuse, and to
explain the emotional antecedents of abused children’s seemingly self-impeaching
behavior. [Citation.] The great majority of courts approve of such expert rebuttal
testimony.’ [Citation.]” (People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1300–1301,
fn. omitted (McAlpin).)
2. Analysis
Defendant does not argue that Dr. Carmichael’s testimony was not relevant to
rehabilitate J.D.’s believability as a witness. Dr. Carmichael’s testimony provided
relevant evidence to the jury in deciding whether J.D.’s conduct was not inconsistent with
the conduct of someone who had been molested and in evaluating her believability. For
example, Dr. Carmichael testified about how victims of child sexual abuse can delay
disclosure of the abuse or disclose the abuse incrementally. Therefore, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in concluding that the testimony involved a matter “beyond
common experience” that would assist the jury. (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a).)
Defendant argues that CSAAS evidence should generally be inadmissible because
it is unreliable and because by its very nature, CSAAS evidence will always support the
conclusion that abuse occurred because it suggests that both intuitive and counterintuitive
behavior support an alleged victim’s credibility. He asserts that while “California has
accepted the admissibility of CSAAS evidence, courts have acknowledged the inherent
problems with such evidence,” citing cases largely from other jurisdictions. Defendant
acknowledges that in McAlpin, the California Supreme Court held that CSAAS evidence
is admissible to rebut common misperceptions about victim behavior, and that this court
is bound by the decisions of our Supreme Court. (McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at
pp. 1300–1302.) However, defendant argues that McAlpin is “no longer an accurate
reflection of current understandings of how children respond to abuse,” and that recent
7
decisions from Courts of Appeal in this state applying McAlpin were wrongly decided.
Defendant asserts that jurors are no longer likely to hold the misconceptions that CSAAS
evidence addresses, and that the admission of CSAAS evidence deprived him of due
process by permitting the jury to infer that J.D. was a credible witness.
Our state Supreme Court indicated in McAlpin that CSAAS expert testimony is
admissible to disabuse jurors of commonly held misconceptions about child sexual abuse
victims’ behavior and to explain seemingly contradictory behavior of a child sexual abuse
victim. (McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1300–1302.) The California Supreme Court’s
decisions are binding on all lower courts in this state. (People v. Johnson (2012) 53
Cal.4th 519, 528.) “CSAAS evidence has been admitted by the courts of this state since
the 1991 McAlpin decision.” (People v. Munch (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 464, 468
(Munch).) “Further, reviewing courts have routinely held the admission of CSAAS
evidence does not violate due process. [Citations.]” (Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at
p. 174.) Defendant’s references to decisions from other jurisdictions that reached a
different position do not affect the binding nature of the McAlpin decision. The McAlpin
decision “is binding on all lower courts in this state. [Citation.] That other jurisdictions
may disagree with it does not change its impact on California cases. [Citation.]”
(Munch, supra, at p. 468.) Accordingly, we adhere to precedent from our state Supreme
Court that CSAAS evidence is generally admissible for the limited purposes for which it
was admitted in the instant case. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the trial
court’s admission of this evidence.3 (See McDowell, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 426.)
Because no abuse of discretion occurred in admitting Dr. Carmichael’s testimony, we
3
Defendant argues that the trial court’s admission of Dr. Carmichael’s testimony
is reviewed de novo because the question presented is whether the trial court correctly
construed the Evidence Code in admitting the evidence. Assuming without deciding that
the de novo standard of review applies, our conclusion remains that the trial court did not
err.
8
need not address whether any error prejudiced defendant or whether defendant’s trial
counsel was ineffective.
B. Instruction Regarding CSAAS Testimony
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred by using CALCRIM No. 1193 to
instruct the jury regarding Dr. Carmichael’s testimony. Defendant argues: “CALCRIM
[No.] 1193 does not inform the jurors that CSAAS assumes the truth of the complaining
witnesses’ claims. It fails to instruct the jury that the evidence is relevant only to educate
the jurors about how molested children may act in general. Instead, it tells the jurors they
may consider the evidence in ‘evaluating [victims’] believability,’ ” which defendant
asserts improperly invites the jury to consider CSAAS evidence to support an alleged
victim’s allegations against a defendant. As a result, defendant asserts that the trial court
erred in using CALCRIM No. 1193, and that the alleged error deprived him of his right to
due process.
1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“A claim of instructional error is reviewed de novo. [Citation.] An appellate court
reviews the wording of a jury instruction de novo and assesses whether the instruction
accurately states the law. [Citation.]” (People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.)
“A jury instruction may ‘ “so infuse[] the trial with unfairness as to deny due
process of law.” ’ [Citation.] However, ‘ “not every ambiguity, inconsistency, or
deficiency in a jury instruction rises to the level of a due process violation. The question
is ‘ “whether the ailing instruction . . . so infected the entire trial that the resulting
conviction violates due process.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “It is well established that the
instruction ‘may not be judged in artificial isolation,’ but must be considered in the
context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record.” ’ [Citations.] ‘ “If the charge
as a whole is ambiguous, the question is whether there is a ‘ “reasonable likelihood that
the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way” that violates the
Constitution.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lemcke (2021) 11 Cal.5th 644, 655.)
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2. Analysis
Defendant did not object to the use of CALCRIM No. 1193 at trial. Instead,
defendant’s trial brief expressed agreement with the substance of the instruction. Based
on this, the Attorney General urges this court to conclude that defendant has forfeited this
issue. Defendant cites section 1259 in arguing that forfeiture should not apply because
his substantial rights were impacted by the use of this instruction.4
We need not decide whether forfeiture applies in this matter because the trial court
did not err in instructing the jury in accordance with CALCRIM No. 1193. It is not
reasonably likely that jurors understood the instruction as permitting the use of
Dr. Carmichael’s testimony for the improper purpose of proving that defendant sexually
abused J.D. CALCRIM No. 1193 specifically informed jurors that CSAAS evidence “is
not evidence that the defendant committed any of the crimes charged against him.” To
the extent that the instruction allowed the jury to consider CSAAS evidence in evaluating
the believability of J.D.’s testimony, the instruction is proper. CSAAS evidence is
relevant and admissible when an alleged victim’s credibility has been attacked. (See
McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1302 [expert opinion that it is not unusual for a parent to
refrain from reporting a known child molestation was “clearly relevant [citation] because
it tended to rehabilitate the testimony” of the victim’s mother as a corroborating
witness].) Thus, nothing about the language of CALCRIM No. 1193 supports
defendant’s argument that his right to due process was violated.
When combined with Dr. Carmichael’s testimony stressing the limited nature of
his testimony and the prosecutor’s argument reemphasizing the limits of CSAAS
evidence, the instruction would not cause the jury to believe that they could consider
Dr. Carmichael’s testimony as proof that defendant sexually abused J.D. As defendant
4
Section 1259 states in relevant part: “The appellate court may . . . review any
instruction given, refused or modified, even though no objection was made thereto in the
lower court, if the substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby.”
10
acknowledges, the Court of Appeal in People v. Gonzales (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 494
(Gonzales) rejected a similar argument to the one defendant raises here. In Gonzales, the
court noted that CALCRIM No. 1193 “must be understood in the context” of the expert’s
testimony, which in that case stated that “CSAAS is not a tool to help diagnose whether a
child has actually been abused.” (Gonzales, supra, at p. 503.) In this context, the court
held, a reasonable juror would understand CALCRIM No. 1193 to mean that the jury
could use the expert’s testimony to conclude that the alleged victim’s behavior “does not
mean she lied when she said she was abused,” not that the alleged victim “was, in fact,
molested.” (Gonzales, supra, at p. 504.) The court concluded: “The CSAAS evidence
simply neutralizes the victim’s apparently self-impeaching behavior. Thus, under
CALCRIM No. 1193, a juror who believes [the expert’s] testimony will find both that
[the alleged victim’s] apparently self-impeaching behavior does not affect her
believability one way or the other, and that the CSAAS evidence does not show she had
been molested. There is no conflict in the instruction.” (Ibid.) Other courts have come
to similar conclusions regarding CALCRIM No. 1193. (See Lapenias, supra, 67
Cal.App.5th at pp. 175–176; Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 474.) This court has
also held that instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 1193 regarding testimony from a
CSAAS expert is not erroneous. (People v. Ramirez (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 175, 219–
220; People v. Ortiz (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 768, 782, 816.) We follow the same
approach here. Because the instruction correctly informed the jury of the permissible and
impermissible uses of Dr. Carmichael’s testimony, and because there is no reasonable
likelihood that the jury misconstrued or misapplied the instruction in the manner asserted
by defendant, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 1193,
and defendant’s due process right was not denied.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DANNER, J.
WILSON, J.
People v. Ramirez
H051009
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