CourtListener 10315217•Bakhtiyari v. Holden CA2/5
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Filed 1/16/25 Bakhtiyari v. Holden CA2/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
MARYAM BAKHTIYARI, B335221
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 23STCV18160)
JANELLE HOLDEN, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Daniel M. Crowley, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Kerendian & Associates, Shab Kerendian and Craig
Cawlfield for Defendants and Appellants.
J. Supple Law, and Peter F. Finn for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
________________________
Defendants and appellants Janelle Holden (Defendant) and
Janelle Holden, D.D.S., Inc.1 appeal from an order denying their
special motion to strike allegations from the complaint (anti-
SLAPP motion; Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16)2 filed by plaintiff and
respondent Maryam Bakhtiyari (Plaintiff). On appeal, Defendant
contends that the motion should have been granted because
Plaintiff’s claims arise from speech protected under the anti-
SLAPP statute, and Plaintiff has not met her burden to show a
probability of prevailing. Defendant asks this court to reverse
the trial court’s order and remand, either with directions to grant
the motion, or alternatively, directions to determine whether
Plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing on the merits. We
reverse and remand for the trial court to evaluate the sufficiency
of Plaintiff’s pleading and evidence and decide in the first
instance whether to strike Plaintiff’s defamation claim and any
other causes of action.
1 The corporate entity is a named defendant and an
appellant, but because we focus primarily on Holden as an
individual, our opinion refers to Defendant in the singular. The
corporate entity will be identified as “Holden, D.D.S., Inc.” as
necessary.
2 “SLAPP” stands for strategic lawsuit against public
participation. (See Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc.
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 57.) Unless otherwise specified, all
subsequent statutory citations are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background
Plaintiff and Defendant are both dentists with active
practices in the city of Manhattan Beach. Defendant’s practice
focuses on pediatric dentistry, Plaintiff’s practice focuses on “non-
invasive and non-extraction orthodontics, temporo-mandibular
joint (TMJ) and sleep apnea,” and the two dentists have some
patients in common. According to Plaintiff, Defendant has not
contacted Plaintiff with any issues or criticism about her work as
to any patients, other than fewer than 10 emails during the 17
years they have both been in practice in Manhattan Beach.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff contends that for 17 years, Defendant has
made statements questioning Plaintiff’s licenses, calling her
treatment hocus-pocus, stating that she Plaintiff used outdated
appliances, and telling patients that Plaintiff was causing
permanent harm to their gums and was not licensed to do
orthodontics.
II. Complaint Allegations
Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant in July 2023,
alleging six causes of action: (1) defamation, (2) slander per se,
(3) trade libel/product disparagement, (4) intentional interference
with prospective business and economic advantage, (5) negligent
interference with prospective business and economic advantage,
and (6) unfair business practices.
The following are factual allegations contained in the
complaint. Defendant and Plaintiff practice in different fields of
3
dentistry, and Defendant “does not practice and has none or
negligible experience practicing in the fields of orthodontics,
craniofacial pain management or sleep apnea.” Defendant
“maliciously made false and defamatory statements” about
Plaintiff “to other medical professionals and/or patients,
including false accusations about [Plaintiff’s] dental practices and
capabilities.” Defendant accused Plaintiff “of incompetence,
unprofessional conduct, and characterized her dental procedures
as outdated, ‘hocus-pocus’, dangerous and harmful.” Defendant
repeatedly told Plaintiff’s patients that Plaintiff “is not licensed
and/or competent to practice orthodontics.” Defendant also told
multiple of their mutual patients that Plaintiff’s “work and plan
were outdated and incorrect (even though the treatments in some
cases were ongoing and unfinished); that [Plaintiff] was not
competent to perform the contracted dental services for the
patient; and that the patient should cancel her contract with
[Plaintiff] mid-treatment to continue with a different dentist.”
Defendant made these statements “both directly and indirectly to
potential patients, existing patients, and the broader dental
community, causing harm to [Plaintiff’s] practice, professional
standing, and personal reputation.”
The complaint further alleged that “[t]he State of California
does not have any separate licensing requirements for the
practice areas of orthodontics or craniofacial pain management.”
As a licensed dentist, Plaintiff was licensed to practice in both
fields. Defendant’s statements “were intended to make patients
and other medical professionals believe that [Plaintiff] lacked the
professional qualifications to practice in her chosen fields.”
Defendant’s statements caused significant harm to Plaintiff’s
professional and personal reputation.
4
Plaintiff alleged on information and belief that Defendant
made the false statements “out of professional jealousy,” with an
intent to harm Plaintiff’s practice and reputation.
Defendant made false oral statements, “both directly and
indirectly to potential patients, existing patients, and the broader
dental community” about Plaintiff’s “incompetence and
unprofessional conduct and characterized her dental procedures
as outdated, dangerous and harmful.” Defendant made “false,
unprivileged statements to others that imputed a lack of
qualification, licensing, capacity, or integrity” to Plaintiff and her
dental practice.
Defendant made the statements with knowledge or reckless
disregard for the truth, and she was motivated by professional
jealousy and bias or prejudice based on Plaintiff’s sex and ethnic
background.
The complaint alleged on information and belief that
Defendant sought to force Plaintiff to discontinue practicing in
the Manhattan Beach area.
III. Defendant’s Anti-SLAPP Motion
In September 2023, Defendant filed an anti-SLAPP motion
and supporting declarations. Defendant argued that the
gravamen of the complaint was based on speech protected under
section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4), and that Plaintiff could not
establish a probability of prevailing on any of her claims
stemming from her defamation claim. The motion argued the
claims were insufficient because Plaintiff had not alleged with
requisite specificity what was said, to whom, and when, and to
the extent any statements were made, they did not support a
5
defamation claim because they were either truthful statements of
fact or nonactionable statements of opinion. In addition,
Plaintiff’s defamation claim was inadequate because there was no
evidence of actual malice.
Defendant’s declaration described her understanding of the
process by which an orthodontist becomes board certified by the
American Board of Orthodontics. She stated, “Although licensed
dentists can perform orthodontic treatment in California, I do not
perform orthodontic treatment.” If Defendant observed a patient
to have an orthodontic issue or believed the patient could benefit
from orthodontic treatment, her practice was to “recommend that
the patient be seen by a specialist – specifically, an orthodontist,
and usually one who is board certified by the American Board of
Orthodontics – rather than a general dentist.” In addition, if a
patient with an orthodontic issue was receiving treatment from
someone who was not an orthodontist, her practice was to
recommend that the patient consider getting a second opinion
from an orthodontist. Defendant had followed this practice with
Plaintiff’s patients. Defendant acknowledged that, to the extent
it could be called an issue, her only issue with Plaintiff was that
Plaintiff “is a general dentist and it is my belief that my pediatric
patients who may need orthodontic care should be seen by
orthodontists, whom I believe provide the best possible
orthodontic care.” Defendant also denied having any personal
bias or animosity towards Plaintiff.
6
IV. Opposition to Anti-SLAPP Motion
In December 2023, Plaintiff filed an opposition and
supporting declarations, as well as objections to Defendant’s
supporting evidence.
The declarations Plaintiff offered in support of her
opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion included accounts by three
different parents. Renee Tinker had two children who were
treated by Plaintiff between 2017 and 2023. In 2021, Tinker’s
oldest son had braces applied by Plaintiff and had some issues
with his gums. Defendant sent Plaintiff an email voicing
concerns with the treatment, and told Tinker that Plaintiff’s
treatment had caused injury to Tinker’s oldest son and that he
had suffered permanent bone loss. Tinker had her second son get
braces with Plaintiff, and Defendant’s negative comments
continued. Tinker declared that “the negative comments kept
coming from Dr. Holden throughout the treatment of my son
Kevin through January 4, 2023. Beyond merely mentioning a
broken bracket here or there, she has stated that Dr. Maryam is
not licensed to practice orthodontics, and attached [sic] her
personally as if Dr. Holden has a grudge against her. If Dr.
Holden had made these comments before I had a chance to get to
know Dr. Maryam, it would have caused me to go elsewhere for
orthodontics.” Two other parents also declared that Defendant
stated to them that Plaintiff was not licensed to practice
orthodontics, although the declarations do not specify when the
statements were made.
7
Plaintiff’s declaration summarized her training and
experience, and described the effect of hearing from her patients
about Defendant’s comments.
V. Reply Brief and Declaration
Together with a reply brief, Defendant filed a declaration
reviewing the dates on which various patients referenced in
Plaintiff’s opposition were last seen in Defendant’s office. As
relevant here, Kevin Tinker was most recently seen in
Defendant’s office on February 14, 2023, while two other patients
were last seen sometime between 2013 and 2021.
VI. Trial Court’s Ruling
In a written decision, the trial court denied Defendant’s
motion to strike the complaint, finding Defendant did not
demonstrate that the statements identified in the complaint were
made in connection with an issue of public interest. The court
reasoned that because Defendant only communicated her
negative view of Plaintiff’s competence and credentials to her
patients and the patients’ guardians, the statements did not
implicate a public issue. Because Defendant did not meet her
burden to demonstrate that the complaint arose from protected
activity, the trial court did not consider whether Plaintiff’s
evidence met her burden to demonstrate a probability of
prevailing on the merits of her causes of action.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. (§§ 425.16, subd.
(i), 904.1, subd. (a)(13).)
8
DISCUSSION
I. Anti-SLAPP Law
“[T]he anti-SLAPP statute is designed to protect
defendants from meritless lawsuits that might chill the exercise
of their rights to speak and petition on matters of public concern.
[Citations.] To that end, the statute authorizes a special motion
to strike a claim ‘arising from any act of that person in
furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under
the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in
connection with a public issue.’ (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)” (Wilson
v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 883–884
(Wilson).)
“ ‘Speech is often provocative and challenging.’ [Citation.]
But our legal tradition recognizes the importance of speech and
other expressive activity even when—perhaps especially when—
it is uncomfortable or inconvenient. The Legislature enacted the
anti-SLAPP statute to safeguard that tradition against those who
would use the judicial process to chill speech they oppose.”
(Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238, 1256.) The anti-SLAPP
statute is designed to “encourage continued participation in
matters of public significance” (§ 425.16, subd. (a)) and it
“provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless
claims arising from protected activity.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1
Cal.5th 376, 384.)
Ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion to strike involves a two-
step process. (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc.
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.) “First, the court decides whether the
9
defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged
cause of action is one arising from protected activity.” (Ibid.;
§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) If that first threshold is met, the court
then determines whether the challenged claim has minimal
merit, meaning that plaintiff “has demonstrated a probability of
prevailing on the claim,” considering “ ‘the pleadings, and
supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which
the liability or defense is based.’ ” (Equilon, at pp. 66–67,
§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) We review de novo a trial court’s denial of
an anti-SLAPP motion based on the moving party’s inability to
clear the first threshold. (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884.)
The anti-SLAPP statute identifies four categories of
protected speech or activity, but the only one at issue in the
current appeal is described in section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4),
often referred to as the “catchall” provision.3 (See, e.g., Geiser,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1243.) In FilmOn.com, Inc. v.
DoubleVerify, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133 (FilmOn), the California
Supreme Court provided the lower courts with two-step
framework for evaluating whether speech or conduct qualified as
3 Section 425.16, subdivision (e) describes the four
protected categories as including “(1) any written or oral
statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or
judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by
law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a
legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official
proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement
or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in
connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other
conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right
of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection
with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”
10
protected activity under the catchall provision: “First, we ask
what ‘public issue or [ ] issue of public interest’ the speech in
question implicates—a question we answer by looking to the
content of the speech. (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).) Second, we ask
what functional relationship exists between the speech and the
public conversation about some matter of public interest. It is at
the latter stage that context proves useful.” (FilmOn, 7 Cal.5th
at pp. 149–150.) In examining the functional relationship
between the speech and the public issue to determine whether
the speech or conduct is protected under anti-SLAPP statute’s
catchall provision, the court focuses on the context or specific
circumstances in which the statement was made, “including the
identity of the speaker, the audience, and the purpose of the
speech.” (FilmOn, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 142–143, emphasis added.) In
other words, following the two-step process set forth in FilmOn, a
court focuses first on the content of the speech, and then on the
context in which it was made.
In a subsequent opinion, the Supreme Court explained,
“where the first step is satisfied, it performs an important
function in the inquiry: It operates as a lens that focuses the
analysis at the second step. In other words, to assess whether
the challenged activity contributes to discussion of a public issue,
we must identify some public issue that the challenged activity
purports to address.” (Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1250.)
Before analyzing whether the alleged defamatory
statements at issue in this case are protected speech under
section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4), we review two pertinent cases:
Yang v. Tenet Healthcare Inc. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 939 (Yang)
and Murray v. Tran (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 10 (Murray). In Yang,
the plaintiff was a general surgeon who filed suit alleging that a
11
hospital, its medical staff, and individual doctors falsely stated to
other healthcare providers, members of the public, and patients
that (1) plaintiff was not qualified or competent to practice her
specialties; (2) her ethics and behavior fell below applicable
standards; (3) she was dangerous to her patients, hospital
employees, and medical staff; and (4) she was under
investigation. (Yang, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 943.) The reviewing
court found the alleged defamatory statements were about a
licensed doctor’s qualifications, competence, and ethics,
specifically any purported deficiencies in those areas, and
therefore concerned a public issue. (Id. at p. 947.) Considering
the functional relationship between the speech and the public
issue, the Yang opinion acknowledged the cautionary note from
FilmOn: “ ‘ “it is not enough that the statement refer to a subject
of widespread public interest; the statement must in some
manner itself contribute to the public debate.” ’ ” (FilmOn, supra,
7 Cal.5th at p. 150; Yang at p. 948.) “ ‘What it means to
“contribute to the public debate” [citation] will perhaps differ
based on the state of public discourse at a given time, and the
topic of contention’ but ultimately ‘we examine whether a
defendant—through public or private speech or conduct—
participated in, or furthered, the discourse that makes an issue
one of public interest.’ ” (FilmOn, at pp. 150–151; Yang at
p. 948.) The Yang court found that “defendants directly
participated in and contributed to the public issue.” (Yang, at
p. 948.) Focusing on the statements by defendants directing
other doctors to not refer patients to the plaintiff, the statements
were “similar to a statement made by a third party to aid and
protect consumers[]” and “akin to consumer protection
information in that defendants ostensibly seek to protect the
12
patients’ interests,” and such protective statements qualified for
anti-SLAPP protection. (Ibid.) The court rejected plaintiff’s
argument that certain statements—specifically warning doctors
not to refer their patients to plaintiff—were to a limited audience
and did not directly impact a broad segment of society. “Given
that statements aimed at protecting groups of consumers have
been viewed as sufficiently broadly applicable to be protected, we
think it clear that statements aimed at protecting members of the
public who might see a doctor are sufficiently broadly applicable.”
(Id. at p. 949.) Other statements qualified for protection because
they were “communicated to the public, not just to discrete
doctors or hospital staff members. This context is significant,
because speech to the public about a doctor’s qualifications
furthers the public discourse on that matter.” (Yang, at p. 948.)
Murray v. Tran was not cited by either party, but its
reasoning also guides our analysis of the functional relationship
between speech and the public issue in question. Plaintiff
Murray and defendant Tran were two dentists who co-owned a
dental practice. Murray practiced dentistry, while Tran handled
the business operations through his own separate entity, which
also owned a number of other dental practices. (Murray, supra,
55 Cal.App.5th at p. 16.) After the business relationship between
Murray and Tran soured, Tran made statements criticizing the
quality of Murray’s dental work, and these statements formed the
basis for two defamation causes of action that Murray added to a
pre-existing lawsuit between the two dentists. (Id. at p. 20.)
Applying FilmOn’s two-step framework, the Murray court
concluded that only one of five distinct categories of defamatory
statements alleged in the complaint was protected activity under
13
the anti-SLAPP statute.4 All the alleged defamatory statements
met the first step inquiry under FilmOn, because regardless of
category, they concerned Murray’s “qualifications and
competence to perform his dental services[,]” a topic in which “the
public, including current and future dental patients, have a vital
interest.” (Murray, at p. 30.)
The second step analysis required examination of the
context of the speech, including the purpose, timing, location, and
actual and intended audiences for the statement; some of those
factors varied depending on the category of speech. (Murray,
supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 30.) The first category involved
emails that Tran sent to an attorney and to administrative
employees and various individuals involved in Tran’s business
operation. The court reasoned that Tran had not shown a
functional relationship between the emails and the public issue
(Murray’s qualifications and competence as a dentist) because
none of the recipients bore any responsibility for Murray’s
competence, and there was no evidence that Tran expected that
the recipients would share the information with Murray’s current
or potential patients. (Id. at pp. 31–32.) Similar reasoning led
the court to find the second and fifth categories of speech were
also not protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. (Id. at pp. 32,
33, 35, 36.)
The third category of speech was an email from Tran to a
retired dentist, Dr. Burgess, who had sold the practice to Tran
4 FilmOn and Yang were both published after briefing in
Murray’s appeal of the trial court’s order granting Tran’s anti-
SLAPP motion was complete, but the appellate court permitted
the parties to file supplemental briefing. (Murray, supra, 55
Cal.App.5th at p. 26.)
14
and Murray about two years before Tran and Murray parted
ways, and who had previously worked with Murray. (Murray,
supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 33.) Tran expressed his concern that
Murray was providing substandard care, and asked Burgess for
advice on how to restore the standard of care at the practice.
“Tran also said, ‘I’m afraid if things go further, the California
Dental Board will have to get involved[,]’ ” and attached various
documents. (Ibid.) The Murray court noted that in FilmOn, the
high court discussed two oft-cited opinions that held “section
425.16, subdivision (e)(4) can ‘apply “to private communications
concerning issues of public interest.” ’ (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th
at p. 146; see Terry v. Davis Community Church (2005) 131
Cal.App.4th 1534 [(Terry)]; Hecimovich v. Encinal School Parent
Teacher Organization (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 450
[(Hecimovich)].)” (Murray, at p. 34.) Also relevant to the
determination was “whether the statements ‘were private or
widely broadcasted and received, and for what purpose.’ ”
(Murray, at p. 34, quoting FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 146.)
Still quoting from FilmOn, the Murray court reviewed the
contextual factors in Terry and Hecimovich that qualified
otherwise private communications to be considered part of a
public conversation. (Murray, at p. 34.) The Murray court found
those contextual factors missing from Tran’s private
communication with Burgess, because there was no record
evidence that Tran communicated with the Dental Board, and no
evidence that his concerns were being discussed or intended to be
discussed with current or prospective patients. (Murray, at
p. 34.) For that reason, Tran’s email to Burgess was not
protected under the anti-SLAPP statute.
15
The only category where the Murray court concluded the
speech was protected under the anti-SLAPP statute involved oral
statements Tran made to another dentist who had recently
employed Murray after Tran had expelled Murray from their
joint practice. Tran texted the other dentist that Tran had
something alarming to tell him. “During their ensuing phone
call, Dr. Tran allegedly told [the other dentist] the following:
‘ “[Dr. Tran was] looking through his charts of patients at his
office in La Jolla [and] found bad work happening at his practice.
He [was] implying that he had evidence that Dr. Murray is doing
substandard care . . . . He also stated that he is sending evidence
to the Board to substantiate his claim. I asked him exactly what
substandard care did he see that Dr. Ian Murray did. [Dr.] Tran
stated that he cannot tell me. He stated the reason he is telling
me because he likes me and that he wants to protect his patients
and my patients from Dr. Murray’s (alleged) substandard
care.” ’ ” (Murray, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 35.) The reviewing
court focused on Tran’s statements that he wanted to warn the
dentist who was now employing Murray “about problems with
Dr. Murray’s work because he wanted to ‘protect’ [the other
dentist’s] patients from ‘substandard care.’ These statements—
made to a current employer—were directly tethered to the issue
of public interest (a dentist’s competence to perform dental work)
and promoted the public conversation on that issue because they
were made to a person who had direct connection to and
authority over the patient population with whom Dr. Murray was
working at the time.” (Murray, at p. 35.) In other words, the
Murray court determined that the context of the phone
conversation between Tran and the other dentist demonstrated
that the speech contributed to a conversation about a public
16
issue. The role of the speaker, the intended audience, and the
purpose of the speech all played a critical role in the court’s
conclusion.
II. The Alleged Statements Are Protected Activity
Analyzing Defendant’s alleged defamatory statements
using the two-step inquiry set forth in FilmOn, we find that
Defendant has met her burden to show the alleged statements
fell within the anti-SLAPP statute’s catchall provision, section
425.16, subdivision (e)(4).
The alleged defamatory statements concerned Plaintiff’s
qualifications and competence to provide orthodontic care. As
such the “public issue implicated is the qualifications,
competence, and professional ethics” of a licensed dentist, a
matter that several cases have recognized as clearing the bar for
a public issue. (Yang, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 947; Murray,
supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 30 [a dentist’s qualifications and
competence to perform dental services “are matters about which
the public, including current and future dental patients, have a
vital interest”]; see also Kibler v. Northern Inyo County Local
Hospital Dist. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 192, 201 [professional conduct of
California licensed physicians are “ ‘matters of public
significance’ ”]; Healthsmart Pacific, Inc. v. Kabateck (2016) 7
Cal.App.5th 416, 429 [consumers “have an interest in being
informed of issues concerning particular doctors and health care
facilities”].)
Examining the functional relationship between the speech
in question and the public conversation about the issue, we keep
in mind that our analysis “must include a consideration of the
17
context or specific circumstances in which the statement was
made, ‘including the identity of the speaker, the audience, and
the purpose of the speech.’ ” (Murray, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 28,
quoting FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 140, 151–152.)
Defendant contends that her statements about Plaintiff’s
qualifications and competence to provide orthodontic care
contributed to the public conversation because the complaint
alleges that such statements were made not just to the two
dentists’ mutual patients, but also to the broader dental
community and other medical professionals. She further
contends that even focusing solely on her statements to specific
patients or their guardians, the statements were still protected
because they bore a functional relationship to the public issue of
a medical or dental professional’s competence.
Plaintiff contends that the alleged defamatory speech does
not fall under the anti-SLAPP statute’s catchall provision, based
on the limited audience for Defendant’s statements and because
the statements were not sufficiently related to any public
conversation about Plaintiff’s qualifications or credentials.
Plaintiff argues the facts here are distinguishable from the
speech at issue in Yang, where the plaintiff alleged that
defamatory statements were communicated to the public. (Yang,
supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 948.) Plaintiff argues Defendant’s
statements to parents of individual patients are more comparable
to the reports at issue in FilmOn, which were issued “not to the
wider public . . . but privately, to a coterie of paying clients.”
(FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 153.)
We agree with Defendant that Plaintiff’s complaint does
not rely solely on statements to the guardians of particular
patients, but also includes allegations that false and defamatory
18
statements were made to existing and potential patients, and to
other dentists and medical professionals. In addition, the
evidence shows that the purpose of Defendant’s speech was to
protect Plaintiff’s current and potential patients from what
Defendant believed to be ineffective treatment methods. For
example, the parent of a mutual patient stated that Defendant’s
comments “ranged from talking about [Plaintiff’s] not being
licensed to practice orthodontics to stating that some of the
methods she was using were not correct or would not be
effective.” Another patient declared that Defendant “tried hard
to convince me that [Plaintiff] did not know how to do
orthodontics.” Defendant’s declaration also stated that
regardless of whether the patient was seeing Plaintiff or another
dentist, she would advise the parent to seek a second opinion
from an orthodontist, many of whom are certified by the
American Board of Orthodontics.
We are persuaded that Defendant’s statements bore a
functional relationship to the public issue of a dentist’s
qualifications and competence. Whether true or false, the
purpose and effect of Defendant’s alleged statements about
Plaintiff’s qualifications, competence, and the quality of her work,
was to contribute to the public issue of a dentist’s qualifications
to practice orthodontics. In that sense, they are similar to the
protected speech in Yang (48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 948–949) and
Murray (55 Cal.App.5th at p. 35), where the purpose and
intended audience of the alleged defamatory speech supported
the conclusion that the statements were made to protect patients.
The trial court was therefore incorrect when it found
Defendant had failed to meet her burden to show that the claims
19
asserted by Plaintiff arose from activity that was protected under
the catchall provision of the anti-SLAPP statute.
III. We Reverse as to the Corporate Entity Defendant and
Remand for the Trial Court to Evaluate Whether
Plaintiff Has Provided Sufficient Evidence to
Demonstrate a Probability of Prevailing Against
Defendant
With respect to the corporate entity defendant, Holden,
D.D.S., Inc., our review of the complaint reveals that other than
naming the entity as a defendant in the caption, Plaintiff makes
no factual allegations against Holden, D.D.S., Inc. The complaint
is legally insufficient to support any claim against Holden,
D.D.S., Inc., and we instruct the trial court to grant the anti-
SLAPP motion as to Holden, D.D.S., Inc.
Because the trial court concluded Defendant’s statements
were not protected speech under the anti-SLAPP statute, it did
not consider whether Plaintiff met her burden to demonstrate
that he claims had minimal merit.
We remand the matter to allow the trial court to evaluate
whether the evidence Plaintiff offered in support of her claims
against Defendant was sufficient to survive an anti-SLAPP
motion. (See Hunter v. CBS Broadcasting Inc. (2013) 221
Cal.App.4th 1510, 1527 [“the more prudent course is to remand
the matter to the trial court to determine in the first instance
whether [the plaintiff] demonstrated a reasonable probability of
prevailing on the merits”].) We express no view on Plaintiff’s
probability of prevailing.
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IV. Plaintiff Forfeited Her Opportunity to Appeal the
Trial Court’s Denial of the Request for Additional
Discovery
In her respondent’s brief, Plaintiff asks this court to
remand with instructions to give her the opportunity to conduct
limited discovery, specifically production of a list of mutual
patients, and depositions of Defendant and other witnesses.
However, she did not meet the statutory requirements for
seeking this form of relief in the trial court, and offers no good
explanation for that failure.
The anti-SLAPP statute generally provides that “[a]ll
discovery proceedings in the action shall be stayed upon the filing
of” an anti-SLAPP motion “until notice of entry of the order
ruling on the motion.” (§ 425.16, subd. (g).) The statute does
permit, however, a court to “order that specified discovery be
conducted notwithstanding this subdivision” on noticed motion
and for good cause shown. (§ 425.16, subd. (g).) “In the anti-
SLAPP context, ‘good cause’ requires ‘a showing that the
specified discovery is necessary for the plaintiff to oppose the
[anti-SLAPP] motion and is tailored to that end.’ [Citation.]”
(Balla v. Hall (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 652, 692; accord, Abir Cohen
Treyzon Salo, LLP v. Lahiji (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 882, 891.)
Before the trial court, plaintiff did not file a noticed motion
seeking an order for limited discovery as permitted under section
425.16, subdivision (g). Instead, in her opposition to Defendant’s
motion to strike, plaintiff merely argued that if the court found
Plaintiff’s evidence insufficient to make a prima facie case
against Defendant, Plaintiff “respectfully requests leave to
conduct discovery in order to more properly oppose Defendants’
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motion.” The trial court did not rule on Plaintiff’s request, but
because Plaintiff never filed a noticed motion, we conclude she is
not entitled to the requested discovery.
DISPOSITION
The order denying the special motion to strike is reversed,
and the case is remanded to the trial court to consider whether
plaintiff and respondent Maryam Bakhtiyari has shown a
probability of prevailing on her claims. Defendants and
appellants Janelle Holden and Janelle Holden, D.D.S., Inc. are
awarded costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:
HOFFSTADT, P.J.
KIM (D.), J.
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