In re G.S. CA2/3

CourtListener 10315214CalctappJan 16, 2025

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Filed 1/16/25 In re G.S. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

B334417
In re G.S., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23CCJP03860C)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Jesus S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Marguerite D. Downing, Judge. Dismissed.
Benjamin Ekenes, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

Jesus S., father of minor G.S., challenges the juvenile
court’s jurisdictional order finding G.S. to be a person described
by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (a).1
The juvenile court found dependency jurisdiction warranted
under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), based on nearly
identical factual allegations, however father does not challenge
the jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b). We
dismiss the appeal for lack of justiciability.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Four-year-old G.S. came to the attention of the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in
September 2023, following two altercations between the parents.
According to an August 2023 police report, law enforcement was
called to the family’s home on August 5. Mother reported that
father had returned from a work trip and accused her of
infidelity. Father grabbed mother’s arm and was “rough and
aggressive.” Mother was able to get away. Father then locked
himself in their bedroom. Mother told law enforcement there had
been previous domestic violence incidents. Father admitted
arguing with mother but denied grabbing her arm.
According to a September 2023 police report, law
enforcement was again called to the family’s home on September
15. Mother told police father had arrived home and again

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

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accused her of infidelity. During the argument that followed,
father began throwing things around the house. Father grabbed
mother’s sweatshirt and twisted it, closing the neck hole over
mother’s throat, and making it difficult for her to speak and
breathe. Mother felt faint and lightheaded from her restricted
breathing. Eventually father released his grip, then he began
throwing mother’s possessions onto the sidewalk. A witness at
the scene said mother had sent her a text message indicating
father was acting erratically and had attempted to strike her.
DCFS interviewed G.S.’s two maternal half siblings, E.C.
(12 years old) and A.C. (14 years old).2 E.C. told a social worker
that she and G.S. were in the home during the parents’
altercation in August. According to E.C., the parents were
screaming, which frightened G.S., but there was no physical
violence. She left during the incident for her father’s house and
took G.S. with her.
A.C. was not present during the August incident, but she
and G.S. were home during the September incident. According to
A.C., she was alone in her room and G.S. was with mother when
the parents began arguing. Father came home drunk and
accused mother of infidelity. Although A.C. repeatedly tried to
take G.S. outside, mother called her back and asked her to tell
father that mother had not cheated on him. A.C. put G.S. in her
room. She saw father pulling on mother’s sweater, but she
denied that he was twisting it or preventing mother from
breathing. There was a lot of noise in the house. A.C. called her

2 Although the dependency petition was sustained as to all
three children, only G.S.’s father has appealed. The juvenile
court’s orders regarding G.S.’s siblings are not at issue in this
appeal.

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father for help but decided not to leave with him because she
wanted to stay to protect G.S. She carried G.S. during the
incident because he was crying, and she was also crying.
When interviewed by DCFS, mother admitted that during
the September incident, father grabbed her sweatshirt and
pulled, causing her to scream, but she denied that he restricted
her breathing. Mother denied that A.C. and G.S. witnessed the
incident. She also said that none of the children were home
during the August incident. She described father as being loving,
caring, and family oriented. In a subsequent interview, mother
denied screaming during the September incident and reported
that father only tugged at her sweatshirt as she attempted to
walk away. Mother stated the parents had no domestic violence
history and the two recent incidents were isolated ones.
Father admitted to a DCFS social worker that he grabbed
the sleeves of mother’s sweatshirt during the September incident,
but he denied restraining her neck. He denied ever pulling or
striking mother. He reported that he did not see any of the
children during the incident. He described the August incident
as a “verbal discussion,” and said none of the children were home
that night. In a later interview, father said he grabbed mother
by the sweatshirt, but not forcefully, and nothing else happened.
He denied ever arguing in front of the children and said the
September incident happened outside the family’s home, away
from the children.
In January 2024, the juvenile court sustained a petition
asserting the children were persons described by section 300,
subdivisions (a) and (b). Count a1 of the petition alleged that,
pursuant to section 300, subdivision (a), there was a substantial
risk the children would suffer serious physical harm inflicted

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nonaccidentally upon them by their parent or guardian.
Count b1 of the petition alleged that, pursuant to section 300,
subdivision (b), there was a substantial risk the children would
suffer serious physical harm or illness as a result of a parent or
guardian’s willful or negligent failure to supervise or adequately
protect them.
As to both counts, the court found true the petition’s
allegations that the parents engaged in violent verbal and
physical altercations in the home; in September 2023, father
grabbed mother hard by the sweatshirt, causing her to scream;
he twisted the sweatshirt “enough to close the sweatshirt[’s] neck
hole over the mother’s throat, making it difficult for the mother
to breathe and causing the mother to feel faint and light headed”;
in August 2023, father grabbed mother’s arm, leading to father’s
arrest; and “such violent conduct on the part of [father] towards
the mother,” endangered the children’s physical health and safety
and placed them at risk of serious physical harm.
The juvenile court removed G.S. from father and placed
him with mother, under DCFS supervision. Father timely
appealed.
DISCUSSION
Father contends substantial evidence did not support the
juvenile court’s finding that G.S. was placed at risk of suffering
serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally by father within
the meaning of section 300, subdivision (a). Father does not
otherwise challenge the court’s jurisdictional order. We conclude
father has not raised a justiciable issue.
“It is a fundamental principle of appellate practice that an
appeal will not be entertained unless it presents a justiciable
issue.” (In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489 (I.A.),

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overruled on another ground in In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266,
283 (D.P.).) “An important requirement for justiciability is the
availability of ‘effective’ relief—that is, the prospect of a remedy
that can have a practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct
or legal status.” (I.A., at p. 1490.)
It is also well established that “ ‘[w]hen a dependency
petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor
comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing
court can affirm the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over
the minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that
are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial
evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need not consider
whether any or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for
jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.’ [Citation.]” (In re I.J.
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
Here, the juvenile court found a basis for jurisdiction under
section 300, subdivision (b), as well as under subdivision (a).
Father does not challenge the section 300, subdivision (b) finding.
Thus, even if he were to prevail on appeal, we would not disturb
the court’s jurisdictional or dispositional orders. (D.P., supra, 14
Cal.5th at pp. 283–284; I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1491–
1492.)
Father thus fails to identify any tangible impact his
successful appeal could achieve. He identifies no specific
dispositional order that would be undermined by a reversal of the
section 300, subdivision (a) finding. Striking jurisdictional
allegations sustained under section 300, subdivision (a) “would
have neither legal nor practical consequence” in the ongoing
proceedings, and therefore would not provide father any effective
relief. (I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1493.)

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Father nonetheless asks us to exercise our discretion to
reach the merits of his arguments. Although “no single factor is
necessarily dispositive of whether a court should exercise
discretionary review of a moot appeal,” appellate courts often
reach the merits when a juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings
could have consequences for the appellant beyond jurisdiction
(D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 286, 285), or when a challenged
finding “is based on particularly pernicious or stigmatizing
conduct.” (Id. at pp. 285–286.)
Father contends the section 300, subdivision (a) finding is
“more stigmatizing” than the subdivision (b) finding. However,
that one basis for jurisdiction may carry more stigma than
another does not establish that the alleged conduct is
“particularly pernicious or stigmatizing . . . .” (D.P., supra, 14
Cal.5th at pp. 285–286, italics added.) And, as father
acknowledges, our high court has indicated that “stigma alone
will not sustain an appeal,” although we may consider the nature
of the allegations when deciding whether discretionary review is
proper. (Id. at p. 286.) Here, the petition’s allegations detail the
conduct forming the basis of the subdivision (a) count, none of
which suggests a level of egregiousness that would warrant the
review of an otherwise nonjusticiable appeal. (Cf. In re G.Z.
(2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 857, 875–876 [addressing merits of appeal
despite termination of jurisdiction where mother challenged the
sole basis for jurisdiction and the petition alleged mother’s
neglect led to infant’s multiple subdural hematomas].)
Father additionally contends discretionary review is
appropriate because of the potential that the section 300,
subdivision (a) finding could negatively impact him in a future
family law proceeding. This possibility is too speculative to

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warrant discretionary review, particularly since, as noted above,
father’s conduct underlying the subdivision (a) finding was also
the basis of the subdivision (b) finding that father does not
challenge. (I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1493, 1495; cf.
D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286 [discretionary review may be
appropriate where parent challenges only one jurisdictional
finding that involves “particularly severe conduct”].)
We decline to exercise our discretion to reach the merits of
father’s arguments regarding the court’s jurisdictional finding
under section 300, subdivision (a).
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

EGERTON, J.

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