CourtListener 10314365•People v. Hernandez CA2/7
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Filed 1/15/25 P. v. Hernandez CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B336351
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA477104)
v.
ANTONIO MANUEL
HERNANDEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Renée F. Korn, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with instructions.
Cheryl Lutz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Lindsay
Boyd, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Antonio Manuel Hernandez appeals from the superior
court’s postconviction order denying his petition for resentencing
under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 In 2020, Hernandez pleaded
no contest to attempted murder and admitted to personal
discharge of a firearm, and he was sentenced to 17 years.
Hernandez filed a resentencing petition in 2023. The
superior court determined at the prima facie hearing that
Hernandez was not entitled to relief under section 1172.6 because
the changes to the law eliminating the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as a basis for liability for murder (and
therefore attempted murder) had already taken effect at the time
of his plea in 2020 as a result of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018
Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437).
Hernandez contends, the People concede, and we agree the
superior court erred in determining Hernandez was ineligible for
relief as a matter of law because it was not until the enactment of
Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551,
§ 2) (Senate Bill 775) in 2022 that the Legislature clarified that
Senate Bill 1437’s ameliorative changes applied to individuals
convicted of attempted murder and voluntary manslaughter.
(See § 1172.6, subd. (a).) We reverse the court’s order denying
Hernandez’s petition for resentencing and direct the court to
issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing.
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Hernandez’s Plea and Sentence
In 2019, Hernandez and a codefendant were charged with
attempted premeditated murder. (§§ 664, 187). The complaint
also alleged a principal personally used a firearm, personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm, and personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or
death (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d), (e)(1)), and that the attempted
murder was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)).2
In February 2020, before a preliminary hearing was
conducted, Hernandez pleaded no contest to attempted murder
and admitted to personal discharge of a firearm (§ 12022.53,
subds. (b), (e)(1)). He received a sentence of 17 years, consisting
of the middle term of seven years for the attempted murder
charge plus 10 years for discharge of a firearm.
B. Section 1172.6 Proceedings
On March 9, 2023, Hernandez filed a petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6. Hernandez alleged in
part that he accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which
he could have been convicted of attempted murder, and
further alleged in his petition that at that time the natural
and probable consequences doctrine was not eliminated for
attempted murder, as it preceded the passage of Senate
Bill 775 in 2022.
2 The facts and circumstances of the offenses are not
material to our resolution of this appeal, so we do not include
them here.
3
The superior court appointed counsel and denied
Hernandez’s petition after briefing and a hearing. The
court ruled that because Hernandez’s plea occurred after
the passage of Senate Bill 1437, the prosecution could not
have prosecuted him based on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, and thus he had not shown a prima
facie case for relief.
Hernandez timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Background and Standard of Review
Senate Bill 1437 eliminated the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of
murder and significantly limited the scope of the felony-murder
rule by amending sections 188 and 189. (See People v. Reyes
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 984; People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 707-708; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).)
Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits imputing malice
based solely on an individual’s participation in a crime and
requires proof of malice to convict a principal of murder, except
under the revised felony-murder rule as set forth in section 189,
subdivision (e). The latter provision now requires the People to
prove the defendant was the actual killer (see § 189, subd. (e)(1));
an aider and abettor to murder who had the intent to kill (see
§ 189, subd. (e)(2)); or a major participant in an underlying felony
listed in section 189, subdivision (a), who acted with reckless
indifference to human life as described in subdivision (d) of
section 190.2. (See § 189, subd. (e)(3); People v. Curiel (2023)
4
15 Cal.5th 433, 448; People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839,
868-869.)
Senate Bill 1437 also provided a procedure, now codified in
section 1172.6, for an individual convicted of felony murder or
murder under the natural and probable consequences theory to
petition the sentencing court to vacate the conviction and be
resentenced on any remaining counts if the individual could not
have been convicted of murder under Senate Bill 1437’s changes
to sections 188 and 189. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959.)
Senate Bill 775, effective January 1, 2022, expanded the scope of
potential relief by applying Senate Bill 1437’s ameliorative
changes, including the section 1172.6 resentencing procedure, to
individuals convicted of attempted murder and voluntary
manslaughter. (See § 1172.6, subd. (a).)
Under section 1172.6, if a petition for resentencing contains
all the required information, including a declaration by the
petitioner that he or she is eligible for relief based on the
requirements of subdivision (a), the petitioner has filed a facially
sufficient petition. The sentencing court must then appoint
counsel to represent the petitioner upon his or her request, allow
briefing, and hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner
has made a prima facie case for relief. (See Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 963; see also § 1172.6, subds. (b)-(c).)
Where a petitioner makes the requisite prima facie showing
the petitioner falls within the provisions of section 1172.6 and is
entitled to relief, the court must issue an order to show cause and
hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate the
murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction and
resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts. (See
§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d)(1).)
5
We independently review the superior court’ s prima facie
determination under section 1172.6. (See People v. Williams
(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251; People v. Harden (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)
B. The Trial Court Erred in Denying Hernandez’s Petition
Without Issuing an Order To Show Cause
Hernandez asserts, the People concede, and we agree the
superior court erred in finding he was ineligible for relief at the
prima facie stage because Hernandez could have been convicted
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
As stated, the superior court ruled that because
Hernandez’s plea occurred after the passage of Senate Bill 1437,
the prosecution could not have prosecuted him based on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine because Senate
Bill 1437 eliminated that doctrine as a basis for liability for
murder. However, after Senate Bill 1437 took effect, the Courts
of Appeal were divided as to whether the bill’s ameliorative
changes applied to convictions for attempted murder. Senate
Bill 775 resolved this conflict by clarifying that the elimination of
the natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for a
murder conviction also applied to attempted murder. It was not
until January 1, 2022, nearly two years after Hernandez’s plea,
that Senate Bill 775 became effective, authorizing defendants
convicted of attempted murder to petition for retroactive relief.
(See People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 223, fn. 3; see
also Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2, subd. (a).) Thus, at the time of his
plea, the law was still in flux as to whether the natural and
probable consequences doctrine remained a valid basis for an
attempted murder conviction.
6
Moreover, as the People agree, nothing in the record of
conviction indicates Hernandez was not convicted under the
natural and probable causes doctrine. A defendant is ineligible
for resentencing relief if the record of conviction shows as a
matter of law that the plea or conviction by jury was not based on
a now-invalid theory of liability, in this case the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 970-972; People v. Estrada (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 328, 339
(Estrada).)
Here, Hernandez pleaded no contest before the preliminary
hearing, and nothing in the record of conviction shows his plea
was not based on the natural and probable causes doctrine. The
complaint charged Hernandez with “willful, deliberate and
premeditated attempted murder,” alleging that he “unlawfully
and with malice aforethought attempt[ed] to murder” the victim.
“Because the crime of attempted murder was generically charged,
the complaint allowed the prosecution to proceed on a theory of
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine.” (Estrada, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at pp. 337-338.)
Hernandez also “did not plead to any particular type of malice
when pleading to attempted murder. Further, he did not admit
to any specific theory of attempted murder. Instead, the record
shows that he pleaded to the generic charge of attempted murder
without the ‘willful, deliberate, and premeditated’ allegation. He
did not admit he harbored an intent to kill.” (Id. at p. 338.)
Therefore, Hernandez’s plea of no contest to the attempted
murder charge “does not answer the question of whether intent
could have been imputed to him under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.” (Ibid.)
7
We agree with Hernandez and the People that the record of
conviction does not show as a matter of law that Hernandez’s no
contest plea to attempted murder was based on a theory other
than the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Therefore,
as the People concede, the superior court erred in denying
Hernandez’s petition on the ground the Legislature changed the
law before he was convicted of attempted murder.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Hernandez’s petition for resentencing is
reversed. On remand, the superior court is directed to issue an
order to show cause and to conduct an evidentiary hearing under
section 1172.6, subdivision (d).
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
SEGAL, J.
FEUER, J.
8
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