Rosenthal v. Bella + Canvas CA2/1

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Filed 1/14/25 Rosenthal v. Bella + Canvas CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

JEFFREY ROSENTHAL, B331769

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20STCV42041)
v.

BELLA + CANVAS, LLC, et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Rupert A. Byrdsong, Judge. Reversed.
Grodsky, Olecki & Puritsky, Allen B. Grodsky, Tim B.
Henderson for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Reed Smith, Raymond A. Cardozo; Bella + Canvas Legal
Department, Andrew P. Holland, Cynthia C. Mullen for
Defendants and Respondents Bella + Canvas and Daniel Harris.
Kinsella Holley Iser Kump Steinsapir, Jonathan P.
Steinsapir, Suann C. MacIsaac and Shivani Morrison for
Defendants and Respondents Abby Gordon and Jeremy
Schwartz.
___________________________________
Bella + Canvas (Bella) is a clothing manufacturer. In late
March 2020, Bella determined it should begin manufacturing
cloth face masks to meet the needs of the Covid-19 pandemic. It
entered into an oral agreement with Plaintiff Jeffrey Rosenthal,
by which Rosenthal agreed to leverage his extensive personal and
professional network to secure buyers for Bella’s masks.
Rosenthal agreed to refer companies to purchase Bella’s masks in
exchange for a 10 percent commission on any sales. After
Rosenthal referred two companies to Bella, Starbucks and
Target, Bella’s principal, Daniel Harris, unilaterally modified the
contract to reduce Rosenthal’s commission on referrals to 1 or 2
percent. Bella thereafter paid Rosenthal what it claimed he was
owed under the modified agreement—this was far less than 10
percent of all sales generated by Starbucks and Target, among
others. Rosenthal filed this action against Bella and its
principals, alleging breach of contract, fraud, and other counts.
Rosenthal now appeals from a judgment entered after the
trial court sustained defendants’ demurrers and granted motions
for summary judgment. Rosenthal argues the complaint stated
viable causes of action and triable issues exist as to his claims.
We agree, and therefore reverse the judgment.

BACKGROUND
The case comes to us after the trial court sustained
demurrers and granted summary judgment. To the extent facts
relate to the demurrers, we take them from the pleadings,
accepting them as true for purposes of review. To the extent facts
relate to summary judgment, we take them “ ‘from the record

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that was before the trial court when it ruled on that motion.’ ”
(Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 713, 716-717
(Wilson).) In the summary judgment proceedings, most of the
pertinent facts were undisputed.
At the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic in March 2020,
Bella, a T-shirt manufacturer, transitioned to making cloth face
masks that it intended to sell to large corporate employers and
“consumer-facing” businesses. Harris was Bella’s president and
co-owner. Abby Gordon, a vice president of Bella’s sister
company, helped in Bella’s transition effort.
Gordon knew Rosenthal through her husband Jeremy
Schwartz, who was Rosenthal’s business associate. Rosenthal
had business contacts with large employers such as Starbucks,
Amazon, Target, and Wal-Mart.
On March 21, 2020, in a telephone conversation among
Schwartz, Rosenthal, and Gordon (speaking on Bella’s behalf),
Rosenthal agreed to introduce potential customers to Bella in
exchange for a 10 percent commission on gross revenues from
Bella’s sales of face masks to those referred customers. There
was no limitation on the time frame in which this commission
would be payable. Harris confirmed the terms of the commission
deal to Rosenthal and Schwartz shortly thereafter.
On March 23 and 24, 2020, Rosenthal referred Starbucks
and Target to Bella for the purchase of face masks. Starbucks
indicated by April 4 that it would place an order for face masks,
and Target placed an order sometime later.
On April 5, 2020, Harris informed Rosenthal that Bella
would not pay him a 10 percent commission.
Schwartz thereafter, without Rosenthal’s authorization,
negotiated a 1 percent commission with Bella on some orders and
2 percent on others.

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Rosenthal continued to refer customers to Bella, and in
May and June 2020 Bella paid him a total of $442,785.22.
Bella ultimately sold millions of masks to Starbucks and
Target.

A. Complaints
1. Original Complaint
In November 2020, Rosenthal sued Bella, Harris, and
Gordon, asserting causes of action against Bella for promissory
fraud, breach of contract, a common count, and unfair business
practices under Business and Professions Code section 17200 et
seq. (UCL), and against Harris and Gordon for fraud and
violation of the UCL.
Rosenthal alleged his referrals to Bella resulted in over $55
million in mask sales, but defendants never intended to pay him
the 10 percent commission they promised. Instead, they intended
to pay him only 1 or 2 percent commissions and informed him
that even those were conditioned on Rosenthal paying Gordon a
10 percent “kickback.” Rosenthal alleged Harris informed him on
April 5, 2020, that Bella would not pay 10 percent, and Schwartz
thereafter secretly invoiced Bella at 1 and 2 percent rates and
paid a 10 percent kickback to Gordon.
Defendants individually demurred to the complaint,
arguing in part that Rosenthal lacked standing under the UCL
because he was neither Bella’s competitor nor a consumer.
The trial court ruled on Bella’s and Harris’s demurrers
before briefing was complete on Gordon’s demurrer. The court
overruled Bella’s and Harris’s demurrers to the causes of action
for breach of contract, fraud and the common count, but

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sustained the demurrers to the UCL claim without leave to
amend.
Rosenthal filed his opposition to Gordon’s demurrer after
this ruling. In it, he declined to oppose the demurrer to his UCL
claim, stating, inaccurately, that the demurrer was moot.
The court sustained Gordon’s demurrer to the fraud cause
of action with leave to amend, and her demurrer to the UCL
claim without leave to amend.

2. First Amended Complaint
In April 2021, Rosenthal filed a first amended complaint;
the defendants individually answered.

3. Second Amended Complaint
After conducting discovery, Rosenthal sought court
approval to file a second amended complaint abandoning the
promissory fraud claim against Gordon but including, among
other new causes of action, a cause of action for conspiracy to
commit fraud. In his application for leave to amend, Rosenthal
represented that “the fraud on which the conspiracy claim is
based . . . is Bella and Harris’ fraud in the first [fraud] cause of
action.”
Rosenthal asserted two common counts and causes of
action for fraud, breach of contract, conspiracy to commit fraud,
inducing breach of contract, interfering with contract and with
prospective economic relations, and breach of fiduciary duty.
In his cause of action for conspiracy to commit fraud,
Rosenthal alleged that around the time Bella and Harris revealed
their true intentions not to pay a 10 percent commission, they
conspired with Gordon and Schwartz “to create the false

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narrative that Rosenthal had agreed to modify his contract with
[Bella] and agreed to take less than the 10% commission.”
Gordon and Schwartz continued to tell Rosenthal that he was
entitled to a 10 percent commission, but they secretly agreed with
Bella and Harris that Schwartz, who submitted invoices to Bella
on Rosenthal’s behalf, “would later take the position that he told
Harris that he was authorized to negotiate on behalf of Rosenthal
and that he and Rosenthal both agreed to accept . . . 2% for
subsequent [Starbucks] orders and 1% on orders from Target.”
Defendants also “concocted [a] bogus term that commissions
would be limited to masks sales within three months after April
5, 2020.”
Rosenthal alleged that to reward Gordon and Schwartz for
their part in the conspiracy, Bella secretly paid Gordon
commissions on the sale of masks to Starbucks and Target,
calculating that it would be less expensive to pay Gordon than
Rosenthal.
Rosenthal alleged that he “did not authorize Schwartz to
negotiate on his behalf and never agreed to accept a lower
commission than the 10% promised by Harris and Gordon on
behalf of [Bella].”
The second amended complaint also alleged a separate
claim for fraud against Gordon and Schwartz—unrelated to the
conspiracy theory—based on a “kickback” they represented
Harris had said Rosenthal must pay to Gordon before Bella
would pay him.
The second amended complaint asserted five additional,
“alternative” claims against Schwartz, for inducing breach of
contract, interfering with Rosenthal’s contractual relations,

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interfering with Rosenthal’s prospective economic relationship,
breach of fiduciary duty, and money had and received.
Rosenthal alleged that after Bella informed him it would
not pay a 10 percent commission and, in fact, had no obligation to
pay anything, Schwartz, to secure “financial benefits for himself
and his wife,” reassured Bella that Rosenthal would accept a 2
percent commission. As a result, Bella refused to pay Rosenthal
per the March 2020 agreement.
In his cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against
Schwartz, Rosenthal alleged that “while Rosenthal denies he was
in a partnership with Schwartz, to the extent it is found or
determined that Rosenthal and Schwartz were partners or owed
each other fiduciary duties, then . . . Schwartz breached his
fiduciary duty to Rosenthal.”
In his common count against Schwartz, Rosenthal alleged
that although he agreed to share 10 percent of his commissions
with Gordon, with 45 percent going each to himself and
Schwartz, Schwartz deducted and kept an additional 5 percent
from Rosenthal’s share, and kept Gordon’s share, resulting in
Schwartz receiving 60 percent of the commissions and Rosenthal
only 40 percent.
Bella and Harris jointly demurred to Rosenthal’s cause of
action for conspiracy to defraud, the only new cause of action
against them. The court sustained the demurrer without leave to
amend.
Gordon and Schwartz also jointly demurred. The court
sustained the demurrer without leave to amend as to Rosenthal’s
cause of action for conspiracy to commit fraud, as to the
interference and breach of fiduciary duty claims against
Schwartz, and as to the common count. The court sustained the

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demurrer with leave to amend on the fraud claim against Gordon
and Schwartz based on the alleged kickback to Gordon.

4. Third Amended Complaint
In July 2022, Rosenthal filed his operative third amended
complaint asserting causes of action against Bella and Harris for
fraud, breach of contract, and a common count for services
rendered (the same claims as had been alleged in the first
amended complaint), and against Gordon and Schwartz for fraud
based on the kickback scheme.
Rosenthal alleged that on March 21, 2020, and the
following week, Bella—through both Gordon and Harris in
separate telephone conversations—agreed to pay him a 10
percent commission “on the gross revenue earned from any
purchasers introduced by either Rosenthal or Schwartz.” The
agreement specified no time by which a purchaser had to place an
order and placed no limitation on when the commissions would be
payable. Rosenthal alleged that on March 23, 2020, he
recommended Bella masks to the founder of Starbucks, and later
referred Target, Lyft, Uber, U.S. Merchandise, Inc., the U.S.
Department of State, and other companies and public entities.
Rosenthal alleged that on April 5, 2020, after he had
contacted numerous potential customers on Bella’s behalf, and
after Starbucks had ordered more than 7 million masks, Harris
informed him that Bella had no obligation to pay him anything.
Rosenthal alleged that Bella sold millions of masks to entities he
referred to Bella, not including Starbucks, yet paid him no
commissions on these sales. He asserted in his common count for
services rendered that Bella owed him the reasonable value of his
services.

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Rosenthal alleged that Gordon and Schwartz fraudulently
induced him to pay Gordon 10 percent of commissions received
from Bella, and intended by their representations “to induce
Rosenthal to introduce his contacts to Bella + Canvas and to
encourage those contacts to purchase only from Bella + Canvas.”
Rosenthal sought damages according to proof, injunctive
relief, punitive damages, and such other relief as the court
deemed just.
Defendants answered the complaint with general denials
and affirmative defenses including, on Schwartz’s part, the
defenses of “authorization” and “estoppel.”

B. Summary Judgment
1. Bella and Harris’s Motion
In January 2023, Bella and Harris moved for summary
judgment, supporting the motion exclusively with Rosenthal’s
discovery responses.

a. Contract Claim
With respect to Rosenthal’s cause of action for breach of
contract, Bella and Harris argued only that Rosenthal could not
establish the existence of a contract. They admitted that
Rosenthal performed under the March 2020 agreement, and
further admitted that Bella refused to pay Rosenthal 10 percent
on all commissions.
Bella and Harris argued that Rosenthal could not establish
the existence of a contract because the March 2020 agreement,
upon which his claims were based, had been terminated before
any sales occurred.

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For purposes of summary judgment only, Bella and Harris
admitted in their separate statement of undisputed material
facts that in March 2020, Bella “agreed that [Rosenthal] would
introduce potential customers of face masks to [Bella] in
exchange for a 10% commission on gross revenues from [Bella’s]
sales to those referred customers. There was no limitation on the
time frame in which this commission would be payable.”
Bella and Harris cited as evidence supporting this
admission Rosenthal’s response to their first set of form
interrogatories, Response No. 50.1, which Bella and Harris
quoted almost verbatim.
Bella and Harris also admitted that Rosenthal performed
under the agreement by referring customers to Bella. They
supported this admission with: (1) Rosenthal’s discovery
responses indicating he made referrals to Bella, which paid him
$275,104.02 on May 18, 2020, and $167,681.20 on June 19, 2020;
and (2) a proposed April 4, 2020 invoice sent to a Starbucks
representative indicating that by April 4, Starbucks had stated it
would order face masks from Bella.
Bella and Harris did not deny that they failed to perform
under the agreement, but instead argued the agreement was
terminable at will, and Harris either modified or terminated it on
April 5, 2020.
In support of the argument, Bella and Harris presented
evidence—again, Rosenthal’s discovery responses—that on April
5, 2020, Harris informed Rosenthal that Bella “would not be
paying a 10% commission on all customers introduced by
[Rosenthal]. On the call, Harris told [Rosenthal] that [Bella]
would pay him 10% on the first order from Starbucks.” Bella and
Harris argued that by April 5, 2020, no referred customer other

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than Starbucks had submitted a purchase order to Bella. They
cited no evidence supporting the argument, but it appears to be
undisputed.
Bella and Harris argued that on April 5, 2020, Harris
informed Rosenthal that Bella would pay 10 percent only on
orders close to closing, i.e., the first order from Starbucks. For all
other orders going forward the commission would be 1 percent on
orders from Target and 2 percent on other orders. Bella and
Harris argued that Rosenthal continued performing under these
new terms, which terminated the March agreement and created a
new agreement.

b. Fraud and Punitive Damages Claims
Bella and Harris moved for summary judgment on
Rosenthal’s fraud and punitive damages claims on the sole
ground that Rosenthal suffered no cognizable fraud damages.
This is so, they argued, because he incurred no out-of-pocket
damages in that he “did not expend money or lose anything of
value that he possessed prior to the fraud.”
They supported the motion with Rosenthal’s discovery
response to Form Interrogatory No. 9.1. Form Interrogatory No.
9.1, asked, “Are there any . . . damages that you attribute to the
INCIDENT? If so, for each item of damage state: . . . [¶] . . . the
nature.” Among other things, Rosenthal stated in response: (1)
he was damaged “in the amount of the reasonable values of [his]
services”; (2) he was entitled to restitution; and (3) he “could have
introduced his contacts to other manufacturers of face masks but,
because of the Defendants’ fraud, went with Defendants. [He]
would have made more in commissions had he not been
defrauded by Defendants.” Bella and Harris argued that these
responses constituted an admission that Rosenthal “did not

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expend money or lose anything of value that he possessed prior to
the fraud,” and instead sought only “benefit-of-the-bargain”
damages, which under California law are not compensable in
tort. Bella and Harris did not address Rosenthal’s response that
he “could have introduced his contacts to other manufacturers of
face masks but, because of the Defendants’ fraud, went with
Defendants.”

2. Rosenthal’s Opposition
In opposition to the motion, Rosenthal objected that
portions of the declaration of Cynthia C. Mellen, Bella’s and
Harris’s counsel, constituted hearsay and lacked foundation.
Specifically, the objections were to Exhibits: H (April 5, 2020
email from Gordon regarding a Starbucks referral and an April 4,
2020 proforma invoice); K (April 10, 2020 email from Gordon
regarding a City of New York referral); and L (April 14, 2020
email from Gordon regarding the New York City referral). The
court did not rule on these objections.
Rosenthal declared that on March 23 and 24, 2020, he
recommended Bella’s masks to the founder of Starbucks and to a
representative from Target. Both companies ultimately placed
orders with Bella. Rosenthal argued he sought contract damages
only as to masks sold to Starbucks and Target, the customers he
referred to Bella before April 5, 2020.
Observing that defendants’ motion focused on “one minor
element of fraud damages,” Rosenthal admitted that if he could
not prove “the amounts spent in reliance on fraud” he would be
entitled to no damages at all. Quoting Alliance Mortgage Co. v.
Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1240 (Alliance), Rosenthal
argued that his fraud damages constituted the difference between
the fair market value of what he gave to Bella and the value of

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what he received. Defendants’ motion did not address the lost
opportunity claim Rosenthal raised in response to Form
Interrogatory No. 9.1, and he did not in his opposition explicitly
mention this claim. However, as evidence of his damages he cited
pages 7 to 10 of his response to Form Interrogatory 9.1, where he
had made the claim. Rosenthal argued that the definition of
“harm” caused by fraud was far broader than defendants’ motion
suggested. He cited, among other things, Alliance, supra, and
Sutter v. General Petroleum Corp. (1946) 28 Cal.2d 525 (Sutter) in
support of this argument.
Rosenthal declared that based on his personal experience,
the fair market value of his referral services was 8 to 12 percent
of the gross revenues of sales to referred customers. He provided
expert testimony to similar effect. Rosenthal declared that when
Harris told him on April 5, 2020 that he would not be paid 10
percent in commissions, he told Harris he did not agree to the
lower amount. He admitted, however, that he received
approximately $440,000 from Bella in May and June 2020.

3. Reply
In their reply, Bella and Harris admitted that “to the
extent that Plaintiff had already performed, i.e., for referred face
mask orders already placed, he would receive the original 10%
commission. . . . But going forward, i.e., for orders placed after
April 6, 2020, the commission would be reduced.”

4. Ruling
On May 9, 2023, the court granted Bella’s and Harris’s
motion for summary judgment, which, after its demurrer rulings,
ante, left the fraud claim against Gordon and Schwartz as the
sole remaining claim in the case.

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C. Dismissal
After summary judgment for Bella and Harris, plaintiff
dismissed the fraud cause of action against Gordon and Schwartz
without prejudice and applied for entry of judgment.
Rosenthal appeals from the resulting judgment.

DISCUSSION
A. Rosenthal’s Appeal of Rulings as to Bella and Harris
In his appeal of the judgment in favor of Bella and Harris,
Rosenthal contends summary judgment was improper as to his
breach of contract claim because the claim arises from his
performance before Harris terminated the March 2020
agreement. He argues that triable issues exist as to whether
Bella and Harris breached the pre-modification agreement.
Rosenthal contends summary judgment was improper as to
his fraud claim because Bella and Harris failed to negate the
damages element, which Rosenthal sometimes argues is the
difference between the fair market values of what he “gave up”
and what he received, and sometimes argues is the difference
between the values of what he “gave” and what he received.
Rosenthal contends the court erroneously sustained Bella
and Harris’s demurrer to his UCL claim in the original
complaint, and to his cause of action for conspiracy to defraud in
the second amended complaint.

1. Summary Judgment
A trial court properly grants summary judgment “ ‘if all the
papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A

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defendant may establish its right to summary judgment by
showing that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot
be established or that there is a complete defense to the cause of
action. ([§] 437c, subd. (p)(2).)’ ” (Neiman v. Leo A. Daly Co.
(2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 962, 967.) “Once the moving defendant
has satisfied its burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show
that a triable issue of material fact exists as to each cause of
action. [Citation.] A triable issue of material fact exists where
‘the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the
underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in
accordance with the applicable standard of proof.’ ” (Ibid.)
In reviewing an order granting a motion for summary
adjudication, we apply the same de novo standard of review that
applies to the granting of summary judgments. (Smith v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1471.) We review
the trial court’s decision de novo, considering all the evidence set
forth in the moving and opposing papers except that to which
objections were made and sustained. (Wilson, supra, 42 Cal.4th
at pp. 716-717.) “We liberally construe the evidence in support of
the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts
concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Id. at p. 717.)
We accept as true the facts shown by the evidence offered in
opposition to summary judgment and the reasonable inferences
that can be drawn from them. (Spitzer v. The Good Guys, Inc.
(2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1385-1386.)

a. Breach of Contract
Bella and Harris challenged Rosenthal’s breach of contract
cause of action on the ground that Rosenthal’s claims were
premised on a terminated agreement. Rosenthal contended
below and maintains on appeal that his claims are premised on
sales to customers referred prior to termination of the agreement.

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“[T]he elements of a cause of action for breach of contract
are (1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or
excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the
resulting damages to the plaintiff.” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v.
Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.)
“The interpretation of a contract is a judicial function.
[Citation.] In engaging in this function, the trial court ‘give[s]
effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed’ at the
time the contract was executed. [Citation.] Ordinarily, the
objective intent of the contracting parties is a legal question
determined solely by reference to the contract’s terms.” (Wolf v.
Walt Disney Pictures & Television (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1107,
1125-1126.)
As admitted in Bella and Harris’s separate statement of
undisputed material facts, the March 2020 agreement obligated
Bella to pay a 10 percent commission on gross revenues from
sales to customers Rosenthal “introduced” to Bella. There was no
limitation on the time frame in which those sales had to occur or
in which the commission would be payable. In other words, the
agreement did not provide that Bella would pay 10 percent only
on sales occurring within a certain time frame. Bella and Harris
also admitted Rosenthal performed under the contract by making
at least one referral, to Starbucks.
We will assume for purposes of argument that the March
2020 commissions contract was terminable at will, which
Rosenthal does not contest for purposes of summary judgment.
We will also assume Harris terminated the contract on April 5,
2020. We make these assumptions because the contract’s
terminability is tangential to this analysis. If the contract was
not terminable, then triable issues exist as to whether Bella and
Harris breached the contract. If the contract was terminable,
triable issues exist as to whether Bella and Harris breached the

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contract as to Rosenthal’s pre-termination performance, as we
will discuss.
Assuming the agreement was terminated on April 5, 2020,
after Rosenthal referred Starbucks and Target to Bella,
termination would operate only prospectively. Termination
“occurs when either party pursuant to a power created by
agreement or law puts an end to the contract otherwise than for
its breach. On ‘termination’ all obligations which are still
executory on both sides are discharged but any right based on
prior breach or performance survives.” (Com. Code, § 2106; see
Grant v. Aerodraulics Co. (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 68, 75 [“To
‘terminate’ a contract . . . means to abrogate so much of it as
remains unperformed, thereby doing away with the existing
agreement upon the terms and with the consequences agreed
upon”].)
Thus, when a terminated contract concerns severable
services, the plaintiff may still recover for services performed
before the termination of the relationship. (Zinn v. Ex-Cell-O
Corp. (1944) 24 Cal.2d 290, 296.) Specifically, “ ‘[i]f the contract
contemplates that the agent shall receive compensation for sales
of which the agent was the procuring cause, the agent is entitled
to a commission on sales procured by him although the sales were
actually consummated by the principal after the termination of
the agency.’ ” (Ibid.; see also Wise v. Reeve Electronics, Inc.
(1960) 183 Cal.App.2d 4, 12-13 [oral agreement that plaintiff
would receive commission on “all products of defendant sold,”
with no provision regarding plaintiff’s pre-termination
solicitations of orders taken after termination].)
A person is considered the procuring cause of a transaction
“ ‘if he brings the principal and the purchaser together so that
they may enter into such a contract. In other words, if the
broker’s efforts result in a “meeting of the minds” between the

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buyer and the seller but the final negotiations and the conclusion
of the sale are conducted by them without the aid of the broker,
he will still earn his commission.’ ” (Buckaloo v. Johnson (1975)
14 Cal.3d 815, 820-821, fn. 2 (Buckaloo), disapproved on other
grounds in Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1995)
11 Cal.4th 376, 393, fn. 5; see also Willson v. Turner Resilient
Floors, Inc. (1949) 89 Cal.App.2d 589, 596 (Willson) [“ ‘An agent
is an “effective cause” ’ ” of a result “ ‘when his efforts have been
sufficiently important in achieving a result for the
accomplishment of which the principal has promised to pay him
so that it is just that the principal should pay the promised
compensation to him’ ”]; Brea v. McGlashan (1934) 3 Cal.App.2d
454, 465 [“if an agent (or broker) is the inducing or procuring
cause of the contract, he is entitled to the commission, even
though the principal takes it out of his own hand and completes
it. The originating cause which ultimately led to the conclusion
of the transaction, is held to be the procuring cause”].)
“ ‘Whether the broker was the “procuring cause” and the
“motivating force” of the sale is a question of fact to be
determined from all of the circumstances surrounding each
specific case.’ ” (Buckaloo, supra, 14 Cal.3d at pp. 820-821, fn. 2;
see also Willson, supra, 89 Cal.App.2d at p. 596 [“the test is one
of ‘fairness,’ and the question is one of fact for the jury”].) Bella
and Harris contend (and Rosenthal does not dispute) that the
March 2020 agreement was terminated or modified on April 5,
2020. Their motion, however, did not address the fact that
Rosenthal performed under the agreement before April 5, 2020,
by referring customers to Bella. The motion addressed only when
orders and sales to referred customers occurred. But the timing
of orders and sales is not dispositive here because the agreement
contained no provision concerning when orders or sales had to
occur to earn the commission. The key question was whether

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Rosenthal made referrals before or after contract termination.
Bella and Harris’s own evidence illustrated that he did make
referrals prior to contract termination.
Bella and Harris admitted, by offering an April 4, 2020
proforma invoice to Starbucks, that Rosenthal referred Starbucks
to Bella before April 5, 2020. They also admitted that on April 5,
Harris informed Rosenthal that Bella “would not be paying a 10%
commission on all customers introduced by” Rosenthal and would
pay 10 percent only “on the first order from Starbucks.” But the
agreement contained no “first order” limitation. Because of these
admissions, a triable issue existed as to whether Harris breached
the agreement by repudiating Bella’s promise to pay a 10 percent
commission on all “sales” (as opposed to only the first sale) to
Starbucks. (See Romano v. Rockwell Internat., Inc. (1996) 14
Cal.4th 479, 489 (Romano) [“if a party to a contract expressly or
by implication repudiates the contract before the time for his or
her performance has arrived, an anticipatory breach is said to
have occurred”].)
By addressing only the tangential issue of when orders and
sales occurred, and failing to address the key issue of whether
referrals occurred before the April 5, 2020 termination, Bella and
Harris failed to show that one or more elements of Rosenthal’s
cause of action for breach of contract could not be established.
They therefore failed to meet their initial burden to demonstrate
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The court need not
have reached Rosenthal’s opposition.
Bella and Harris argue that because Rosenthal continued
to refer customers to Bella after April 5, 2020, he agreed to the
new commission terms retroactively as a matter of law. We
disagree.
As noted above, termination of a contract operates only
prospectively unless the parties agree otherwise. (Zinn, supra,

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24 Cal.2d at p. 296.) No authority to which we have been
directed provides that as a matter of law, continued performance
after contract termination constitutes agreement to the new
terms retroactive to pre-termination performance. Here,
construing all evidence and inferences in Rosenthal’s favor, we
have no basis to conclude anything other than that Rosenthal’s
continued performance evidenced his acceptance of the modified
terms prospectively to reduce commissions on new referrals.
Bella and Harris adduced no evidence to the contrary.
Bella and Harris cite five cases—Klein Norton Co. v. Cohen
(1930) 107 Cal.App. 325, 327-328 (Klein); Burcham v. Caprio
(1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 514, 516-517; Swalley v. Addressograph
Multigraph Corp. (7th Cir. 1946) 158 F.2d 51, 54; DiGiacinto v.
Ameriko-Omserv Corp. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 629, 637
(DiGiacinto); and Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc. (2009) 47 Cal.4th
610, 620 (Schachter)—for the proposition that to preserve a claim
founded on pre-modification performance, a party must “refuse[]
to perform further” after modification.
These cases do not so hold, nor have Bella and Harris
meaningfully analyzed this issue.
For example, in Klein, supra, the parties entered into a
written contract by which Cohen, a salesman, would receive a 3
percent commission on sales he made on behalf of Klein Norton
Company. The agreement was for an indefinite time and could
be terminated at any time. (Klein, supra, 107 Cal.App. at p. 327.)
Klein Norton asserted that sometime after entering into the
agreement, it informed Cohen that going forward, commissions
would be reduced. (Id. at pp. 328-329.) The reviewing court held
that by informing Cohen of the reduction, Klein Norton made a
new offer that Cohen accepted, which terminated the written
agreement. The court held that “the oral agreement made by the
parties was not, as contemplated by law, executed. . . . [T]he

20
reciprocal obligations of the parties—the selling of the
merchandise by [Cohen] and the payment therefor by [Klein
Norton]—had not been performed. They were, on both sides, to
be performed in the future.” (Id. at pp. 330-331.) Nothing in the
opinion suggests the reduced commission under the new
agreement applied retroactively to sales made under the prior
agreement.
In DiGiacinto, supra, an employer unilaterally modified an
employment agreement to reduce the employee’s hourly wage.
The employee continued to work for a year, then sued to recover
wages for that year at the original rate. (DiGiacinto, supra, 59
Cal.App.4th at p. 632.) The court had no occasion to address the
amount due the employee for work performed before the
employer modified the contract.
In Schachter, supra, an employer and employee bilaterally
modified an employment agreement prospectively. The Court
held, “[a]n ‘employee who continues in the employ of the
employer after the employer has given notice of changed terms or
conditions of employment has accepted the changed terms and
conditions.’ ” (Schachter, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 620.)
“[E]mployers and employees are free to prospectively and
bilaterally alter the terms of employment.” (Ibid., original
italics.)
None of these cases supports the proposition that Bella
could unilaterally reduce Rosenthal’s compensation for services
he performed before Bella claims to have terminated the March
2020 agreement. Nor do the other cases cited support this
proposition. When a party asserts a point but fails to support it
with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the
point as forfeited. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.)

21
We conclude that Bella and Harris failed to satisfy their
burden to show that Rosenthal’s claims are based on a
terminated contract.
Even had they done so, and thus shifted the burden to
Rosenthal to demonstrate a triable issue, Rosenthal declared in
opposition to the motion that he referred both Starbucks and
Target to Bella before April 5, 2020, and asserted that he sought
contract damages only as to sales to these customers. Defendants
offered no rebuttal to this evidence. This undisputed evidence
would have established a triable issue of material fact.
In sum, triable issues exist as to whether Rosenthal’s
breach of contract claim is premised on a terminated agreement,
either because Bella and Harris’s motion ignored Rosenthal’s pre-
termination performance claim or because Rosenthal offered
affirmative evidence establishing performance. Summary
judgment on Rosenthal’s cause of action for breach of contract
was improper.

b. Common Count
Rosenthal alleges in his common count that Bella and
Harris requested but did not pay him for the reasonable value of
his referral services. Bella and Harris made no independent
showing on this count below—their separate statement set forth
identical facts and evidence for both Rosenthal’s contract and
common count claims. And on appeal, Bella and Harris argue
only that the common count fails for the same reason that
Rosenthal failed to raise a triable issue on his breach of contract
claim. By that token, and because we hold, at the very least, a
triable issue exists as to Rosenthal’s contract claim, a triable
issue exists also as to the common count.

22
c. Fraud
Bella and Harris challenged only the damages element of
Rosenthal’s fraud cause of action. They contended there were no
triable issues of material fact because Rosenthal lost nothing of
value “that he possessed” in reliance on Bella and Harris’s
representation that Bella intended to pay Rosenthal for referrals.
Instead, Bella and Harris argued, Rosenthal sought only benefit-
of-the-bargain damages, which are recoverable only on a contract
claim, not a fraud claim.
Rosenthal argues Bella and Harris ignored his response to
Form Interrogatory No. 9.1, that he suffered damages because,
due to their fraud, he “did not seek to represent other customers.”
We agree.
“ ‘The elements of fraud, which give rise to the tort action
for deceit, are (a) misrepresentation (false representation,
concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or
“scienter”); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d)
justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.’ [Citations.] [¶]
‘Promissory fraud’ is a subspecies of the action for fraud and
deceit. A promise to do something necessarily implies the
intention to perform; hence, where a promise is made without
such intention, there is an implied misrepresentation of fact that
may be actionable fraud. [Citations.] [¶] An action for
promissory fraud may lie where a defendant fraudulently induces
the plaintiff to enter into a contract.” (Lazar v. Superior Court
(1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638 (Lazar).)
“For the breach of an obligation not arising from contract,
the measure of damages, except where otherwise expressly
provided by this Code, is the amount which will compensate for
all the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could
have been anticipated or not.” (Civ. Code, § 3333; see also Civ.
Code, § 1709 [“One who willfully deceives another with intent to

23
induce him to alter his position to his injury or risk, is liable for
any damage which he thereby suffers”].)
Although the measure of damages is intended to
compensate a plaintiff for a loss sustained, plaintiff is not entitled
to tort damages that would “give him the benefit of any contract
bargain.” (Overgaard v. Johnson (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 821, 823-
824.)
“The ‘out-of-pocket’ measure of damages ‘is directed to
restoring the plaintiff to the financial position enjoyed by him
prior to the fraudulent transaction, and thus awards the
difference in actual value at the time of the transaction between
what the plaintiff gave and what he received. The “benefit-of-
the-bargain” measure, on the other hand, is concerned with
satisfying the expectancy interest of the defrauded plaintiff by
putting him in the position he would have enjoyed if the false
representation relied upon had been true; it awards the
difference in value between what the plaintiff actually received
and what he was fraudulently led to believe he would receive.’ ”
(Alliance, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1240.)
Out-of-pocket damage has two elements. First, the plaintiff
must have given up or lost possession of something as a result of
the defendant’s fraud. (See Alliance, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1240
[“unless the plaintiff merely seeks to rescind the contract, it must
suffer actual monetary loss to recover on a fraud claim”].)
Second, the plaintiff must be able to place a monetary value on
that which he lost.
In Lazar, for example, the plaintiff alleged he was induced
to leave a secure job and relocate from New York to California
based on false representations that the California company was
financially strong and the plaintiff would have long-term
employment. (Lazar, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 636.) The plaintiff
was terminated two years later. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court held

24
that fraud damages could not include prospective loss of income
associated with the California job, i.e., the plaintiff’s expectancy
interest in contract fulfillment, but could include consequential
damages such as “the loss of security and income associated with
his former employment in New York.” (Id. at pp. 648-649.)
In Sutter, supra, 28 Cal.2d 525, the plaintiff, Sutter, was
induced by false promises to abandon his own oil development
projects and devote his time and efforts to developing and
carrying out the defendants’ project. (Id. at pp. 530-531.) Sutter
sought reimbursement of the reasonable value of his services
during the time he was engaged in developing and operating the
defendants’ project. (Id. at p. 534.) The Court held he adequately
pleaded entitlement to “the reasonable value of his services and
the loss of [his] time.” (Id. at p. 535.)
Lazar and Sutter thus held that a fraud plaintiff may seek
compensation for out-of-pocket damages, including lost
opportunities.
Here, when asked to identify his damages, Rosenthal,
stated he “could have introduced his contacts to other
manufacturers of face masks but, because of the Defendants’
fraud, went with Defendants.” Pursuant to Alliance, Lazar, and
Sutter, this lost opportunity, along with whatever money or time
Rosenthal lost as a result of Bella’s and Harris’s fraud,
constitutes out-of-pocket damages compensable in fraud.
Bella’s and Harris’s motion ignored this issue. They
asserted only that Rosenthal had no evidence that he spent or
lost money as a result of the fraud, ignoring his lost opportunity
claim. Their respondents’ brief on appeal does not mention the
word opportunity. Bella’s and Harris’s first effort to address
Rosenthal’s lost opportunity theory occurred at oral argument, in
which their counsel stated Rosenthal could recover only for the
opportunity he “forewent,” and then incorrectly asserted that

25
Rosenthal offered no evidence of any lost opportunity. But as
explained above, Rosenthal made the claim in his discovery
response and referenced the discovery response in his opposition
to summary judgment. In any event, because Bella’s and Harris’s
motion ignored this issue in the first instance, we conclude
summary judgment on Rosenthal’s fraud claim would have been
improper on this ground even absent an opposition. (See Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1) [“A motion for summary
adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a
cause of action”].)
Bella and Harris argue they were not required to negate
every conceivable theory of fraud damages; they were required to
negate the only legal theory that Rosenthal asserted below. We
agree, but they failed to negate Rosenthal’s lost opportunity
theory, which he asserted both in his third amended complaint
and discovery responses.
Bella and Harris argue that Rosenthal’s proposed damages
theory would permit him to both accept the modified terms of the
agreement and also sue for fraud damages alleging the value of
his services exceeded the terms of the modified agreement. For
reasons discussed above, we disagree. Rosenthal’s fraud claim
pertains only to referrals he made before the alleged contract
modification, not after. Rosenthal also may not recover the same
damages both in fraud and contract. Any overlap between
damages recoverable in tort and contract would be limited by the
rule against double recovery. (Lazar, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp.
648-649.) Defendants argue that Rosenthal’s claim for punitive
damages fails with his fraud claim. Because we conclude triable
issues of material fact exist as to the fraud claim, they exist too
as to the punitive damages claim.
We conclude summary judgment was improper as to Bella
and Harris.

26
2. Demurrer
Rosenthal contends the trial court erred in sustaining Bella
and Harris’s demurrer to his UCL cause of action in the original
complaint, and to his cause of action for conspiracy to defraud in
the second amended complaint. We agree.

a. UCL
The UCL defines unfair competition as “any unlawful,
unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” (Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 17200.) Therefore, under the statute “there are three
varieties of unfair competition: practices which are unlawful,
unfair or fraudulent.” (In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th
298, 311 (Tobacco II).)
Under the fraud prong, “a plaintiff must allege that the
defendant’s misrepresentations were an immediate cause of the
injury-causing conduct.” (Tobacco II, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 328.)
An “unfair” business practice occurs when that practice
“ ‘offends an established public policy or when the practice is
immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially
injurious to consumers.’ ” (State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1104.) The “unfair”
standard “is intentionally broad, thus allowing courts maximum
discretion to prohibit new schemes to defraud. [Citation.] The
test of whether a business practice is unfair ‘involves an
examination of [that practice’s] impact on its alleged victim,
balanced against the reasons, justifications and motives of the
alleged wrongdoer. In brief, the court must weigh the utility of
the defendant’s conduct against the gravity of the harm to the
alleged victim’ ” (Id. at pp. 1103-1104.)
On appeal from a judgment after an order sustaining a
demurrer, we review the order de novo to determine whether the

27
complaint states a cause of action. (See McMahon v. Craig (2009)
176 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1508-1509.)
Here, Rosenthal alleged that Bella, Harris, and Gordon
colluded to defraud him of most of his commissions, to invoice
Bella at the reduced rate without his knowledge, and to kick back
10 percent of his reduced commission to Gordon. These
allegations set forth a fraudulent and unfair practice and
Rosenthal’s economic injury; the demurrer to Rosenthal’s UCL
cause of action should have been overruled.
Bella and Harris argue that standing to sue under the UCL
is confined to competitors and consumers because the UCL is
intended to preserve fair competition and protect consumers from
market distortions (see Cel–Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los
Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 187 (Cel-
Tech)), and not to create a redundant and unnecessary cause of
action for commercial parties who are capable of bringing their
own claims for breach of contract or in tort (see Linear
Technology Corp. v. Applied Materials, Inc. (2007) 152
Cal.App.4th 115, 135-136 (Linear Technology)). We disagree.
A private person has standing to sue under the UCL if he
or she “has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property
as a result of . . . unfair competition.” (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 17204; Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Ct. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310,
322.) Proof of economic injury from unfair competition can be
shown by demonstrating that a plaintiff was “deprived of money
or property to which he or she has a cognizable claim.” (Kwikset,
at p. 323.)
Rosenthal’s allegations that he lost commissions to which
he had a contractual claim establish standing for purposes of
demurrer.
No authority to which we have been directed abrogates the
standing provision of Business and Professions Code section

28
17204 simply because the plaintiff is a sophisticated
businessman.
Linear Technology, upon which Bella and Harris
principally rely, held that “where a UCL action is based on
contracts not involving either the public in general or individual
consumers who are parties to the contract, a corporate plaintiff
may not rely on the UCL for the relief it seeks.” (Linear
Technology, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 135.) It is unclear how
this logic would apply here.
Bella and Harris argue that because Rosenthal is a
sophisticated party with business experience, he is subject to the
limitations described in Linear Technology. We disagree. Linear
Technology itself did not so hold, and nothing in the UCL’s
standing provision, Business and Professions Code section 17204,
limits its grant of standing to “a person” who is unsophisticated.
Bella and Harris argue that Rosenthal’s UCL claim merely
restated his fraud claim, and thus sustaining the demurrer to the
claim was nonprejudicial. We disagree. Rosenthal’s fraud and
UCL claims are not duplicative, because he alleges that the UCL
claim is founded on both fraudulent and unfair conduct, e.g., the
kickback scheme and breach of contract, whereas the fraud claim
is based only on Bella and Harris’s misrepresentations and false
promises.
Bella and Harris argue Rosenthal lacks standing under the
UCL because he insists on a benefit-of-the-bargain measure of
damages and is not seeking out-of-pocket damages. For reasons
discussed above, we disagree.

b. Conspiracy to Defraud
In his cause of action for conspiracy to commit fraud,
Rosenthal alleged that Bella and Harris conspired with Gordon
and Schwartz not only to limit his commissions to 1 or 2 percent

29
of sales but to restrict those commissions to sales occurring
withing within three months after April 5, 2020.
Bella and Harris do not dispute that these allegations on
their face state a cause of action for conspiracy to defraud.
Instead, Bella and Harris argue that because Rosenthal admitted
in his application for leave to amend that “the fraud on which the
conspiracy claim is based . . . is Bella and Harris’ fraud in the
first cause of action,” the cause of action fails because a party
cannot conspire with itself. We disagree with this reading of the
operative complaint.
Conspiracy is a theory of vicarious liability by which one
defendant can be held liable for the acts of another. (IIG
Wireless, Inc. v. Yi (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 630, 652.) Because
conspiracy is not itself a tort, “[i]t must be activated by the
commission of an actual tort.” (Applied Equipment Corp. v.
Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503, 511.)
As noted above, Rosenthal alleges several elements of a
fraudulent scheme among Bella, Harris, Gordon, and Schwartz in
addition to the promissory fraud alleged in the fraud cause of
action. For example, in the fraud cause of action, Rosenthal
alleges that Bella and Harris conspired with Gordon and
Schwartz to limit Rosenthal’s commissions to 1 or 2 percent of
sales, and to limit sales upon which commissions would be based
to within three months after April 5, 2020.
Bella and Harris’s demurrer to the cause of action for
conspiracy to defraud should have been overruled.

30
B. Rosenthal’s Appeal as to Rulings in Favor of Gordon
and Schwartz
In his appeal of the judgment in favor of Gordon and
Schwartz, Rosenthal contends the trial court erred in sustaining
demurrers without leave to amend. We agree.
Although judgment was entered in favor of Gordon and
Schwartz only after Rosenthal dismissed a viable cause of action
against them, presumably to facilitate appeal, a plaintiff who
dismisses a complaint after an adverse ruling by the trial court
may still appeal the adverse ruling insofar as other limitations on
appealability permit. (Gutkin v. Univ. of S. Cal. (2002) 101
Cal.App.4th 967, 974-975.)

1. Original Complaint
As discussed above, the court incorrectly sustained Bella
and Harris’s demurrer to Rosenthal’s UCL Claim. The same goes
for Gordon’s and Schwartz’s demurrer to that claim.
Citing Roman v. BRE Properties, Inc. (2015) 237
Cal.App.4th 1040, 1056 (Roman), Gordon and Schwartz argue
that Rosenthal waived or forfeited his appeal of this ruling by
failing to oppose their demurrer. Roman is inapposite. There, an
appellant contended that summary judgment was improper
because more discovery was needed. But the appellant failed to
ask for a continuance of summary judgment proceedings to
conduct more discovery. The court held that a party who fails to
request such a continuance cannot complain on appeal that the
need for discovery precluded summary judgment. Roman said
nothing about whether a plaintiff may appeal a judgment entered
after an unopposed demurrer is sustained.

31
2. Second Amended Complaint
a. Conspiracy to Defraud
As discussed above regarding Bella and Harris’s demurrer,
Rosenthal’s second amended complaint adequately stated a cause
of action for conspiracy to defraud. The same reasoning applies
to Gordon’s and Schwartz’s demurrer.
Gordon and Schwartz argue the conspiracy claim fails
because Rosenthal alleges that their part in the conspiracy—their
creation of a false narrative that Rosenthal would accept a 1 or 2
percent commission rather than 10 percent, did not occur until
after the fraud, i.e., until Harris’s statement on April 5, 2020 that
Bella would not pay 10 percent. We disagree, because Bella and
Harris’s fraud was not complete until they made good on their
threat not to pay 10 percent.
As noted above, “In the event the promisor repudiates the
contract before the time for his or her performance has arrived,
the plaintiff has an election of remedies—he or she may . . . ‘treat
the repudiation as an empty threat, wait until the time for
performance arrives and exercise his [or her] remedies for actual
breach if a breach does in fact occur at such time.’ ” (Romano,
supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 489.) In other words, so long as the
promisee treats the repudiation as an empty threat, the promisor
has time to retract its threat and perform on the contract.
Applying that scenario here, Rosenthal was not injured,
and the fraud not complete, until Bella and Harris made good on
their threat not to pay commissions. If, as alleged, Gordon and
Schwartz encouraged Bella and Harris not to pay Rosenthal 10
percent by persuading them that they could pressure Rosenthal
not to exercise his contract remedies, then Gordon and Schwartz
assisted Bella and Harris in completing the fraud. “[A] defendant
who assists in an ongoing tort may be held liable as a

32
coconspirator.” (Kidron v. Movie Acquisition Corp. (1995) 40
Cal.App.4th 1571, 1595-1596.)
Gordon and Schwartz argue that Rosenthal’s cause of
action for conspiracy fails because he does not allege he relied on
their “false narrative,” and was thus not harmed by it. We
disagree. A plaintiff alleging conspiracy to defraud need not
allege reliance on every coconspirator’s misrepresentation in
furtherance of the fraud. He need only allege the coconspirators
assisted the principal’s fraud.

b. Breach of Fiduciary Duty--Schwartz
The elements of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty are
“ ‘(1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship, (2) its breach, and
(3) damage proximately caused by that breach.’ ” (O’Neal v.
Stanislaus County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2017) 8
Cal.App.5th 1184, 1215.) A fiduciary relationship may arise
when a person places trust and confidence in the integrity of
another who voluntarily accepts the confidence; once accepted,
the confidant cannot act so as to take advantage of the other’s
interests without their knowledge or consent. (Tri-Growth Centre
City Ltd. v. Silldorf, Burdman, Duignan & Eisenberg (1989) 216
Cal.App.3d 1139.)
Rosenthal alleges that he and Schwartz were in a business
relationship in which they shared commissions and Schwartz
invoiced Bella on Rosenthal’s behalf.
Schwartz does not dispute that this signifies a fiduciary
relationship. Instead, he argues that in the third amended
complaint Rosenthal denies any partnership between the two.
Schwartz argues that this denial precludes any factual finding
that he and Rosenthal were in a fiduciary relationship. We
disagree. Although a partnership will likely involve a fiduciary
relationship, it is not the only sort of business arrangement that

33
may give rise to a fiduciary relationship. Even in the absence of
a partnership one may repose confidence in the integrity of
another such that that party cannot act so as to take advantage
of the principal’s interests without their knowledge or consent.
For example, Rosenthal alleges he and Schwartz were in business
together, they were family friends, he trusted Schwartz to
negotiate on his behalf, and they shared commissions. For his
part, Schwartz alleges in his answer that Rosenthal authorized
his conduct with respect to the Bella commissions and is estopped
from asserting his rights against Schwartz. At the demurrer
stage, and indulging all inferences in Rosenthal’s favor, we
cannot conclude that as a matter of law Rosenthal and Schwartz
were not in a fiduciary relationship.

c. Interference Claims—Schwartz
California recognizes two theories upon which the tort of
interference with economic relations may be based. (Ixchel
Pharma, LLC v. Biogen, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1130, 1142.)
“[W]hile intentionally interfering with an existing contract is
generally ‘a wrong in and of itself’ [citation], intentionally
interfering with prospective economic advantage requires
pleading that the defendant committed an independently
wrongful act.” (Ibid.)
Interference claims generally require that the allegedly
interfering party be a “stranger” to the contract or prospective
economic advantage. (Mintz v. Blue Cross of California (2009)
172 Cal.App.4th 1594, 1603; Shamblin v. Berge (1985) 166
Cal.App.3d 118, 122-123 [interference torts require that a
contract or prospective economic advantage be with a third-
party].) In other words, a person generally cannot interfere with
his or her own relationship or contract.

34
Rosenthal alleges that Schwartz, to reap financial benefits
for himself and his wife (Gordon), interfered with Rosenthal’s
contract and prospective economic relationship with Bella by
reassuring Bella and Harris that Rosenthal would accept a 1 or 2
percent commission. As a result, Rosenthal alleged, Bella and
Harris refused to pay Rosenthal a 10 percent commission per the
March 2020 agreement.
These allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action for
interference with contract and economic relations.
Schwartz argues he was “no stranger” to Rosenthal’s
contract or relationship with Bella and Harris and that he
therefore cannot be held liable for interfering with his own
relationship with them. He argues that Rosenthal admitted his
(Schwartz’s) relationship with Bella and Harris by alleging that
both Rosenthal and Schwartz would make referrals, Bella and
Harris agreed to pay both of them, and Rosenthal and Schwartz
had a separate agreement to share commissions. We disagree.
These allegations certainly establish some connection between
Schwartz, Bella, and Harris, but do not as a matter of law
establish that Schwartz was a party to Rosenthal’s contract or
relationship with Bella or Harris. Whether he was so close to the
relationship as to be virtually a party to the contract is a question
of fact not to be resolved on demurrer.
Schwartz also argues that Rosenthal could not have been
harmed by his actions because his alleged interference took place
after April 5. At that point, Schwartz argues that the March
2020 agreement ended. For the reasons discussed above, we
disagree. After its April 5, 2020 repudiation of the March 2020
agreement, Bella and Harris still had time to retract the
repudiation and perform on the agreement. Rosenthal alleges
that due to Schwartz’s interference, Bella and Harris declined to
do so.

35
We conclude the trial court improperly sustained Gordon’s
demurrers. This holding does not affect the judgment as to
Rosenthal’s cause of action for fraud against Gordon and
Schwartz, which he voluntarily dismissed without prejudice.

DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. Appellant is to recover his costs
on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

*
KLATCHKO, J.

We concur:

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

WEINGART, J.

*
Judge of the Riverside County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

36

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