CourtListener 10313623•People v. Williams CA2/2
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Filed 1/14/25 P. v. Williams CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B328864
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct.
v. No. MA079335)
ABRAHAM GUY WILLIAMS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Lisa M. Strassner, Judge. Affirmed.
Emry J. Allen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Heidi Salerno, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
A jury found defendant and appellant Abraham Guy
Williams guilty of two counts of continuous sexual abuse of a
child under 14 years old (Pen. Code, § 288.5, subd. (a))1 as to
victims T.R. (count 1) and N.R. (count 10); one count of
aggravated sexual assault of a child under 14 years old as to T.R.
(§§ 261, subds. (a)(2) & (6), 269, subd. (a)(1); count 3); three
counts of forcible rape of a child over 14 years old as to T.R.
(§ 261, subds. (a)(2); counts 4, 5 & 6); and one count of a lewd act
on a child under 14 years old as to N.R. (§ 288, subd. (b)(1);
count 7). As to counts 1, 7, and 10, the jury found true multiple
victim allegations within the meaning of section 667.61,
subdivisions (b) and (e). Defendant admitted that he had
suffered a prior strike conviction under the “Three Strikes” law.
(§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b).)
The trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate
term of 120 years to life and a determinate term of 54 years in
state prison.
In this timely appeal, defendant contends that (1) the trial
court erred by failing to give the jury a limiting instruction
regarding the use of charged offenses for one victim as propensity
evidence as to the other victim; (2) the court abused its discretion
by admitting evidence that defendant had been in prison; (3) the
prosecution engaged in misconduct by misleading the jury about
the burden of proof; and (4) the court abused its discretion by
declining to dismiss defendant’s prior strike conviction.
We affirm.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2
BACKGROUND2
Defendant began a relationship with Sandra W. (Sandra) in
2006, when Sandra’s daughter, T.R., was five years old, and her
other daughter, N.R., was three years old. Defendant went to
prison in January 2007, and was released over a year later. A
few months after his release, defendant moved in with Sandra
and her daughters. Defendant and Sandra were married a few
months later.
When T.R. was seven years old, defendant began to touch
her sexually whenever Sandra was at work. When T.R. turned
11 years old, defendant forced her to perform oral sex on him
several times per week. T.R. never told her mother because she
was afraid of defendant and of not being believed.
Sometime after T.R. turned 13 years old, defendant
knocked her unconscious and vaginally raped her. After that
incident, defendant continued to have vaginal sex with T.R.
nearly every day. T.R. did not report defendant out of fear; she
knew he had a criminal record and had been incarcerated.
When she was 16 years old, T.R. gave birth to a child
fathered by defendant. Within six weeks of the baby’s birth,
defendant resumed sexually assaulting T.R. T.R. gave birth to
her second child fathered by defendant when she was 17 years
old.
Defendant began to sexually abuse N.R. when she was
seven years old, including forcing her to touch his penis.
Defendant anally raped N.R. when she was around eight years
old. N.R. did not tell anyone what defendant had done to her
2 Because defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting his convictions, we only briefly summarize
the evidence adduced at trial.
3
because she was scared, embarrassed, and humiliated. When
N.R. was around nine years old, defendant forced her to perform
oral sex, followed by anal sex. Defendant later started having
vaginal sex with N.R. at least once or twice per week.
DISCUSSION
I. Alleged Instructional Error
Defendant argues that the trial court was required to
instruct the jury, sua sponte, that it could not consider the
charged offenses as to one victim as propensity evidence of crimes
against the other victim. To the extent this claim was forfeited,
defendant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for not
requesting such a limiting instruction.
A. Additional background
The People filed a motion in limine requesting that the jury
be able to consider as propensity evidence uncharged instances of
defendant’s sexual abuse of T.R. and N.R. that occurred in Utah
from 2017 to 2019. At the hearing on the motion, the trial court
confirmed that the propensity evidence sought to be admitted
pertained to uncharged sexual abuse. Over defense counsel’s
objection, the court found the uncharged offenses admissible.
The trial court later instructed the jury with CALCRIM
No. 1191A, as follows:
“The People presented evidence that the defendant
committed additional sex acts in Utah during 2017[–]2019 that
w[ere] not charged in this case. These crimes are defined for you
in these instructions.
“You may consider this evidence only if the People have
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant in
fact committed the uncharged offenses. Proof by a preponderance
of the evidence is a different burden of proof from proof beyond a
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reasonable doubt. A fact is proved by a preponderance of the
evidence if you conclude that it is more likely than not that the
fact is true.
“If the People have not met this burden of proof, you must
disregard this evidence entirely.
“If you decide that the defendant committed the uncharged
offenses, you may, but are not required to, conclude from that
evidence that the defendant was disposed or inclined to commit
sexual offenses, and based on that decision, also conclude that
the defendant was likely to commit and did commit Counts 1
through 10, as charged here. If you conclude that the defendant
committed the uncharged offenses, that conclusion is only one
factor to consider along with all the other evidence. It is not
sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is guilty of Counts
1 through 10. The People must still prove the charge beyond a
reasonable doubt.”
B. Relevant law
Evidence Code section 1101 “limits the admissibility of so-
called ‘propensity’ or ‘disposition’ evidence offered to prove a
person’s conduct on a particular occasion. [Citation.]” (People v.
Daveggio and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 822–823
(Daveggio).)
“Evidence Code section 1108 . . . carves out an exception to
Evidence Code section 1101.” (Daveggio, supra, 4 Cal.5th at
p. 823.) Subdivision (a) of Evidence Code section 1108 provides:
“In a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a
sexual offense, evidence of the defendant’s commission of another
sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by [Evidence
Code s]ection 1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant
to [Evidence Code s]ection 352.” Evidence Code section 352, in
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turn, gives a trial court discretion to “exclude evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability
that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time
or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing
the issues, or of misleading the jury.”
“[I]n authorizing the jury’s use of propensity evidence in
sex offense cases, [Evidence Code] section 1108 . . . extends to
evidence of both charged and uncharged sex offenses . . . .”
(People v. Villatoro (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152, 1162.)
C. Standard of review
We review claims of instructional error and ineffective
assistance of counsel de novo. (People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th
561, 579 [instructional error]; People v. Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th
142, 199 [ineffective assistance of counsel].)
D. Analysis
Defendant does not challenge the admissibility of the
uncharged offenses that occurred in Utah as propensity evidence.
Nor does he contend that CALCRIM No. 1191A as given
misstated the law. Rather, he asserts that the trial court erred
by “not instruct[ing] the jury that charged offenses as to one
alleged victim could not be considered as propensity evidence
against the other . . . .”
Defendant, however, failed to request such a limiting
instruction. Accordingly, his claim of instructional error is
forfeited. (People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 99–100 [“‘A
party may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in
law and responsive to the evidence was too general or incomplete
unless the party has requested appropriate clarifying or
amplifying language.’ [Citations.]”].)
6
Forfeiture aside, defendant’s claim lacks merit. Defendant
points to nothing in the record indicating that the trial court or
the People led the jury to believe that evidence of the charged
offenses could be used as propensity evidence for other charged
offenses. Thus, there simply was no occasion for the court to
instruct the jury, sua sponte, on whether or how a charged sexual
offense could be used to prove propensity.
It follows that we also reject defendant’s claim that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to request a limiting
instruction. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must show that counsel’s performance was both
deficient and prejudicial. (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986,
1009.) “[A] reviewing court defers to counsel’s reasonable tactical
decisions, and there is a presumption counsel acted within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” (Ibid.) Here,
“there could be no deficiency in failing to request an unnecessary
instruction.” (People v. Dieguez (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 266, 280–
281.) And, “[a] reasonable attorney may have tactically
concluded that the risk of a limiting instruction . . . outweighed
the questionable benefits such instruction would provide.”
(People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 394.)
II. Alleged Evidentiary Error
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in
admitting evidence that defendant had previously been
incarcerated.
A. Additional background
The trial court found that, if defendant testified, his prior
burglary conviction would be admissible as a crime of moral
turpitude for impeachment purposes. The People argued that
defendant’s prior incarceration should also be admitted to
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substantiate the victims’ fear of defendant, which dissuaded them
from reporting the abuse. The court deferred its decision on that
issue pending information on whether the victims knew
defendant had been in prison.
T.R. subsequently testified during the People’s case-in-chief
about the first time that defendant had vaginal sex with her. She
explained that she did not tell anyone what happened out of
“[f]ear.” The following testimony was elicited without objection:
“Q What was it about [defendant] that made you afraid?
“A Knowing his past.
“Q What do you mean by that?
“A Knowing the fact that the defendant has a criminal
record.
“Q . . . [A]t this point you were 13. [¶] When did you
first become aware that the defendant had some type of criminal
past?
“A I was in the second grade, I believe. And the
defendant ended up incarcerated.
“Q And at that point was he already living with your
family or was he part of your life?
“A He was living with us.
“Q So he was living with you and then he left at some
point and was incarcerated?
“A Correct.
“Q And did he return to your house when he got out?
“A Yes.”
Defendant testified on his own behalf later in the trial. He
stated that he had a prior burglary conviction and had spent a
year in custody.
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B. Relevant law
“No evidence is admissible except relevant evidence” (Evid.
Code, § 350), and “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, all
relevant evidence is admissible” (id., § 351). Evidence is relevant
if it has “any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any
disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action.” (Id., § 210.)
A trial court has discretion to exclude relevant evidence
under Evidence Code section 352 “if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
will . . . create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing
the issues, or of misleading the jury.”
“‘“The prejudice that [Evidence Code] section 352 ‘“is
designed to avoid is not the prejudice or damage to a defense that
naturally flows from relevant, highly probative evidence.”
[Citations.] “Rather, the statute uses the word in its etymological
sense of ‘prejudging’ a person or cause on the basis of extraneous
factors. [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] In other words,
evidence should be excluded as unduly prejudicial when it is of
such nature as to inflame the emotions of the jury, motivating
them to use the information, not to logically evaluate the point
upon which it is relevant, but to reward or punish one side
because of the jurors’ emotional reaction. In such a circumstance,
the evidence is unduly prejudicial because of the substantial
likelihood the jury will use it for an illegitimate purpose.”’
[Citation.]” (People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 162–163
(Powell).)
C. Standard of review
We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse
of discretion. (People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 597.) We
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will “not disturb the . . . ruling unless it was arbitrary, capricious,
or made in a ‘“patently absurd manner that resulted in a
manifest miscarriage of justice.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Thomas
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 358.)
D. Analysis
There was nothing arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
about the trial court’s decision to admit evidence of defendant’s
previous incarceration. The brief mention that defendant had
been to prison was directly probative of the genuineness and
reasonableness of T.R.’s fear of defendant and its effect on her
delayed disclosure of defendant’s abuse. This was a highly
relevant issue in this case, as T.R.’s “credibility was crucial to the
prosecution’s case.” (People v. Case (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1, 31 (Case);
see also People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 302 [“Evidence
of fear is relevant to the witness’s credibility”].)
Defendant argues that “the actual probative value of the
evidence was minimal because T[.R.] was seven years old at most
when she learned of [defendant]’s status as a prison inmate” and
that “[i]t is inconceivable” that such a young child would “attach[]
the same opprobrium to the reality of state prison that an adult
jur[or] would.” This argument misses the mark because it goes to
the weight a jury should have given to T.R.’s testimony, and not
its admissibility.
Neither do we agree with defendant that the admission of
defendant’s prior incarceration was unduly prejudicial. In this
case, the evidence that defendant had been to prison for a
burglary conviction “was far less inflammatory than the evidence
of the charged offenses” (Case, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 32), which
involved horrific acts of sexual abuse against children. “There is
no reason to believe the jury would have indulged in the
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speculative and emotional response defendant imagines.”
(Powell, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 163.)
III. Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct
Defendant argues that the prosecutor committed
prejudicial misconduct during closing argument by misleading
the jury about the applicable burden of proof to find defendant
guilty of the charged offenses.
A. Additional background
During closing argument, the prosecutor stated:
“Now, all of the information we heard about before up
through 2017 w[as] the charged conduct, right? That makes up
counts 1 through 10.
“But you also heard quite a bit of testimony about abuse
that continued when they lived in Roy, Utah and Ogden, Utah.
And we’re referring to this as the uncharged conduct.
“Now, why does the uncharged conduct matter? For a
couple of reasons. One, it helps contextualize the full scope of
their abuse. Just because they left Palmdale in California, the
anal sex, the vaginal sex, the oral sex, and the physical violence
didn’t stop. The defendant took that terror across state lines and
continued to abuse both girls in Utah as well. [¶] . . . [¶]
“Now, the reason why this has legal significance is because
you can consider uncharged conduct in your consideration of the
charged conduct. What does this mean? It is jury instruction
1191A, right? This is a different burden of proof.
“In Utah you only have to believe by a preponderance of the
evidence to determine whether or not those sex acts are true.
That means, do you think that it’s more likely than not that the
defendant raped the girls in Utah? That he sodomized them in
Utah? That he forced oral sex on them in Utah? If you believe
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that it’s more likely than not that that occurred, you can use that
analysis to decide he committed the acts in California.
“If he was likely to do it in Utah by a lower standard of
preponderance of evidence, you can use that in considering
whether or not he did it in California. If he did it there, he’s more
likely to do it here.
“Two things to keep in mind about your consideration of
uncharged conduct. Utah conduct burden of proof is
preponderance of the evidence. It’s a lower standard. Charged
conduct, what happened here in California, is proof beyond a
reasonable doubt; that’s something that we talked about kind of
ad nauseam during the jury selection process. You have the legal
definition of what that is and I’ll probably talk about it a little bit
more during my argument.
“So it’s a factor that you guys can take into consideration in
deciding whether or not he’s guilty of the acts in California. It’s
not the only thing you can consider, but it’s a factor to go along
with all of the other evidence.”
B. Relevant law
“‘A prosecutor commits misconduct when his or her conduct
either infects the trial with such unfairness as to render the
subsequent conviction a denial of due process, or involves
deceptive or reprehensible methods employed to persuade the
trier of fact.’ [Citation.] ‘As a general rule a defendant may not
complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a timely
fashion—and on the same ground—the defendant made an
assignment of misconduct and requested that the jury be
admonished to disregard the impropriety.’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Silveria and Travis (2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 306.)
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C. Standard of review
We review de novo a claim of prosecutorial misconduct.
(See People v. Uribe (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 836, 860.)
D. Analysis
Defendant contends that the prosecutor’s closing argument
improperly “led the jury to believe that it could employ a
preponderance of the evidence standard in determining whether
[defendant] was guilty of the California offenses, and still comply
with the [trial] court’s instruction that the standard of proof to
find a verdict of guilty was guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Specifically, defendant points to the prosecutor’s statement that
if the jury “believe[d] that it’s more likely than not that [the
uncharged Utah offenses] occurred, [the jury could] use that
analysis to decide he committed the acts in California.”
Defendant forfeited his claim of misconduct by failing to
raise it below.3 (People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 481.)
The claim also fails on the merits. Read in its full context,
the prosecutor’s closing argument made it absolutely clear that
the jury was required to find defendant guilty of the charged
offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecutor expressly
stated that the “Utah conduct burden of proof is preponderance of
the evidence. It’s a lower standard. Charged conduct, what
happened here in California, is proof beyond a reasonable
doubt . . . .” The prosecutor correctly stated the law that the
3 And, because there was nothing objectionable about the
prosecutor’s closing argument with respect to the burden of proof
regarding the charged and uncharged offenses, we also reject
defendant’s alternative argument that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object. (See People v. Anderson (2001)
25 Cal.4th 543, 587 [“Counsel is not required to proffer futile
objections”].)
13
uncharged offenses admitted under Evidence Code section 1108
only needed to be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
(See People v. Regalado (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1056, 1061.) No
reasonable juror could have construed the prosecutor’s argument
as reducing the burden of proof for the charged California
offenses from beyond a reasonable doubt to a preponderance of
the evidence.
IV. Alleged Error in Refusing to Dismiss Strike
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by declining to dismiss his prior “strike” conviction.
A. Additional background
Prior to sentencing, defendant filed a Romero4 motion to
dismiss his prior strike conviction of burglary from 2003. The
motion explained that defendant’s “parents were never part of his
life”; defendant’s father had been incarcerated when defendant
was born and died in prison; and defendant’s mother died when
he was a toddler. Defendant “ha[d] battled with depression and
substance abuse for most of his life”; had attempted suicide as a
teenager; “was physically and emotionally abused by his foster
families”; was shot when he was 19 years old; and had been
homeless for a period of time. Defendant attached a
psychological report by a licensed clinical social worker that
detailed his background.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that it had
“read [defendant’s] motion as well as the accompanying
psychological workup by [the] licensed social worker . . . .”
Defense counsel submitted on the motion. The prosecutor argued
that while the strike appeared to be remote in time, it occurred
4 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497
(Romero).
14
relatively close in time to when defendant began the sexual abuse
at issue in this case.
The trial court denied the motion as follows:
“So the court does agree while if you were to just look at the
conviction date of his strike prior which I believe is 2003 in and of
itself not considering anything else, one might consider that to be
remote; however, this court does not consider that to be remote.
In light of the fact that when he was released from prison on that
case and on parole, that is when the abuse began shortly
thereafter for the next 10 years regarding . . . T[.R.] and N[.R.]
[¶] . . . I will also note that he failed on parole and was sent back
to state prison as a violation in 2007.
“So although it may seem that it’s remote in time, based
upon his prior record, based upon the fact that . . . the continuous
sexual abuse and the child abuse took place over almost a decade
shortly after he was released while on parole, the court has
considered that factor as well as other factors in considering
whether it is going to strike his strike prior . . . .
“In exercising its discretion to not strike the strike prior
enhancement under . . . section 1385 the court considered the
nature and the circumstances of the defendant’s current crimes,
the defendant’s prior convictions and record and the particulars
of his . . . background, character and prospects.
“The court finds the defendant squarely fits within the
spirit of the Three Strikes law.”
B. Relevant law
A trial court may, in furtherance of justice, strike a prior
conviction allegation brought under the Three Strikes law.
(§ 1385, subd. (a); see also Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 529–
530.) In determining whether to take such action, the court
15
“must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances
of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony
convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and
prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the [Three
Strikes] scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be
treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or
more serious and/or violent felonies.” (People v. Williams (1998)
17 Cal.4th 148, 161.)
“[T]he three strikes law not only establishes a sentencing
norm, it carefully circumscribes the trial court’s power to depart
from this norm and requires the court to explicitly justify its
decision to do so. In doing so, the law creates a strong
presumption that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing
norms is both rational and proper.” (People v. Carmony (2004)
33 Cal.4th 367, 378 (Carmony).)
C. Standard of review
We review the denial of a Romero motion to dismiss an
allegation under the Three Strikes law for an abuse of discretion.
(Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 374–375.)
D. Analysis
Applying these legal principles, we readily conclude that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion. This case involved
continuous sexual abuse of children over the course of a decade.
The abuse began not long after defendant suffered the prior
strike in question. Accordingly, that strike was not remote in
time from the current criminal conduct.
Defendant asserts that the trial court failed to afford
appropriate weight to “mitigating aspects of [his] background”
and, instead, “virtually ignored them.” The record belies this
characterization.
16
The trial court expressly noted that it had read defendant’s
moving papers and the psychological evaluation offered in
support. The court also noted that it had “considered the nature
and the circumstances of the defendant’s current crimes, the
defendant’s prior convictions and record and the particulars of
his . . . background, character and prospects.” Thus, the record
shows that the court considered the totality of the evidence that
defendant placed before it and found that he “squarely fit[] within
the spirit of the Three Strikes law.” Where, as here, “the record
demonstrates that the trial court balanced the relevant facts and
reached an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the
law” (People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310), we can
find no abuse of discretion and will affirm the court’s ruling.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
_____________________, J.
ASHMANN-GERST
We concur:
________________________, P. J.
LUI
________________________, J.
CHAVEZ
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