CourtListener 10313543•Carraman v. Pyburn CA2/4
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Filed 1/14/25 Carraman v. Pyburn CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
FELIPE RICKY CARRAMAN, B327100
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21STCV09003)
v.
LINDA PYBURN,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Kerry Bensinger, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Ted B. Wacker, Vincent D. Howard; The Arkin Law
Firm and Sharon J. Arkin for Plaintiff and Appellant.
The Safarian Firm, Christina S. Karayan and Harry A. Safarian for
Defendant and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff was injured by a falling branch while trimming trees on
defendant’s property. Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, alleging a single
cause of action for negligence. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for
summary judgment, concluding that plaintiff was acting as an independent
contractor and that under the doctrine established in Privette v. Superior
Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689 (Privette), defendant could not be held liable for
his injuries. Plaintiff appeals, arguing that under Labor Code section 2750.5,
he was entitled to a statutory presumption that he was acting as defendant’s
employee because he did not have the license required to trim defendant’s
trees. As the trial court correctly determined that Business and Professions
Code section 70481 exempted plaintiff from the licensure requirement, we
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts of this case are largely undisputed. Defendant and
respondent Linda Pyburn (Pyburn) owned real property located in Castaic,
California. Beginning in 2012 or 2013, Pyburn would regularly hire plaintiff
and appellant Felipe Ricky Carraman (Carraman) to perform work at the
Castaic property, including weed abatement, tree trimming, trash hauling,
and painting. In March 2019, Pyburn again hired Carraman to trim oak
trees on the property that varied in height from 20 to 30 feet.
Carraman’s assistant, Jaime Avila (Avila), worked with him on the job.
Carraman used Pyburn’s ladder to trim the trees, but otherwise supplied his
own tools. Pyburn provided general comments that she wanted the trees to
1 All further statutory references are to the Business and Professions
Code unless otherwise stated.
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look uniform, but it was ultimately left up to Carraman to determine how to
approach trimming each tree. As Carraman and Avila were finishing their
work, Pyburn came out of the house and asked them to cut a specific tree
branch. When Carraman cut the branch, it fell and hit the ladder he was
standing on, knocking him to the ground. Carraman suffered various alleged
injuries in the accident, including fractures to his ribs and spine, vertigo, and
a concussion. Carraman was paid $300 for the tree trimming job.
I. Carraman’s Complaint
On March 8, 2021, Carraman filed suit against Pyburn asserting a
single cause of action for negligence. Carraman asserted that under section
7026, a license is required to trim trees over 15 feet tall. Carraman claimed
that because he was not licensed for the job, he was deemed to be acting as
Pyburn’s employee as a matter of law. Carraman also pointed to certain
California OSHA regulations and Labor Code sections that Pyburn allegedly
failed to satisfy.
II. Pyburn’s Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication
Pyburn filed a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication
on Carraman’s cause of action for negligence. In her motion, Pyburn argued
the undisputed facts showed she was not negligent in maintaining her
property. Alternatively, she argued that Carraman was acting as an
independent contractor in trimming her trees and that under the Privette
doctrine, there was a rebuttable presumption that she could not be held liable
for injuries Carraman suffered as an independent contractor. She also
argued that none of the exceptions to the Privette rule applied.
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Carraman opposed Pyburn’s motion. He argued Pyburn failed to carry
her burden in moving for summary judgment because her arguments were
based on the assumption Carraman was acting as an independent contractor
in trimming Pyburn’s trees. Carraman argued that a license was required to
trim Pyburn’s trees because they were more than 15 feet tall. He claimed
that under Labor Code section 2750.5, he was entitled to the presumption
that he was acting as Pyburn’s employee because he did not have the
requisite license. Accordingly, Carraman claimed Privette and its progeny
did not apply.
In her reply, Pyburn acknowledged that under section 7026.1, a license
is required to trim trees that are over 15 feet tall. However, Pyburn argued
that under the “small operations exception” codified in Business and
Professions Code section 7048, a license is not required for any work where
the aggregate contract price is less than $500. Pyburn claimed that because
Carraman was paid $300 for the tree trimming, section 7048 applied and
exempted Carraman from the licensure requirement. Thus, Pyburn
concluded Labor Code section 2750.5 did not apply, and Carraman was not
presumed to be acting as an employee.
Pyburn’s motion was heard on December 7, 2022. At the hearing,
Pyburn’s counsel requested that further briefing be allowed regarding the
application of Labor Code section 2750.5. The court agreed and ordered the
parties to submit supplemental briefing.
Pyburn submitted additional briefing, again arguing that under section
7048, Carraman was not required to be licensed to trim Pyburn’s trees
because the work was valued at less than $500. In his supplemental brief,
Carraman argued that to trigger section 7048, Pyburn had to show both that
the work was valued at less than $500 and make a separate showing that the
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work in question was “considered of casual, minor, or inconsequential
nature.” Carraman admitted the first condition was met, but argued a
triable issue of material fact remained as to whether Carraman’s tree
trimming work was deemed “casual, minor, or inconsequential” under section
7048.
After the second hearing, the court took the matter under submission.
On February 6, 2023, the trial court issued an order granting Pyburn’s
motion. The court rejected Carraman’s interpretation of section 7048, finding
it was not supported by the plain language of the statute. The court
determined that because the cost of the tree trimming was below $500, the
small undertakings exception codified in section 7048 applied as a matter of
law. Because the exception applied, the court determined there was no
presumption that Carraman was acting as Pyburn’s employee at the time of
the accident. The court then determined Carraman was instead acting as an
independent contractor, and that Pyburn could not be held liable for
Carraman’s injuries under the Privette doctrine.
On March 6, 2023, the court entered judgment in Pyburn’s favor.
III. Appeal
Carraman timely appealed the judgment. On appeal, Carraman raises
two issues. First, he argues a triable issue of material fact remains regarding
the application of section 7048. Second, he contends Pyburn failed to meet
her burden of proof because she did not present evidence regarding the OSHA
violations alleged in his complaint.
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DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
“A party is entitled to summary judgment only if there is no triable
issue of material fact and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A defendant moving for summary
judgment must show that one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of
action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense. (Id., subd.
(p)(2).) If the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff
to present evidence creating a triable issue of material fact. (Ibid.) A triable
issue of fact exists if the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to
find the fact in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. (Aguilar v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)” (Grebing v. 24 Hour
Fitness USA, Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 631, 636–637.)
“We review the trial court’s decision de novo, considering all of the
evidence the parties offered in connection with the motion (except that which
the court properly excluded) and the uncontradicted inferences the evidence
reasonably supports.” (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476.)
“‘[W]e review the trial court’s rulings and not its reasoning.’” (Coral
Construction, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco (2010) 50 Cal.4th 315,
336, quoting People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 944.)
II. Business and Professions Code section 7048
It is undisputed that, absent a statutory exemption, sections 7026.1
and 7028 required Carraman to be licensed to trim Pyburn’s trees. It is also
undisputed that if Carraman was required to be licensed and wasn’t, then
under Labor Code section 2750.5, a presumption arises that he was acting as
Pyburn’s employee and not as an independent contractor. The crux of this
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case is whether section 7048 exempted Carraman from the licensure
requirement. If Carraman was exempted from the licensure requirement for
tree trimming, then Labor Code section 2750.5 does not apply and there is no
presumption that Carraman was acting as Pyburn’s employee. Carraman
contends the trial court misinterpreted section 7048 in finding that it
exempted Carraman from the licensure requirement. Carraman argues a
triable issue of material fact exists regarding the application of section 7048,
and therefore the court erred in finding the exemption applies to Carraman
as a matter of law.
1. Principles of Statutory Interpretation
“The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court
should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose
of the statute.” (Law Office of Carlos R. Perez v. Whittier Union High School
Dist. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 463, 472.) “In doing so, we look first to the words
of a statute, ‘because they generally provide the most reliable indicator of
legislative intent.’ [Citation.]” (Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc.
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 524, 529 (Pineda).) “We give the words their usual and
ordinary meaning [citation], while construing them in light of the statute as a
whole and the statute’s purpose [citation]. ‘In other words, “‘we do not
construe statutes in isolation, but rather read every statute “with reference to
the entire scheme of law of which it is part so that the whole may be
harmonized and retain effectiveness.”’”’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 529–530.)
“The law of statutory interpretation instructs us to apply the usual and
ordinary meaning of words unless a definition is provided within the statute
itself. Internal definitions are controlling.” (Witt Home Ranch, Inc. v. County
of Sonoma (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 543, 559.) “If the words themselves are
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not ambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the
statute’s plain meaning governs.” (DeNike v. Mathew Enterprise, Inc. (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 371, 378; see also City of Alhambra v. County of Los Angeles
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 707, 719 [“‘We consider extrinsic aids, such as legislative
history, only if the statutory language is reasonably subject to multiple
interpretations’”].)
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. (Reid v.
Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 527.
2. The Trial Court Correctly Interpreted and Applied section 7048
Section 7048 is comprised of three paragraphs. Carraman’s argument
on appeal centers on the first paragraph of the statute, which provides: “This
chapter does not apply to any work or operation on one undertaking or
project by one or more contracts, the aggregate contract price which for labor,
materials, and all other items, is less than five hundred dollars ($500), that
work or operations being considered of casual, minor, or inconsequential
nature.”
The trial court interpreted this language as imposing a single $500
threshold and determined that all work below this threshold was deemed to
be casual or inconsequential. Accordingly, the trial court concluded the
exemption applied to Carraman because it was undisputed that the contract
price for his work was below the $500 threshold. Carraman argues this
conclusion was error. Carraman insists the first paragraph of section 7048
imposes a two-part test rather than a single $500 threshold. Under
Carraman’s interpretation, the exemption was not triggered simply because
the contract price was below $500, instead he argues there must also be a
separate and independent finding that the work in question is “of casual,
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minor, or inconsequential nature.” Carraman argues this second question
must be resolved by a jury, and thus Pyburn did not carry the burden of
establishing both prongs of section 7048 in moving for summary judgment.
We disagree.
As relevant here, the statute states, “This chapter does not apply to any
work . . . the aggregate contract price [for which] is less than five hundred
dollars ($500), that work or operations being considered of casual, minor, or
inconsequential nature.” This language is plain and unambiguous. It
imposes a single $500 threshold under which work is exempted from
licensure requirements that would otherwise apply under other provisions of
the Business and Professions Code. The clause “that work or operations
being considered of casual, minor, or inconsequential nature” does not impose
a substantive second requirement to trigger the exemption. Instead, this
clause is descriptive language explaining why work below the $500 threshold
triggers the exemption: because the Legislature has determined such work is
casual, minor, or inconsequential as a matter of law. There is no conjunctive
language suggesting this clause must be read as imposing a substantive
additional requirement beyond the $500 threshold, nor is there any language
that suggests this clause is meant to be additive rather than descriptive. Put
simply, nothing in the plain language of the statute suggests or implies that
the Legislature was imposing a two-part test for the exemption.
Other authorities examining section 7048 have come to the same
conclusion. One court discussing section 7048 described it as “the general
statutory $500 threshold for needing a contractor’s license” without reference
to any additional requirement. (Jones v. Sorenson (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 933,
941; see also People v. Vis (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 549, 559.) Secondary
sources have similarly described the exemption as a single $500 threshold
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rather than a two-part test. (See e.g. 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th
ed. 2024) Contracts, § 499 [statutory licensure requirement does not apply
“[w]here the contract price is less than $500”]; 9 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real
Estate (4th ed. 2024) § 31:6 [licensure requirement “does not apply to work on
a project where the combined value of labor, materials, and all other costs on
one or more contracts is less than $500”].)
Our conclusion is further bolstered when section 7048 is construed in
light of the entire statutory scheme. (Pineda, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 529–
530.) Here, where the Legislature intended to impose two substantive
requirements in analogous statutory provisions, it did so expressly. For
example, section 7027.2 provides that an unlicensed person may advertise for
construction work if the aggregate price for the “project or undertaking is less
than five hundred dollars ($500), and he or she states in the advertisement
that he or she is not licensed under this chapter.” (§ 7027.2, italics added; see
also § 7044.) This is the precise approach the Legislature took in recent
amendments to section 7048 itself. Assembly Bill No. 2622 amended the first
paragraph of section 7048 to expressly impose an additional requirement. As
effective January 1, 2025, section 7048, subdivision (a) will now read “This
chapter does not apply to a work or operation on one undertaking or project
by one or more contracts, if the aggregate contract price for labor, materials,
and all other items, is less than one thousand dollars ($1,000) that work or
operation being considered of casual, minor, or inconsequential nature, and
the work or operation does not require a building permit.” (§ 7048, as
amended by Stats. 2024, ch. 240, § 2, italics added.) It is clear from this
amendment that where the Legislature intends to impose additional
substantive requirements to trigger the licensure exemption, it does so
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through express language. No such language is present in the version of the
statute that applied to Carraman.
Carraman’s argument requires us to read words into section 7048
which do not appear. This we cannot do. “In the construction of a statute or
instrument, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is
in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been
omitted, or to omit what has been inserted.” (Manufacturers Life Ins. Co. v.
Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 257, 274, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 1858;
People v. Roach (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 178, 184 [declining to insert language
into statute because intent to “‘legislate by implication is not to be
presumed’”].)
As the plain language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need
not consider any other extrinsic aids in deciphering the Legislature’s intent.
The trial court correctly determined that section 7048 imposed a single $500
threshold to bring Carraman’s work within the exemption. As it was
undisputed that the contract price for Carraman’s work fell within the $500
statutory threshold, the trial court correctly determined the exemption
applied to Carraman’s work and Labor Code section 2750.5 did not apply.
3. The Exception to the Exemption
The second and third paragraphs of section 7048 set forth exceptions
under which the licensure exemption does not apply. Under the third
paragraph, the exemption “does not apply to a person who advertises or puts
out any sign or card or other device which might indicate to the public that he
or she is a contractor or that he or she is qualified to engage in the business
of a contractor.” (§ 7048.) Carraman argues for the first time on appeal that
11
there remains a triable issue of material fact as to whether this third
paragraph of section 7048 applied to Carraman.
As Carraman did not raise this argument below, he has forfeited the
issue on appeal. When a motion for summary judgment has been granted,
“[t]he opposing party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal.”
(Sanchez v. Swinerton & Walberg Co. (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1461, 1465.)
Carraman attempts to avoid this result by arguing that Pyburn had to
disprove the possibility that the third paragraph applied to carry her burden
in moving for summary judgment. He argues we must reverse because
Pyburn did not affirmatively show the third paragraph of section 7048 was
inapplicable to Carraman. We disagree.
“To prevail on summary judgment, the defendant no longer must
conclusively negate the plaintiff’s case. Given the difficulty of proving a
negative, such a test is often impossibly high.” (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc.
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 373.) “If the moving defendant argues that it has a
complete defense to the plaintiff’s cause of action, the defendant has the
initial burden to show that undisputed facts support each element of the
affirmative defense. Once it does so, the burden shifts to plaintiff to show an
issue of fact concerning at least one element of the defense.” (Bacon v.
Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 854, 858.) “If, in anticipation
of an affirmative defense, the complaint alleges facts to refute it, the
pleadings themselves create ‘a material issue which defendant[] would have
. . . to refute in order to obtain summary [judgment].’ [Citation.] In the
absence of such allegations, the plaintiff can avoid summary judgment only
by presenting evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue concerning the
affirmative defense.” (Ibid.)
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Here, Carraman’s complaint did not include any allegations regarding
the application of section 7048. Accordingly, Pyburn was not required to
negate the third paragraph of section 7048 to carry her initial burden in
moving for summary judgment. Instead, it was enough for Pyburn to present
evidence showing the licensure exemption from the first paragraph of section
7048 applied. Pyburn carried this burden by presenting evidence that the
contract price for Carraman’s work fell below the $500 threshold, triggering
the exemption. Once Pyburn made this showing, the burden shifted to
Carraman to raise a triable issue of material fact regarding the application of
the exemption. It is undisputed that Carraman offered no argument on this
point below.
Our California Supreme Court has recognized “that parties may
advance new theories on appeal when the issue posed is purely a question of
law based on undisputed facts, and involves important questions of public
policy.” (Fisher v. City of Berkeley (1984) 37 Cal.3d 644, 654, fn. 3 (Fisher).)
Carraman attempts to avail himself of this rule, arguing that public policy
considerations here warrant consideration of this point on appeal. We are
unconvinced. The focus of this case is on the purely private question of
whether Carraman held himself out as a licensed tree trimmer. The mere
fact this question arises in the context of statutory licensing requirements is
not enough; virtually every statute exists to vindicate some important public
policy. (See, e.g., Peterson v. John Crane, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 498,
515 [“[t]he reasonableness of a section 998 award . . . does not involve an
important question of public policy or public concern, but simply determines
whether in this particular case a trial court abused its discretion in deciding
how much one party should pay another”].)
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In any event, the doctrine stated in Fisher is purely discretionary, and
courts have declined to exercise this discretion. (See, e.g., Greenwich S.F.,
LLC v. Wong (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 739, 767.) This is particularly true on
summary judgment. “‘The rule which forbids raising a new issue for the first
time on appeal takes on added significance in summary judgment
proceedings because “[t]he moving party’s burden on a motion for summary
judgment is only to ‘negate the existence of triable issues of fact in a fashion
that [entitles] it to judgment on the issues raised by the pleadings.
[Citation.] It [is] not required to refute liability on some theoretical
possibility not included in the pleadings.’ [Citation.]”’ [Citation.]” (Jordan-
Lyon Productions, Ltd. v. Cineplex Odeon Corp. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1459,
1472.) For these reasons, we decline to consider Carraman’s argument for
the first time on appeal.
III. Alleged OSHA Violations
Carraman also argues that Pyburn was not entitled to summary
judgment because she did not address the OSHA violations alleged in his
complaint. In response, Pyburn argues the workplace safety requirements
imposed by OSHA do not apply to independent contractors, citing Seabright
Ins. Co. v. US Airways, Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 590, 594. In his reply,
Carraman does not dispute this assertion. He has therefore conceded this
point. (Westside Center Associates v. Safeway Stores 23, Inc. (1996) 42
Cal.App.4th 507, 529 [a party “effectively concedes” an issue by failing to
address it in briefing]; People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 480 [an
argument is conceded by failure to address it on appeal].) Instead, Carraman
contends Pyburn’s argument is irrelevant because “the whole point of this
appeal is to establish whether, in fact, Carraman was an independent
14
contractor.” In other words, Carraman acknowledges that we need not reach
his argument concerning the alleged OSHA violations if we determine that he
was acting as an independent contractor.
Carraman bears the burden on appeal of establishing error by the trial
court. (Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657,
708 [“on appeal, the trial court’s judgment is presumed correct, and the
burden is on the Appellants to demonstrate reversible error. . . . This is true
even on de novo review”]; accord Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–
609.) Carraman’s only arguments on appeal regarding his status as an
independent contractor concerned the application of the statutory licensure
exemption under section 7048. We determined above that the trial court
correctly interpreted and applied section 7048. In the absence of any other
claimed error, we presume the trial court correctly determined Carraman
was acting as an independent contractor. As Carraman concedes his
arguments regarding the alleged OSHA violations fail if he is deemed to be
an independent contractor, we need not address those arguments and decline
to do so.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Pyburn is awarded her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ZUKIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
CURREY, P. J. COLLINS, J.
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