People v. Tyner CA2/7

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Filed 1/14/25 P. v. Tyner CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B329967

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA120629)
v.

CHAUMON TYNER,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mike Camacho, Judge. Affirmed.
Waldemar D. Halka, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Ana R. Duarte, Deputy Attorney
General, and Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION

A jury convicted Chaumon Tyner of first degree murder,
animal cruelty, and arson, and the trial court found true the
allegation Tyner had a prior serious felony conviction. Tyner
argues that the trial court deprived him of his right to represent
himself and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.
We conclude that Tyner’s three motions to represent himself were
untimely and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying them. We also conclude that the record does not show
why counsel for Tyner acted or failed to act in the ways Tyner
asserts were ineffective and that there may have been tactical
reasons for the choices made by Tyner’s counsel. Therefore, we
affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Tyner Kills Ronnie Wall in Her Apartment and Sets
Several Fires
Tyner met Ronnie Wall through an online dating site.
They had been dating for about six weeks when Wall’s son visited
her on Saturday, March 16, 2019, at her apartment in Pomona.
After spending the day with her son, Wall drove him to the train
station in Claremont, where she dropped him off and picked up
Tyner, who claimed to live in Venice. Tyner and Wall intended to
spend the weekend together.
The following Monday morning, March 18, 2019,
firefighters responded to a call from Wall’s apartment building,
where a sprinkler system had been activated. When the fire
captain entered Wall’s apartment he saw the living room in

2
disarray, a hammer on the ground with blood on it, and burnt
carpet. The fire captain found Wall’s body in the bathroom with
her dog beside her, both dead. There was a pair of scissors next
to Wall’s body. The fire captain said bed sheets had been
removed from Wall’s bed and “gathered up” next to Wall, where
they were partially burnt. Firefighters pronounced Wall dead at
6:50 a.m.
Police officers responded to the scene and found no sign of
forced entry. There was blood on the walls, carpeting, clothing,
and other items in the apartment, including a pair of men’s
shoes. A trail of blood led from the couch in the living room into
the master bedroom and into the bathroom where Wall was
found. Wall’s cell phone was missing, and her car was not at the
apartment complex. Surveillance video showed Wall’s car leaving
the complex at 5:54 a.m., Monday, March 18, 2019.
A fire investigator found three fires were intentionally set
in the apartment: one in the kitchen, one in the bathroom of the
master bedroom, and one, the largest of the three, in the living
room. A trail of towels, sheets, and clothes from the living room
to the bedroom and into the bathroom provided fuel for the fires.
The clothes included a pair of white jeans. The living room fire
burned from the living room into the bedroom, but another fire
set in the bedroom or bathroom burned the material extending
into the bathroom and Wall’s leg. The fire investigator found an
empty bottle of cleanser that looked like it had been used as an
accelerant for the fires.
The coroner determined Wall died from two fatal stab
wounds, one to her neck and one to her chest. In total, the
coroner identified 18 “sharp force injuries,” numerous “superficial
sharp force wounds,” and “multiple blunt force blows.” The latter

3
included “a lot of injuries to the head,” including an injury to
Wall’s brain that indicated “a lot of force being applied to striking
her head.” The coroner also found burns on Wall’s body, which
could have occurred before Wall’s death, and fractures in her
cervical spine. Wall’s dog had a severed spinal cord caused by
blunt force trauma.

B. Police Investigate and Arrest Tyner
Wall’s son told police detectives that Wall spent the
weekend with Tyner. Detectives located Tyner at a group home
in Inglewood, arrested him, and recorded an interview with him.1
Tyner told the detectives that he was dating Wall and that he
spent weekends with her. Tyner said Wall picked him up at the
train station on Saturday, March 16, 2019, at approximately
5:00 p.m. As they drove to her apartment, Tyner said a rock
thrown by a group of teenagers on a street corner struck him
near his eye. Tyner said that he was “bleeding everywhere” and
that Wall treated his injury in her apartment with cotton swabs
and ointment. Tyner said he told Wall that he still felt unwell,
and Wall offered to drive him home. He showered at Wall’s
apartment and changed out of his bloody clothes, including a pair
of white jeans, which Tyner said Wall offered to clean for him.
Tyner said the last time he saw Wall was Saturday evening in
front of his building at 6:40 p.m.
Tyner told police Wall sent him “a couple of texts” after she
took him home. Tyner said that, in the exchange of text
messages, he told Wall that he liked her a lot, but that she
needed to make her health and her son her priorities. Tyner said

1 The prosecutor played a recording of the interview at trial
and provided the jurors a copy of the transcript.

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that they did not break up, but that Wall said she would not call
him anymore.
Tyner told the detectives he spent Saturday night at his
residence, leaving only to get food. When the detectives told
Tyner they had evidence that he missed the group home’s night
checks and that his roommates said he was not there Saturday
night, Tyner insisted he was. Tyner claimed to have spent most
of Sunday and Sunday night with a friend watching basketball.
He said they watched a game between the Boston Celtics and the
Philadelphia 76ers Sunday afternoon and a Los Angeles Lakers
game that evening. The next morning, Tyner said, he took a bus
to the trade school where he was enrolled. Tyner’s friend told the
detectives that Tyner was not with him that Sunday, but that he
watched a game with Tyner the following weekend. The
detectives also determined that neither the Celtics nor the 76ers
played on Sunday, March 17 and that the Lakers played that day
at 9:00 a.m., Pacific Daylight Time.
Cell phone evidence also contradicted much of Tyner’s
account.2 Records placed Tyner’s phone at Wall’s apartment
building from 7:03 p.m., Saturday, March 16, 2019, until
5:53 a.m., Monday, March 18, 2019, one minute before Wall’s car
left her apartment complex. On Monday morning, March 18,

2 The evidence introduced at trial included cell phone tower
data and “Google location history,” which is based on global
positioning satellites and Wi-Fi data associated with a particular
email address. (See generally In re Google Location History
Litigation (N.D.Cal. 2021) 514 F.Supp.3d 1147, 1155 [denying a
motion to dismiss a putative class action alleging Google
“gather[s] location data ‘almost incessantly’ and even when a user
is not interacting with [a Google app]”].)

5
2019, Tyner’s phone connected to several cell towers along the
freeway between Pomona and the area near Tyner’s trade school
in Los Angeles, which was near where police found Wall’s car.
The last connection to a cell tower from Wall’s phone was in an
area between Wall’s car and Tyner’s trade school.
Detectives also extracted cell phone text data from Tyner’s
phone. Tyner and Wall texted each other multiple times leading
up to his arrival at the Claremont train station. There were no
text messages between their phones from 4:25 p.m. to 9:42 p.m.,
Saturday, March 16, 2019. Beginning at 9:43 p.m., Tyner’s and
Wall’s phones exchanged six text messages. In one of them,
Tyner told Wall that he “‘really like[d]’” her, but that she needed
to get some help. Wall responded she was, but Tyner said,
“‘That’s cool; but I’m sorry.’” At 9:55 p.m., Wall responded, “‘Like
I said, I knew you wouldn’t understand. Fine. I wouldn’t call you
anymore.’” Cell phone records placed Tyner’s phone at Wall’s
apartment building during this exchange, but investigators could
not identify the location of Wall’s phone.3 At 10:12 p.m., Wall’s
phone made an outgoing call to Tyner’s phone, with both phones
connecting to the cell tower near Wall’s apartment. Tyner then
sent several texts and made two outgoing phone calls to other
women from the same location.
On Sunday morning, March 17, 2019, Tyner sent a text
message to a woman telling her he got a cut over his eye from a
welding accident. He sent a text to another woman telling her
that he could not meet her for lunch because he got stuck “‘in
traffic’” while taking groceries to his brother and his family in
Palmdale. That evening Tyner had two lengthy cell phone

3 At trial the prosecutor suggested Tyner created this text
exchange to support an alibi.

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conversations. For all these texts and calls, Tyner’s phone
connected to a cell tower near Wall’s apartment.
Surveillance video from Tyner’s trade school showed him
arriving there between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., Monday,
March 18. The video also showed Tyner with a gash over his
right eye. Tyner’s instructor asked him if he was “okay” and
“what happened.” Tyner said he thought a rock hit him when he
got off the train. The instructor suggested Tyner get stitches,
and Tyner left for the hospital. When Tyner returned to school,
two classmates noticed his hand was swollen. He said someone
slammed a car door on his hand in a separate incident.
The police also obtained DNA evidence from items in Wall’s
apartment. A swab from the handle of the scissors found next to
Wall’s body included a mixture of DNA profiles consistent with
Tyner’s and Wall’s DNA. The blade of the scissors contained
DNA from only Wall. Fingernail clippings from Wall’s left hand
included DNA from Wall and Tyner.

C. A Jury Convicts Tyner, and the Trial Court Sentences
Him
The People charged Tyner with murder (Pen. Code, § 187,
subd. (a)),4 animal cruelty (§ 597, subd. (a)), and arson of an
inhabited structure (§ 451, subd. (b)). People alleged that Tyner
personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon in committing the
murder (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), that he had a prior felony
conviction that was a serious or violent felony within the
meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12,
subds. (a)-(d)) and a serious felony, within the meaning of
section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and that he served three prior

4 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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prison terms within the meaning of former section 667.5,
subdivision (b), an allegation the trial court struck during trial.
Before and during Tyner’s trial the court denied three
requests by Tyner under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S.
806 (Faretta) to represent himself and a motion under People
v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden) to replace appointed
counsel. The jury found Tyner guilty on all counts and found true
the weapon allegation. The court found the prior conviction
allegation true.
The trial court denied Tyner’s motion for new trial based on
ineffective assistance of counsel, but struck the enhancement for
personally using a deadly or dangerous weapon. On Tyner’s
murder conviction, the court sentenced Tyner to a prison term of
25 years to life, doubled under the three strikes law, plus five
years for the prior serious felony enhancement. On the animal
cruelty conviction, the court sentenced Tyner to a consecutive
term of eight months, doubled under the three strikes law, and
on the arson conviction the court sentenced him to a consecutive
term of five years, doubled under the three strikes law (the court
struck the prior serious felony enhancement for this conviction).
Thus, the court sentenced Tyner to an aggregate prison term of
11 years, four months, to be served before an indeterminate term
of 55 years to life. Tyner timely appealed.

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DISCUSSION

A. The Trial Court Did Not Deprive Tyner of His Right
To Represent Himself

1. Relevant Proceedings

a. Before Trial
Tyner was arraigned April 22, 2021. On June 1, 2021
Tyner appeared with his court-appointed counsel, Alexander
Sario, before Judge Douglas Sortino for a pretrial conference.
Tyner waived his right to a speedy trial. (See § 1382.)
Tyner waived his speedy trial right several more times,
including on September 30, 2021. At that hearing Sario informed
the court that Tyner had requested a copy of the discovery, a
request Sario declined. Judge Sortino said, “Try to work this
out,” and explained to Tyner why having discovery in the jail
could be problematic. Tyner said, “I understand, but I still want
it.” Judge Sortino said, “Talk to Mr. Sario. He gets to control
that.” The court also asked Sario to work with the prosecutor in
the event Sario decided to share any discovery with Tyner to
ensure identifying information was redacted.
Several hearings later, on April 13, 2022, Judge Mike
Camacho held a pretrial conference. Tyner asked the court for a
copy of the discovery in his case. The court denied the request
and told Tyner that he was “not entitled to [his] own personal
copy of the discovery.” Tyner said, “I was here six months ago.
I talked to a judge, and he ordered the [prosecutor] and my
attorney to give me a copy of my discovery. I have here a writ of
mandamus asking you to honor that request.” The court said the

9
writ was not properly before the court and again denied Tyner’s
request for a copy of the discovery.
After an intervening hearing and another continuance, the
parties appeared before Judge Sortino on July 14, 2022. The
court set the case for trial on September 6, 2022 (later continued
to September 8, 2022). Sario informed the court Tyner believed
the court had ordered Sario to provide Tyner a copy of the
discovery. The court stated, “I know I would never make that
ruling.” The prosecutor said he believed Judge Camacho made
the ruling Tyner was referring to, but Judge Sortino read the
record from the prior hearing where Judge Camacho denied
Tyner’s request for the discovery. Tyner said, “There was one
before that,” and Judge Sortino replied, “I don’t care what the
other judge did . . . . I’m not going to order your lawyer to provide
you with discovery. I have never done that, nor will I. That is a
decision your lawyer makes for tactical or safety reasons for you
of not having discovery floating around the jail.” Judge Sortino
added, “It’s up to the lawyers to make that kind of decision.”

b. During Trial
The first motion. Judge Camacho presided over the trial.
On the morning of September 8, 2022, and before inviting the
prospective jurors into the courtroom, the court asked counsel
whether there had been any efforts to resolve the case through a
plea agreement. The prosecutor said the People offered a term of
51 years to life, and counsel for Tyner said his client would accept
11 years. The court said, “That’s clearly not going to happen.”
After Tyner spoke briefly with his attorney, Tyner said he wanted
to represent himself.

10
The court stated: “Today is the day for trial and a request
of that nature should have been made a long time ago. . . . The
only possible way I would permit you to represent yourself at this
stage is to go forward with this trial . . . without any continuance,
because I’m getting the impression from you that your request
. . . is a request to delay these proceedings unnecessarily,
knowing full well that jurors have been ordered.” Tyner said he
was not informed the trial was starting that day. The court said
that the case had “been lingering . . . for quite some time,” but
that the court would not interfere with Tyner’s right to represent
himself if he was ready to proceed. Tyner said that he was not
ready and that he would not be ready until he received the
discovery and “other pertinent information.”
The court denied the request as untimely. The court said
Tyner had never indicated any interest in representing himself
throughout the history of the case until he saw “jurors waiting in
the hallway on the day of trial.” The court found Tyner had not
made a motion under Marsden to replace his appointed counsel.
The court said Sario was “an extremely experienced defense
lawyer” who understood how to evaluate a case and formulate a
trial strategy. The court then invited the prospective jurors into
the courtroom.
The second motion. Tyner again asked to represent himself
later that same day, after jury selection began. Sario informed
the court Tyner would be ready for trial the following Monday
(September 8, 2022 was a Thursday), and Tyner agreed Sario
could continue jury selection that day and Friday. Sario said that
he had a “first packet” of discovery ready to share with Tyner and
that he could give him the rest of it that weekend. The court said
it would consider Tyner’s request and address it before swearing

11
in the panel. The court said that the request was still untimely,
but that the court was inclined to grant it if the trial could
proceed without delay. The court also said Sario could provide
Tyner a copy of the discovery packet, so long as sensitive
information was redacted to the People’s satisfaction. The
prosecutor urged the court to consider that much of the discovery
was in electronic form and that Tyner would not have access to it
from jail or through an investigator (which Tyner didn’t have
anyway). The court informed Tyner it would consider his ability
to “properly prepare,” given his limited access to electronic
equipment. At the end of the day the court gave Tyner a “Faretta
waiver” form titled Advisement and Waiver of Right to Counsel
(Faretta waiver) to review, and Sario gave Tyner approximately
250 pages of discovery.
The next day Sario submitted Tyner’s signed Faretta
waiver and said he would give Tyner the remaining discovery
that day. After jury selection, but before the clerk swore the
panel, the court returned to Tyner’s request to represent himself.
As it had the day before, the court found Tyner’s motion was
untimely. The court also found Tyner’s request was equivocal.
The court said Tyner’s request appeared to be “made in passing
out of frustration and anger” after the People rejected Tyner’s
plea offer. The court explained that “moments before” Tyner
made his first request on the morning of trial, the court said a
plea agreement was “not going to happen.” The court said Tyner
“blurted out the uninvited response” that he wanted to exercise
his Faretta rights. The court found Tyner’s request “rash and
impulsive” because it immediately followed the failed plea
negotiations, Tyner had not (yet) expressed dissatisfaction with
Sario, and Tyner had little time to prepare for trial.

12
Sario informed the court Tyner might have said he wanted
to fire Sario and hire a new attorney after the last of the pretrial
hearings where the court denied Tyner access to the discovery.
Tyner said he did. Sario also said that Tyner was a “miss-out” for
several pretrial hearings5 and that he did not speak to Tyner
after the trial readiness hearing, which meant Tyner did not have
an opportunity to tell him or the court he wanted to represent
himself during about two months leading up to trial.
Tyner told the court his decision to represent himself was
not made out of frustration. He said that a judge previously told
Sario and the prosecutor to “get together, redact [the] discovery,
and give it to [him],” but that never happened. Tyner said that
he had been trying to get the discovery so he could decide
whether to represent himself, but that neither his attorney nor
the prosecutor would meet him “even halfway.” Now, according
to Tyner, he needed the discovery so he could “go over the
evidence” himself to “better assist” in his defense. He said that
Sario was “doing a decent job” but that, because he was Tyner’s
fifth court-appointed attorney, Tyner had not had “continuous
counsel to help [him] come to a really good decision about this.”
Tyner claimed that Sario failed to attend a scheduled video
conference with him and that he believed trial was not scheduled
until September 16. Tyner also claimed he had been trying to get
the discovery from Sario for some time. He said the first time he
asked Sario for a copy of the discovery, Sario responded, “‘I don’t
give discovery. If you want your discovery, go pro per.’” Tyner

5 “Miss-out” refers to a defendant who is in custody before
trial but is not brought to court for a hearing or other proceeding.
(See People v. Howze (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1389.)

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said he decided at that time to represent himself if Sario would
not give him the discovery.
The court found Tyner’s frustration appeared to arise not
from failed plea negotiations, but from his inability to “get [his]
hands on [his] own set of discovery.” The court concluded Tyner’s
request to represent himself was equivocal because it was “not
truly” what he desired. The court made a “special exception” to
allow Tyner to keep his set of the discovery to be able to assist in
his defense.
The third motion. The prosecutor expressed concern the
court’s ruling on Tyner’s second motion could be reversed on
appeal and asked the court to reconsider Tyner’s request to
represent himself after Tyner reviewed the discovery over the
weekend. The prosecutor, however, also argued Tyner’s
statements he did not know trial was beginning in early
September 2022 did not “ring true” because Tyner was in court
and refused to waive time on July 14, 2022, when trial was set for
September 6, 2022. The court agreed to consider a renewed
request for self-representation the following Monday.
Tyner renewed his request the following Monday,
September 12, 2022, and Sario said Tyner was prepared to make
an opening statement and to cross-examine witnesses. The court
expressed concerns with Tyner’s ability to represent himself,
given the limited time he had to prepare, and Tyner said he
understood the disadvantages of self-representation. The court
asked Tyner if he understood he was waiving his right to counsel
and would “be on [his] own” if he chose to represent himself.
Tyner said he did and, after conferring with Sario, Tyner moved
under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 to reassign the case
to another judge because Tyner did not believe he could get a fair

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hearing from Judge Camacho. The court denied the motion as
“extremely untimely.” (See Code Civ. Proc., § 170.6, subd. (a)(2);
Maas v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 962, 973 [in most
instances, “a disqualification motion cannot be presented after
commencement of the trial or hearing”].)
The court said it was prepared to “give in” to Tyner’s
request to represent himself, but asked Tyner if he “truly
desire[d]” to waive his right to counsel and represent himself.
Tyner said, “Yes, I do want to go pro per. But if I need counsel,
I may need aid of counsel. And that will be from a state-
appointed attorney, not someone from the public defender’s office
or the alternate public defender’s office.” The court denied
Tyner’s motion to represent himself as equivocal because it found
Tyner was not certain he wanted to waive his right to counsel.
The court said Tyner was “requesting counsel in the alternative,”
which is “not an unequivocal request for self-representation.”
The court also stated Tyner suggested he was “entitled to standby
counsel or some type of co-counsel, . . . which tells the court that
he still desires representation and is concerned about his
representation in the event he is allowed to proceed in pro per,
which means it is not unequivocal . . . .”
When trial resumed, Sario elected to reserve Tyner’s
opening statement until the defense case. Tyner attempted to
renew his peremptory challenge to Judge Camacho and said he
had a “conflict of interest” with Sario because Sario was not
“doing anything” Tyner asked him to do. After excusing the jury,
the court again denied Tyner’s oral motion under Code of Civil
Procedure section 170.6 and warned Tyner he risked tainting the
jury’s view of him and his right to be present at trial by making
“unsolicited outbursts.” Tyner reiterated he had a conflict of

15
interest with his attorney; the court conducted a hearing under
Marsden and denied Tyner’s (implied) request for a different
court-appointed lawyer.

2. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Under the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, a criminal defendant has a “constitutional right to
conduct his own defense.” (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 836.)
The right to self-representation is independent of the guarantees
of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments “that a person brought
to trial in any state or federal court must be afforded the right to
the assistance of counsel before he can be validly convicted and
punished by imprisonment.” (Id. at p. 807.) However, “the right
of self-representation is not absolute.” (Indiana v. Edwards
(2008) 554 U.S. 164, 171; see People v. Frazier (2024) 16 Cal.5th
814, 850 (Frazier); People v. Butler (2009) 47 Cal.4th 814, 825.)
“When a defendant makes a timely and unequivocal request for
self-representation, and does so knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently, a trial court must grant the defendant’s request.
[Citation.] When a defendant’s motion is untimely, the motion is
‘based on nonconstitutional grounds’ [citation] and it is ‘within
the sound discretion of the trial court to determine whether such
a defendant may dismiss counsel and proceed pro se.’” (People
v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 397 (Thomas); see Frazier, at
p. 852; People v. Johnson (2019) 8 Cal.5th 475, 499 (Johnson);
People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 124, 127-128, 129, fn. 6
(Windham); see also People v. Lawrence (2009) 46 Cal.4th 186,
191-192 [while a timely, unequivocal Faretta motion invokes “the
nondiscretionary right to self-representation,” an untimely
motion for self-representation does not]; People v. Bradford

16
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1365 [if a motion for self-representation
is untimely, “self-representation no longer is a matter of right but
is subject to the trial court’s discretion”].) Requiring defendants
to file timely motions under Faretta “reflects that ‘the
government’s interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of
the trial at times outweighs the defendant’s interest in acting as
his own lawyer.’” (Johnson, at p. 499; see People v. Lynch (2010)
50 Cal.4th 693, 722 (Lynch) [“the purpose of the requirement is
‘to prevent the defendant from misusing the motion to
unjustifiably delay trial or obstruct the orderly administration of
justice’”], overruled on another ground in People v. McKinnon
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 636-643.)
A “‘Faretta motion is timely if it is made “within a
reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial.”’” (Thomas,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 397; see Johnson, supra, 8 Cal.5th at
p. 499.) In determining whether such a motion is timely, “a trial
court may consider the totality of the circumstances,” including
“‘not only the time between the motion and the scheduled trial
date, but also such factors as whether trial counsel is ready to
proceed to trial, the number of witnesses and the reluctance or
availability of crucial trial witnesses, the complexity of the case,
any ongoing pretrial proceedings, and whether the defendant had
earlier opportunities to assert his right of self-representation.’”
(Johnson, at p. 500; see Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 726.) In
general, “motions ‘“made on the eve of trial”’” are untimely
(Thomas, at p. 397; see Johnson, at pp. 499-500), “‘extreme,’” and
“disfavored” (People v. Powell (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1277;
see Lynch, at pp. 722-723).
The California Supreme Court in Windham prescribed the
factors the trial court should consider in ruling on an untimely

17
motion for self-representation. Those factors include the
defendant’s reasons for the request, the quality of counsel’s
representation of the defendant, the defendant’s prior proclivity
to substitute counsel, the length and stage of the proceedings,
and the disruption or delay granting the motion might reasonably
cause. (Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at pp. 128-129; accord,
Frazier, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 852; Thomas, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 399.) The trial court need not explicitly consider all the
factors, so long as the record contains sufficient evidence to
support their implicit consideration. (People v. Bradford (2010)
187 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1354; see People v. Marshall (1996)
13 Cal.4th 799, 828 [trial court did not abuse its discretion where
the record reflected the court’s “explicit or implicit consideration
of each of the . . . Windham factors”]; Windham, at p. 129, fn. 6
[order denying a motion for self-representation based on
nonconstitutional grounds need only “afford[ ] an adequate basis
on which to determine the merits of a claim that the ruling was
an abuse of discretion”].) The trial court may also consider
whether the defendant would need a continuance. (Windham,
p. 128, fn. 5.) “‘If the motion is untimely . . . the defendant has
the burden of justifying the delay.’” (People v. Valdez (2004)
32 Cal.4th 73, 102 (Valdez); see People v. Horton (1995)
11 Cal.4th 1068, 1110; Windham, at p. 128, fn. 5 [defendant must
make “some showing of reasonable cause for the lateness of the
request”].) “Because the right to counsel is self-executing and
persists unless the defendant affirmatively waives the right, the
court must indulge every reasonable inference against such a
waiver.” (People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 703; see People v.
Burgener (2016) 1 Cal.5th 461, 471.)

18
The Supreme Court has not articulated the standard of
review for determining whether a defendant’s request for self-
representation is timely. (See Johnson, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 501
[“We did not articulate in Lynch what standard a reviewing court
should apply in determining whether a defendant’s request for
self-representation is timely.”].) Tyner argues our review should
be de novo, but he cites a case where the defendant’s request was
admittedly timely. (See People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913,
932.) The People do not take a position on the standard of
review. Under any standard, however, Tyner’s request was
untimely. We review for abuse of discretion the trial court’s order
denying Tyner’s untimely (and thus nonconstitutional) motion for
self-representation. (Thomas, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 399.)

3. All Three Motions Were Untimely
Tyner asserts that his first motion was timely because “it
was made before the jury selection” and that he made it at “the
first available opportunity [he] had for making such a motion in
front of the trial judge.” The first assertion is contrary to
California law; the second is factually inaccurate and legally
irrelevant.
To support his first assertion, Tyner cites Avila v. Roe
(9th Cir. 2002) 298 F.3d 750 and People v. Herrera (1980)
104 Cal.App.3d 167 for the proposition his first motion was
timely because he made it before jury selection. Neither case
supports Tyner. In Avila the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit stated, “In this circuit, a Faretta request is
timely if made before jury impanelment, ‘unless it is shown to be
a tactic to secure delay.’” (Avila, at p. 753.) But that is not the
law in California. In Johnson, supra, 8 Cal.5th 475 the

19
California Supreme Court acknowledged that “most federal
courts have concluded that a Faretta motion is timely as a matter
of law if it is made before trial, unless the motion is made for the
purpose of delay,” but the Supreme Court in Johnson rejected any
such “bright-line rule” for California, observing many states have
adopted a timeliness test consistent with Lynch. (Johnson, at
p. 502; see Avila, at p. 753, fn. 3 [acknowledging the “California
Supreme Court has articulated a different rule: under California
law, a Faretta motion is considered timely if made a reasonable
time before trial”].) Under Lynch, as stated, the trial court
considers the totality of the circumstances in determining
whether a Faretta motion is timely. (See Johnson, at p. 500;
Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 726.) The Supreme Court in
Johnson also observed California cases have held “‘on numerous
occasions that Faretta motions made on the eve of trial are
untimely.’” (Johnson, at pp. 499-500 [citing five Supreme Court
cases, including Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 102 (“Faretta
motion made ‘moments before jury selection was set to begin”’
was untimely) and People v. Horton, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1110
(Faretta motion made on the date scheduled for trial was
untimely)].) In Herrera, the other case Tyner cites, the
defendant’s motion, made the morning of trial, did not, unlike
Tyner’s motion, include a request to continue the trial. (See
Herrera, at pp. 174-175.) And Herrera predated by several
decades the California Supreme Court’s more recent decisions
addressing the timeliness of Faretta motions.
Tyner did not make his first motion in a reasonable time
before the scheduled trial date. Indeed, prospective jurors were
waiting in the hallway. (See Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 102
[Faretta motion was untimely where the defendant asserted his

20
right to represent himself on the verge of jury selection].) In
addition, counsel were ready to proceed with the trial, the case
was scheduled to last two to three weeks and include numerous
witnesses, and Tyner had many earlier opportunities to assert his
right to self-representation. (See Johnson, supra, 8 Cal.5th at
p. 500; Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 726.) And Tyner requested
a continuance to prepare for trial. (See Johnson, at p. 501
[defendant’s statement he needed “‘considerable time’” to prepare
for trial supported the trial court’s ruling the defendant’s Faretta
motion was untimely].) Under these circumstances, the trial
court did not err in ruling Tyner’s first motion was untimely.
Regarding Tyner’s second assertion (on his first motion),
Tyner had numerous opportunities to assert his right to self-
representation before the first day of trial. Tyner first appeared
with Sario as appointed counsel on June 1, 2021, over 15 months
before the trial began. Tyner admitted Sario told him to “‘go
pro per’” the first time Tyner asked Sario for a copy of the
discovery, which had to have been before the pretrial hearing on
September 30, 2021, when Tyner told Judge Sortino he had asked
Sario for the discovery. That was almost a year before Tyner
asked to represent himself. Moreover, as early as July 14, 2022
Tyner knew trial was scheduled to begin on September 6, 2022.
Although the July 14, 2022 hearing was before Judge Sortino,
Tyner previously appeared before Judge Camacho on April 13,
2022, when the court scheduled trial to begin by the end of July
2022. And nothing prevented Tyner from asserting his right
before Judge Sortino or any judge other than the eventual trial
judge. (See Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 102 [defendant could
have made a valid Faretta motion to the judge presiding over a
pretrial conference]; People v. Stringer (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 974,

21
991 [Faretta motion was untimely where, among other reasons,
the defendant did not make a request to represent himself “at
any of the many pretrial proceedings he attended”]; see also
People v. Wycoff (2021) 12 Cal.5th 58, 78 [judge presiding over
pretrial proceedings granted the defendant’s motion under
Faretta].)
Regarding Tyner’s second motion, Tyner argues it was
timely because he told the court he no longer needed a trial
continuance. But in Thomas, supra, 14 Cal.5th 327 the Supreme
Court stated, “We have repeatedly held that a Faretta motion
made on the eve of trial . . . is untimely, without regard to
whether the defendant requested a continuance.” (Id. at p. 398;
see People v. Bloom (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1008, 1057 [rejecting the
argument that “even a belated [Faretta] request must be granted
unless it would entail undue delay or interfere with the orderly
administration of justice”].) And, as discussed, the totality of
circumstances supported the trial court’s ruling Tyner’s second
motion was untimely.
Finally, in denying Tyner’s third motion, the trial court did
not make a finding it was untimely; the court instead denied the
motion because it was not unequivocal. The record, however,
establishes Tyner’s third request was also untimely for the same
reasons the first two motions were untimely. (See Lynch, supra,
50 Cal.4th at p. 728 [two Faretta motions made three weeks apart
were both untimely]; see also People v. Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th
at p. 703 [a reviewing court may affirm a ruling denying
defendant’s Faretta motion where the motion was properly denied
on any ground].)

22
4. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Denying Tyner’s Untimely Requests
To Represent Himself
Because all of Tyner’s motions to represent himself were
untimely, we determine only whether the trial court abused its
discretion in denying them. (See Frazier, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 852; Thomas, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 397.) It did not.
In denying Tyner’s first motion to represent himself the
trial court found that Tyner was seeking to delay the trial, that
he could have asserted his right to self-representation earlier,
and that Sario was a capable advocate. The court also considered
whether Tyner had made a Faretta or Marsden motion in the
past (he had not) and whether Tyner requested a continuance to
prepare for trial (he did). Tyner said he did not ask to represent
himself earlier because he did not know his trial was beginning
that day, which, as discussed, was contrary to evidence Tyner
knew the trial was going to begin September 12, 2022 at the
latest. Tyner faults the trial court for failing to acknowledge it
had discretion to grant Tyner’s request even if the request was
untimely. But the trial court considered all the Windham factors
(with the possible exception of the length of the proceedings,
which the court had acknowledged earlier that morning was two
to three weeks). Thus, the record supports the trial court’s
explicit or implicit consideration of the Windham factors. (See
People v. Marshall, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 828; Windham, supra,
19 Cal.3d at p. 129, fn. 6.)
In denying Tyner’s second motion the trial court
acknowledged it had discretion to grant Tyner’s motion despite
its untimeliness. Considering the reason for Tyner’s request, the
court found it arose from frustration stemming from Tyner’s

23
inability to get a copy of the discovery. Rather than address that
justification (which the record supports), Tyner argues the trial
court improperly considered several other factors, such as Tyner’s
frustration from failed plea negotiations and his limited access to
electronic discovery and other resources while in custody. But
those were not the bases for the court’s decision. A court may
deny a “motion for self-representation made in passing anger or
frustration.” (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 23; see
People v. Burgener, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 471.) The court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Tyner’s untimely (second) motion
based on his frustration in not getting access to the discovery.
In denying Tyner’s third motion the trial court found
Tyner’s request was equivocal because Tyner suggested he might
need co-counsel or standby counsel. Tyner argues the trial court
abused its discretion in failing to exercise its discretion to appoint
standby counsel. That argument relies on a court’s obligation in
a capital case (which this is not) to consider a defendant’s request
for standby or advisory counsel after the court has granted a
request for self-representation. (See People v. Bigelow (1984)
37 Cal.3d 731, 745-746 [self-represented defendant in a capital
case is entitled to “a conscientious exercise of judicial discretion
on the appointment of advisory counsel”]; People v. Garcia (2000)
78 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1428-1431 [trial court has the option to
appoint advisory counsel in noncapital cases, but its ruling is not
subject to appellate review; the trial court cannot abuse its
discretion in denying a request for advisory counsel in noncapital
case].) Windham and its progeny do not require a trial court, in
exercising its discretion on a motion for self-representation in a
non-capital case, to consider whether it might grant a future
request for advisory counsel. As Windham requires, the trial

24
court considered Tyner’s reasons for his request and found,
within its discretion, Tyner did not truly want to represent
himself.
Moreover, during the hearing on Tyner’s third motion
Tyner also moved twice under Code of Civil Procedure
section 170.6 to assign his case to another judge and stated he
had a conflict of interest with his attorney. Those actions and
statements further support the trial court’s ruling denying
Tyner’s request as equivocal and as an attempt to disrupt or
delay the proceedings. (See Frazier, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 852
[trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying an untimely
motion for self-representation where the defendant intermingled
Faretta and Marsden motions]; People v. Stanley, supra,
39 Cal.4th at p. 933 [interposed requests for self-representation
and Marsden motions made “out of apparent annoyance or
frustration” did not demonstrate unequivocal request for self-
representation].)
Tyner also argues the trial court infringed on his right to
counsel by attempting to condition approval of his request on his
agreement to waive his right to appeal. Tyner cites no support
for this contention and, in any event, the court did not deny
Tyner’s request because he would not agree to waive his
appellate rights.

B. Tyner Has Not Shown His Counsel Provided
Ineffective Assistance

1. Applicable Law
“To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a
criminal defendant must establish both that his or her counsel’s

25
performance was deficient and that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. [Citation.] The deficient performance
component of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires a
showing that ‘counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness’ under prevailing professional norms.
[Citation.] ‘Unless a defendant establishes the contrary, we shall
presume that “counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of
professional competence and that counsel’s actions and inactions
can be explained as a matter of sound trial strategy.”’” (People v.
Ramirez (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 175, 211-212 (Ramirez); see
Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland);
People v. Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 125.)
“On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for
ineffective assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses
counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or
omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide
one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation. All
other claims of ineffective assistance are more appropriately
resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (People v. Mai (2013)
57 Cal.4th 986, 1009; see Ramirez, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at
p. 212.) “[W]e begin with the presumption that counsel’s actions
fall within the broad range of reasonableness, and afford ‘great
deference to counsel’s tactical decisions.’ [Citation.] Accordingly,
we have characterized [a] defendant’s burden as ‘difficult to carry
on direct appeal,’ as a reviewing court will reverse a conviction
based on ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if
there is affirmative evidence that counsel had ‘“‘no rational
tactical purpose’”’ for an action or omission.” (People v. Mickel
(2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198; Ramirez, at p. 212.)

26
“Regarding prejudice, ‘[t]he defendant must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.’ [Citation.] ‘A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’
[Citation.] ‘A defendant must prove prejudice that is a
“‘demonstrable reality,’ not simply speculation.”’” (Ramirez,
supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 212; see Strickland, supra, 466 U.S.
at p. 694; People v. Bell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 125.) “Whether
counsel’s performance was deficient, and whether any deficiency
prejudiced defendant, are mixed questions of law and fact subject
to our independent review.” (In re Gay (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1059,
1073; see In re Thomas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1249, 1256.)

2. Counsel for Tyner Did Not Provide Ineffective
Assistance by Failing To Present Evidence
Supporting a Theory of Voluntary
Manslaughter or Second Degree Murder

a. Relevant Proceedings
The court discussed jury instructions with counsel several
times during trial. Regarding instructions for the lesser included
offense of voluntary manslaughter, the court stated the nature of
the wounds inflicted on Wall were “consistent with an act of rage
and uncontrollable behavior.” Sario agreed and asked for a
voluntary manslaughter instruction. The prosecutor conceded
there was evidence of “rage” and “anger,” but he argued there
was “not a single, itsy-bitsy, teeny bit” of evidence of provocation.
Instead, the prosecutor stated, Tyner said that he was not at
Wall’s apartment when she was killed and that he and Wall got

27
along well. The court said it “tend[ed] to agree” with the
prosecutor that there had to be some evidence of provocation
beyond the nature of the offense and the choice of weapon (i.e., a
“readily available” item inside the apartment, which “detracts
from a premeditated type of decision”) and that there was no such
evidence in the trial so far. The court said it would return to the
issue after all the evidence had been received. The court
similarly postponed considering whether to give CALCRIM
No. 522 on the effect of provocation on the degree of murder until
the end of the evidentiary portion of the trial.
After the People indicated they were ready to rest their
case and Tyner decided against testifying, the court stated it had
“eliminated any reference to voluntary manslaughter as a lesser
offense” from the jury instructions. The court explained “there is
zero evidence of adequate provocation to invoke sufficient heat of
passion necessary to negate malice.” The court stated it also
eliminated any reference to provocation that could reduce first
degree murder to second degree murder.
During closing argument Sario argued Tyner was not at
Wall’s apartment when she was murdered and was “not
responsible” for Wall’s murder. Sario also characterized Wall’s
murder as a “crime of passion” committed without careful
consideration or premeditation. But he never argued Tyner was
provoked into killing Wall. Instead, Sario argued the People
provided no evidence of motive, which tended to show Tyner was
not guilty.
After the verdict Tyner retained new counsel, who filed a
motion for a new trial. Tyner argued Sario provided ineffective
assistance by failing to present evidence that would have
required the trial court to instruct the jury on voluntary

28
manslaughter. In particular, Tyner argued Sario should have
called as witnesses Robert Cobos and Eli Shapiro, two of Wall’s
neighbors the police interviewed after the murder. Cobos told
police he heard a “loud commotion” coming from Wall’s
apartment at approximately 7:05 p.m. on Sunday, March 17,
2019. He described the commotion as “furniture and bodies
hitting the wall.” The only words he heard were from a female
voice saying, “I love you.” He said he could hear another voice,
but he could not tell if it was a male or female voice. Shapiro told
police he “frequently” heard loud noises coming from Wall’s
apartment. He said he heard “loud talking from a male and a
female” at about 11:00 p.m. on March 17, 2019. He said that the
loud talking continued after midnight, when he fell asleep, and
that he did not hear anything else until the smoke alarm sounded
the next morning.
The People opposed the motion for a new trial and argued
Sario’s decisions not to call Cobos and Shapiro were tactical or
unavoidable. Regarding Cobos’s potential testimony, the People
pointed out Cobos could not have heard a woman’s voice on
Sunday, March 17, 2019 because Wall was killed on Saturday,
March 16, 2019. The People also argued Cobos’s statement he
heard a woman say “I love you” implicated Tyner, who was Wall’s
boyfriend at the time she was killed.6 Thus, the People argued,
Sario’s decision not to call Cobos as a defense witness was a “wise
tactical decision.” The People also said they did not call Cobos as
a prosecution witness because they could not locate him at the

6 The People’s opposition to the motion for a new trial
included Cobos’s testimony from Tyner’s preliminary hearing
that he heard a woman say, “I still love you” instead of simply,
“I love you.”

29
time of trial. Regarding Shapiro, the People argued he also
mistakenly told the police that he heard noises in Wall’s
apartment on March 17, 2019 instead of March 16 and that he
might have heard the television or Tyner talking on the phone on
the night of March 17. Either way, the People argued, Sario’s
decision not to call Shapiro was reasonable.7 The trial court
denied Tyner’s motion for a new trial.

b. Tyner Cannot Show There Was No
Satisfactory Explanation for Sario’s
Decisions
Tyner argues “[n]o sound trial strategy existed to justify”
Sario’s decisions not to present the statements or testimony of
Cobos and Shapiro, “especially in light of counsel’s argument to
the jury that this was a crime of passion and not a deliberate and
premeditated murder.” Tyner contends, as he did in the trial
court, evidence from Cobos and Shapiro would have required the
trial court to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter and
with CALCRIM No. 522 on the effect of provocation on the degree
of murder. The People argue Sario’s decision not to present
evidence to support a theory of voluntary manslaughter or second
degree murder was rational because those theories contradicted
Tyner’s statements to police that he was not in Wall’s apartment
when she was killed and that he did not kill Wall. Tyner

7 The People stated they did not call Shapiro as a prosecution
witness because he was 86 years old at the time of the trial in
2022 and he told a deputy district attorney he would not go to
court and risk getting COVID. Shapiro also said he would not
comply with a subpoena. Thus, the People argued, Shapiro was
unavailable to testify.

30
contends Sario could have argued Tyner killed Wall in the heat of
passion or with provocation “without undermining Tyner’s
statements to police that he did not commit the crimes.”
Choosing not to present the jury with contradictory
theories of events is a rational tactical decision. (See, e.g., People
v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 643 [defense counsel had a
rational tactical reason for not requesting an instruction on
intoxication, which would have negated the defendant’s specific
intent to kill, when defendant said he intended only to scare the
victim when he shot her]; People v. Diaz (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th
1172, 1181-1182 [defense counsel had a rational tactical reason
for not requesting an instruction on provocation, where the
defendant’s theory was misidentification]; People v. Windfield
(2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 496, 520-521 [defense counsel had a
rational tactical reason for not requesting an instruction on
provocation, where the defendant’s theory was that “someone else
may have shot” the victim]; People v. Olivas (2016)
248 Cal.App.4th 758, 771 [defense counsel had a rational tactical
reason for not requesting an instruction on intoxication in
connection with charge for sexual misconduct, where “the
primary defense theory was that no misconduct occurred”].)
Thus, there is a satisfactory explanation for Sario’s decision not
to call Cobos or Shapiro as a defense witness (or otherwise to
attempt to introduce their statements to police or Cobos’s
preliminary hearing testimony). To be provoked, Tyner had to be
in Wall’s apartment and had to be provoked into killing her. His
defense was that the People failed to prove he was there and
that, even if he was there, the People failed to show he had any
motive to kill Wall. Sario could have presented evidence from
Cobos and Shapiro and argued the evidence supported voluntary

31
manslaughter or second degree murder, but “to do so risk[ed]
incredulity from jurors.” (Diaz, at p. 1182.)8
Moreover, introducing testimony from Cobos that Wall told
Tyner just before her death she loved him could have backfired
by making Tyner out to be a ruthless and heartless killer. (See
People v. Diaz, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 1182 [defense counsel
rationally avoided testimony that “could spark jury
indignation”].) And Shapiro’s statement he heard “loud talking”
on March 17 (or March 16) was unremarkable in light of his
statement he “frequently” heard loud noises coming from Wall’s
apartment. Thus, Sario had a rational tactical reason for not
presenting evidence from Cobos and Shapiro that would
contradict Tyner’s version of events.

3. Sario’s Failures To Object to the Prosecution’s
Closing Argument Does Not Demonstrate
Ineffective Assistance on Direct Appeal

a. Relevant Proceedings
Tyner argues the prosecutor committed prosecutorial
misconduct by appealing to the jury’s sympathies and by
referring to Tyner’s demeanor in closing arguments. First, Tyner
contends the prosecutor appealed to the emotions and passions of
the jury by “sobbing or crying” during closing argument and by
reciting song lyrics that encouraged the jury to view the murder

8 Because Sario’s performance was not deficient, we do not
consider whether hypothetical testimony from Cobos and Shapiro
that reiterated their statements to police would have required the
court to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter or
provocation under CALCRIM No. 522.

32
through the eyes of the victim. The prosecutor said Wall “didn’t
die in silence. She still speaks to us.” The prosecutor said he
couldn’t help thinking about Wall and remarked, when he
became tearful, “I’m not doing this intentionally.”9 The
prosecutor then quoted lyrics from the song “Goner” by
Twenty One Pilots, which the prosecutor said he heard in his car
the day before. The prosecutor said: “The song has words that
tied in with this case . . . . It starts out with saying ‘I’m a goner.’
I didn’t know Ronnie [Wall]. ‘I’m a goner. Somebody catch my
breath. I’m a goner. Somebody catch my breath. I want to be
known by you. I want to be known by you.’ The chorus reads,
‘and though I’m weak and beaten down, I will slip away into the
sand. The ghost of you is close to me. I’m inside out. You’re
underneath.’ Second verse. ‘I’ve got two faces, blurry is the one
I’m not.’ This is not who she is. This is who she is. ‘I’ve got two
faces, blurry is the one I’m not. I need your help to take him out.
I need your help to take him out. Don’t let me be gone. Don’t let
me be gone.’” The prosecutor then said this case is about “justice
for Ronnie and your understanding down in your soul that you
have knowledge and evidence to believe that [Tyner] is guilty
beyond any doubt.” Sario did not object.
Second, Tyner argues the prosecutor impermissibly
commented on Tyner’s demeanor in the jury’s presence. During
his closing argument the prosecutor said, “People have dark
sides.” He read from a transcript of Tyner’s police interview

9 In their opposition to Tyner’s motion for a new trial the
People stated the prosecutor “teared up and was unable to speak
for a moment,” but he did not sob or cry. The trial transcript does
not indicate whether the prosecutor sobbed, cried, or simply
teared up.

33
where a police officer said, in an apparent attempt to “rile up”
Tyner, “‘You’re just a bootie call, dude.’” Tyner told the officer, “‘I
wasn’t a bootie call. She didn’t dump me. She wasn’t breaking
up with me. She’s a 60-year-old woman.’” The prosecutor told
the jury: “When that issue came up in court, [Tyner] laughed.
Now, pause for a second. Think about that for a moment. . . . He
is the defendant in the case with the context [Wall] was badly
murdered. . . . You’re here to judge the evidence in the case, and
in court he laughs. There is a dark side. . . . He does not like
being disrespected. That gives you some insight into motive.”
Again, Sario did not object.

b. Sario’s Failures To Object Did Not
Render His Assistance Ineffective
A prosecutor may not use arguments giving the jury the
impression that “emotion may reign over reason” or inviting an
“irrational, purely subjective response.” (People v. Leon (2015)
61 Cal.4th 569, 605-606, internal quotation marks omitted; see
People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1210.) “‘As a general
rule, a prosecutor may not invite the jury to view the case
through the victim’s eyes, because to do so appeals to the jury’s
sympathy for the victim.’ It is also improper to ask jurors to
imagine the victim’s thoughts during the last seconds of life.”
(Leon, at p. 606; see People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370,
1406-1407.) A prosecutor also “may not comment on a
defendant’s demeanor or behavior during the guilt phase [of a
capital trial] unless it is to tell the jury to ignore a defendant’s
demeanor or behavior.” (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th
1186, 1223; see People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 434.) At
least one court has called the use of such comments “imprudent”

34
in a non-capital trial. (People v. Vance (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th
1182, 1201.)
Failing to object to improper arguments, however, “‘rarely
constitutes constitutionally ineffective legal representation.’”
(People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 207; see People v. Ramirez
(2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 48, 58.) “‘[D]eciding whether to object is
inherently tactical, and the failure to object will rarely establish
ineffective assistance.’” (People v. Ramirez, at p. 58; see People
v. Arredondo (2019) 8 Cal.5th 694, 711.) And, as stated, courts on
direct appeal regularly reject claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel based on failing to object where the record sheds no light
on why trial counsel for the defendant did not object or request
an admonition. (See People v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 514.)
The record does not disclose why Sario did not object to the
prosecutor’s arguably improper comments and conduct. Tyner’s
motion for a new trial included a declaration from Sario, but it
stated only that (but not why) Sario did not object when the
prosecutor quoted the song lyrics and (in Sario’s words) “began
openly crying in front of the jury.” But Sario reasonably could
have concluded that objecting to the prosecutor’s arguments
would draw “undue attention” to them. (People v. Ramirez,
supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 61; see ibid. [no ineffective assistance
of counsel where counsel’s failure to object could be explained as
a tactical decision not to draw the jurors’ attention to comments
by the prosecutor]; see also People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th
175, 206 [“counsel could have preferred not to draw the jurors’
attention to particular comments by the prosecutor by objecting
to them”].) We will not assume on direct appeal Sario’s failure to
object to the prosecution’s arguments rendered his assistance
ineffective. (See People v. Ramirez, at p. 61.)

35
But even if Sario’s performance was deficient, Tyner has
not established prejudice. Tyner argues that the prosecutor
“used Tyner’s courtroom demeanor to portray him as having a
‘dark side’ and seeing himself as more than the victim and
therefore having a motive to kill” Wall and that “quoting
emotional song lyrics while crying or sobbing before the jury and
urging the jurors to give justice to the victim” compounded the
prejudice. But the evidence against Tyner was overwhelming.
Granted, the evidence was circumstantial, but it consisted of
surveillance video and cell phone data showing Tyner with Wall
at or near her apartment building throughout the weekend of
March 16-17, 2019, DNA evidence showing Tyner handled the
murder weapon, evidence showing Wall had Tyner’s DNA under
her fingernails, Tyner’s bloodied white jeans among the materials
used to start a fire, statements from residents of Tyner’s group
home undermining his alibi, multiple inconsistent statements
concerning where Tyner was that weekend and the source of his
injuries, and the location of Wall’s stolen car. There is no
reasonable probability that, but for the prosecutor’s quotes from
“Goner” and statements about Tyner’s “dark side” (admittedly
somewhat questionable conduct by a prosecutor), the result of the
trial would have been different. (See People v. Delgado (2013)
56 Cal.4th 480, 484 [strong circumstantial evidence precluded
finding of prejudice]; People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 699
[given “strong circumstantial evidence” and “the inherent
implausibility of much of defendant’s version of events” there was
no substantial probability the trial outcome was affected].)
Tyner contends his case was not “open and shut” because
the jury asked to see his military discharge records showing he
was discharged for being absent without leave. Tyner introduced

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those records to rebut testimony from a witness that Tyner was
discharged for throwing a person out a window. Tyner does not
explain, however, how the jury’s interest in records showing a
nonviolent reason for his discharge undermined the strength of
the evidence against him.10

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

STONE, J.

10 Because the trial court did not err in denying Tyner’s
motions to represent himself and Tyner has not demonstrated
ineffective assistance of counsel, we do not consider Tyner’s
argument the cumulative effect of the alleged errors resulted in a
miscarriage of justice or denied him a fair trial.

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