CourtListener 10310595•People v. Willis CA2/2
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Filed 1/8/25 P. v. Willis CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B325337
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA020235)
v.
RYAN O’NEAL WILLIS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Michael D. Carter, Judge. Affirmed.
Verna Wefald, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Ivan Ivri and Yun K. Lee, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
Appellant Ryan O’Neal Willis appeals the summary denial
of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6
(former 1170.95, Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10).1 The jury instructions
and the jury’s true findings on two special circumstances show
that appellant is ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
A. The underlying crime2
Appellant was abusive toward taxicab driver Crystal Stahl
(Stahl), with whom he lived for some time. During one fight,
appellant hit Stahl repeatedly while he told her, “You’re never
going to leave me.” Stahl broke up with him and started dating
someone new. Shortly thereafter, appellant attacked her, and
she called the police, resulting in appellant’s arrest.
Stahl moved in with her new boyfriend.
Appellant told his friends he was angry that Stahl had put
him in jail and that she was dating a new man. He stated that
he was going to kill her, and more specifically, that he would
burn her in the taxi she drove and flee to Las Vegas. On
January 5, 2000, appellant called the cab service and requested
that Stahl pick him up at a gas station. Stahl obliged. Soon
thereafter, she was found dead, having been burned alive in her
taxicab a mile and a half from where she had picked up
appellant.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 This summary is drawn from the opinion in the direct
appeal, People v. Willis (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 379 (Willis).
2
B. Conviction and appeal
On June 27, 2002, a jury convicted appellant of first degree
murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), and found true the special circumstance
allegations that he committed the murder by lying in wait
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)) and that the murder was intentional and
involved the infliction of torture (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18)). The trial
court sentenced appellant to life without the possibility of parole.
In his direct appeal from the conviction, appellant argued
that the trial court erred in admitting unreliable evidence of dog
scent identifications. (Willis, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th 379.) This
court agreed, but found the error harmless and affirmed. (Id. at
p. 380.)
II. Procedural Background
On February 4, 2022, appellant filed a petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6. After the court appointed
counsel for appellant, the People filed an opposition, and
appellant filed a brief in support of his petition.
At the November 4, 2022 hearing the superior court
summarily denied appellant’s petition, explaining, “Based on this
court’s view of . . . what was presented to the jury, which the
court can review as far as the jury instructions are concerned[,]
even at the prima facie stage and not going into the facts drawn
from the appellate opinion, but simply going off what the charges
are and what the jury’s finding was, this court finds that the
petitioner has not made a prima facie case; and that, as a matter
of law, the petitioner does not qualify” for relief under section
1172.6.
DISCUSSION
Enacted in 2018, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg.
Sess.) effectively abolished the natural and probable
3
consequences doctrine in cases of murder and limited the
application of the felony-murder doctrine. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015,
§ 1, subd. (f); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).)
The legislation also served to eliminate murder convictions
premised on any theory of imputed malice—that is, any theory by
which a person can be convicted of murder for a killing committed
by someone else, such as felony murder or the natural and
probable consequences doctrine—unless the People also prove
that the nonkiller defendant personally acted with the intent to
kill or was a major participant who acted with reckless disregard
to human life. (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3) & 189, subd. (e).) Specifically,
the Legislature amended section 188 to require that when the
felony-murder rule does not apply, a principal in the crime of
murder “shall act with malice aforethought” and “[m]alice shall
not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); People v. Gentile
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843 (Gentile).)
Section 1172.6 is the procedural vehicle by which a
defendant convicted of murder may seek to vacate the conviction
on the ground that it rested on a now-invalid theory that imputes
malice to a defendant who was not the actual killer (rather than
requiring a showing that the defendant personally harbored the
requisite malice). (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) A trial court may
summarily deny an 1172.6 petition—that is, deny it without
holding an evidentiary hearing—only if the defendant is
“ineligible for relief at the prima facie stage as a matter of law”
because it is not possible that the jury’s verdict could rest on any
theory of imputed malice invalidated by Senate Bill No. 1473.
(People v. Estrada (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 328, 338; accord,
People v. Lovejoy (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 860, 867.) We review
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the trial court’s summary denial of a petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6 de novo. (People v. Allen (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 389, 395.)
Based on the jury’s true findings on the lying-in-wait and
torture-murder special circumstances in this case, it is not
possible that the jury’s verdict rested on any theory of imputed
malice. In order to find either of these special circumstances
true, the jury was instructed that it must find appellant
personally harbored an intent to kill. (People v. Flinner (2020) 10
Cal.5th 686, 748 (Flinner) [lying-in-wait special circumstance
requires intent to kill, unlike lying-in-wait murder]; People v.
Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 246 [same]; People v. Jennings
(2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 647 (Jennings) [torture-murder special
circumstance requires an intent to kill, unlike murder by
torture]; People v. Superior Court (Riverside) (2023) 88
Cal.App.5th 26, 32–33 [same].) The jury’s special circumstance
findings thus preclude relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of
law. The summary denial of appellant’s resentencing petition
was appropriate.
Appellant relies on People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433
(Curiel) to argue that these true findings do not necessarily
render him ineligible for relief under section 1172.6. Curiel held
that a jury’s true finding on a gang-murder special circumstance,
which required an intent to kill, did not make the defendant
ineligible for relief as a matter of law because it did not
“conclusively establish[] every element” of a still-valid theory of
murder. The remaining record of conviction also did not
demonstrate ineligibility for relief, because the jury was
instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine
5
and was not required to state the theory of murder liability on
which its conviction was based. (Id. at pp. 462–463, 468.)
Unlike the gang-murder special circumstance at issue in
Curiel, however, the murder-by-lying-in-wait special
circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)) requires all the elements of
the still-valid theory of murder (§ 189, subd. (a)), plus the intent
to kill. (People v. Parker (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1, 58, Flinner, supra,
10 Cal.5th at p. 748; People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083,
1148–1149.) The same goes for the torture-murder special
circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18)). (Jennings, supra, 50
Cal.4th at p. 647 [“the torture-murder special circumstance
requires (1) proof of first degree murder, (2) proof that the
defendant intended to kill and torture the victim, and (3) proof of
the infliction of an extremely painful act upon a living victim”].)
Moreover, the jury in this case was not instructed on any
theory of liability for murder that allowed malice to be imputed to
appellant: There was no instruction on a felony-murder theory,
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or, for that
matter, any “target” offense other than murder.3 (Cf. Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 466 [jury was instructed on target offenses
of “disturbing the peace and carrying a concealed firearm by a
gang member”].) The absence of such instructions, which
appellant does not dispute, further precludes the possibility that
the jury’s conviction rested on a theory of imputed malice.
(People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52 [“if the record
shows that the jury was not instructed on either the natural and
probable consequences or felony-murder doctrines, then the
petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law”]; see People v.
3 Although appellant was charged with robbery and
kidnapping, the jury was not instructed on those crimes.
6
Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 599 [“if the jury did not receive
an instruction on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, [it] could not have convicted the defendant on that
basis”].)
Appellant cites People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972
(Langi) to argue that aiding and abetting instructions may
sometimes permit a jury to impute malice to a defendant. In
Langi, the defendant was convicted of second degree murder as
an aider and abettor based on his participation in a fistfight
among several people, in which the victim died as a result of
falling and hitting the back of his head on the pavement after
being punched in the face. (Id. at pp. 975, 976–977.) On appeal
from the summary denial of defendant’s section 1172.6 petition,
the Langi court determined that the instruction on aiding and
abetting (CALJIC No. 3.01) creates an ambiguity in the context of
second degree implied-malice murder, which may allow the jury
to “find the defendant guilty of aiding and abetting second degree
murder without finding that he personally acted with malice.”
(Langi, at p. 982.)
Langi has no application to the instant case for the simple
reason that appellant’s jury did not receive instructions on second
degree murder (CALJIC No. 8.31), so the ambiguity that might
have led Langi’s jury to impute malice is not present. Indeed, as
explained above, appellant’s jury necessarily found that he
personally harbored the intent to kill when it found true the
lying-in-wait and torture-murder special circumstances; it did not
impute malice to appellant under any theory.
Nevertheless, appellant asserts that the instructions given
on aiding and abetting, paired with those on “unjoined
perpetrators of same crime” (CALJIC No. 2.11.5) and malice
7
aforethought (which defines both express and implied malice)
(CALJIC No. 8.11), left room for the jury to impute malice to
appellant. We are not persuaded.
The unjoined perpetrator instruction informed the jury that
“[t]here has been evidence in this case indicating that a person
other than defendant . . . may have been involved in the crime for
which the defendant is on trial,” but admonished the jury “not
[to] discuss or give any consideration as to why the other person
is not being prosecuted,” and went on to remind the jury that its
sole “duty is to decide whether the People have proved the guilt of
the defendant on trial.” Nothing in this instruction, the aiding
and abetting instruction, or the malice aforethought instruction
permitted the jury to impute malice to appellant, and appellant
fails to explain how the combination of these instructions allowed
the jury to convict him on a now-invalid theory of murder.
(Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 848 [“Senate Bill 1437 does not
eliminate direct aiding and abetting liability for murder because
a direct aider and abettor to murder must possess malice
aforethought”], citing People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111,
1118; People v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 953; People v.
Carr (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 136, 139 [“Implied malice is not
imputed malice”].)
Finally, although the superior court stated its intention to
soon “file a written decision with the parties,” it never did so.
Appellant contends that the court’s ruling from the bench was too
vague to meet the requirement that the court “provide a
statement fully setting forth its reasons” for denying the petition
(§ 1172.6, subd. (c)). But he fails to explain how these purported
shortcomings prejudiced him. We therefore deem this argument
waived. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.)
8
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
LUI, P. J.
We concur:
ASHMANN-GERST, J.
CHAVEZ, J.
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