People v. Twinn CA5

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Filed 1/8/25 P. v. Twinn CA5

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F086482
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. F22908150)
v.

JAMES RONELL TWINN, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Michael G.
Idiart, Judge.
Robert Navarro, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Amanda D. Cary,
and Hannah Janigian Chavez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
On March 17, 2023, defendant James Ronell Twinn was convicted of, among other
things, forcible rape of M.A. and false imprisonment of B.C. by violence or menace. On
appeal, defendant argues that (1) there is insufficient evidence to support the conviction
for forcible rape of M.A., (2) there is insufficient evidence to support the conviction for
false imprisonment of B.C. by violence or menace, and (3) the trial court erred by failing
to instruct the jury on misdemeanor false imprisonment, a lesser included offense of false
imprisonment by violence or menace. The People disagree. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 21, 2023, the District Attorney of Fresno County filed a first
amended information charging defendant with forcible rape of M.A. (Pen. Code,1 § 261,
subd. (a)(2); counts 1, 2); kidnapping M.A. to commit rape (§ 209, subd. (b)(1); count 3);
false imprisonment of M.A. by violence or menace (§ 236; count 4); assaulting M.A. with
a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 5); making criminal threats to M.A. (§ 422;
count 6); possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 7); possession
of ammunition by a person prohibited from owning a firearm (§ 30305, subd (a)(1);
count 8); forcible rape of B.C. (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); counts 9, 10); forcible oral copulation
of B.C. (§ 287, subd. (c)(2)(A); counts 11, 12); kidnapping B.C. to commit rape (§ 209,
subd. (b)(1); count 13); and false imprisonment of B.C. by violence or menace (§ 236;
count 14). The first amended information alleged enhancements and aggravating factors,
including that, as to count 2, defendant used a deadly weapon (a knife) during
commission of a sex offense (§ 12022.3, subd. (a)).
On February 23, 2023, defendant pled no contest to counts 7 and 8. After the
prosecution’s case-in-chief, defendant made a motion for acquittal on all counts pursuant
to section 1118.1. The trial court granted the motion as to count 13, but otherwise denied
it.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2.
On March 17, 2023, defendant was found guilty by a jury on counts 2, 9, 10, 11,
12, and 14. The jury did not reach a unanimous verdict on counts 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6, or the
use of a deadly weapon enhancement attached to count 2.2
On June 5, 2023, the trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of
30 years to life, plus two years, consisting of: 15 years to life on count 2; 15 years to life
on count 9; and two years (the middle term) on count 7. The court also imposed the
following concurrent terms: two years (the middle term) on counts 8 and 14; and 15
years to life on counts 10, 11, and 12.
Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
The Prosecution’s Case
The 2021 Incident
On April 6, 2021, B.C., who was 17 years old, walked to a store. While she was
walking, defendant drove up to her and asked her if she needed anything. B.C. told
defendant that she needed a cigar wrap, and defendant got it for her. Defendant also told
her that he could get marijuana, and B.C. gave defendant her phone number.
Later that day, defendant and B.C. had a conversation via text message. Defendant
told B.C. that he had marijuana. At approximately 11:00 p.m., B.C. snuck out of her
house and got into defendant’s car. Eventually, they went to a casino. Before going into
the casino, B.C. smoked marijuana.
After B.C. gambled for a while, defendant asked B.C. if she wanted to see the city
lights, and B.C. said yes. They got into defendant’s car, and defendant started driving.
As defendant continued to drive, B.C. began getting more and more nervous because it
kept getting darker and she had just met defendant. However, after defendant parked in
an area near other cars, she “didn't feel so nervous anymore.”

2 All hung counts were later dismissed at the prosecution’s request.

3.
While they were parked, B.C. voluntarily drank a shot of alcohol. Defendant
encouraged B.C. to drink more and told her, “ ‘We’ll start driving back that way the more
we finish the bottle.’ ” So, B.C. “faked” taking additional shots, although defendant
noticed.
After approximately 20 minutes, B.C. said that she needed to use the restroom,
and defendant started driving back. Eventually, defendant pulled over on a dirt shoulder
and parked on top of a little dirt hill. It was dark, and no other cars were parked in the
area. B.C. told defendant to take her home because she needed to use the restroom.
Defendant told B.C. that they would leave after she took another shot, so she “faked”
taking the shot. Defendant also told B.C. that if she needed to use the restroom so badly,
“to just pop a squat.”
B.C. again asked defendant to take her home, and she waited a bit to see if he
would start driving. He did not start driving, so she got out of the car and peed.
B.C. got back into the car. After approximately a minute, defendant got out of the
car and went to the passenger side door. Defendant tried to pull B.C.’s pants down, but
she kept pulling them back up and begging him not to do it. Defendant told B.C. to be
quiet. He got on top of B.C. and continued pulling on her pants. B.C. tried to resist by
wiggling her body and closing her legs, but defendant was too heavy and too strong.
B.C.’s legs were shaking because she was scared.
Defendant inserted his penis into B.C.’s vagina and “kept going in and out.”
Defendant eventually opened B.C.’s legs and orally copulated her. After that, he inserted
his penis into her vagina again and “kept going in and out” while holding B.C. down.
After that, he orally copulated B.C. again and then inserted his penis into her vagina
again. Defendant also bit B.C., sucked on her body, and slapped her cheek.
After defendant inserted his penis into B.C.’s vagina the third time, B.C. saw her
phone next to her, slipped her hand out, and called 911. B.C. did not say anything

4.
because she was afraid that defendant would kill her. However, she put the phone close
to her face and made “[gasping] sounds and weird noises” so the operator would know
that she was in danger.
Eventually, Fresno County Sheriff’s Office deputies arrived, and defendant
stopped. B.C. got out of the car and told a deputy that she had been raped.
The 2022 Incident
On August 13, 2022, M.A. went on a walk to exercise because she recently got out
of the hospital. She stopped at a park because she could not catch her breath. While she
was at the park, defendant approached her and said, “ ‘Hi, I haven’t seen you since [sic] a
long time.’ ” However, M.A. did not know who he was. Defendant offered her a ride,
but she declined. Defendant told her to get into his car. As defendant said this, he was
holding something in his pocket. M.A. eventually agreed to go with defendant because
she was afraid, and defendant escorted her to his car.
As defendant was driving, M.A. repeatedly asked defendant to let her get out, but
defendant did not let her out.
Defendant stopped at a liquor store and went inside to buy alcohol. M.A. tried to
get out of the car, but the door would not open. M.A. looked around the car, and she saw
the handle of a gun underneath her seat. However, she was unable to reach it.
After defendant got back into the car, he pulled out a knife. He told M.A. that if
she yelled, he would “take [her] out.” Defendant also opened the bottle of alcohol he
bought and told M.A. to drink from it. M.A. did not want to drink, but she drank every
time defendant told her to. At first, she only pretended to drink, but defendant noticed.
Defendant drove to a different park and parked. M.A. did not see any other cars or
people around. Defendant got out of the car and went to the passenger side. He reclined
M.A.’s seat and moved her legs so that he would fit on top of her. M.A. started crying,

5.
told defendant to stop, and tried to defend herself. Defendant told her to pull down her
shorts. She crossed her legs and tried to push defendant off.
M.A. started screaming. Defendant put the knife to the left side of her neck and
told her that he would kill her if she yelled. He also pulled off her shorts. M.A. tried to
pull her shorts back up, but defendant stopped her.
After defendant put on a condom and pulled M.A.’s shorts off, he penetrated her
vagina with his penis. Defendant “thrust[ed] back and forth.” Defendant also told M.A.
to hug him, to tell him that she wanted to have a child with him, and to tell him that she
loved him.
Eventually, the condom tore. Defendant took it off and threw it out of the car. He
then penetrated M.A. again, and he continued thrusting until he ejaculated. After
defendant ejaculated, he started picking up his pants. M.A. noticed that defendant had
dropped the knife, and she picked it up because she was afraid defendant was going to
kill her.
After defendant got off M.A. and out of the car, M.A. got out of the car. She
yelled for help and tried to run as fast as she could. She saw a man in the distance stand
up. M.A. ran towards the man, and defendant left. M.A. gave her cell phone to the man
and asked him to call 911, which he did.
M.A. was transported to a hospital, where she was examined by a sexual assault
forensic examiner nurse. The nurse observed that M.A. had “a little pinprick” on the left
side of her neck, which M.A. told the nurse came from defendant putting a knife to her
throat. Additionally, there was redness on M.A.’s right wrist, which M.A. told the nurse
came from defendant grabbing her and holding her down. The nurse also examined
M.A.’s vagina. M.A. “had some blood and discharge on the outside of the vagina, with a
small laceration to the opening of the vagina. And then, inside, there was also more
blood and discharge.”

6.
Defendant’s Case
Defendant testified on his own behalf. According to defendant, both encounters
were consensual.
The 2021 Incident
As to the 2021 incident, defendant was driving and made eye contact with B.C.
She put her hands up in a greeting, so defendant stopped his car next to her. They talked,
and defendant asked B.C. her age. B.C. first told defendant she was 21 years old, then
told him she was 19 years old. During the conversation, B.C. gave defendant her phone
number.
Defendant and B.C. exchanged text messages about setting up a time to meet.
They also discussed having marijuana for B.C., and B.C. told defendant the brand of
alcohol she drinks.
Later that day, defendant picked B.C. up and they eventually went to a casino.
Prior to going into the casino, defendant and B.C. drank alcohol. Additionally, B.C.
smoked marijuana. At the casino, they gambled using defendant’s money.
After about two hours, they decided to leave the casino. B.C. asked if there was
somewhere they could go to smoke and finish the bottle of alcohol. Defendant told her
there was, and he drove them to a place he called “city lights.” They talked, and B.C.
eventually reached over and gave defendant a kiss. They kissed for about 10 minutes,
then B.C. asked if they could go somewhere more private. Defendant drove them to a
different location, where they engaged in consensual sexual intercourse.
Eventually, a sheriff’s deputy arrived. After the deputy arrived, defendant noticed
that B.C. had been sitting on her phone. After the deputy got out of his car, defendant
noticed that B.C. was attempting to hide from the deputy. The deputy walked closer and
asked if everything was all right. B.C. then stood up and told the deputy that she had
been raped.

7.
The 2022 Incident
As to the 2022 incident, defendant drove to a park to meet a friend. Defendant
parked, and M.A. approached him. She asked him to buy her a drink, and he said that he
would. Before getting into his car, she asked him if he “date[d],”3 and he said, “[Y]es.”
Defendant drove M.A to a liquor store, went inside, and bought an alcoholic
beverage for them to share. After that, they went to a different park, drinking on the way.
After arriving, M.A. agreed to have sexual intercourse with defendant in exchange
for crystal meth and $20. He put on a condom, and they had consensual sexual
intercourse in the car.
After defendant finished, he pulled money from his pocket to pay M.A. When she
saw the amount of money he had, she repeatedly asked him to give her more money. He
refused. Before he left, she told him that he would regret it.
When defendant was interviewed by detectives regarding this incident, they
showed him a picture of a knife, and he did not recognize it. However, he later
remembered that a friend had left that knife in his car. When defendant had found it, he
put it in the middle console of his car and never touched it again.
Defendant also introduced a video of a detective testing the lock on the front
passenger side door of the car. When the car was locked, the door did not open when the
door handle was pulled. However, the detective was able to unlock the car from the
passenger seat, and when he did, the door opened when the door handle was pulled.
DISCUSSION
I. Substantial Evidence Supports the Convictions
Defendant argues that the convictions on counts 2 (forcible rape of M.A.) and 14
(false imprisonment of B.C. by violence or menace) are not supported by substantial
evidence. The People disagree, as do we.

3 According to defendant, “dating” means paying for sexual intercourse.

8.
A. Applicable Law
“Forcible rape is defined as ‘an act of sexual intercourse … with a person not the
spouse of the perpetrator … accomplished against a person’s will by means of force,
violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person
or another.’ ” (People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1022.) “[I]t has long been
recognized that ‘in order to establish force …, the prosecution need only show the
defendant used physical force of a degree sufficient to support a finding that the act of
sexual intercourse was against the will of the [victim].’ ” (Id. at pp. 1023–1024, first
bracketed insertion added.) “ ‘ “ ‘The kind of physical force is immaterial; ... it may
consist in the taking of indecent liberties with a woman, or laying hold of and kissing her
against her will.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1024.)
“False imprisonment is the unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another.”
(§ 236.) “In this context, ‘ “[p]ersonal liberty” ’ is violated when ‘the victim is
“compelled to remain where [s]he does not wish to remain, or to go where [s]he does not
wish to go.” ’ [Citations.] It is the restraint of a person’s freedom of movement that is at
the heart of the offense of false imprisonment ….” (People v. Reed (2000)
78 Cal.App.4th 274, 280, first bracketed insertion in original.) “ ‘ “ ‘The wrong may be
committed by acts or by words, or both, and by merely operating upon the will of the
individual or by personal violence, or both ....’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) “The offense becomes
felonious when it is ‘effected by violence, menace, fraud, or deceit ....’ [Citations.]
‘ “Violence” ... means the “ ‘the exercise of physical force used to restrain over and
above the force reasonably necessary to effect such restraint.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘Menace’ is
defined as ‘ “ ‘a threat of harm express or implied by word or act.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.)
B. Standard of Review
When evaluating a sufficiency of evidence claim, “ ‘we review the whole record in
the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial

9.
evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”
(People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 507.) “The test for evaluating a sufficiency of
evidence claim is deferential.” (People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 411.) “We must
presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact that the trier of fact could
reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 919.)
“We must also ‘accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn from the
circumstantial evidence.’ ” (Flores, at p. 411.) “The conviction shall stand ‘unless it
appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to
support [the conviction].” ’ ” (Cravens, at p. 508.)
C. Analysis re: Count 2, Forcible Rape of M.A.
Defendant argues that “under the facts of this case and especially in light of the
failure of the prosecution to prove any of the other charges and enhancements which all
deal with factors of either force, threat, duress or menace, [defendant] submits that in the
[M.A.] case the conviction [on count 2] for forcible rape lacks substantial evidence and
must be reversed.”4
Defendant’s argument lacks merit. He largely relies on the fact that the jury did
not reach a verdict on the other counts related to the 2021 incident or the knife
enhancement attached to count 2. According to defendant, as the jury did not reach a
verdict on the knife enhancement, the knife could not have been the basis of the finding
of force. Additionally, “because the jury hung on all the other counts and enhancements
including kidnapping to commit rape, false imprisonment by violence, assault with a
deadly weapon or criminal threats (Count 3 to 6), the elements of force, duress or menace
inherent in those charges cannot support a finding of force in Count 2.” However, the

4 The first amended information alleged two counts of forcible rape of M.A. Count 1 was
based on the first act of intercourse and count 2 was based on the last act of intercourse. The jury
did not reach a unanimous verdict on count 1.

10.
jury’s failure to reach a verdict on the other counts is not relevant to the issue of whether
substantial evidence supports the conviction on count 2.
Generally, if a conviction is supported by substantial evidence, it is allowed to
stand even if it is inconsistent with other verdicts. (See § 954 [“An acquittal of one or
more counts shall not be deemed an acquittal of any other count.”]; People v. Avila (2006)
38 Cal.4th 491, 600 [“As a general rule, inherently inconsistent verdicts are allowed to
stand.”]; People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 656 [“ ‘[A] criminal defendant … is
afforded protection against jury irrationality or error by the independent review of the
sufficiency of the evidence undertaken by the trial and appellate courts’ ”].) “For
example, ‘if an acquittal of one count is factually irreconcilable with a conviction on
another, or if a not true finding of an enhancement allegation is inconsistent with a
conviction of the substantive offense, effect is given to both.’ [Citation.] Although
‘ “error,” in the sense that the jury has not followed the court’s instructions, most
certainly has occurred’ in such situations, ‘it is unclear whose ox has been gored.’
[Citation.] It is possible that the jury arrived at an inconsistent conclusion through
‘mistake, compromise, or lenity.’ [Citation.] Thus, if a defendant is given the benefit of
an acquittal on the count on which he was acquitted, ‘it is neither irrational nor illogical’
to require him to accept the burden of conviction on the count on which the jury
convicted.” (Avila, at p. 600.)
Accordingly, we need not attempt to reconcile the allegedly inconsistent verdicts.
(People v. Carbajal (2013) 56 Cal.4th 521, 532 [“ ‘[A]n individualized assessment of the
reason for the inconsistency would be based either on pure speculation, or would require
inquiries into the jury’s deliberations that courts generally will not undertake.’ ”].)
Instead, the question before us is whether substantial evidence supports the conviction on
count 2. And here, it does.

11.
To begin, there is substantial evidence that defendant used a knife to accomplish
the sexual intercourse. M.A. testified that, before defendant pulled off her shorts and
penetrated her, she screamed. Defendant responded by putting a knife to her neck and
telling her that he would kill her if she yelled. Additionally, there is evidence that she
picked up the knife after defendant dropped it and later gave it to a police officer. There
is also evidence that the knife was tested for DNA, and “the DNA results provided very
strong support that [defendant] [was] a contributor to the DNA mixtures that
were … obtained from the knife swab.” Finally, M.A. was examined by a nurse, and the
nurse observed that M.A. had “a little pinprick” on the side of her neck, which M.A. told
the nurse came from defendant putting a knife to her throat.
Moreover, even if we did not consider evidence related to the knife, there is still
substantial evidence that defendant used force. According to M.A., while she was in the
passenger seat of the car, defendant reclined her seat and moved her legs so he would fit
on top of her. M.A. told defendant to stop, crossed her legs, and tried to push defendant
off. However, defendant eventually got her shorts off and penetrated her. She attempted
to pull her shorts back up, but defendant prevented it. After defendant took the condom
off, he penetrated her again. Defendant, who was approximately six feet two inches tall
and weighed more than 250 pounds, was still on top of her, and she could not get out of
the car. This is substantial evidence that defendant used force to accomplish the sexual
assault. (See, e.g., People v. Griffin, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1025, 1029 [holding that
“ ‘ “force” plays merely a supporting evidentiary role, as necessary only to insure an act
of intercourse has been undertaken against a victim’s will,’ ” and finding sufficient force
where the defendant “pinned [the victim’s] arms to the floor as he penetrated her vagina
with his penis”].)
Therefore, defendant’s argument that the conviction on count 2 lacks substantial
evidence fails.

12.
D. Analysis re: Count 14, False Imprisonment of B.C. by Violence or Menace
Defendant also argues that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to
support the conviction on count 14 for false imprisonment by violence or menace.
According to defendant, he “did not commit ‘violence’ within the definition of the
statute” because “his use of force in ‘pinning’ down” B.C. “was at the same time an act
committed in furtherance of the sexual offenses and necessarily committing the false
imprisonment.” Defendant also argues that “no additional threat or menace was
employed by either physical harm or by intimidating conduct.”
Defendant’s argument is not persuasive. Even assuming defendant is correct that
there is no evidence of violence because pinning B.C. down is the act that prevented B.C.
from moving, there is substantial evidence of menace.5
Both B.C. and a sheriff’s deputy testified that defendant and B.C. were parked in a
secluded location. At the time, defendant weighed approximately 200 pounds and was
approximately six feet two inches tall. B.C. weighed approximately 130 pounds and was
approximately five feet five inches tall. According to B.C., while at the secluded
location, defendant tried to pull her pants down, but she resisted and begged him not to
do it. Eventually, defendant pulled her pants off and got on top of her. B.C. tried to resist
by wiggling her body and closing her legs, but defendant was too heavy and too strong.
Defendant then penetrated her, orally copulated her, penetrated her again, orally
copulated her again, and then penetrated her again. During the sexual assaults, defendant
slapped B.C. while telling her to “ ‘shut up,’ ” sucked on her, and bit her.

5 In People v. Matian (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 480, the court held that either a weapon or a
verbal threat of harm is required for a finding of menace. (Id. at pp. 485–486.) While defendant
mentions this case, defendant does not urge us to adopt this holding. Moreover, like our court in
People v. Aispuro (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1513, we disagree with this holding. (See also
People v. Islas (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 116, 125–126; People v. Wardell (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th
1484, 1490–1491.)

13.
The penetration, oral copulation, slapping, biting, and sucking were not acts
necessary to restrain B.C. Moreover, from these acts, the jury could reasonably conclude
that defendant showed he was willing to harm B.C. if she did not remain in the passenger
seat while he continued to sexually assault her. (See People v. Aispuro, supra,
157 Cal.App.4th at p. 1513 [“Threats can be exhibited in a myriad number of ways,
verbally and by conduct.”].)
Additionally, there is evidence that B.C. and defendant were in a secluded location
and that defendant was much larger than B.C. B.C. also testified that she “was scared
that if [she] did anything wrong, [defendant] would have killed [her].” This is further
evidence that defendant impliedly threatened to harm her. (See People v. Whitmore
(2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 116, 130 [“A jury properly may consider a victim’s fear in
determining whether the defendant expressly or impliedly threatened harm.”].)
Finally, there is evidence that defendant was not on top of B.C. during the entire
incident. Despite this, and despite evidence that B.C. did not want to be there, B.C.
remained in the passenger seat until after a deputy arrived.
There is thus substantial evidence from which a jury could conclude that B.C. was
compelled to remain in the passenger seat by an implied threat of harm.
Defendant’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. While conceding that “it
is uncontroversial” that sexual assaults can contribute “to the force or fear necessary to
commit … later false imprisonment,” defendant argues that this is not what occurred
here. However, defendant ignores that there is evidence of five separate acts of sexual
assault that occurred over a period lasting longer than 20 minutes, as well as evidence
that B.C. remained in the passenger seat during and after each assault. Thus, there is
evidence in this case that acts of sexual assault contributed to the fear necessary to
commit false imprisonment.

14.
Defendant also appears to argue that we cannot consider the facts underlying the
sexual assault as the basis for the false imprisonment conviction because “the physical
restraint against [B.C.] was at the same time an act committed in furtherance of the
sexual offenses.” However, defendant cites no law in support of this argument, and our
court has held the opposite.6 (See People v. Reed, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at pp. 281–282;
People v. Islas, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at pp. 124–126, 129–130.)
Based on the foregoing, defendant’s argument that the conviction on count 14
lacks substantial evidence fails.
II. Any Error in Failing to Provide the Jury Instruction for Misdemeanor False
Imprisonment Was Harmless
A. Applicable Law
“All elements of misdemeanor false imprisonment are also elements of the felony;
the felony cannot be committed without necessarily committing the misdemeanor. The
misdemeanor is therefore a lesser included offense of the felony.” (People v. Babich
(1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 801, 807.)
“The [trial] court must instruct on any lesser included offense for which there is
substantial evidence to support a conviction [citation], but not if the pertinent evidence is
‘minimal and insubstantial’ [citation]. ‘ “In deciding whether evidence is ‘substantial’ in
this context, a court determines only its bare legal sufficiency, not its weight.” ’ ”
(People v. Hicks (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 496, 507; see also People v. Najera (2008)
43 Cal.4th 1132, 1136 [“ ‘in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the trial
court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the
evidence’ ”].)

6 Defendant does not argue that he could not be convicted of both the sexual offenses and
false imprisonment because they are based on the same acts, or that the trial court erred by
failing to stay the conviction on count 14 pursuant to section 654.

15.
B. Standard of Review
“We review the trial court’s failure to instruct on a lesser included offense de novo
[citations] considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant
[citations].” (People v. Brothers (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 24, 30.) “When substantial
evidence supports an instruction on a lesser included offense, the failure to so instruct is
assessed for prejudice under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 .…” (People v.
Hicks, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 507; see also People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186,
195–196.) Under this standard, reversal is not required unless it is reasonably probable
the defendant would have obtained a more favorable result had the error not occurred.
(Watson, at p. 836.)
C. Analysis
Defendant argues that the trial court erred because it did not sua sponte instruct the
jury on misdemeanor false imprisonment, a lesser included offense of felony false
imprisonment.
Even assuming defendant is correct that the trial court erred, we will only reverse
the judgment if the error was prejudicial. However, defendant does not argue, in either
his opening brief or his reply brief, that the error was prejudicial. Defendant’s only
argument that might be related to prejudice is that substantial evidence does not support
the conviction for felony false imprisonment, but, as discussed ante, this argument fails.
Moreover, we have reviewed the record, and we see no prejudice. Notably,
defendant and B.C. told two conflicting versions of events regarding what occurred after
they left “city lights.” According to defendant, the sexual encounter was consensual and
he never restrained B.C. According to B.C., she was repeatedly sexually assaulted by a
large man in a secluded location while forced to remain in the passenger seat. As
defendant was convicted on all counts submitted to the jury regarding B.C., it appears the

16.
jury believed B.C.’s account. And as discussed above, B.C.’s account included
substantial evidence of menace.
Accordingly, there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have convicted
defendant of misdemeanor false imprisonment instead of felony false imprisonment had
they been instructed on both, and defendant’s argument fails.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

HILL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

DETJEN, J.

MEEHAN, J.

17.

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