People v. Madrigal CA2/8

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Filed 1/6/25 P. v. Madrigal CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B328207

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA482074-01)
v.

JOAQUIN MADRIGAL,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Ray G. Jurado, Judge. Affirmed.
Olivia Meme, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan S. Pithey, Assistant Attorney
General, Idan Ivri and Roberta L. Davis, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________________
INTRODUCTION
The People charged Joaquin Madrigal with battery against
a man. Madrigal entered into a plea agreement in which he
would be released on his own recognizance, and if he obeyed all
laws while awaiting sentencing, he would be sentenced to a
misdemeanor and placed on summary probation. Otherwise, he
would be sentenced to a felony. Prior to sentencing, Madrigal
was arrested for assaulting a woman. At an evidentiary hearing,
the trial court imposed a felony sentence after finding that
Madrigal violated the terms of his plea agreement. On appeal,
Madrigal argues the trial court denied him due process by
refusing to allow the arresting officer to testify about the victim’s
statement that she did not see or know who attacked her.
We conclude the trial court did not err in excluding the proffered
testimony, and even if it did, any such error was harmless.
We accordingly affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Madrigal’s plea agreement
In an information filed on November 18, 2019, Madrigal
was charged with one count of battery with serious bodily injury
(Pen. Code1 § 243, subd. (d)). According to the preliminary
hearing testimony, Madrigal grabbed the victim on the street and
threw him facedown to the ground. The victim sustained a head
injury, and had to be resuscitated at the scene. As passerby
attended to the victim, Madrigal sat on a nearby bench until he
was arrested.

1 Unless otherwise stated, all further undesignated statutory
references are to the Penal Code.

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On May 19, 2022, Madrigal entered into a plea agreement
with the prosecution. Under the terms of the agreement, the
information was amended to add a count for assault likely to
produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)). Madrigal pled no
contest to that offense, and the original charge was dismissed.
The parties agreed to continue sentencing for six months with
Madrigal released on his own recognizance. If Madrigal “obey[ed]
all laws and stay[ed] out of trouble” during that six-month period,
he would be convicted of a misdemeanor and sentenced to one-
year summary probation. If, however, Madrigal violated the
terms of the plea agreement, he would be convicted of a felony
and subject to a maximum sentence of four years in state prison.
The court set the sentencing hearing for November 18, 2022.
II. Hearing on alleged violation of plea agreement
On November 6, 2022, Madrigal was arrested.
On January 4, 2023, the trial court held a hearing to determine
whether Madrigal violated the terms of his plea agreement by
failing to obey all laws. At the start of the hearing, the
prosecution informed the court that there were three witnesses in
attendance: Ruben Medellin and Long Beach police officers
Ismael Martinez and Danny Velasquez. Madrigal’s counsel asked
that the officers “be called for the defense as well.”
The prosecution first called Medellin to testify. According
to his testimony, on the afternoon of November 6, 2022, Medellin
and his wife were driving in Long Beach when he saw Madrigal
on a sidewalk, striking a woman with a closed fist. Madrigal
punched the woman in the face four times. As Medellin’s wife
called the police, he pulled over and walked to within 20 feet of
the woman and Madrigal. The woman appeared to be
unconscious, and was lying motionless while bleeding from her

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mouth. Madrigal sat on a nearby planter. The police arrived less
than two minutes later and arrested Madrigal.
The prosecution next called Officer Velasquez to testify, but
the trial court stated, “I think I’ve heard enough.” In response,
defense counsel advised the court that he wanted to call Officer
Martinez as a witness. When asked for what purpose, defense
counsel explained that, when Officer Martinez took the victim’s
statement, she said “she did not see who struck her, did not know
who struck her, and the only person that she knew that was
there was a man named Emmett, who is her friend.”
The trial court noted this was not a preliminary hearing,
but rather a proceeding to determine whether Madrigal violated
the law by being arrested for assault. Defense counsel replied
that an arrest did not necessarily mean that a crime was
committed. The court disagreed, stating, “In this case even if
that were an issue, I don’t think it is, but I think a crime was
committed.” Defense counsel then told the court, “[F]or the
record, we would like to present evidence to rebut the
prosecution’s evidence that they’ve been able to present. [¶] And
we submit, Your Honor.” At that time, the trial court found that
Madrigal violated the terms of his plea agreement by failing to
obey all laws.
The court sentenced Madrigal to three years in state
prison. The sentence was satisfied by time served based on
Madrigal’s custody credits.
Madrigal filed a timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Madrigal argues the trial court violated his
constitutional right to due process when it did not allow him to
call one of the arresting officers to testify at the hearing on the

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alleged violation of his plea agreement. The Attorney General
asserts the trial court did not err in disallowing the proposed
testimony, and even if there was error, it was harmless. We find
no error and further note that any error was harmless.
I. Governing law
Under section 1192.5, if a plea agreement is accepted by
the prosecution and approved by the trial court, the defendant
“cannot be sentenced on the plea to a punishment more severe
than that specified in the plea.” (Id., subd. (b).) The statute also
provides that if the court subsequently withdraws its approval of
the agreement, the defendant “shall be permitted to withdraw
the plea if the defendant desires to do so.” (Id., subd. (c).)
In People v. Cruz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1247 (Cruz), the
California Supreme Court recognized that a defendant may
expressly waive his or her rights under section 1192.5 at the time
the plea is accepted, such that if the defendant willfully fails to
appear for sentencing or violates other agreed-upon conditions,
the court “may withdraw its approval of the defendant’s plea and
impose a sentence in excess of the bargained-for term.” (Cruz, at
p. 1254, fn. 5.) This type of plea agreement is commonly known
as a Cruz waiver. (People v. Fuentes (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1286,
1291; People v. Puente (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1146, fn. 3.)
When the plea agreement provides for a specified high sentence if
the defendant fails to appear or meet certain conditions, it may
also be referred to as a Vargas waiver, based on a similar type of
agreement approved in People v. Vargas (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d
1107, 1113. (People v. Puente, at p. 1145, fn. 2.)
A Cruz or Vargas waiver may include a provision requiring
the defendant not to violate any laws while released on his or her
own recognizance as a condition of the plea agreement. (People v.

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Rabanales (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 494, 499 (Rabanales); People v.
Carr (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 786, 788 (Carr).) There is no right
to a jury trial or to a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
on the question of whether the defendant violated the terms of a
Cruz or Vargas waiver. (Rabanales, at pp. 501–502.) Rather, the
trial court applies a preponderance of the evidence standard to
determine whether the defendant breached the plea agreement
by violating the conditions of his or her release. (Id. at p. 509;
Carr, at p. 792.) An appellate court generally reviews a trial
court’s determination that the defendant violated a Cruz or
Vargas waiver for substantial evidence. (Rabanales, at p. 509.)
II. The trial court did not violate Madrigal’s due process
rights in excluding his proffered evidence
In challenging the trial court’s finding that he violated his
plea agreement, Madrigal contends the court deprived him of his
right to be heard and present evidence on his behalf. Madrigal
specifically claims the court denied him due process when it
refused to allow Officer Martinez to testify about the victim’s
statement that she did not see or know who attacked her.
Our Supreme Court has not addressed the scope of due
process protections to be afforded defendants in proceedings to
determine whether there was a Cruz or Vargas waiver violation.
However, in other procedural contexts, the Court has recognized
that “ ‘ “[t]he essence of due process is the requirement that ‘a
person in jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case
against him and opportunity to meet it.’ ” [Citations.] The
opportunity to be heard must be afforded “at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner.” ’ ” (In re Harris (2024) 16 Cal.5th
292, 322.) The Supreme Court also has explained that “ ‘[d]ue
process does not call for the same procedures in every situation.

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Instead, “ ‘[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands.’ ” ’ ” (People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 228.)
In Carr, the Court of Appeal held there was no due process
violation where the defendant “had adequate notice and ample
opportunity to prepare and mount a defense to the allegation he
violated his Vargas waiver by breaking the law.” (Carr, supra,
143 Cal.App.4th at p. 791.) The court declined to apply the due
process requirements of probation revocation cases to an alleged
Vargas waiver violation. (Id. at p. 789.) The court also rejected
the defendant’s claim that the trial court violated his due process
rights by giving him inadequate notice and making insufficient
findings. (Id. at pp. 790–792.) The court reasoned that nothing
in the Vargas line of cases required a formal petition setting forth
the alleged violation of the Vargas waiver, or a detailed, written
statement of reasons for finding a violation. (Id. at pp. 791–792.)
In this case, the record demonstrates that the trial court
provided Madrigal with adequate notice of his alleged violation of
his plea agreement and an opportunity to be heard on the matter.
Madrigal was arrested for violently assaulting a woman in early
November 2022, and the trial court held an evidentiary hearing
on the alleged violation about two months later in January 2023.
Madrigal was present at the hearing, and was represented by his
counsel. During Medellin’s testimony, defense counsel was able
to cross-examine the witness about his recollection of the assault,
including his identification of Madrigal as the perpetrator. Based
on Medellin’s eyewitness testimony, the trial court decided it did
not need to hear from either of the officers who arrested Madrigal
at the scene. When defense counsel indicated that he wanted to
call one of the officers to testify, the court asked for an offer of

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proof. Defense counsel explained that he intended to elicit Officer
Martinez’s testimony that, when he took the victim’s statement,
she said that she did not know or see who struck her, and that
the only person she knew at the scene was her friend, Emmett.
Based on this offer of proof, the trial court reasonably could
conclude the evidence had minimal probative value given that
Officer Martinez could only testify that the victim denied ever
seeing her assailant. On appeal, Madrigal argues that Officer
Martinez’s testimony was potentially exculpatory because the
victim “excluded [Madrigal] from the scene” in her statement.
However, as described by defense counsel, the victim never said
Madrigal was not present at the scene. Rather, she said the only
person she knew at the scene was a friend named Emmett. Thus,
in her statement to Officer Martinez, the victim neither placed
Madrigal at the scene of the crime, nor excluded him from being
there. She simply stated that she did not see or know who
attacked her, which was consistent with Medellin’s account that
the victim appeared to be unconscious during the assault. Officer
Martinez’s testimony would not have provided a contrary version
of events or otherwise exculpated Madrigal.
In making his offer of proof, defense counsel did not
contend that Officer Martinez could provide relevant testimony
on any other matter related to the alleged crime. Moreover,
while defense counsel stated at the hearing that he wanted to
“present evidence to rebut the prosecution’s evidence,” he did not
ask to call any witnesses to testify other than Officer Martinez.
On this record, the trial court reasonably could decide it did not
need to hear from Officer Martinez to determine by a
preponderance of the evidence whether Madrigal violated his
Cruz waiver by committing the assault. Therefore, to the extent

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Madrigal had a right to confront and cross-examine witnesses on
his alleged violation of the Cruz waiver, the trial court did not
deny Madrigal due process in excluding the proffered evidence.
For these same reasons, we are convinced that the trial
court would have found that Madrigal committed the assault in
violation of his Cruz waiver even if it had allowed the defense to
call Officer Martinez as a witness. While the victim was unable
to identify her assailant in her statement to the police, Medellin’s
eyewitness testimony provided compelling and uncontroverted
evidence that Madrigal was the perpetrator. Accordingly, under
any standard of prejudice, any alleged error in excluding Officer
Martinez’s testimony was harmless. (People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [state law error is harmless if it is not
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant
would have occurred absent the error]; Chapman v. California
(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [reversal for federal constitutional error is
not required if the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

VIRAMONTES, J.

WE CONCUR:

GRIMES, Acting P. J.

WILEY, J.

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