People v. Boyd CA2/8

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Filed 1/6/25 P. v. Boyd CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B333737

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA423283-01)
v.

DAVID THOMPSON BOYD,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Ricardo R. Ocampo, Judge. Affirmed.
Brad J. Poore, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan S. Pithey, Assistant Attorney
General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Megan Moine, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________________
INTRODUCTION
David Thompson Boyd appeals from an order denying his
petition for dismissal of a conviction under Penal Code1
section 1203.4, which provides relief when a defendant has
fulfilled the conditions of probation throughout the probationary
period. The trial court denied the petition ruling that Boyd did
not successfully complete his probation because he was convicted
of a separate offense and sentenced to state prison during the
probationary period. On appeal, Boyd argues the court erred
because the subsequent conviction was based on conduct that
occurred prior to the grant of probation in this case. The People
assert the court properly denied the petition because Boyd had a
prior probation violation, and he failed to prove he successfully
completed all the conditions of his probation. We conclude Boyd
was not entitled to relief under section 1203.4 because the record
shows he did not fulfill the conditions of probation through the
entire probationary period. We accordingly affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Boyd is placed on formal probation
On June 2, 2014, Boyd was charged in Los Angeles County
Superior Court case No. BA423283 with one felony count of
unlawful firearm activity in violation of section 29815,
subdivision (a) (the “Los Angeles case”). On August 1, 2014, a
jury found Boyd guilty as charged of that count. On November
10, 2014, the trial court sentenced Boyd to three years of formal
probation subject to various terms and conditions, including
180 days in county jail.

1 Unless otherwise stated, all further undesignated statutory
references are to the Penal Code.

2
On March 21, 2016, Boyd was arrested for an alleged
probation violation on the grounds that he had been lying to his
probation officer about his place of residence. On April 25, 2016,
Boyd admitted to violating his probation, and the trial court
found a violation of probation. The court revoked and then
immediately reinstated Boyd’s probation, and ordered that it
continue under the same terms and conditions, with an
additional requirement that Boyd perform 160 hours of
community service.
II. Boyd is sentenced to state prison in another case
On June 30, 2016, Boyd was indicted in San Diego Superior
Court case No. SCD255550 on multiple felony counts arising from
an alleged mortgage fraud scheme (the “San Diego case”). Boyd
was taken into custody in that case on or about July 11, 2016.
On January 9, 2017, Boyd pleaded guilty to one count of
procuring or offering a false or forged instrument in violation of
section 115, subdivision (a), which occurred on or about July 12,
2012. On February 7, 2017, Boyd was sentenced to a total term
of four years in state prison in the San Diego case.
III. Boyd’s probation is revoked and then terminated
Meanwhile, on January 4, 2017, the trial court called the
Los Angeles case for a possible probation violation. The court
noted that Boyd was not present, and that he appeared to be in
custody in San Diego on a new charge. On that date, the court
revoked Boyd’s probation and issued a no-bail bench warrant.
On March 29, 2018, the trial court called the Los Angeles
case for a bench warrant hearing. Boyd again failed to appear,
and the prosecutor informed the court that Boyd was currently
serving a four-year prison term in San Diego. At the prosecutor’s

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request, the court recalled the bench warrant and terminated
Boyd’s probation.
IV. Boyd files a section 1203.4 petition for dismissal
On July 31, 2023, Boyd filed a petition to dismiss his
conviction in the Los Angeles case under section 1203.4. In his
form petition, Boyd checked a box stating he was entitled to relief
because he “has fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire
period thereof.”
On September 5, 2023, the trial court denied the petition.
There is no reporter’s transcript of the proceeding because the
court considered the matter in chambers and off the record.
However, in its written order denying Boyd’s request for section
1203.4 relief, the court stated: “Petitioner did not successfully
complete prob[ation]. Pet[itioner] convicted of 115 and sentenced
to state prison.”
Boyd filed a timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Boyd challenges the trial court’s denial of his
petition for relief under section 1203.4. He claims that, because
he did not violate any laws, rules, regulations, or orders of the
court during the term of his probation, the trial court erred in
finding that he had not fulfilled the conditions of probation.
I. Governing law
Section 1203.4 provides, in relevant part, that “[w]hen a
defendant has fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire
period of probation, or has been discharged prior to the
termination of the period of probation, or in any other case in
which a court, in its discretion and the interest of justice,
determines that a defendant should be granted the relief
available under this section, the defendant shall, at any time

4
after the termination of the period of probation . . . be permitted
by the court to withdraw their plea of guilty or plea of nolo
contendere and enter a plea of not guilty; or, if they have been
convicted after a plea of not guilty, the court shall set aside the
verdict of guilty; and, in either case, the court shall thereupon
dismiss the accusations or information against the defendant and
except as noted below, the defendant shall thereafter be released
from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense of
which they have been convicted . . . .” (§ 1203.4, subd. (a).)
“ ‘ “A grant of relief under section 1203.4 is intended to
reward an individual who successfully completes probation by
mitigating some of the consequences of his conviction . . . .” ’ ”
(People v. E.B. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 47, 54.) However, such
relief “ ‘does not, strictly speaking, “expunge” the conviction,
nor render the conviction “a legal nullity.” ’ ” (People v. Tidwell
(2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 212, 217.) Dismissal of a conviction
under section 1203.4 “ ‘merely frees the convicted felon from
certain “penalties and disabilities” of a criminal or like nature.’ ”
(People v. Chavez (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 110, 116.)
Based on the plain language of the statute, courts have
identified three factual scenarios in which a defendant may be
eligible for section 1203.4 relief: (1) where the defendant has
fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire probationary
period; (2) where the defendant has been discharged before the
termination of the probationary period; or (3) where the court, in
its discretion and the interests of justice, determines that the
defendant should be granted relief. (People v. Allen (2019)
41 Cal.App.5th 312, 322; People v. Seymour (2015)
239 Cal.App.4th 1418, 1429–1430 (Seymore).) “If the petitioner
comes within either of the first two scenarios, ‘the court is

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required to grant the requested relief.’ [Citation.] In such cases,
the defendant is entitled to relief ‘as a matter of right’ and
dismissal is mandatory. [Citation.] ‘Under the third scenario,
the court exercises its discretion whether to grant relief in the
interests of justice.’ ” (Seymour, at p. 1430.)
Where the propriety of the trial court’s ruling on a petition
under section 1203.4 “turns on the interpretation of the relevant
statutory provisions, it presents an issue of law, which we review
de novo.” (Seymour, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 1428.)
II. The trial court did not err in denying Boyd’s
section 1203.4 petition
In challenging the denial of his section 1203.4 petition,
Boyd contends the trial court erred in finding that he had not
fulfilled the conditions of probation. Boyd claims the trial court
based its finding on his 2017 conviction in the San Diego case,
even though the conduct underlying that conviction occurred in
2012, and thus, preceded the 2014 probation grant in this case.
Boyd reasons that, because the trial court’s ruling was based on
an erroneous factual finding, this court must reverse the order
denying his petition and remand the matter to the trial court for
further proceedings. We disagree.
In his section 1203.4 petition, Boyd sought relief under the
first scenario—that he fulfilled the conditions of probation for the
entire probationary period. In denying the petition, the trial
court found that Boyd “did not successfully complete prob[ation]”
because he was “convicted of [a violation of section] 115 and
sentenced to state prison.” Boyd argues this statement shows the
trial court erroneously based its denial of his petition on his
conviction in the San Diego case. The Attorney General, on the
other hand, asserts the trial court never stated that the San

6
Diego conviction itself was disqualifying; rather the court found
that Boyd did not successfully complete his probation because he
was in state prison custody in the San Diego case.
In denying Boyd’s petition, the trial court referenced both
his conviction in the San Diego case and his resulting state prison
sentence. As Boyd contends, his conviction for an offense that
was committed prior to the grant of probation in this case did not
itself constitute a violation of the terms of probation. However, a
defendant seeking section 1203.4 relief under the first scenario
must “affirmatively establish that he or she has fulfilled all
probationary conditions” for the entire period of probation.
(People v. Johnson (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 252, 261 (Johnson).)
Where the defendant does not fulfill all conditions of probation
during the probationary term, and probation is terminated early
because a prison term is imposed in another felony case, he or she
is not entitled to relief under section 1203.4. (Johnson, at p. 264.)
Here, Boyd’s probation was revoked and then terminated
before the expiration of his probationary term because he was
sentenced to a four-year prison term for the San Diego offense.
The trial court therefore could find that, regardless of when that
offense occurred, Boyd was not entitled to section 1203.4 relief
because he failed to establish that he fulfilled all conditions of
probation during the entire probationary period. (Johnson,
supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 264.) Yet even if we assume the
trial court based its denial of the petition solely on the mistaken
belief that Boyd committed the San Diego offense while serving
probation in this case, reversal is not required. “[W]e review the
trial court’s ruling, ‘not the court’s reasoning and, if the ruling
was correct on any ground, we affirm.’ ” (People v. Camacho
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 77, 123.)

7
Moreover, as the Attorney General correctly asserts, Boyd
cannot show that he fulfilled the conditions of probation for the
separate reason that, prior to his conviction and sentence in the
San Diego case, he already had committed a violation of
probation in this case. “Qualification for relief under the first
scenario—fulfilling the conditions of probation during the entire
probationary period—requires exactly that: fulfillment of all the
conditions of probation throughout the entire period of probation.
Any violation of any of the probationary terms will disqualify a
probationer from seeking dismissal under the first scenario.”
(People v. Guillen (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 975, 991; see, e.g.,
Seymour, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 1430 [where defendant
admitted two violations of probation, he was not entitled to relief
under the first scenario because “ ‘he clearly could not claim that
he successfully completed each of the terms of his probation’ ”];
People v. Chandler (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 782, 789 [defendant
who failed to pay the full amount of restitution owed during the
probationary period had “not met the statutory requirement of
fulfilling ‘the conditions of his probation for the entire period
thereof’ ”].) In this case, Boyd admitted to violating his probation
in 2016 by lying to his probation officer, and the trial court found
that Boyd was in violation of probation at that time.
Boyd nevertheless claims his 2016 probation violation did
not disqualify him from relief because the trial court decided to
revoke and reinstate his probation under the same terms and
conditions, plus 160 hours of community service. This claim is
unavailing. “[A] decision by the [trial] court, in the exercise of its
discretion, declining to revoke probation despite a violation is not
the same as a determination the defendant fully complied with
all its conditions.” (People v. Covington (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th

8
1263, 1267.) “Even where a defendant’s probation has not been
revoked, relief under [section 1203.4] may be denied absent a
showing that the defendant fulfilled the conditions of probation.”
(Johnson, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 262.) By violating the
terms of his probation in 2016, Boyd became ineligible for relief
under the first scenario regardless of whether the court exercised
its discretion to revoke and then reinstate his probation. Because
the record demonstrates that Boyd did not fulfill the conditions of
probation throughout the entire period of probation, the trial
court properly denied him section 1203.4 relief.
Finally, Boyd argues that, even if he was not entitled to
mandatory relief under section 1203.4, the matter should be
remanded for the trial court to decide whether to exercise its
discretion to dismiss his conviction in the interests of justice.
However, in bringing his section 1203.4 petition, Boyd never
asked the trial court to grant him relief on these grounds, nor did
he submit any evidence showing why it would be in the interests
of justice to do so. Rather, Boyd solely sought mandatory relief
based on his alleged fulfillment of the conditions of probation.
This does not mean Boyd is precluded from seeking discretionary
relief at some point in the future. “[T]he denial of a prior request
for relief under section 1203.4 does not preclude a subsequent
request based upon different facts.” (People v. McLernon (2009)
174 Cal.App.4th 569, 577.) However, on this record, Boyd failed
to establish that he was entitled to section 1203.4 relief. The
trial court accordingly did not err in denying Boyd’s petition.

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DISPOSITION
The order denying the petition for relief under
section 1203.4 is affirmed.

VIRAMONTES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J.

WILEY, J.

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