CourtListener 10306713•In re A.T. CA2/5
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Filed 1/2/25 In re A.T. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re A.T. et al., Persons Coming B334110
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
22CCJP03967C–D)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
A.T.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Lisa A. Brackelmanns, Judge Pro Tempore.
Affirmed.
Liana Serobian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Richard B. Lennon and Nicole Kronberg, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Respondent D.F.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Peter Ferrera,
Principal County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________________
I. INTRODUCTION
Father A.T. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s entry
of a Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 362.4 custody order,
which granted him and mother D.F. (mother) joint legal and
physical custody over the children A.T. (born in 2019) and N.F.
(born in 2020). Father argues that the order, which required that
father’s older child A.T.III, who had sexually abused the
children’s half siblings, not be present during father’s custodial
time, violated father’s constitutional rights. Father also contends
the order, which required that the parents arrange for custodial
time, unlawfully delegated authority to mother to determine his
custody time. We affirm.
1 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
II. BACKGROUND
A. Prior Appeal
The children and A.T.III were the subjects of a prior
appeal, In re A.T.III et al. (July 23, 2024, B330055, B330061)
[nonpub. opn.].) We recite the relevant facts here.2
On February 9, 2023, the Los Angeles County Department
of Children and Family Services (Department) filed an amended
dependency petition, alleging in counts b-4, d-3, and j-4 that
father failed to protect A.T. and N.F. and created a detrimental
home environment by allowing A.T.III to stay in the home and
giving him unlimited access to the two younger children, even
though father knew that A.T.III had sexually abused the
children’s half siblings A.F. (born in 2009) and O.F. (born in
2011).
On June 14, 2023, the juvenile court sustained the counts
against father, released the children to the parents, and ordered
that A.T.III have no unmonitored contact with the children. We
affirmed the orders on appeal. (In re A.T.III et al., supra,
B330055, B330061.)
2 Father requested judicial notice of the prior record in
appeal Nos. B330055 and B330061, which we granted. Father
also requests judicial notice of the record in appeal No. B335027,
concerning A.T.III and juvenile court proceedings occurring after
the events referenced in appeal Nos. B330055 and B330061. We
deny that request.
3
B. Current Appeal
On December 6, 2023, the Department filed a section 364
report, recommending that jurisdiction be terminated and that
the parents be granted joint legal and physical custody with
mother’s home designated as the primary residence. In the
report, the Department indicated that the children stayed with
father on Sundays and Mondays, but otherwise lived with
mother.
On December 13, 2023, the juvenile court held the section
364 hearing regarding the children and their half-siblings. At
that hearing, minors’ counsel requested that A.T.III not be
present when A.T. and N.F. were in father’s custody. Z.R., father
of the half-siblings, requested that the court order “the parents to
arrange for custodial time.” The court responded, “All right.
That should be added.”
Father submitted evidence that he had been enrolled in a
sexual abuse awareness program since September 5, 2023, and
had completed 12 sessions as of December 2023. Father objected
to any order that A.T.III not be present during father’s custodial
time, arguing that unsupervised contact between A.T.III and the
children was appropriate in light of father’s participation in the
sexual abuse awareness program. In father’s view, he had
“gained the tools so that he can protect the minors from any
possible sexual abuse.” In the alternative, father requested an
order that A.T.III be present, but supervised, during father’s
custodial time with the children.
Following argument by the parties, the juvenile court
ordered that jurisdiction over A.T. and N.F. be terminated upon
issuance of the custody order, and adopted the recommendations
4
made by the Department, with a modification that father not
allow A.T.III to be present during father’s custodial time. Father
also requested that he be awarded joint legal and physical
custody and that there be no primary custody designation for the
children.
On December 20, 2023, the juvenile court issued the
custody order granting the parents joint legal and physical
custody. As relevant here, the court also ordered the following:
“1. Parents are to arrange custodial time,” and “2. [A.T.III],
minors’ half-sibling, is not to be present during Father’s custodial
time.” Father timely appealed.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Principles
“Section 362.4 governs the termination of juvenile court
jurisdiction and related orders. The statute authorizes a juvenile
court to make ‘exit orders’ regarding custody and visitation upon
terminating dependency jurisdiction over a child. (See § 362.4,
subd. (a); In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 203; In re
Kenneth S., Jr. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1358.) These exit
orders remain in effect until modified or terminated by a
subsequent order of the superior court. (§ 362.4, subd. (b); see
also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.700.)
“‘[I]n making exit orders, the juvenile court must look at
the best interests of the child.’ (In re John W. (1996) 41
Cal.App.4th 961, 973; see also In re T.S. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th
503, 513 (T.S.) [‘When making a custody determination under
section 362.4, “the court’s focus and primary consideration must
5
always be the best interests of the child[ ]”’], quoting In re
Nicholas H. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 251, 268 (Nicholas H.).) The
court must be guided by the totality of the circumstances and
issue orders that are in the child’s best interests. (In re Chantal
S., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 201; In re Roger S. (1992) 4
Cal.App.4th 25, 30–31.) Because juvenile dependency
proceedings arise when children are subject to or at risk of abuse
or neglect, ‘[t]he presumption of parental fitness that underlies
custody law in the family court just does not apply. . . . Rather
the juvenile court, which has been intimately involved in the
protection of the child, is best situated to make custody
determinations based on the best interests of the child without
any preferences or presumptions.’ (In re Jennifer R. (1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 704, 712 (Jennifer R.); accord, [In re] Chantal S.,
supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 206.)
“‘[T]he juvenile court has broad discretion to make custody
[and visitation] orders when it terminates jurisdiction in a
dependency case (§ 362.4).’ (Nicholas H., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th
at p. 265, fn. 4.) We review the juvenile court’s exit orders for an
abuse of that discretion. (See, e.g., In re Maya L. (2014) 232
Cal.App.4th 81, 102; Jennifer R., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 711;
see also In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.)” (In re
J.M. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 95, 112–113.)
6
B. Analysis
1. Restriction on A.T.III’s Presence During Children’s
Custody Time with Father
Father contends that the custody order violates his rights
to free association and familial association under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
because it prevents him from having all three of his children
present during his custody time. Father cites no legal authority
for his contention.
“‘Appellate briefs must provide argument and legal
authority for the positions taken. “When an appellant fails to
raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned
argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as
waived.”’ [Citation.] ‘We are not bound to develop appellants’
argument for them. [Citation.] The absence of cogent legal
argument or citation to authority allows this court to treat the
contention as waived.’ [Citations.]” (Cahill v. San Diego Gas &
Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956.) Accordingly, we
could reject father’s argument based on forfeiture grounds. Here,
we also reject the argument on its merits. The custody order does
not impermissibly burden father’s right to associate with each of
the three children. (See § 300.2 [purpose of juvenile court law is
to protect the safety and well-being of a child whose parents
either cannot or will not do so, or who themselves pose threat to
the child]; In re J.M., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 112 [“‘the
juvenile court, which has been intimately involved in the
protection of the child, is best situated to make custody
determinations based on the best interests of the child without
7
any preferences or presumptions’”]; In re T.S. (2020) 52
Cal.App.5th 503, 513 [“When making a custody determination
under section 362.4, ‘the court’s focus and primary consideration
must always be the best interests of the child’”].)
To the extent that father’s statement, that “it [was] not in
the children’s best interests to have no contact with their half-
brother during their minority,” can be construed as an argument
that the court abused its discretion in requiring that A.T.III not
be present during father’s custody time with the children, we
reject it. As we explained in our earlier opinion affirming the
court’s jurisdictional orders, “the record supports a finding that
[A.T.III’s] abuse of [the children’s half siblings] was severe,
involving multiple acts of abuse, digital penetration, and
sodomy.” (In re A.T.III et al., supra, B330055, B330061.) There
was substantial evidence that father knew or should have known
of the abuse, yet denied the abuse throughout the juvenile court
proceedings and continued to maintain that it was in the
children’s best interest to let A.T.III have unsupervised contact
with them. On this record, the order requiring that A.T.III not be
present during father’s custodial time with the children was well
within the court’s exercise of discretion.
2. Order Requiring Parents to Arrange Custodial Time
Father next contends that the portion of the exit order
providing that “[p]arents are to arrange custodial time” was “an
unenforceable order in that father would have no way to
complain[ ] to law enforcement if mother did not release the
children to him on certain days” and “also improperly delegated
8
authority over father’s custodial time to mother.” We disagree
with both contentions.
If father’s first contention is a complaint that the juvenile
court should have designated fixed days and times for custody,
father did not request that the court set such a schedule.3 He has
therefore forfeited such an argument on appeal. (In re S.B.
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1294.) If, instead, father complains that
he has no legal remedy in the event mother interferes with his
exercise of his custodial time, we disagree. Exit orders are
subject to modification. (See Heidi S. v. David H. (2016) 1
Cal.App.5th 1150, 1163 [citing § 302, subd. (d); family court may
modify juvenile court’s exit order if it finds “‘there has been a
significant change of circumstances since the juvenile court
issued the order and modification of the order is in the best
interests of the child’”].)
We also disagree with father’s contention that the order
that the “[p]arents are to arrange custodial time” delegated the
setting of father’s custodial time to mother. We do not interpret
the court’s order as permitting mother to set any such time.
Rather, we interpret “arrange” in its ordinary meaning as
requiring the parents “to make preparations” (Merriam-
Webster’s Online Dict. <https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/arrange> [as of Dec. 30, 2024], archived
at <https://perma.cc/J72R-Y9XG>) for custodial time. Father’s
citation to In re T.H. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1119 is inapposite.
There, “the [juvenile] court terminated jurisdiction and granted
joint legal custody to mother and father with physical custody to
3 Father’s counsel objected to mother’s home being the
primary residence of the two children, an issue which father does
not challenge on appeal.
9
mother.” (Id. at p. 1122.) The court granted father supervised
visitation rights, but ordered that such visitation was “to be
determined by the parents.” (Ibid., italics added.) The Court of
Appeal found reversible error, finding that the trial court “abused
its discretion by framing its order in a way that gave mother an
effective veto power over that [visitation] right.” (Id. at pp. 1123–
1124.) Here, however, the juvenile court awarded father joint
physical custody, under which he was entitled to “significant
periods of physical custody.” (Fam. Code, § 3004.) He is
therefore not subject to or limited by a visitation order. Indeed,
prior to entry of the exit order, father and mother had arranged
for custodial time, with father having parenting time on Sundays
and Mondays, and mother having parenting time on the
remaining days of the week. There is no evidence in the record
that the parents cannot continue to arrange custodial time
together. (Cf. In re T.H., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1123–
1124 [mother and father did not get along, and mother wanted
father to have no visitation].)
10
IV. DISPOSITION
The custody order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KIM (D.), J.
I concur:
MOOR, J.
11
In re A.T. et al.
B334110
BAKER, Acting P. J., Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
I agree the juvenile court did not err when including in its
custody order a condition that A.T. and N.F.’s half-sibling is not
to be present during the father’s custodial time. I disagree,
however, that the custody order’s terse language (“[p]arents are
to arrange custodial time”) suffices to avoid an impermissible
delegation of judicial authority. (In re T.H. (2010) 190
Cal.App.4th 1119, 1123; see also In re Kyle E. (2010) 185
Cal.App.4th 1130, 1136; In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d
752, 757.)
BAKER, Acting P. J.
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