People v. Fields CA5

CourtListener 10305692CalctappDec 30, 2024

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Filed 12/30/24 P. v. Fields CA5
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F083476
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. F21900886)
v.

MAURICE LAFAY FIELDS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Monica R.
Diaz, Judge.
Allan E. Junker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Michael A. Canzoneri and
Clifford E. Zall, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Hill, P. J., Poochigian, J. and Peña, J.
This matter is before us on transfer from our Supreme Court for reconsideration in
light of People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730 (Lynch), which settled a division among
courts of appeal on the appropriate standard for assessing prejudice in the context of
noncompliance with the requirements of Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(1), (2),
and (3)1 as modified by Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 567).
In accordance with the direction of the Supreme Court, we have vacated our earlier
decision and permitted supplemental briefing from the parties.
Defendant Maurice Lafay Fields pled no contest pursuant to a plea agreement to
infliction of corporal injury to a cohabitant in exchange for dismissal of other counts and
enhancement allegations. He was sentenced to the upper term of four years’
imprisonment, execution of the term was suspended, and the trial court granted defendant
a term of probation. Defendant later violated probation and the suspended sentence was
executed. In his original briefing in this appeal, he argued he was entitled to resentencing
in light of Senate Bill 567’s changes to section 1170, subdivision (b). After the matter
was transferred by our Supreme Court, defendant’s appellate counsel filed a letter
indicating he did not intend to file a supplemental opening brief. Likewise, the People
have not filed a supplemental brief. Nevertheless, we conclude that defendant’s sentence
must be vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing in light of Lynch because an
upper term sentence was imposed, at least in part, based on aggravating factors not
proved in compliance with section 1170, subdivision (b) and the record contains no clear
indication the trial court would have imposed the same sentence if it understood the new
scope of its discretion.
We vacate defendant’s sentence and remand for full resentencing. In all other
respects, the judgment is affirmed.

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On April 20, 2021, the Fresno County District Attorney filed an information,
charging defendant with false imprisonment (§ 236; count 1), making criminal threats
(§ 422; count 2), inflicting corporal injury to a cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 3),
and human trafficking (§ 236.1, subd. (b); count 4). The information further alleged that
defendant had suffered two prior strike convictions. (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12,
subds. (a)–(d).)
On June 17, 2021, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant pled no
contest to count 3 of the information. In exchange for his no contest plea, the plea
agreement required dismissal of all other counts and allegations and provided a sentence
that included no initial state prison and dismissal of the remaining counts and allegations.
The plea agreement indicated that the trial court could find a factual basis pursuant to
“People v. West”2 and the trial court confirmed that the parties “stipulate[d] … the crime
reports and[/]or the preliminary hearing transcript … would [provide] a factual basis” for
defendant’s plea. After defendant entered his no contest plea, the prosecutor dismissed
the remaining counts and allegations “reserving the right to comment and with a
Harvey[3] waiver.” Prior to the prosecutor’s comment, no mention was made of a Harvey
waiver, defendant was not asked to waive Harvey protections, and the plea agreement
was silent regarding a Harvey waiver.

2 People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595. A West plea is “ ‘a plea of nolo contendere,
not admitting a factual basis for the plea,’ ” which “allows a defendant to plead guilty in
order to take advantage of a plea bargain while still asserting his or her innocence.”
(People v. Rauen (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 421, 424.)
3 People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754. In Harvey, our Supreme Court held that a
trial court may not consider evidence of any crime as to which charges were dismissed as
an aggravating circumstance to support the upper term on any remaining count or counts.
(Id. at p. 758.) “To avoid the Harvey restriction, prosecutors often ‘condition[] their plea
bargains upon the defendant agreeing that the sentencing court may consider the facts
underlying the not-proved or dismissed counts when sentencing on the remainder’ ”—a
so-called “Harvey waiver.” (People v. Munoz (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 160, 167.)

3.
On July 16, 2021, the trial court sentenced defendant to four years’ imprisonment
(the upper term) on count 3. It imposed the upper term based upon its true findings on
the following circumstances in aggravation: “defendant has engaged in violent conduct
which indicates a serious danger to society” (California Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(b)(1))4; “defendant’s prior convictions as an adult or sustained petitions in
juvenile delinquency proceedings are numerous …” (rule 4.421(b)(2)); “defendant has
served a prior term in prison …” (rule 4.421(b)(3)); and “defendant’s prior performance
on probation, … or parole was unsatisfactory” (rule 4.421(b)(5)).5 The court then
suspended execution of the sentence and granted defendant felony probation for a term of
three years.
On October 22, 2021, following a contested violation of probation hearing, the
trial court concluded that defendant violated the terms of his probation. The court
revoked defendant’s probation and imposed the previously suspended four-year term of
imprisonment.
On October 25, 2021, defendant filed a notice of appeal.
On June 20, 2022, this court filed its now-vacated opinion in this case.
On October 3, 2024, our Supreme Court transferred the matter to this court with
directions to vacate our prior opinion and reconsider in light of Lynch. We afforded the
parties the opportunity to submit supplemental briefing. Both declined.

4 All rules references are to the California Rules of Court.
5 To quote the trial court verbatim: “The Court is selecting the aggravated term
based upon the violent conduct that is indicated by the probation report and the serious
danger to society which is indicated by that conduct, the number of prior convictions
[defendant] has suffered, as well as the number of prior prison terms he has served, and
the fact that [defendant’s] prior performance on parole or probation has been
unsatisfactory.”

4.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
Because defendant’s plea was entered pursuant to People v. West, the trial court
relied on the police reports in finding a factual basis. The probation officer summarized
the facts of a police report in defendant’s case.
Defendant was in a sexual relationship with the confidential victim (CV). On
December 14, 2020, at approximately 3:08 a.m., Fresno police officers responded to a
domestic disturbance call involving defendant and CV. CV told officers she had an
active warrant and asked to be arrested. Officers removed CV from defendant and
discovered that she had no active warrant. CV told officers that she was staying at a
friend’s house when defendant told her to come outside and threatened to burn the house
down if she would not comply. She exited the home. Defendant then struck her with a
belt, grabbed her hair, and forced her to his vehicle.
CV also told officers that on December 13, 2021, defendant struck her repeatedly
on her left arm with his closed fist. When she fell to the ground, defendant “stomped”
her right side approximately three times, causing her head to strike the ground and
bruising to her left arm and her ribs.
DISCUSSION
Defendant originally contended that we were required to vacate his sentence and
remand the matter because defendant did not admit, and the trial court did not find true,
the facts underlying the circumstances in aggravation that the trial court relied upon in
imposing the upper term. While he did not submit a supplemental brief after we afforded
him an opportunity to do so, in light of our Supreme Court’s decision in Lynch, we
conclude that the argument presented in his original brief is correct. Moreover, the
record provides no clear indication that the trial court would have exercised its discretion
in the same way had Senate Bill 567 been in effect on the date defendant was sentenced.
From March 30, 2007, to January 1, 2022, California’s determinate sentencing law
specified that “[w]hen a judgment of imprisonment [wa]s to be imposed and the statute

5.
specifie[d] three possible terms, the choice of the appropriate term … rest[ed] within the
sound discretion of the court.” (§ 1170, former subd. (b).)
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill 567 amended section 1170, subdivision (b).
(Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) Section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) now provides, “[t]he court
may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in
aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding
the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by
the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by
the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).) As an exception to the general rule, a
trial court is permitted to rely upon a certified record of conviction to determine prior
convictions without submitting the matter to a jury. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3); see Erlinger v.
United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 838 [“[A] judge may ‘do no more, consistent with the
Sixth Amendment, than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was
convicted of.’ ”].)
In Lynch, our Supreme Court held that where a trial court employed a former
version of section 1170, subdivision (b), and relied on facts not proved in compliance
with section 1170, subdivision (b) to impose the upper term, the sentence must be vacated
and the matter remanded unless we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury
would have found the facts underlying all circumstances in aggravation relied upon by
the trial court true beyond a reasonable doubt. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 742–743,
761.) “In making this determination, we may ‘ “examine[] what the jury necessarily did
find and ask[] whether it would be impossible, on the evidence, for the jury to find that
without also finding the missing fact as well.” [Citations.] …’ We may also find the
omission harmless if we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt ‘that the omitted [fact]
was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence.’ ” (Id. at p. 775, italics
omitted.) Further, because Senate Bill 567 “altered the scope of the trial court’s
discretion,” for sentences imposed under the former version of section 1170,

6.
subdivision (b), “the record must clearly indicate that the court would have found an
upper term justified had it been aware of its more limited discretion.” (Id. at p. 743; see
id. at p. 777 [providing examples of the “kind of definitive statements” that our Supreme
Court has found to clearly indicate a trial court “would not impose a lesser sentence
under any circumstances”].)
Here, the trial court imposed the upper term, in part, “based upon the violent
conduct that is indicated by the probation report and the serious danger to society which
is indicated by that conduct … and the fact that [defendant’s] prior performance on parole
or probation has been unsatisfactory.” Those first and fourth circumstances in
aggravation were not based on facts proved in conformity with section 1170, subdivision
(b)(2) or (3). (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 742–743.)
As to the first circumstance in aggravation found true by the trial court, the
probation report reflects defendant had a lengthy criminal history, including two strike
convictions. However, even if we could find that portion of the aggravating circumstance
true beyond a reasonable doubt—and the record before us does not provide
“overwhelming evidence” for that proposition (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p.775)—we
cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found true beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant’s prior violent conduct presently “indicate[d] a serious
danger to society.” (Rule 4.421(b)(1), italics added.) Our Supreme Court has cautioned
against attempting to determine whether a jury would have found true aggravating
circumstances that require “an imprecise quantitative or comparative evaluation of the
facts.” (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 840.) “[T]o the extent a potential
aggravating circumstance … rests on a somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be
difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been
submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did
the trial court.” (Ibid.) Such is the case here. Whether defendant posed a serious danger
to society is a somewhat subjective inquiry, not capable of precise determination. For

7.
instance, the jury might have concluded that defendant’s use of a belt as a weapon during
the offense or “stomp[ing]” on CV suggested he posed a serious threat to society. Or it
could have determined that because his attack was targeted at a specific person, or
because he was not armed with a deadly weapon, he was not a serious danger to society.
Any conclusion on our part would be speculative.
Because we cannot find the omission of a jury finding harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt as to the second aggravating circumstance, defendant’s sentence must
be vacated and the matter remanded for full resentencing.6 (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 776.) For that reason, we need not address the other unproved aggravating
circumstances. Moreover, our review of the record provides no clear indication that the
trial court would have imposed the upper term in light of the new presumptive middle
term. (Lynch, at p. 777.) For those reasons, we vacate defendant’s sentence and remand
for resentencing.
DISPOSITION
Defendant’s sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded for full resentencing
in conformity with section 1170, subdivision (b). The People may elect to retry the
aggravating facts on remand. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

6 “ ‘ “The proper remedy for this type of failure of proof—where … [aggravating
facts] were ‘never tried’ to the jury—is to remand and give the People an opportunity to
retry” ’ the aggravating facts.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 776.)

8.

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