CourtListener 10305570•People v. Thompson CA2/7
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Filed 12/30/24 P. v. Thompson CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B327730
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A038839)
v.
BILLY THOMPSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Laura L. Laesecke, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
John A. Colucci, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Christopher G.
Sanchez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
__________________________
In 1988 a jury convicted Billy Thompson of first degree
murder and second degree murder. The jury found true a
multiple-murder special circumstance as to the first degree
murder, and a firearm allegation as to the second degree murder.
In 2022 Thompson petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95).1 The superior court
denied the petition, finding Thompson did not establish a prima
facie case for relief. On appeal, Thompson contends the superior
court should have issued an order to show cause as to his first
degree murder conviction only. He maintains the record of
conviction—specifically, the multiple-murder special
circumstance finding and the prosecutor’s closing argument—
does not conclusively refute his allegations in his petition that he
was convicted of first degree murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine and that he could not be
convicted of murder under current law. We reverse the court’s
denial as to his first degree murder conviction and otherwise
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Evidence at Trial, the Verdict, and the Appeal
We provide a summary of the evidence at trial from our
opinion in People v. Thompson (Sept. 25, 1990, B048678)
[nonpub. opn.]:2
1 Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to
section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 We summarize the facts to provide context and background
and do not rely on them in deciding the merits of this appeal.
2
“On May 15, 1985, Ernest Malo died of multiple stab
wounds—75 stab and slashing wounds to the head, neck, torso,
and arms.
“Steven Save, a friend of [Thompson], attended a party in
[Thompson’s] home at 1210 C Street on the night of May 15; he
observed [Thompson] and Malo at the mouth of an alley one
house to the side of [Thompson’s] house, fighting and hitting each
other; while [Thompson] was on top of Malo, Armando Macias,
another friend, came up, pulled a knife out of a sheath and
stabbed Malo in the back four times. Save was not sure who took
Malo down the alley but acknowledged he told police shortly after
the homicide that he saw [Thompson] and Macias take Malo
down the alley; when asked if that was ‘what happened,’ Save
replied, ‘I guess.’ Save left; a couple hours later, [Thompson]
came to his house; asked if he told police that ‘[Thompson] told
[him] couple hours after the incident that Malo was calling
[Thompson’s] name so they had to finish him’[;] Save answered, ‘I
guess,’ then acknowledged ‘that’s what it says on the tape.’
“On May 15, Officer Drouin saw the body of . . . Malo in an
alley toward the rear of 1231 West B Street; there were ‘many,
many stab wounds’ on the body which was covered with a
‘tremendous amount of blood’; he followed a trail of blood leading
from the body, along the intersecting alley to C Street, to
[Thompson’s] house at 1210 C Street.
“. . . On February 11, 1987 Luther [Andrews][3] died of a
gunshot wound to the chest; the gunshot perforated [Andrews’]
heart and both lungs.
3 Although the prior opinion referred to the victim as “Luther
Adams,” we will refer to him as Luther Andrews, the name that
3
“Rosie Sanchez, living with [Thompson] at 1210 C Street on
February 11, saw a red car towards the back of her house early
that morning; Marvin Ford yelled to [Thompson] in the backyard,
‘that guy [Andrews] wanted something, but not to sell him
anything because he thought he was a cop’; she understood the
‘something’ to be narcotics. The man exited the red car waving a
shiny chrome object she ‘thought’ to be a gun; Ford ran away
down the alley and [Thompson], standing from three to five car
lengths away, shot the man once with a .357-caliber handgun:
the man ran, then fell; a bald man, who was also in the red car,
put him back in the car and drove it away; the next day she saw
the car at a nearby liquor store lot.
“On February 11, Officer Wierman saw the body of
[Andrews] in a red car parked in a liquor store lot; there was a
gunshot wound in [Andrews’] left chest; his body lay with the feet
at the door and the head at the car’s console and there was dirt
around as if he had been pulled into the front passenger seat.
There were no weapons with the body. Officer Wierman followed
the sand and mud tracks of the red car to a spot 228 feet south of
C Street where he found a pool of blood, and from there he
followed a trail of blood to a dirt lot almost directly behind
[Thompson’s] house at 1210 C street; at the dirt lot there was a
slipper that matched one worn by [Andrews]; the lot behind
[Thompson’s] house was about three-quarters of a block from
where [Andrews’] body was found.”
In 1988, a jury convicted Thompson of the first degree
murder of Malo (count 2; § 187, subd. (a)), and the second degree
appears in the information, the verdict form, and the trial
transcript.
4
murder of Andrews (count 1; § 187, subd. (a)). The jury also
found true a multiple-murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd.
(a)(3)) as to the first degree murder of Malo, and that Johnson
personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5) as to the second degree
murder of Andrews. The trial court sentenced Johnson to life
without the possibility of parole for the first degree murder plus
15 years to life for the second degree murder and two years for
the firearm allegation. We affirmed the convictions. (People v.
Thompson, supra, B048678.)
B. The Section 1172.6 Proceedings
On January 26, 2022 Thompson filed a petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6 as to both counts 1 and 2. The
superior court appointed counsel for Thompson and set the
matter for further proceedings. The People filed an opposition,
and defense counsel filed a response.
At the prima facie hearing, defense counsel argued
Thompson was eligible for relief because the trial court instructed
the jury with the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
The People responded that “for the jury to have found true the
special circumstance, they had to find that the defendant had the
intent to kill.” The superior court denied the petition, ruling “the
jury specifically found that defendant acted with intent to kill” as
to both counts.
Thompson filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, he
focuses only on the contention that he is eligible for resentencing
as to his conviction on count 2, for first degree murder of Malo.
5
DISCUSSION
A. Relevant Legal Principles
Effective 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)
(SB 1437) eliminated the natural and probable consequences
doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder
(People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 984; People v. Gentile
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843 (Gentile)) and narrowed the
felony-murder rule (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e); see People
v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448-449 (Curiel); People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 957 (Lewis)). Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits
imputing malice based solely on one’s participation in a crime
and requires proof of malice to convict a principal of murder,
except under the revised felony-murder rule in section 189,
subdivision (e). The latter provision now requires the People to
prove that the defendant was the actual killer (§ 189, subd.
(e)(1)); an aider and abettor to murder who had the intent to kill
(§ 189, subd. (e)(2)); or a major participant in an underlying
felony listed in section 189, subdivision (a), who acted with
reckless indifference to human life as described in subdivision (d)
of section 190.2. (§ 189, subd. (e)(3); see Curiel, at p. 448; People
v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 868-869; Strong, at p. 708;
Gentile, at pp. 842-843.)
SB 1437 also provided a procedure (codified in section
1172.6) for “[a] person convicted of felony murder or murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on
that person’s participation in a crime” to petition the superior
court to vacate the conviction and be resentenced on any
6
remaining counts if the petitioner could not now be convicted of
murder because of the changes to sections 188 and 189.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
If a section 1172.6 petition contains all the required
information, the sentencing court must appoint counsel to
represent the petitioner if requested. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A),
(b)(3); see also Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 962-963.) The
prosecutor must then file a response to the petition, the
petitioner may file a reply, and the court must hold a hearing to
determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie
showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c).) If the petitioner makes that showing, the court must
issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether to vacate the murder and resentence the
petitioner on any remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(1).)
In deciding whether a petitioner has made a prima facie
showing for relief under section 1172.6, “ ‘ “the court takes
petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary
assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to
relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court
must issue an order to show cause.” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 971; see Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 460.) The court may
consider the record of conviction, which will “necessarily inform
the trial court’s prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6],
allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit
from those that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis, at p. 971; see
Curiel, at pp. 463-464.) “In reviewing any part of the record of
conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court should not
engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the
7
exercise of discretion.’ ” (Lewis, at p. 972; see People v. Eynon
(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967, 975.)
“Nevertheless, the court may appropriately deny a petition
at the prima facie stage if the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a
matter of law. ‘ “[I]f the record, including the court’s own
documents, ‘contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the
petition,’ then ‘the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner,’ ” ’ thereby deeming the
petitioner ineligible.” (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
45, 52; see Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 460; Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) “We review de novo whether the trial court
conducted a proper inquiry under section 1172.6, subdivision (c).”
(People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251.)
B. Relevant Jury Instructions and the Prosecutor’s Closing
Argument
The trial court instructed the jury with the following
relevant instructions: (1) aiding and abetting (CALJIC Nos. 3.00-
3.01); (2) murder (CALJIC No. 8.10); (3) malice aforethought
(CALJIC 8.11); (4) first degree murder (CALJIC No. 8.20);
(5) second degree murder (CALJIC No. 8.30); and (6) multiple-
murder special circumstance (CALJIC No. 8.80).
As to malice aforethought, the court instructed the jury
with a modified version of CALJIC No. 8.11 (1983 rev.) (4th ed.
1987). The instruction omitted all references to implied malice.
It stated in part: “Malice is express when there is manifested an
intention unlawfully to kill a human being.”
For the first degree murder instruction, the court gave the
1979 version of CALJIC No. 8.20 (1979 rev.) (4th ed. 1979). The
instruction provided in part: “All murder which is perpetrated by
8
any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing with
express malice aforethought is murder of the first degree.”
As to aiding and abetting, the court instructed the jury
with the 1987 version of CALJIC No. 3.00 (1987 rev.) (4th ed.
1987) and the 1984 version of CALJIC No. 3.01 (1984 rev.) (4th
ed. 1987). CALJIC No. 3.00 stated that principals involved in
committing a crime are “equally guilty” and include (1) those who
“directly and actively commit or attempt to commit the act
constituting the crime” or (2) those who “aid and abet the
commission or attempted commission of the crime.” It also
included a bracketed portion that stated, “One who aids and
abets is not only guilty of the particular crimes that to his
knowledge his confederates are contemplating committing, but he
is also liable for the natural and probable consequences of any act
that he knowingly and intentionally aided or encouraged. It is
for you, the jury, to determine whether the defendant is guilty of
the crime allegedly contemplated, and, if so, whether the crime
charged was a natural and probable consequence of the criminal
act knowingly and intentionally encouraged.”
CALJIC No 3.01 stated in part, “A person aids and abets
the commission of a crime when he or she, [¶] (1) with knowledge
of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and [¶] (2) with the
intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the
commission of the offense, by act or advice aids, promotes,
encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.”
As to the multiple-murder special circumstance, the trial
court instructed the jurors with the 1984 version of CALJIC No.
8.80 (1984 rev.) (4th ed. 1987). It stated in part, “If you find the
defendant in this case guilty of murder of the first degree, you
must then determine if murder was committed under the
9
following special circumstance: multiple murder conviction. . . .
If defendant was an aider and abettor but not the actual killer, it
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to
aid in the killing of a human being before you are permitted to
find the alleged special circumstance of that first degree murder
to be true.” The court also instructed the jurors with the People’s
requested jury instruction, which stated in part, “If you find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant in Count II [with
victim Malo] is either the actual killer or an aider or abett[or],
but you are not certain as to which, then you must also find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended either to
kill a human being or to aid another in the killing of a human
being, in order to find the special circumstance to be true. On the
other hand, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was the actual killer, you need not find that the
defendant intended to kill a human being in order to find the
special circumstance to be true.”
During closing argument, the prosecutor argued Thompson
personally killed Andrews: he “pull[ed] out a gun and [shot]”
Andrews in a “kind of quick type of situation.” The prosecutor
also told the jury Thompson had an intent to kill when he shot
Andrews. As the prosecutor stated, “Simply, if I take a gun out
and shoot him, hit him in the chest, he dies, pretty obvious what
my intent is. . . . [T]he intent to kill . . . appears to be obvious.”
The prosecutor then argued the murder of Andrews was a second
degree murder because there was “not enough . . . evidence to
show premeditation and deliberation.”
As to the murder of Malo, the prosecutor said Thompson
“was beating on . . . Malo . . . and while he was beating on . . .
Malo, this person . . . Macias . . . came up, took the knife out of
10
[Thompson’s] . . . shoe [and] stabbed [Malo] about four times.”
Then “[t]hey dragged him to a whole separate area and finished
him off.” Acknowledging there was no direct evidence that
Thompson stabbed Malo to death, the prosecutor argued
Thompson either personally killed Malo or aided and abetted his
murder. The prosecutor stated, “[Y]ou as a juror have to decide
whether or not this defendant was the direct participant, that is,
did he actually do some of the stabbing, or was he an aider and
abettor. . . . So even if you, as a juror, conclude that . . . Macias
did all the stabbing in this case, [Thompson’s] act, by helping
[Macias] carry, drag this poor gentleman down the alley, makes
him an aider and abettor.”
Under either theory of liability, the prosecutor told the jury
Thompson had the intent to kill Malo based on the nature of the
injuries alone: “It’s an obvious intent to kill when you slash
someone’s throat.” Further, the murder of Malo was a first
degree murder, the prosecutor argued, because the murder was
“considered beforehand.” The prosecutor pointed to the following
facts as evidence Malo’s murder was “considered beforehand”:
“they had to walk down a couple of alleyways before they got to
the area where . . . Malo eventually died”; there was 75 stab
wounds; Malo’s throat was slashed; and Thompson said, “We had
to finish him off.”
For the special circumstance, the prosecutor stated, “If you
come to the conclusion as a juror, and you find the facts to be that
when he and this person [Macias] killed . . . Malo, that he was an
aider and abettor, that he did not actually stab or do the killing
directly himself, the law requires you to also find . . . that he had
the intent to kill . . . Malo . . . . It’s pretty obvious what both
persons intend[ed] . . . even if you were not the one that did the
11
stabbing. [¶] The intent to kill . . . is very, very obvious.” The
prosecutor did not refer to the natural and probable consequences
doctrine at any point.
C. Thompson’s First Degree Murder Conviction Is Not Barred
from Relief Under Section 1172.6 as a Matter of Law
Thompson argues the superior court erred in failing to
issue an order to show cause for his first degree murder
conviction for the death of Malo because his conviction did not
require the jury to find he had an intent to kill. We agree. The
jury instructions, verdict forms, and prosecutor’s closing
argument do not conclusively establish that Thompson is
ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law.
1. Thompson Could Have Been Convicted Under the
Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine
The trial court instructed the jury that it could convict
Thompson of first degree murder under either of two theories of
liability: (1) as the actual perpetrator with premeditated and
deliberate express malice; or (2) as an aider and abettor. Of
importance here, the aiding and abetting instructions included
the 1987 version of CALJIC No. 3.00, which stated principals are
“equally guilty.” It also provided in part: “One who aids and
abets is not only guilty of the particular crimes that to his
knowledge his confederates are contemplating committing, but he
is also liable for the natural and probable consequences of any act
that he knowingly and intentionally aided or encouraged.” This
was an instruction on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. (People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 263-264
(Prettyman) [the natural and probable consequences doctrine was
in CALJIC No. 3.00 from 1976 to 1988].) Given these
12
instructions, the jury could have convicted Thompson of first
degree murder based on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. (See Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 838 [until the
Supreme Court decided People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, it
was possible to be convicted of first degree premeditated murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine].)
The verdict forms did not eliminate this possibility. The
forms did not require the jurors to identify the theory under
which they convicted Thompson. Nor did the forms require the
jurors to identify whether Thompson was guilty as a perpetrator
or as an aider and abettor. (See Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 467 [jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder, “but it
was not required to identify which theory it found persuasive”].)
Therefore, it was possible the jury could have found Johnson
guilty of first degree murder as an aider and abettor under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. (See Curiel, at
p. 468 [“The jury could have relied on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine to convict Curiel of murder, and the
findings required under that theory—even when combined with
the finding of intent to kill required by the gang-murder special
circumstance—do not encompass all of the elements of any theory
of murder under current law”]; cf. People v. Coley (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 539, 546 [defendant “was ineligible for
resentencing as a matter of law” because “the jury did not receive
instructions that it could convict [him] based on . . . the natural
and probable consequences doctrine at trial”].)
The People assert the jury was not instructed on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine because “[m]urder
was the target crime.” The record does not support this
assertion. The 1987 version of CALJIC No. 3.00 did not require
13
the trial court to identify a target crime. It was not until 1996 in
Prettyman, supra, 14 Cal.4th 248 that the Supreme Court held
that, when the prosecution relies on the natural and probable
consequences theory of accomplice liability and the evidence
supports an instruction on that theory, the trial court must give
“an instruction describing or defining the elements of the target
crimes.” (Id. at p. 266; see People v. Lopez (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
566, 572, fn. 6 [because the defendant’s trial predated Prettyman,
the “natural and probable consequences jury instruction did not
specify the target crime he was charged with aiding and
abetting”].) Because the target crime was unidentified, the jury
could have “ ‘indulged in unguided speculation’ ”—it could have
found Thompson guilty of first degree murder by finding he aided
and abetted some unspecified crime, such as an assault, and the
natural and probable consequences of that conduct was murder.
(See Prettyman, at p. 266.)
2. The Special Circumstance Finding Does Not
Conclusively Establish Thompson’s Ineligibility
The People argue Thompson is not eligible for resentencing
under section 1172.6 because the multiple-murder special
circumstance instruction required the jury to find Thompson had
the intent to kill Malo. We are not persuaded.
“To find true the multiple-murder special-circumstance
allegation, a jury must find that the defendant has been
convicted of at least two counts of murder, at least one of which
must be first degree murder, and that the defendant either
actually killed or intended to kill at least one of the victims.”
(People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 495, italics
added.) However, our courts “have never held that the multiple-
murder special circumstance requires a jury to find the defendant
14
intended to kill every victim.” (People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th
468, 516, italics added; People v. Holmes, McClain, & Newborn
(2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 785 [“The multiple-murder special
circumstance does not require a finding of intent to kill more
than one victim.”]; People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 892
[“Our state law never has required a jury to find intent to kill
both victims in order for the multiple-murder special
circumstance to be found true.”].) Thus, the true multiple-
murder special-circumstance finding means the jury found that
Thompson intended to kill at least one of the two victims.
However, it does not conclusively establish that he intended to
kill both. Because the trial court instructed the jury on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, in addition to
murder with express malice aforethought, it is possible the jury
could have found Thompson guilty of the first degree murder of
Malo under the natural and probable consequences doctrine and
guilty of the second degree murder of Andrews under a theory
that he was the actual perpetrator with intent to kill. (See e.g.,
People v. Maciel (2013) 57 Cal.4th 482, 521 [the special
circumstance could apply if one conviction was based on actual
killing or harboring express malice and the other conviction was
based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine].)
Thus, the jury instruction on the special circumstance does not
allow us to determine as a matter of law which of the two murder
counts was necessarily based on Thompson harboring express
malice.
15
3. The Prosecutor’s Closing Argument Did Not
Eliminate the Possibility the Jury Convicted Based on
the Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine
The People correctly point out that during closing
arguments pertaining to the murder of Malo, the prosecutor did
not argue the natural and probable consequences doctrine
applied, and focused only on the theories that Thompson was
either the actual killer or a direct aider and abettor who harbored
an intent to kill. The prosecutor further argued that if the jury
believed Thompson was only an aider and abettor to Malo’s
murder, in order to find the multiple-murder special
circumstance true, “the law requires [the jury] to also find . . .
[Thompson] had the intent to kill . . . Malo.” Despite the
prosecutor’s focus on Thompson’s intent to kill Malo, we agree
with the defense that the prosecutor’s closing argument did not
foreclose the possibility that the jury convicted Thompson of the
murder of Malo under a now-invalid theory.
Although the prosecutor argued “the law require[d]” the
jury to find Thompson harbored the intent to kill Malo, “the
theories suggested [by the prosecutor] are not the exclusive
theories that may be considered by the jury.” (People v. Perez
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1126.) Courts “ ‘presume that jurors treat
the court’s instructions as a statement of the law by a judge, and
the prosecutor’s comments as words spoken by an advocate in an
attempt to persuade.’ (People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663,
fn. 8.) ‘[P]rosecutorial commentary should not be given undue
weight in analyzing how a reasonable jury understood . . .
instructions. Juries are warned in advance that counsel’s
remarks are mere argument, missteps can be challenged when
they occur, and juries generally understand that counsel’s
16
assertions are the “statements of advocates.” Thus, argument
should “not be judged as having the same force as an instruction
from the court.” ’ ” (People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101, 131;
see People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 676 [“ ‘[w]hen
argument runs counter to instructions given a jury, we will
ordinarily conclude that the jury followed the latter and
disregarded the former’ ”].)
Here, the trial court also instructed the jury with CALJIC
No. 1.00, which provided, in relevant part: “Your . . . duty is to
apply the rules of law that I state to you to the facts as you
determine them and in this way to arrive at your verdict. [¶] It
is my duty in these instructions to explain to you the rules of law
that apply to this case. You must accept and follow the rules of
law as I state them to you.” Because the trial court then
instructed the jury with the now-invalid natural and probable
consequences theory, we cannot conclusively rule out, based
solely on the prosecutor’s argument, that the jury convicted
Thompson on a natural and probable consequences theory that
did not require an intent to kill Malo. (See People v. Lee (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1188-1190 [although prosecutor proceeded
solely on theory that defendant personally committed a
provocative act, with no suggestion defendant was liable because
of a provocative act committed by someone else, court was unable
to conclude prosecutor’s closing argument “overrode” the now-
invalid jury instructions]; cf. People v. James (2000)
81 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1365, fn. 10 [“We do not consider comments
by counsel during closing argument to determine whether the
error in the instruction was cured. The jurors were told that if
anything counsel said conflicted with the court’s instructions,
they must follow the instructions. (CALJIC No. 1.00.)”].)
17
DISPOSITION
The order denying Thompson’s petition under section
1172.6 is reversed. The superior court is directed to issue an
order to show cause and conduct further proceedings under
section 1172.6 on the first degree murder conviction and deny
Thompson’s petition with respect to his second degree murder
conviction.
STONE, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
SEGAL, J.
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